Pastine, Tuvana and Pastine, Ivan
Political Campaign Spending Limits.
Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent’s
ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have
superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we
show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has an
initial voter disposition advantage, however small and regardless of the
candidates’ relative fundraising ability. If the challenger has higher campaign
spending effectiveness, the effect of limits may be non-monotonic. If the
incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage, a moderate limit
benefits the challenger. Further restricting the limit favours the incumbent.
Stricter limits may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected
||Campaign Finance Legislation, Spending Cap, Expenditure
Limit, Incumbency Advantage, Efficiency in Fundraising, Effectiveness of
Campaign Spending, Initial Voter Disposition, All Pay Auction, Contest,
Preferential Treatment Auction.
||Social Sciences > Economics
Ms Sandra Doherty
||06 Sep 2010 08:51
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