



NUI MAYNOOTH

Cliaicéil na hÉireann Má Nuad

**FROM IRISH WHIG REBEL TO BOURBON DIPLOMAT: THE LIFE
AND CAREER OF NATHANIEL HOOKE (1664-1738)**

by

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
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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

The abbreviations used in the text adhere to those listed in ‘Rules for contributors’ in *Irish Historical Studies*, supp. 1 (1968) and the revised ‘Rules for contributors’ in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxiii, no. 131 (May, 2003). The following additions have been made:

A.A.E.	Archives des Affaires Étrangères (Paris)
CP	Correspondence Politique
MD	Mémoires et Documents
TNA	The National Archives (London)

References to calendar years and dates also follow *I.H.S* rules.

All translations are the author’s own.

INTRODUCTION

‘A tall personable Irishman, who speaks good English, somewhat brownish [...], slender, his face somewhat ruddy, at least sometimes, with a long dusky periwig hanging commonly behind his shoulders, [...] somewhat of the smallpox in his face, his visage long [and] his garb and gate a little too antick’,¹ Nathaniel Hooke was described in 1718 as ‘certainly as cunning and as designing a fellow as any in Europe.’²

Alteration and adaptation were the defining hallmarks of Hooke’s life and the period in which he lived. When he was born in Dublin in 1664, England was one of Europe’s weaker states. In 1738 when he died, Britain was a great power. In this period of change, Hooke’s own life and career were markedly fluid. Raised in a stoutly Protestant family with strong Cromwellian connections, Hooke first mutated from a non-conformist clergyman and Whig rebel in 1680s England, via service to James II, into an exile and Catholic convert. Then he metamorphosised again, into another role as a trusted and reliable soldier, diplomat, intelligence analyst and geopolitical strategic advisor in the service of Louis XIV.

As a study of such a fluid life and diverse career, this thesis also necessarily evolved and transformed. The project was initially conceived as a biography of an Irish Jacobite exile. Existing references to Hooke in John Cornelius O’Callaghan’s (1805-1883) *History of the Irish Brigades in the service of France* and Richard Hayes’ (1882-1958) *Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen*

¹ Fr. Ambrose Grymes to Bevil Skelton, English envoy in Holland, Brussels, 1 July 1685 (B. L., Add. 41817 f. 199).

² Major Simon Fraser to Brigadier Colin Campbell of Glendarule, June 1718, H.M.C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers belonging to his Majesty the King preserved at Windsor Castle* (7 vols, London, 1904-23), vi, (London, 1916), 550.

in France emphasised his Jacobitism, his Catholicism and his military career.³ These works were very much of their time and reflected the prevailing preoccupations of Irish historiography.⁴ O'Callaghan made no mention of Hooke's family origins or life before Jacobitism. In the same vein, Hayes made only a brief reference to Hooke's time in Trinity College Dublin before stressing that he 'left soon afterwards, became an enthusiastic Jacobite and reverted to Catholicism, the religion of his immediate forbears.'⁵ However, as early as 1855, Hooke's descendant, Noel Hooke Robinson, had begun to explore his family history. By dint of his private research and a series of questions and answers in *Notes and Queries* he was able to collect information on Hooke's activities.⁶

His findings, despite their incompleteness, some inaccuracies and not a few misinterpretations, provided the basis of a fuller treatment of Hooke's life by William Dunn Macray (1826-1916). Macray, a librarian in the Bodleian Library, investigated Hooke's life and career while preparing an edition of some of

³ J. C. O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish brigades in the service of France from the revolution in Great Britain and Ireland under James II., to the revolution in France under Louis XVI* (Glasgow, 1870), pp 329-30; Richard Hayes, *Biographical dictionary of Irishmen in France* (Dublin, 1949), pp 127-28.

⁴ Politics and history were closely intertwined. O'Callaghan joined the staff of the *Nation* newspaper in 1842. He was a strong supporter of Daniel O'Connell's campaign to repeal the Anglo-Irish Act of Union. The fact that O'Connell's uncle, Count Daniel O'Connell (1745-1833), had been the last colonel of the Irish Brigade in France may have inspired O'Callaghan's interest in the Irish regiments. Contemporary events also coloured Richard Hayes historical perspective. Born in Bruree, Co. Limerick, an area marked by land agitation, boycotts and evictions, he was a boyhood friend of Éamon de Valera. He became active in the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and was jailed for his role in the 1916 Rising. He was elected a member of the first Dáil in 1919.

⁵ Hayes, *Biographical dictionary*, p. 127.

⁶ See *Notes and Queries: a medium of inter-communication for literary men, artists, antiquaries, genealogists, etc.*, xii, no. 322 (29 Dec., 1855), p. 509; *ibid.*, 2nd series, vii, no. 175 (7 May, 1859), p. 375; *ibid.*, 2nd series, viii, no. 183 (2 July, 1859), p. 11; *ibid.*, 2nd series, ix, no. 231 (2 June, 1860), p. 427; *ibid.*, 2nd series, ix, no. 233 (16 June, 1859), pp 466-68; *ibid.*, 2nd series, x, no. 236 (7 July, 1860), p. 19; *ibid.*, 2nd series, no. 239 (28 July, 1860), p. 61; *ibid.*, 2nd series, xi, no. 265 (6 Jan., 1861), p. 75; *ibid.*, 2nd series, xi, no. 270 (2 Mar., 1861), p. 177; *ibid.*, 4th series, i, no. 1 (25 Jan., 1868), p. 1.

Hooke's correspondence from original manuscripts held in the Bodleian.⁷ Macray's main focus was to use the documents to shed light on British history and the work concentrated on the attempted French expedition to Scotland in 1708. He did, though, give a brief overview of Hooke's family history, early life and education, a synopsis which was largely accurate, although containing a small number of factual errors. The papers in the Bodleian contained documents written by and to Hooke from 1703 to 1712, but the great majority of the source material covered the period of Hooke's involvement with Scottish affairs from 1703 to 1707: hence the work's title. The *DNB* article on Hooke in 1891 drew in large measure on Macray's introductory preface in this work.⁸ Very noticeably, Richard Hayes' entry on Hooke in his 1949 *Biographical Dictionary of Irishmen in France*, while drawing on the *DNB* article which references Macray's work, studiously refrained from referring to the Hooke family's Protestantism and Cromwellian connections.

Macray's scholarship and thoroughness were impressive. Despite his best efforts, however, there were a number of limitations to his work. Travel to far-flung archives was arduous and access to many private collections difficult to negotiate. The creation of comprehensive catalogues, calendars and guides and centralised repositories was a slowly unfolding process. Macray did his best to

⁷ *The Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke, agent from the court of France to the Scottish Jacobites, in the years 1703-1707*, ed. W. D. Macray, (2 vols, London, 1870). This was based on MSS D 26, a portion of Nathaniel Hooke's correspondence relating to the Scottish expedition of 1708, and a brief report on his mission to Saxony in 1711-12. The Saxon material was not included in the published work.

⁸ Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, (eds), *Dictionary of National Biography: from the earliest times to 1900* (63 vols, London, 1885-1900), xxvii (1891), pp 281-282. Equally the revised article on Hooke in the new edition of the *DNB* is substantially the same as its predecessor. See H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: from the earliest times to the year 2000* (60 vols, Oxford, 2004), xxvii, 949-50. Also available electronically at www.oxforddnb.com.

overcome the difficulties he faced in Britain. Abroad however, he faced insurmountable problems. He corresponded with French archives, noting access was carefully controlled. Succeeding in obtaining a list of some manuscript materials related to aspects of Hooke's career, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 rendered further progress impossible before the work went to press. Macray's *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, although incomplete, thereafter remained the standard work on Hooke. What was essentially a snapshot of a portion of Hooke's career and a constricted view of his life and character became fixed in the historical record as the fullest account of his complex career.

Access to the documents which Macray was unable to obtain led to a radical alteration in the shape and scope of this project. The two volumes of correspondence published by Macray, containing over 1000 letters covering a core period of five years of Hooke's career, were originally envisaged as the most important source for this project, which intended to examine Hooke's Jacobitism and his (military) role in the Scottish expedition of 1708. O'Callaghan, Macray, the *DNB* and Hayes, had all highlighted Hooke's Jacobitism and Scotland as the mainstay of his career.

A closer examination of the published correspondence and research in the Bodleian Library raised questions about the range of Hooke's activities and the nature of the role which he played. Received opinion increasingly appeared to underestimate and misjudge the man and his career. The unpublished manuscript detailing Hooke's mission to the Saxon court in 1711/12, only of passing interest to Macray's project, in particular suggested that there was more to Hooke than existing accounts indicated. Combining detailed information on, and analysis of,

the personalities and politics of the Saxon court with a broad ranging overview of European geopolitics, this correspondence was addressed to the French Foreign Secretary, Jean Baptiste Colbert, the marquis de Torcy, at Versailles; the paper was annotated in the margin by Hooke, himself, indicating that it had been read in council before Louis XIV. Presenting such a report for the personal consideration of the French king suggested that Hooke's life and career were indeed more complex and significant than previously understood. He was not just a Jacobite but an important figure in the theory and practice of French diplomacy and geopolitical strategy. Therefore he required, and was worthy of, a deeper and broader reconsideration and reinterpretation.

An important question to ask was why Hooke, a significant figure in the formulation and implementation of French foreign policy, had not yet been the subject of in-depth research. Professionally, as a political activist, clergyman, exiled dissident, rebel, royal messenger, soldier, covert emissary, intelligence agent, political analyst, strategic advisor, military planner, secret envoy and diplomat he was involved in an impressive array of important events in British and European history such as Monmouth's rebellion, the Glorious Revolution and the War of Spanish Succession; personally he led a remarkably varied life and career, being at different times Protestant and Catholic (and later accused of having no religion), Whig, Jacobite and adherent of Louis XIV, Irish-born of English heritage but dying a naturalised Frenchman. Thus a study of Hooke appeared to offer a uniquely rich and rewarding vein of insight and understanding at a personal level, of migration, strategies for survival and identity and transformation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, while at the

same time linking this individual experience with the broader unfolding of history by casting valuable light on workings of geopolitics, diplomacy and international relations. However despite this promising potential, Hooke as a topic of investigation and analysis had, so far, been overlooked. Why was this? Was it merely neglect and oversight or were there practical historiographical reasons why Hooke had remained unexamined? That is to say, were sufficient primary materials at hand and accessible for such a study and would they provide enough evidence to allow worthwhile conclusions to be made?

The history of how and why some of Hooke's manuscripts reached the Bodleian Library provided some answers but also raised more questions about Hooke and the nature of the project. It soon became apparent that little about Hooke, personally or historiographically, was uncomplicated. A short time after his death in 1738, his private papers had been seized by an officer of the French Court. His grand nephew, Luke Joseph Hooke (1714-1796)⁹ who had had possession of the papers, had managed to hide, and then smuggle to relatives in England, the documents that eventually came to be deposited in the Bodleian. Why had the French government believed it necessary to impound his papers? Did some or all of these confiscated papers still exist and could they be accessed to answer some of the growing questions about Hooke?

A report by Armand Baschet on documents relating to British history in French archives mentioned Hooke in connection with manuscripts in the Archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.¹⁰ Some of these documents matched the list

⁹ See Thomas O'Connor, *An Irish theologian in Enlightenment France: Luke Joseph Hooke, 1714-1796* (Dublin, 1995).

¹⁰ Armand Baschet, 'Report upon documents in French archives relating to British history', in *The thirty-sixth annual report of the deputy keeper of the public records* (1875, London), pp 230-58.

Macray had been supplied with in 1870 but others were mentioned for the first time. My research in the archives eventually led to the discovery of a sequence of manuscripts relating to Hooke's career from 1701 to 1712 in Holland, Germany, Scotland, and Saxony. Despite Macray being aware of at least some of this evidence it had been almost entirely neglected in investigations and assessments of Hooke's life and career.¹¹ Among these were original dispatches with some sensitive sections in numeric code. In most cases these were followed by decoded copies prepared for de Torcy by his officials. Frequently a number of Hooke's individual letters have been grouped together in one document. He also wrote a number of briefing papers for de Torcy on the general European geopolitical situation just prior to the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession. In these documents Hooke recommended strategies to protect and enhance French diplomatic and commercial interests. In the case of Holland and Scotland, Hooke was assigned the task of putting his suggested policy into practice. Other documents shedding light on Hooke and his career were found in archives in Dublin, London, Paris and Dresden. Together, these sources created a very different impression of Hooke's role, activities and influence than that traditionally available.

While it was now clear that a significant body of source material existed on Hooke, the scattered and fragmented nature of the evidence provided another reason why Hooke had been neglected in the historical record. The study, for the first time, of these variously located archival materials as a unified body of sources held the promise of providing a valuable insight into Hooke's world and

¹¹ John S. Gibson's excellent *Playing the Scottish card: the Franco-Jacobite invasion of 1708* (Edinburgh, 1988) used a small number of these original documents to cast light on the failure of the expedition in that year.

important aspects of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century European history. Examination of the documents confirmed that Hooke had played a significant and substantial role in advising the marquis de Torcy on French foreign policy during the War of Spanish Succession. Allied with his practical activities as an intelligence agent, it was now apparent that Hooke had also been an acute and incisive theoretician of political strategy.

Hooke's particular experience and knowledge of international politics and economics derived from his time in England, The Netherlands and France. Thus he had the unique advantage of being in a position to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of the different jurisdictions. He was able, through his own skill and abilities, to position himself as the ideal person to act for the French as a sort of diplomatic and political 'consultant', comparable to a modern intelligence analyst, concerning the motivation and intentions of the English, the main threat to French security at the time. A British observer commented that 'really, the French are ignorant in our manners and customs, and want to be set right in a great many things'.¹² He recognised Nathaniel Hooke as the prime example of a man who was able to perform this role because 'he knows perfectly the routine of affairs here, has a head turned to business and of great application, and knows a great deal of the constitution of England.'¹³

Hooke's written analyses, in a series of lengthy 'memoires' drawn up for, and at the behest of the marquis de Torcy, detailed and explained the internal political systems of England, and to a lesser degree, The Netherlands, interpreted

¹² General George Hamilton to the duke of Mar, Paris, 21 Nov. 1717, H.M.C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers belonging to his Majesty the King preserved at Windsor Castle* (7 vols, London, 1904-23), v, (London, 1912), 220.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

the meaning and likely affects of significant events for France and French military and diplomatic policy and commented on European geopolitics in the context of worldwide trade and commerce. This crucial aspect of Hooke's career has until now been completely overlooked and unexplored.

The discovery and subsequent evaluation of these documents brought about particular challenges. In practical terms it necessitated the reorientation of the scope and emphasis of the thesis to accommodate a broader study concerned with political, diplomatic and intelligence history. The sources themselves also required careful handling. As Alan Haynes remarks in his *The Elizabethan secret services*, 'ideas of historical scholarship and polite truth do not sit easily with mendacity, betrayal, apostacy, double-dealing, false witness, torture and execution.'¹⁴

The practitioners of history and the gathers of intelligence do, however, have much in common. Both seek out information and evidence with a view to interpretation and understanding 'of meanings in people's writings and other significant behaviour' and 'in particular the weighing, sifting, and tying together of intelligence data resembles the analysis that goes into the writing of history.'¹⁵ Equally, 'for intelligence purposes, as for historical study, it is necessary to gauge the quality of the source material – the access of its authors to the relevant information, the temporal closeness of the record to the event, the established pattern of the authors for veracity or fabrication, their motivation or bias, the

¹⁴ Alan Haynes, *The Elizabethan secret services* (Stroud, 2004), p. v. Yves Martial, in the preface to a collection of conference papers on diplomatic relations between France and the Netherlands, comments that some of the real activities related in the accounts can often outdo events usually 'confined to espionage novels'. See W. Frijhoff and O. Moorman van Kappen (eds), *Les Pays-Bas et la France des Guerres de Religion a la création de la République Batave* (Nijmegen, 1993), p. viii.

¹⁵ E. W. Bennett, 'Intelligence and history from the other side of the hill' in *The Journal of Modern History*, lx (June, 1988), p. 313.

limits of their perspective.’¹⁶ Neither intelligence agents nor historians can be sure of having all of the relevant material to hand nor claim that the result of their work is infallible. Historians and intelligence analysts both ‘try to understand the action of inaccessible people, but this takes research, imagination, and self restraint, and of course never wholly succeeds.’¹⁷ This close linkage between history and intelligence is readily apparent in Hooke’s writings, in style, structure and content.

Not coincidentally Hooke included numerous historical references in support of his judgements in his analytic reports. This makes his reports doubly interesting, as they not only comment on current events but attempt to explain how these came to pass. For instance in assessing the makeup of the political spectrum in England for de Torcy in 1702, Hooke delved back into events since the reign of Charles II to account for the evolution of the parties since that date.¹⁸ Hooke summed up why he saw the past as useful by saying that ‘one can only judge the genius of a people by their past conduct, and while their inclinations, their maxims, and the reasons for these maxims continue to subsist, one can reckon that they will take after the same behaviour.’¹⁹ What makes Hooke’s testimony especially valuable is the fact that he was not only a direct witness who lived through all of these events of the period but a participant, albeit minor, in many of them, with personal connections to some of the leading characters in later Stuart politics and Bourbon diplomacy. Of course Hooke was relating this information some twenty years after the fact and the vagaries of the human

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 313.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See for example Nathaniel Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702, (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 146r).

¹⁹ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702, (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 164r).

memory inevitably must be borne in mind. However, Hooke amassed the collection of papers that were seized after his death precisely to aid his own recall and avoid the pitfalls of inaccurate recollection. It appears that he may have intended to use this collection in the preparation of his memoirs.²⁰ Although many of these papers are now missing, Hooke makes it clear in his writings that he drew on documentary evidence when drafting many of his reports. He had a vested interest in being accurate – the reliability of his written work determined the success of his career in French service.

Hooke's writings are almost exclusively 'official papers', reports, analyses, dispatches and related correspondence. The usefulness of records such as these in researching and writing history and biography has been debated.²¹ However, John C. Rule has demonstrated quite explicitly how revealing this type of source can be: appropriately he did this in an article exploring the education and career of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy - Hooke's superior and patron.²² As in Hooke's case, sources for de Torcy's life were uneven and required the close reading of 'an avalanche of official documents.'²³ Rule goes on to write that the 'wealth of material that can be drawn from the so-called official documents [...] demonstrates' that much can be learned from these sources and

²⁰ A number of Hooke's papers located in the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs are annotated with later clarifications, additions and corrections in his own hand, indicating that they were originally among the personal documents seized after his death. These notes appear to have been made as Hooke was trying to sort his papers, perhaps with memoirs in mind. His nephew, also Nathaniel Hooke (d. 1763), the author of a celebrated history of Rome, was the likely editor of an edition of some of Hooke's documents published anonymously at The Hague in 1758, *Revolutions d'Ecosse et d'Irlande en 1707, 1708 et 1709* (The Hague, 1758).

²¹ On this point see A. Lloyd Moote, 'Introduction; new bottles and new wine: the current state of early modernist biographical writing' in *French Historical Studies*, xviii, no. 4, Special Issue: Biography (Autumn, 1996), pp 911-926. On the more general issue of history and biography see Lloyd E. Ambrosius (ed.), *Writing biography: historians and their craft* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 2004).

²² See J. C. Rule, 'A career in the making: the education of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy' in *French Historical Studies*, xviii, no. 4 (Autumn, 1996), pp 967-996.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 967.

that they can provide valuable and informative evidence for the historian.²⁴ Liam Chambers in his examination of the life and writings of another Irishman in Europe during this period, Michael Moore (1639-1726), whose apparent paucity of primary sources had long appeared to rule out the possibility of an in-depth study, also stresses the point that ‘a surviving collection of personal papers, while obviously advantageous, is not fundamental to the reconstruction of a person’s life and work.’²⁵ This thesis too, aims to shed light on an elusive Irishman, Nathaniel Hooke and in doing so, work towards a deeper understanding of the Irish exile experience in Europe more generally.

Chapter one examines and reassesses Hooke’s origins, family background and early life in Ireland, explores his own efforts to refashion his identity and considers how the theme of identity and Irishness was dealt with in later publications. Chapter two looks at his involvement with radical politics in England, culminating in participation in Monmouth’s Rebellion. Chapter three outlines Hooke’s exile to The Netherlands and then examines his surrender and shift of loyalties to James II. These three chapters chart the essential background to Chapter four which details the beginnings of his career in French service. Chapters five and six look at his mission to The Netherlands in 1702, a mission which was both a testing ground for Hooke and vitally important for the formation of French foreign and military policy at the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession. Chapter seven reconsiders Hooke’s role in the conception, planning and execution of the 1708 expedition to Scotland and places it within context of

²⁴ Ibid., p. 988.

²⁵ Liam Chambers, ‘The life and writings of Michael Moore (c. 1639-1726)’, (Ph.D thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2001), p. 4. See also Liam Chambers, *Michael Moore (c. 1639-1726): the world of an Irish clerical immigrant* (Dublin, 2004).

the wider geopolitical strategies devised by Hooke on behalf of the French. Chapter eight explores his diplomatic mission to negotiate with Augustus of Saxony in 1711 and details Hooke's life and fortunes in his later years, after his retirement from active affairs until his death on 25 October 1738. The conclusion highlights Hooke's significance as a man who broke the Jacobite mould to become an excellent example of a career diplomat. In a period where the conduct of France's foreign relations was pivotal to its interests and security, Hooke played a significant role in the conception and initiation of policy and his ability to conceive and implement peace policies and conceive realistic geopolitical strategies made him extremely useful and valuable to de Torcy, and to Louis XIV's France.

CHAPTER 1: THE HOOKE FAMILY AND IRELAND

Nathaniel Hooke was born in 1664 at Corballis House in Co. Dublin.¹ He was the third son of John and Margaret Hooke. John Hooke, a nonconformist clergyman since his ejection from the Anglican Church in 1662, was a scion of a prosperous Dublin merchant family, who had moved to Drogheda in the 1650s. Margaret Hooke (*née* Hooke) was English by birth, with documentary sources indicating both Gloucestershire and Hampshire as the county of origin.² It is likely that Nathaniel's parents were related. Nathaniel's grandfather, Thomas Hooke (c.1590-1670), was a merchant who had strong links with the Cromwellian regime in the 1650s. He was elected mayor of Dublin in 1654.³

Tracing the origin of the Hooke family in Ireland is problematic. William Dunn Macray, the editor of Hooke's papers, interpreted references in naturalisation papers of the Hooke family in France as pointing toward a link with a senior branch of the English family located in Gloucestershire.⁴ This was based on the arms claimed for the family in the naturalisation papers. However the

¹ Thomas Hooke to James Butler, duke of Ormond, 18 May 1666, (Bodleian Library [hereafter Bodl.] Carte Ms. 154, 78v). Thomas Hooke (15??-1670) was a successful merchant and significant figure in Dublin politics from the 1640s until his death. Corballis House, where Nathaniel was born, came into his possession as part of the Cromwellian land settlement. Following the restoration of Charles II in 1660 his ownership of the house, along with much of the rest of the land he had acquired, was contested. In 1666 Hooke was eventually forced to relinquish Corballis House, but not before receiving permission from Lord Deputy Ormond to remove 'certain fittings put up by the petitioner.' In a strange twist of history, and rather fittingly given Nathaniel Hooke's propensity for travel, Corballis House is located today adjacent to the Arrivals and Departures building of Dublin Airport. (I would like to thank Mr Thomas Doyle for this reference in the Carte Manuscripts). See also J. A. Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses: a biographical list of all known students, graduates and holders of office at the University of Cambridge, from the earliest times to 1900* (Cambridge 1922), part I, vol. II.

² *The Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke, agent from the court of France to the Scottish Jacobites, in the years 1703-1707*, ed. W. D. Macray, (2 vols, London, 1870), ii, p. ix. Contacts with the County Record Offices in question, while producing a number of possible candidates for a Margaret Hooke, were unable to confirm either claim.

actual arms born by the Irish Hookes more closely approximated to those of a Hooke family of Hampshire.⁵ Macray included a family tree for the Alway branch of the Hookes in Gloucestershire with an alleged connection to Longford, Ireland. This overlooked the more likely choice of Longford, Gloucestershire, in an attempt to establish an Irish connection. Much of what exists relating to the Hookes' migration to Ireland is therefore based on circumstantial evidence.

Direct testimony from Nathaniel Hooke informs the naturalisation papers submitted for registration in the *Chambre des Comptes* in January 1706. This document traced the origins of the Hookes back to the Norman invasion of England in 1066. Eustache de la Hougue was one of the knights of William the conqueror's invasion force. In 1172 his descendant Florence de la Hougue allegedly accompanied Henry II to Ireland, established themselves near Waterford, anglicising their name to Hooke. The town which they founded was called Hooke-Town, but unfortunately, (if perhaps conveniently), this bourg had been eventually inundated by the ocean. The only remaining remnant of the settlement was the family chateau, still bearing the name of Hooke Castle. The document then skips directly to Nathaniel Hooke and refers to frequent marriage alliances between the Irish family and the senior branch in England, citing Margaret Hooke as an example.⁶

³ J. T. Gilbert, *Calendar of the ancient records of Dublin, in the possession of the municipal corporation of that city* (18 vols, Dublin, 1889-1922), iv, 61-61.

⁴ *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, p. x.

⁵ I am grateful to Mr. C. E. A. Cheesman, Rouge Dragon Pursuivant of the College of Arms, London, for supplying very valuable and detailed information in relation to the genealogy and arms of the Hooke families in England. Personal Communication, 9 Dec. 2004.

⁶ Hooke family genealogy (Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS Dossiers Bleus 59, f. 9351); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, p. ix. Eustace de la Hougue may have been one of William's followers in 1066. However the Hooke's claimed connection is 'a typical piece of sixteenth or seventeenth century bogus genealogy, involving the anachronistic use of surnames of a sort that only developed much later...It seems likely the Hookes of Hooke Town and Hooke

A pedigree of the family contained in a French genealogical guide⁷ draws on and echoes much of the account given in the naturalisation document. Intriguingly however it then proceeds to add new information fleshing out the rather skeletal family tree presented in the original source with a much more detailed genealogy. In this version we learn of the same claimed descent from Eustache de la Hougue's arrival in England, to Florence de la Hougue's journey to Ireland. From this point it vaults four centuries to arrive at another Eustache Hooke, of Hooke Castle, County Waterford. His existence is unconfirmed by other documentation. He is said to have lived c. 1590s and to have been married to Helen O'Byrne of County Wicklow. His son is named as Thomas Hooke (of Hooke Castle), who married Eleanor O'Kelly from Aughrim in County Galway (or possibly of Aughrim, County Wicklow). Partial veracity of the document is confirmed by the inclusion of Thomas Hooke, Nathaniel's grandfather. Independent documentation confirms his existence, though not his place of birth, and the feasibility of his being born in 1590s.⁸ There is no evidence connecting him with Hooke Castle. It is interesting to note that both of these early Hookes are claimed to have married women from prominent Gaelic Irish families.⁹ Such a

Castle invented their own ancestor Florence to tack on to the Eustace provided by the earlier version', Mr C. E. A. Cheesman, Rouge Dragon Pursuivant, Personal Communication, 9 Dec. 2004.

⁷ Nicholas de Saint-Allais, *Nobiliaire universel de France ou recueil général des généalogies historiques des maisons nobles de ce royaume* (Paris, 1872), pp 19-22.

⁸ The will of Thomas Hooke, Alderman, was proven in 1672, see the *Twenty-sixth report of the deputy keeper of the public records and keeper of the state papers in Ireland* (Dublin, 1894), p. 428. A will for an Alderman Thomas Cooke, undated, is recorded in the Index of Will Abstracts held by the Genealogical Office, see P. Beryl Eustace, 'Index of will abstracts in the Genealogical Office, Dublin', in *Guide to the Genealogical Office Dublin* (Dublin, 1998), p. 145. Confusion between Hooke and Cooke is not unlikely and Thomas Hooke was indeed incorrectly recorded as Thomas Cooke in the Civil Survey of 1654, see R. C. Simington (ed.), *The Civil Survey 1654-56: volume vii, county of Dublin* (Dublin, 1945), p. xxii.

⁹ Certain branches of the O'Byrnes did actually establish social and cultural links with the English of Pale during the late 1500s. See Colm Lennon, *Sixteenth century Ireland: the incomplete conquest* (Dublin, 1994), p. 194.

connection with Gaelic nobility would have served Nathaniel Hooke's purpose by strengthening his claim to noble status in French eyes. It may also have gained him greater acceptance in Irish *émigré* circles in Paris. Significantly Hooke made no mention of his grandfather being mayor of Dublin. While this would have testified to the family's status, it would also have highlighted unwelcome links with Parliament and radical Protestantism in the 1640s, 1650s and 1660s. Hooke would appear to have suppressed this aspect of his past by constructing an alternative origin centring on Hooke Castle/Hook Tower.

Most of the confusion surrounding the history of the Hookes stems from Nathaniel seemingly constructing this past connection with Hook Tower himself. An early seventeenth century map depicts the lighthouse as 'Castle Hooke' complete with fortifications.¹⁰ A later document by Hooke refers to his possession and use of a book of maps by cartographer John Speed.¹¹ Hooke wrote in praise of the usefulness of the atlas in 1705, one year before he applied for naturalisation as a French subject. For a man seeking to prove his noble ancestry, the existence of an extant Hooke Castle with suitably impressive battlements hinting at the past martial *gloire* of the family must have been a godsend. The only building which comes close to matching this description is the Tower of Hook on the Hook peninsula, County Wexford. This however is a lighthouse built in the early thirteenth century by William Marshall, earl of Pembroke to guide shipping safely into Waterford harbour and the Barrow estuary. The original keepers of the Tower

¹⁰ Billy Colfer, *The Hook peninsula, Co. Wexford* (Cork, 2004), p. 86. I am indebted to Mark Colfer of Hook Heritage Ltd. for kindly sending me information on the history of Hook lighthouse, and for pointing me in the direction of Billy Colfer's section on the tower of Hook in *The Hook peninsula*, pp 84-91.

¹¹ 'The state of Scotland, written by the earl of Lauderdale in 1690 and sent to me by M. Louis Inese, Almoner to the Queen' [with annotation by Hooke], 7 Nov. 1705 (A.A.E. CP Angleterre,

of Hook were the monks of the nearby Rinn Dubhán monastery, who had also been involved in its construction, thus rendering any involvement of the Hooke family in the early history of the tower unlikely.¹² The first lay keepers of the tower were established after the dissolution of the monastery in the 1540s and the tower was shown with crenellations on Frances Jobson's 1591 map of Waterford Harbour.¹³ A list of the principal castles in Wexford included Hook Tower in 1598.¹⁴

The remaining members of the Hooke family resident in the Tower, were allegedly driven out by Cromwellian troops in the 1640s, escaping or expelled to the West Indies.¹⁵ While members of the Hooke family were indeed to be found on the West Indian islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, it is unlikely that Cromwellian dispossession was responsible for their presence.¹⁶ What had come

supplemental, vol. 3, f. 277r). Hooke cites the work as Speed's *Theatre of the empire of Great Britain* (London, 1614), p. 129.

¹² Colfer, *The Hook peninsula*, p. 84.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁴ Colfer, *The Hook peninsula*, p. 84; William Colfer, 'The tower of Hook', in *Journal of the Wexford Historical Society*, no. 10 (1984-5), pp 69-78.

¹⁵ J. C. O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish brigades in the service of France from the revolution in Great Britain and Ireland under James II., to the revolution in France under Louis XVI* (Glasgow, 1870), p. 328; Richard Hayes, *Biographical dictionary of Irishmen in France* (Dublin, 1949), p. 128.

¹⁶ References to this family are found in the Royal Irish Academy MSS 24 D9, pp 1-48. These documents originate from a legal case concerning *dérogance* taken in 1785 by members of this West Indian Hooke family. They claimed descent from a John Hooke who left Ireland to establish himself on St Christopher. He married Elizabeth Melou on the island. They had seven children and after the siege of St 'Kitts' moved to Guadeloupe, where they prospered. Members of the family later served in the Irish regiments of the French army, and eventually established themselves in Gatteville in Normandy. However the documents cast little light on when or why John Hooke left Ireland, as, not surprisingly, the family members themselves were unclear by the 1780s; in de Saint-Allais's account of the Hooke family's history in *Nobiliaire universel de France*, pp 19-22, this John Hooke who migrated to the West Indies is identified as the son of Peter Hooke, a brother of Nathaniel's father John. His existence is confirmed by the *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, p. ix. Peter's son, John, would therefore have been Nathaniel's cousin. If the account is accurate, the political outlook of this branch of the family was very different to the rest of the family: Peter Hooke is claimed to have disappeared after the reduction of Ireland by Cromwell, and his son John, a cavalry lieutenant, was allegedly proscribed at that time also, leading to his migration to St Christopher. This version of the Hooke genealogy would place Peter Hooke very much at odds with his father Thomas Hooke, a committed supporter of Parliament in politics and Protestantism in religion, and a man who substantially aided and benefited from the

to be called Hooke Castle was attacked by a small Parliamentary force from the fort of Duncannon in July 1642. However it appears that there was no connection between the Tower of Hook and the Hooke family, other than chance coincidence in name. Yet both John Cornelius O'Callaghan and Richard Hayes appear to have attributed the 'Cromwellian' attack on Hooke castle as the action which led to the expulsion of the Hookes from their alleged lands in Wexford.¹⁷ There are serious problems with this version of the Hooke's family history. Despite later misunderstanding or obfuscation, it remains a fact that the Hookes benefited rather than suffered from the Cromwellian conquest and settlement.

Hooke was far from unusual in attempting, retrospectively, to embellish his ancestry to mask the foundations of a rapid social ascent.¹⁸ Many first and

Cromwellian conquest as we shall see later in this chapter, and his brother John, the non-conformist minister. De Saint-Allais gives no source for this information. As the work was printed in the 1870s it may have been influenced by increasing controversy, much of it in print, surrounding Cromwell's memory in both Ireland and England. This could have led to a misinterpretation of the reasons motivating John Hooke to leave Ireland. Rather than being forced to leave, he may have been a voluntary participant in Cromwell's 'Western Design' to mount an expedition against Spanish territories in the West Indies. A John Hooke is recorded as Assistant to the Commissary General of Musters in Jamaica in 1657, see *C.S.P Colonial, America and the West Indies, 1675-76: Addenda 1574-1674* (London, 1893), p. 499. If this is the same John Hooke, his career was furthered by involvement with Cromwellianism rather than hindered. Spain, rather than France, was England's main rival in the 1650s. Indeed from the late 1650s England and France were allies in a war against Spain. In the West Indies the island of St. Christopher was a shared territory and instances of holding land in both parts of the island were not unusual, see *C.S.P Col., America and the West Indies*, p. 758. An anachronistic reading of history in the 1870s may have projected prevailing historical attitudes backwards in time, to provide what seemed an eminently plausible explanation of displacement by Cromwell, but one which went beyond the documentary evidence. Nathaniel's father, also John Hooke, equally was believed to have been dispossessed of lands in Westmeath as a result of the Cromwellian settlement, see O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish brigades in the service of France*, p. 328. In reality any association John Hooke had with lands in Westmeath was as a result of his father, Thomas Hooke, implementing and benefiting from the Cromwellian land settlement in the 1650s. Similarly confusion may have arisen in regard to Thomas' other son, Peter, and his grandson John. For the fate of those less fortunate Irishmen and women who were transported to the Caribbean in the 1650s, see Sean O'Callaghan, *To hell or Barbados* (Dingle, 2000); See also Aubrey Gwynn, 'Documents relating to the Irish in the West Indies', in *Analecta Hibernica, including the reports of the Irish Manuscripts Commission*, no. 4 (Oct. 1932), pp 139-286.

¹⁷ O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish brigades in the service of France*, p. 328; Hayes, *Biographical dictionary of Irishmen in France*, p. 128.

¹⁸ Joseph Bergin, *The rise of Richelieu* (Manchester, 1997), p. 12; C. E. A. Cheesman, Rouge Dragon Pursuivant, Personal Communication, 9 Dec. 2004.

second generations *arrivistes* in Ireland, England and France spent much time and money avoiding the stigma of being seen as a *parvenu* in the ranks of nobility. It was crucial to ‘cover their sometimes unsavoury and usually shadowy backgrounds with a veneer of antiquity’; similarly ‘members of the displaced élites of Old Ireland, adrift on the continent, clutched at pedigrees [which] comforted by reminding them of what they had forfeited, and buttressed requests for fresh ennoblement.’¹⁹ That even a man who became as eminent in the hierarchies of the French church and state as Cardinal Richelieu felt the need for a sympathetic redaction of his pedigree demonstrates that the weight of authority and legitimacy attached to the prestige of lineage was no mere foible.²⁰ The consequences of having the legitimacy of claims accepted could be great. For a man in Richelieu’s position in the highest ranks of the elite an illustrious past served to cast his rise to power in a natural light and reinforce his hold on the most powerful offices of state. To those in Hooke’s position, strangers and exiles in France, far below *les grands* on the social scale, the benefits of a distinguished ancestry were also practical. Economically the acknowledgement of noble status was vitally important in avoiding taxes and making the financial position of *émigré* families more secure. Socially it provided an *entrée* into the exclusive world of the French nobility. Hooke’s true identity as one of the newer English of Ireland complicated his situation still further. Hence he obscured the awkward portions of his heritage and highlighted or invented elements which he believed enhanced his prospects of being granted a patent of nobility in France.

¹⁹ T. C. Barnard, *A new anatomy of Ireland: the Irish protestants, 1649-1770* (London & New Haven, 2003), pp 45-51.

²⁰ Bergin, *The rise of Richelieu*, pp 12-13.

While Hooke did receive his patent of nobility in France, his claims were not uncontested. Other Irish observers in France commented less favourably on Hooke's ancestry, insinuating that it was far from noble in origin. Rumours regarding Hooke even penetrated the court at Versailles. Louis XIV, it appears, was moved by interest and curiosity to enquire about the origins of this Irishman. In his response to Louis's query his foreign minister and Hooke's superior, Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, gave a glimpse of another enduring facet of Irish identity: begrudgery. He recounted details regarding Hooke that he had learned whilst in conversation with an Irish friar.²¹ The good friar (unfortunately his name has not been recorded), obviously unimpressed by Hooke's achievements, rank and titles filled in some of the man's family background, including the fact that 'his father was Irish and nothing more than a man from the common people.'²² In other words, there was no reason for Colonel Hooke to aspire to ideas above his station. Rarely can the issue of Irish identity have been discussed in such elevated circles.

A more plausible foundation for the Hooke's origins lie in southern England. Both Hampshire and Gloucestershire were cited as the location of related Hooke families, and both had major ports which were trading centres. Gloucestershire in particular had established mercantile links, through Bristol, with Irish ports. The civic government structures that developed in Dublin bore many of the hallmarks of Bristol's administrative organisation and special trading privileges in Dublin were granted to the merchant guilds of Bristol by King Henry

²¹ Frédéric Masson (ed.), *Journal inédit de Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy* (Paris, 1884), p. 109.

²² Ibid.

II in 1172.²³ These close connections between the cities provide a credible motive for the migration of the members of the Hooke family to Dublin.²⁴

While sources for the earliest history of the family in Ireland are not as extensive as one might wish due to the unfortunate destruction of records, evidence does exist that casts light on the family's presence, status and way of life in seventeenth and eighteenth century Dublin. It is against the backdrop of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms that details of the Hooke family become more plentiful. At this turbulent point Thomas Hooke (d. 1670) was family patriarch.²⁵ He appeared first in the subsidy rolls of the city in 1637.²⁶ In following years he set about fostering his family's place in mercantile business operations despite the escalating political difficulties in Ireland and the other kingdoms.²⁷

Because of trade and frequent correspondence with merchants and seafaring crews from other ports throughout the Isles and beyond, Thomas Hooke was well informed on the state of affairs throughout the Three Kingdoms of the Stuart polity. Contemporaries recognised access to information as a key advantage and the lifeblood of commerce.²⁸ What distinguished Hooke however from his contemporaries was his ability to capitalise on these connections. He possessed the requisite strength of character to negotiate the uncertain and often choppy

²³ Aubrey Gwynn, 'Medieval Bristol and Dublin', in *Irish Historical Studies*, v, no. 20 (1947), p. 279; R. D. Edwards, 'The beginnings of municipal government in Dublin', in *Dublin Historical Record*, i, no. 1 (1938), p. 3.

²⁴ *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, vol. ii, p. i.

²⁵ *Fifty seventh report of the deputy keeper of the public records and keeper of the state papers in Ireland*, (Dublin, 1919), p. 561.

²⁶ Herbert Wood (ed.), *The registers of Saint Catherine, Dublin, 1636-1715* (London, 1908), Appendix A, 'Extracts from subsidy roll, city of Dublin, 1637', p. 234; T. C. Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland: English government and reform in Ireland 1649-60* (Oxford, 1975), p. 82.

²⁷ Wood (ed.), *The registers of S. Catherine*, p. 234.

²⁸ Thomas Mun, *England's treasure by foreign trade* (originally 1664, reprint New York, 1885), pp 7-27.

waters of the first half of the seventeenth century, ‘the age of the soldier’.²⁹ This is manifest from his activities throughout this period both in business and economics. His skill and perseverance ensured that the family’s fortunes not alone stayed afloat during this critical period but prospered amidst the uncertainty and trauma of war.³⁰

Following the sudden downfall of the earl of Strafford as Lord Deputy the fissiparous nature of the body politic of the island became manifest.³¹ Political and religious tensions were rising to dangerous levels on both sides of the Irish Sea.³² On the eve of crisis in the Three Kingdoms Hooke had been a minor merchant of comfortable means but not a member of the prestigious merchant’s Guild of the Holy Trinity.³³ He was still of the ‘middling sort’ in the city, neither pauper nor patrician.³⁴ On the outbreak of the Irish rebellion in 1641 however Hooke had nailed his colours to the mast by giving significant material support to the government’s forces. Hooke’s sense of English and Protestant identity appears to

²⁹ Joseph Bergin (ed.), *The seventeenth century: Europe 1598-1715* (Oxford, 2001), pp 9-10.

³⁰ Hooke was listed as resident in the heart of the old medieval city in the narrow street of Skinner’s Row/Castle Street, nestling between the Dublin Castle and Christchurch cathedral in the parish of St Nicholas within the walls, see Séamus Pender, (ed.), *Census of Ireland c. 1659* (Dublin, 1939), p. 363. By 1664 Thomas Hooke’s business endeavours, and his political connections, saw him joining the flight to suburbia having added a large pile, with six ‘chymneys’, in the Finglas countryside to his other properties; see G. S. Cary, ‘Hearth money role for Co. Dublin, 1664’ in *Journal of the Kildare Archaeological Society*, xi (1930-33), p. 420. Apparently the involvement of prominent Dublin politicians in lucrative, if not always entirely legitimate, property transactions has a long history.

³¹ Patrick Little, ‘The Earl of Cork and the fall of the Earl of Strafford, 1638-41’ in *The Historical Journal*, xxxix, no. 3 (1996), p. 624; Patrick Little, ‘The Irish ‘Independents’ and Viscount Lisle’s lieutenancy of Ireland’ in *The Historical Journal*, xxxiv, no. 4 (2001), p. 944; Phil Kilroy, *Protestant dissent and controversy in Ireland 1660-1714* (Cork, 1994), pp 6-7.

³² Conrad Russell, ‘The British background to the Irish Rebellion of 1641’ in *Historical Research*, lxi, no. 144 (February, 1988), pp 166-182; Sarah Barber, ‘The formation of cultural attitudes: the examples of the three kingdoms in the 1650s’ in Allan MacInnes & Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.), *The Stuart kingdoms in the seventeenth century: awkward neighbours* (Dublin, 2002), pp 169-185; Barry Coward, *The Stuart age: England 1603-1714* (London, 3rd edition, 2003), pp 198-200; Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p. 81.

³³ Barnard, *A new anatomy of Ireland*, p. 173; Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 82.

³⁴ Barnard, *A new anatomy of Ireland*, pp 239-278; H. R. French, ‘The search for the ‘middle sort of people’ in England, 1600-1800’ in *The Historical Journal*, xxxiii, no. 1 (2000), pp. 277-293.

have motivated him to support the parliamentary position in the wars of the Three Kingdoms.³⁵ In the religiously and politically poisonous and precarious atmosphere of mid-seventeenth century Dublin, the recent actions of the King must have seemed unconscionable. Charged with upholding the Reformed Church in England against the ‘Papal antichrist’, he had apparently betrayed his ‘bounden and sacred duty’.³⁶ For this there could be no forgiveness and from Thomas Hooke there was none. In due course as the King met his death on the executioners block Hooke had no qualms about the justice of the deed. An informant later claimed that Hooke had said that the ‘trial of the king had been the right and proper course of action and [...] the execution of Charles I had been a just outcome.’³⁷

Hooke’s sympathies were clearly protestant and parliamentary. His beliefs engaged him to provide practical support. In 1642 he provided significant amounts of supplies to the government forces fighting the Confederate Catholic armies, while in 1643 he was recorded as being paid forty eight pounds for thirty barrels of herrings.³⁸ However payment was not always so readily forthcoming. In January 1647 Hooke petitioned Parliament, recently victorious in its first tilt against the King, for the payment of a sum of 948/ 4s, plus interest, for the supply of victuals, namely a large quantity of ‘herrings and cheese’ to the English

³⁵ L. J. Arnold, *The Restoration land settlement in county Dublin, 1660-88: a history of the administration of the acts of Settlement and Explanation* (Dublin, 1993), pp 155, 159; L. J. Arnold, ‘The Cromwellian land settlement of the county of Dublin 1652-60’ in *The Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*, ci (Dublin, 1971), p. 150.

³⁶ Kilroy, *Protestant dissent*, p. 5; John Adamson, ‘England without Cromwell’ in Niall Ferguson (ed.), *Virtual history* (London, 1997), p. 105.

³⁷ Anonymous informant to the lord lieutenant, the duke of Ormond, 1663, in R. P. Mahaffy (ed.), *Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland preserved in the Public Record Office, 1663-65*, (London, 1907), p. 499.

³⁸ Order of the [Irish] lords and commons in parliament assembled, Dublin, 7 April 1643 (Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A. 110, ff 45v-46r).

garrison then stationed in the city.³⁹ In the midst of a complex political, military and religious struggle for control in Ireland, with the fortunes of each party in a continuous precarious flux between triumph and defeat for the best part of a decade, Hooke displayed an uncanny capacity to survive and even prosper.

Thomas Hooke may have been one of those who welcomed the arrival of Cromwell's Parliamentary army to Ireland in 1649.⁴⁰ He could take satisfaction in having had a small share in facilitating its creation.⁴¹ Hooke himself appears to have been personally involved in the organisation and transportation of an earlier expedition of 2000 Parliamentary troops to Dublin in 1647.⁴² Seeing little chance of maintaining the royalist position in Ireland, the lord lieutenant, the duke of Ormond, had negotiated an agreement to hand the city over to Parliamentary forces. Ormond eventually withdrew from the city in July 1647. From April 1647 preparations for an expeditionary force under Colonel Michael Jones were made in England. The fall of the port of Chester to Parliament in February 1647 made such an undertaking much easier. Plans for a much larger military intervention in Ireland became entangled in an increasingly bitter and disabling internal power struggle between Parliamentary soldiers and political factions in London. However despite this internecine wrangling Jones's force was assembled and

³⁹ Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Sixth report, part one*, (London, 1877), p. 155.

⁴⁰ David Sturdy, *Fractured Europe 1600-1721* (Oxford, 2002), p. 171.

⁴¹ Of course not so gratified as to forget his continuing petitions to parliament for the repayment of his capital sum of 948 *l* and 4*s* plus accrued interest. Business astuteness and acumen remained the hallmarks of this canny gentleman.

⁴² *C. S. P. Ire., 1647-1660* (London, 1903), pp 727-43. Thomas Hooke may have travelled to London to pursue a case in relation to debts owing to him from Parliament. His familiarity with arrangements for trade and shipping between Ireland and England, and specifically the port of Chester, made his selection for a his role in organising the logistics for the transport of Parliamentary troops and supplies to Dublin a very rational one.

transported from Chester.⁴³ Hooke and another merchant were entrusted with overseeing the practicalities of providing supplies and aiding with transportation. Hooke was compensated for his efforts with a grant of £60 and no doubt the added benefit of a large amount of goodwill on the part of the Parliamentary Commissioners in Ireland, who had travelled from Chester with the expedition.⁴⁴

During 1649-50 the political landscape of Ireland was changed by Cromwell's progress. Economic instability, along with the uncertainty generated by the execution of the king exacerbated the situation. Thomas Hooke was able to adjust to the new political, religious and social climate. Religion appears to have provided reassurance and comfort for Hooke, at a time when the next world never seemed far away. In the midst of a vicious war, calamitous events were recounted at length and in gruesome detail by a stream of pamphlets and alleged eye witness accounts. This heightened already existing fear and panic. Inevitably in such a period of crisis, questions arose concerning mortality and the relationship between this world and the afterlife. If all Protestants were good God fearing people why had so many been allowed to die? Why had their trust in Providence apparently proved false?

In the search for answers to these questions Hooke found his solace in the newly established Independent church in St Nicholas, close by his Castle Street residence.⁴⁵ The Independent churches were established in the wake of the arrival of the Cromwellian army. The religious ethos of this military force was influenced

⁴³ David Scott, *Politics and war in the three Stuart kingdoms: 1637-49* (London, 2004), pp 134-39; *C. S. P. Ire., 1647-1660*, p. 731. As late as February 1647 the Committee of the Admiralty was requested to provide shipping for 6,000 infantry and 400 cavalry. By March however very unmilitary terms such as 'encouragement' and 'persuade' were being used in relation to sending troops to Ireland, see *C. S. P. Ire., 1647-1660*, pp 740-41.

⁴⁴ *C. S. P. Ire., 1647-1660* (London, 1903), p. 742.

by Independent beliefs and two churches were quickly set up to meet the spiritual needs of soldiers and administrators. One was at St Nicholas's Church and the other, serving mainly the military, at Christchurch Cathedral.⁴⁶

The radical religious groups emerging from the spiritual and political volatility of 1640s England were eager to attract adherents in Ireland.⁴⁷ Prior to their arrival from England the indigenous Irish Reformed Church had not been as seriously affected by the issues that saw the virtual mushrooming of both separatist and non-separatist dissenter movements within the English ecclesiastical structure.⁴⁸ The entire Cromwellian expedition to Ireland had a significant religious element. An outlook and motivation redolent of a crusader mentality infused the entire Cromwellian enterprise from its inception, rendering subsequent hostilities, at times, brutal in the extreme.

To fight for God's cause was [...] [a] vocation. Those who fought for a false God were idolators and blasphemers. Their cause was wicked. They could expect the harsh formalities of war and no more. In the case of a holy war against militant and hostile Catholicism there could be no give in the steel of Cromwell's avenging sword.⁴⁹

This missionary zeal and evangelical fervour proved attractive to the Hooke family. In addition to Thomas becoming a member of the St Nicholas's

⁴⁵ Phil Kilroy, 'Radical religion in Ireland, 1641-60' in Jane Ohlmeyer (ed.), *Ireland from independence to occupation 1641-60*, (Cambridge, 1995), p. 207.

⁴⁶ Kilroy, 'Radical religion in Ireland, 1641-60', p. 208.

⁴⁷ St. J. D. Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland, 1647-61* (Oxford, 1912, reprint 1969), p. 61; Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp 90-8.

⁴⁸ Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland*, p. 51.

⁴⁹ J. C. Davis, *Oliver Cromwell* (London, 2001), pp 107-12. Davis emphasises that 'war, remained, for Cromwell, politics, and we might say, religion by other means', 'indeed the interplay between the three is essentially the story of his career from 1642 onwards'. For a complementary and instructive reassessment of conflict in England also being much more brutal than previously thought, see Will Coster, 'Massacre and codes of conduct in the English Civil War', in Mark Levene and Penny Roberts (eds), *The massacre in history* (New York, 1999), pp 89-105. Coster argues that the war in England was as bloody as that in Ireland and Scotland, if not more so. He lists eighteen separate instances of massacre in England between 1643 and 1645. '[...] the English were not so different from their Celtic or European contemporaries [...] they were subject to similar prejudices and codes of conduct.'

Independent congregation he also brought the rest of his family to join the ‘assembly of the gathered saints’.

In time the Hookes’ involvement with the church developed and deepened significantly. Thomas himself became not only a full member but later an elder of the church, a position of honour and no little responsibility.⁵⁰ He was closely associated with Samuel Winter (1603-66), provost of Trinity College Dublin from 1652, minister at St Nicholas’s and leader of the moderate Independents in Ireland, and Samuel Mather (1626-71), co-pastor of Winters at St Nicholas’s, senior fellow of Trinity, and previously employed by the council of state in England. Both of these men were prominent figures in the political and religious affairs of Ireland during the Commonwealth and Protectorate.⁵¹ In a further demonstration of the Hookes’ close bond with, and commitment to, the church, Thomas’s son, John, became an Independent minister.⁵² In the 1650s he was one of a number of Independent ministers who formed the equivalent of a spiritual ‘special forces squad’ sent to preach vigorously the true message throughout the country.⁵³

Thomas Hooke’s close involvement with and progress in the religious sphere of the Independent Church in Dublin was mirrored by an equally, and not unrelated, meteoric ascent in the civic politics and administration of the city.

⁵⁰ Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland*, p. 61.

⁵¹ Mather was a member of a renowned New England puritan family. For the careers of Winter and Mather in Ireland, see R. L. Greaves, *God’s other children: protestant nonconformists and the emergence of denominational churches in Ireland 1660-1700* (Stanford, 1997), pp 7, 12-13, 22, 24, 35, 55-56, 99, 161; Kilroy, *Protestant dissent*, pp 60-80, 154-55, 162n, 165n, 241, 259; Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp 81, 83, 99-100, 112-18, 120, 121, 126-27, 129, 132-33, 136-42, 158, 174, 192, 199-205, 210. For the close relations between Thomas Hooke and Winter and Mather see Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp 81, 147n, 192. A bequest of 40s for a ring for Mather was included in Hooke’s will, dated 20 June 1670, see Macrae (ed.), *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ii, p. ii.

⁵² Kilroy, *Protestant dissent*, p. 54, n. 26; Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland*, pp 57, 214.

Previously outside the established oligarchy entrenched in power in the city's government, Hooke's connections with members of the new regime proved advantageous.⁵⁴ On the arrival of the Parliamentary Commissioners in Dublin the issue of religion moved to the forefront in the formation of policies for the administration of the expanding areas under Commonwealth control.

As the Cromwellian campaign against the forces of the Confederacy progressed rapidly from August 1649 onwards the question of what would happen in the wake of victory became more urgent. Again the policies put forward reflected the centrality of the religious aspect intertwined with a desire to avenge the alleged massacres of 1641. Chief amongst the aims of the Cromwellian settlement was the completion of the conquest of Ireland. The new dispensation would endeavour finally to instil English Protestant values and cultural norms nationwide through the mechanisms of property confiscation and population transfer.

When in May 1650, Cromwell delegated the coordination of mopping up operations to his deputy Henry Ireton (1611-1651), Thomas Hooke was already well placed in Dublin political and economic circles. Although an Alderman of the City of Dublin since at least 1642 he became considerably more prominent in this role in the 1650s.⁵⁵ Dublin aldermen, appointed for life, were a self-selecting group who, along with the Common Council, were entrusted with the oversight of municipal government.⁵⁶ Hooke's ascent was one of a number of politically

⁵³ Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland* (Oxford, 1912, reprint, 1967), p. 57.

⁵⁴ Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 81.

⁵⁵ Charles McNeill (ed.), *The Tanner letters: original documents and notices of Irish affairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Dublin, 1943), p. 171.

⁵⁶ Edwards, 'The beginnings of municipal government in Dublin' in *Dublin Historical Record*, vol. i, no. 1 (Dublin, 1938), p. 8.

reliable aldermen such as Richard Tighe, Daniel Hutchinson and John Preston who came to the fore of this body during the early years of the Commonwealth.⁵⁷

Thomas Hooke's rise to influence within this group was rapid. In 1654 he was elected, in a departure from the previous system of arranged succession, to the office of mayor of Dublin. He advanced steadily in power and responsibility in the civic government of Interregnum Dublin as he proved both his loyalty and usefulness to the Cromwellian regime. He became mayor, justice of the peace, revenue commissioner, commissioner for probate of wills and farmer of the petty customs of Dublin. He was directly involved in overseeing land confiscation and population transplantation. Indeed in what can be seen as evidence of his trustworthiness and reliability he was the only non-military member amongst an eight man commission sent to the precinct of Waterford to investigate 'the delinquency of Irish and other proprietors [...] in order to the distinguishing of their respective qualifications, according to the act for settling Ireland'.⁵⁸

His period as mayor in 1654-55 coincided with the arrival of many crucial instructions from the Commonwealth Parliament.⁵⁹ This parliament, the first, at least notionally, 'British' parliament, acted as the seat of power for the *de facto* union of England, Ireland and Scotland. It advised the Dublin-based lord deputy and council, which acted as the governing body in Ireland, on how best to manage the country. The aldermen and common council of Dublin in turn were entrusted with duties in areas not previously included in their traditional sphere of responsibility. Hooke and his colleagues were delegated to deal with the appeals of those to be transplanted to Connaught. He was also selected by the lord deputy

⁵⁷ Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp 81-3.

⁵⁸ Robert Dunlop (ed.), *Ireland under the commonwealth* (2 vols, Manchester, 1913), ii, 378.

and council to be part of the examining committee for the approbation of ministers of religion and assigned a part in the responsibility of organising a series of lectures in Irish. These initiatives were designed to make the spreading of the Word both efficient and available to the widest possible spectrum of the population.⁶⁰ Combined with the envisaged land settlement and population transfers, this can be seen as an ambitious attempt at social engineering, an attempt to bend extant religious, political and social values to a configuration more acceptable to the prevailing standards and morals of the Protectorate.

Thomas Hooke was deeply involved in this process, demonstrating both his loyalty and usefulness to the Cromwellian regime. In return he received financial rewards and further posts. Hooke's most important role at this time came as a commissioner of the Civil Survey for the county of Dublin under the overall supervision of William Petty in 1654.⁶¹ Hooke's appointment as commissioner, dating from October 1654, was unique as he was the only civilian named on the Survey. His fellow commissioners Lt. Col. Isaac Dobson, Lt. Col. Robert Doyley and Lt. Col. John Tuttle were all military officers.⁶² Hooke's presence on the commission was designed to satisfy the interests of the adventurers who underwrote the Parliamentary campaign while his colleagues' membership stemmed from the army's desire to procure recompense for the pay arrears of the veterans.

⁵⁹ Ibid., ii, 344, 378, 462, 464, 466, 470, 487, 509, 528, 545, 588, 603*n.*, 624, 665.

⁶⁰ Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland*, p. 114.

⁶¹ W. H. Hardinge, 'On manuscript mapped and other townland surveys in Ireland of a public character, embracing the Gross, Civil and Down Surveys, from 1640 to 1688' in *Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy*, xxiv (Dublin, 1862), p. 67.

⁶² Ibid.

Perhaps not surprisingly, at the end of this exercise Hooke was recorded as the holder of the lease of extensive estates in North Dublin, estimated at over 1400 acres,⁶³ spread over the three baronies of Nethercross, Coolock and Castleknock.⁶⁴ These estates were, in the main, previously the property of Philip Hore, an Old English Catholic whose lands were confiscated for his alleged association with the rebels of the 1640s. Evidencing the immense amount of human suffering attendant to such upheaval, Molly Hore, a member of the family, had committed suicide upon hearing of their intended transplantation to Connacht.⁶⁵ In lieu of the full repayment of his capital sum of 948/ 4s plus interest (a sum now amounting to more than the original investment) still owing from the 1640s, Hooke was granted the use of these estates on a renewable lease from Parliament in London. The case of Hooke's claim for satisfaction of the debt, and crucially the thorny subject of the attendant interest, occasioned a veritable flurry of cross channel correspondence. Hooke, appealing directly to Protector Cromwell in London, eventually won his battle to acquire a lease to the lands that would run until such time as his original investment was repaid and he had recouped the now larger amount of interest, granted at very generous rate of 8%.⁶⁶ In addition to these lands Hooke was a landowner in his own right, being listed as the proprietor of five acres in Dublin city itself.⁶⁷ In the absence of a survey for the central city area comprehensive information on these properties is lacking but through a variety of

⁶³ Mahaffy (ed.), *Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, 1647-60* (London, 1903), pp 643-4. I would to thank Joseph Byrne for his valuable advice on researching land grants in the 1650s and 1660s.

⁶⁴ Simington (ed.), *The Civil Survey 1654-56: volume vii, County of Dublin* (I. M. C., Dublin, 1945), p. xxii.

⁶⁵ William J. Smyth, 'Exploring the social and cultural topographies of sixteenth and seventeenth century Dublin', in Kevin Whelan and F. H. A. Aalen (eds), *Dublin. City and county: from prehistory to present. Essays in honour of J. H. Andrews* (Dublin, 1992), p. 175.

⁶⁶ Mahaffy (ed.), *Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, 1647-60*, pp 643-4, 844, 848.

other surviving documentation the Hooke family can be connected with the parishes of St Catherine's, St Nicholas's-within-the-Walls and St Werbourg's.⁶⁸ Rather than being harmed by the Cromwellian conquest and land settlement as was assumed by later historical works discussed earlier in this chapter, the Hooke family prospered during the period. These were the family circumstances and ethos into which Nathaniel Hooke was born: ethnically English, Independent in religion and avowedly anti-Royalist in politics. This was also the heritage Nathaniel Hooke was understandably keen to conceal when drawing up his family tree in 1706. The descendants of many of those who had lost out during the 1650s were his companions in exile in France. It was a situation that Nathaniel could hardly have expected given the circumstances of his own birth and early life.

After the Restoration and the fall of the old sources of political patronage, the Hooke family still enjoyed a measure of success like many others who had profited from the Interregnum. The manner of the return of Charles II to the throne of the three kingdoms, through negotiation rather than military victory, made the situation complex. 'In practice the monarchy had been reconstructed by the same powers by which it had been destroyed: the army and parliament.'⁶⁹ Both reward and revenge were therefore necessarily tempered by political expediency.

In Ireland Charles's policy of attempting to cater to all interests on the religious and political spectrum led his close confidant, the lord lieutenant of

⁶⁷ Arnold, *The Restoration land settlement in Co Dublin, 1660-88*, pp 155, 159.

⁶⁸ Wood (ed.), *The registers of St. Catherine, Dublin*, pp 104, 234; Pender (ed.), *Census of Ireland c. 1659*, p. 363; *Fifty first report of the deputy keeper of the public records and keeper of the state papers in Ireland* (Dublin, 1919), pp 558-9.

⁶⁹ Jonathan Scott, *England's troubles: seventeenth-century English political instability in a European context* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 188.

Ireland James Butler (1610-88), duke of Ormond, to make the well known comment that it would be necessary to create another Ireland to satisfy everyone. The Acts of Settlement and Explanation whose implementation Ormond oversaw in an attempt to square the circle of land redistribution left few people happy. The attempted balance of interests ended instead by falling between two stools. Royalist and Catholic claimants were disillusioned that the workings of the Acts had not returned more of their land despite their loyalty to the king. Parliamentarians too were disgruntled at having to surrender part of their gains. Having supported, in their own eyes at least, the right cause, triumphed in the wars and invited the king back to the kingdom, they now resented what many saw as a punitive peace settlement. For some this resentment hardened into active subversion. A hardcore of conspirators led by Captain Thomas Blood planned to seize Dublin Castle in 1663. This military coup was intended as an act of political theatre, a salutary lesson to the king reminding him of the power that the army veterans and its political supporters could marshal in Ireland. While Blood's Plot failed it presented a clear lesson in just how far royal policy in Ireland was effectively trammelled by mutually exclusive interests.

Thomas Hooke's experience after the Restoration in Ireland shows the lack of a coherent and definitive policy. Initially, he felt the cold winds of the new dispensation. He no longer enjoyed the access to power and the attendant benefits which he had gained from holding office under the Protectorate. As one of those who had supported the old regime from ideological beliefs, religious and political, this was to be expected. However, the mixed nature of royal policy in Ireland was highlighted by the fact that Hooke retained his position as an Alderman of Dublin

Corporation. An unsuccessful effort was made immediately after the Restoration in 1660, to have Hooke excluded from the general pardon issued by Charles II.⁷⁰ He remained an alderman until his death, even in the wake of further damning allegations against him, reported, anonymously, to the new Lord Deputy and Privy Council late in 1662 or early 1663. A 'Note on the conduct of certain Aldermen and Councillors of Dublin' recommended that

Certain persons – as follows – should be put out from being Aldermen and others of the Common Council [should be expelled] which will conduce to the peace of His Majesty's Government and the welfare of his subjects: - Richard Tight [Tighe?], Thomas Hook (*sic*), Daniel Hutcheson, John Preston, William Clife – all aldermen. Tight said that King James committed an abominable crime [named] with the duke of Buckingham, that the late king did poison King James, and that 'he would rather die than see the foberyes of common prayer used.' Hook (*sic*) said, before Lieutenant-Colonel Yarner, that the late king was justly put to death and that it was a just act of parliament. The above to be 'expulsed' from bearing any office and be 'disfrancht.' Sir William 'Dumbell' [Dumvile], the Mayor and Recorder Alderman William Smith, Peter Weybrant, Mark Quine, Robert Deey, aldermen, or any four or more of them, should be empowered from time to time to 'expulse' all such out of the 'tabell' of Aldermen and Common Council 'as they shall conceive fitt; teninge to His Majesty's servis'. Only those known to be well affected to the King's Government to be Aldermen or of the Common Council.⁷¹

Given that charges could be made against many members of the Corporation, the writer went on to specify why he saw Hooke's behaviour as particularly egregious. He stated that Hooke in maintaining publicly, in front of many witnesses, that 'the trial of the king had been the right and proper course of action and [...] the execution of Charles I had been a just outcome' was unfit for any office. Furthermore the writer urged that the matter be investigated thoroughly because those mentioned were only the most obviously guilty. It was probably no coincidence that these claims were made at the same time as

⁷⁰ Bodl., Clarendon state papers, 73, f. 264, cited in Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 85.

⁷¹ 'Note on the conduct of certain Aldermen and Councillors of Dublin', 1662, in *C. S. P. Ire., 1663-65*, p. 499. As an example of the ironies of history, and continuing connection networks, a descendent of the William Domville, (lawyer, attorney general of Ireland and father in law of William Molyneux), recommended here to enforce censure upon Thomas Hooke, became a friend and correspondent of Hooke's great-grandson Nathaniel Hooke (c. 1690-1763), when both men had settled in England in the 1700s, see P. Beryl Eustace (ed.), *Registry of Deeds Dublin: abstract of wills, volume II, 1746-8* (Dublin, 1954), p. 158.

revelations concerning Blood's Plot became public. The early days of the Restoration gave great leeway to those interested in settling old scores or making a profit from those recently dislodged from power.⁷² The informant against Hooke may have been seeking reward or preferment; or possibly revenge for a hostile decision by one of the many administrative bodies Hooke acted on, possibly even one of the transported seeking a means of redress. Even if the claim was entirely spurious it gave the crown an opportunity to harass a man who was widely known as a supporter of the former regime: strength of the evidence, indeed evidence itself, rarely proved a bar to judicial retribution.

The informer in this case was to be disappointed, because in the wake of the unrest evident among unreconstituted Cromwellians, the authorities in Dublin evidently had no desire to make an example of Thomas Hooke. Despite the serious accusations levelled against Hooke no action was taken. Hooke himself sought to exploit the uncertainty of royal policy regarding the land settlement but lost out in the subsequent tussle for Philip Hore's Kilsalaghan estate to the better connected Sir George Lane,⁷³ secretary to Ormond.⁷⁴ However Hooke fought a vigorous rearguard action against dispossession. He refused to vacate the property arguing a lawful lease had previously been granted to him. The arrangement he

⁷² H.M.C., *Report on the manuscripts of F. W. Leyborne-Popham* (Norwich, 1899), pp 269-70. Dr George Clarke, Judge Advocate of the army from 1681 and secretary for war in 1689, who interrogated Nathaniel Hooke in that year, recalled a similar incident where malicious claims had been made against his grandfather by a covetous neighbour.

⁷³ George Lane (1620-1683), Viscount Lanesborough. Born in Ireland to Richard Lane and his second wife Mabel, *née* Fitzgerald; grandson of an Elizabethan military migrant from England, but also with family links to the Gaelic O'Farrells and the Old English Burkes. He entered Trinity College Dublin in 1638. Royalist exile during the civil wars, as secretary to Ormond during his post-Restoration lord lieutenantancy he acquired his title, government posts, lands and a reputation for venality. See Toby Barnard, 'Lane, George, first Viscount Lanesborough (1620–1683). See the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/58510>, accessed 22 Dec. 2005].

⁷⁴ Mahaffy (ed.), *Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, 1663-5*, p. 399.

referred was that that had been decided in lieu of the payment of arrears owing to Hooke for the goods he supplied to Parliament in 1643. When Hooke had petitioned the tri-national parliament in London for satisfaction of the longstanding debt on a number of occasions in the 1650s he had complained bitterly of the time taken for repayment and of being unable to engage in trade as a consequence. After correspondence between Dublin and London, the Lord Protector decreed that the issue be solved by the award of revenue from Hore's lands, and to ensure full restitution a lease on the lands was granted to Hooke for twenty one years. Hooke argued that as he had not had full restitution the lease was still in force.

This parcel of Hore lands was to be a *cause célèbre* after the Restoration. The case aptly illustrates the untidy and confused muddle of the Restoration land settlement in Ireland. George Lane, as we have seen, used his connections to the lord lieutenant to acquire a title to the lands, while Hooke had actual possession of the lands and Hore was still aggrieved at his original loss. Indeed even at the time the case came to serve as a prime example of the problems the Crown faced in Ireland regarding the redistribution of land. A Cromwellian grantee, a well connected royalist and a Catholic 'rebel' contending for the right to land title: not surprisingly the spectacle attracted the attention of those interested in the wider political scene. The case was still a live issue in 1670 when the Irish land settlement was once more creating waves at the English court. Richard Talbot (1630-91),⁷⁵ in London acting as the agent for the Irish Catholic interest, hoped to

⁷⁵ Talbot had fought with the Catholic Confederate and royalist armies in the 1640s and only narrowly escaped from Drogheda after it fell to Cromwell's forces in 1649. He became the leading Catholic spokesman at court in the 1670s. Under James II, who created him earl of Tyrconnel, he steadily acquired power and position in Ireland, becoming lord deputy in 1686. Apparently he

use the Lane-Hore dispute (Hooke having died earlier in the year) to highlight the injustices evident in the land settlement. However Lane proved himself the more skilled political operator. When the case was called before council, with Charles II in attendance, it was revealed that a private arrangement had been made between the two parties, thereby frustrating the hopes of those who had wanted to use the issues involved to support calls for the reopening of the entire Irish land issue.⁷⁶

As for Hooke, he had lodged a brief in the court of claims instituting an application for the granting of lands in the counties of Meath, Westmeath and Armagh.⁷⁷ The family had had connections with this area for some time. John Hooke, Nathaniel's father, had been sent as an Independent minister to Drogheda on the Louth/Meath border in 1652.⁷⁸ There he remained despite a turbulent relationship with central authority, illustrated by a suspension from his preaching duties in 1655.⁷⁹ Notwithstanding this he remained active in Drogheda as assistant to Dr Faithful Teate.⁸⁰ In 1659 he was assigned the additional responsibilities of preaching at Dunleer and Holligestown.⁸¹ He was still officially acting at Drogheda in 1660.⁸² In the wake of the Restoration he refused to conform to the Established Church. Therefore as 'non-conformist' he lost his position as a minister entitled to remuneration from the church.⁸³

planned to undo the Restoration land settlement before the Revolution brought renewed upheaval. Talbot died in 1691. His wife, Frances Jennings, was the sister of Sarah Jennings, wife of John Churchill, duke of Marlborough. Her later meeting with Nathaniel Hooke, and continuing involvement with Jacobitism, is discussed in chapter six.

⁷⁶ Richard Cox, *Hibernia Anglicana: or the history of Ireland from the conquest thereof by the English, to this present time* (London, 1692), pp 12-13 of *A letter to the author of a history of Ireland* bound therein.

⁷⁷ *Fifteenth annual report of the Irish Record Commission*, (Dublin, 1825), p. 67.

⁷⁸ Seymour, *The puritans in Ireland*, p. 57.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Kilroy, *Protestant dissent*, p. 54.

In 1667 he is recorded as being once again resident in Dublin.⁸⁴ From this point on very little information on the later life of Nathaniel's father survives. However in later records relating to Nathaniel's education, his father is described as both a 'clerk' (a description later applied to Nathaniel himself) and a merchant, most likely involved to some degree with the family's trading interests.⁸⁵ The appellation 'clerk' in official records was quite often used to designate a nonconformist minister. It can reasonably be supposed that a man with the religious views of John Hooke did not give up his beliefs lightly and remained active, preaching the faith to fellow non-conformists alienated by the Restoration religious settlement.⁸⁶

In light of this decidedly Protestant and Cromwellian family history we can return briefly to examine the representation of the family in later historiography. Accounts of the Hooke family tell less than the full story. A question that arises is whether this originated from deficiencies in the sources available or whether another explanation might be hazarded. In J.C. O'Callaghan's *History of the Irish Brigades in the service of France* published in 1870, any allusion to Nathaniel Hooke's Protestant New English past is absent.⁸⁷ Regarding his family background O'Callaghan states that Hooke was an offshoot of an old line of that name expelled from their lands in Westmeath by the Cromwellians. However as we have seen the Hooke family had been Cromwellians themselves, and far from being victims of confiscation were much

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, p. x; Thomas O'Connor, *An Irish theologian in enlightenment France: Luke Joseph Hooke 1714-96* (Dublin, 1995), p. 13; Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, part I, vol. II.

⁸⁶ Kilroy, 'Radical religion in Ireland: 1641-60', p. 209; Kilroy, *Protestant dissent*, p. 75.

⁸⁷ O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish brigades in the service of France* (Glasgow, 1870), p. 329.

more likely to be doing the expelling. And Thomas Hooke had actually gained land, power, profit and status through his connections and service in the Cromwellian administration.

We can perhaps excuse O’Callaghan because his work was published in 1870, the same year which also saw the publication of *The correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke for the years 1703 to 1707*, edited by W.D. Macray. The preface to this work included a long, detailed and largely accurate history of the Hooke family in Ireland and their true background, including their intimate involvement with the Cromwellian regime and Puritan religious beliefs. This in-depth treatment of the Hooke’s connections with the Cromwellian authorities may be accounted for by the fact that to Macray, an Oxford scholar and Bodleian librarian, associations with Cromwell would not have been viewed in the negative light that they would have been by many in Ireland at this period, when the demonisation of Cromwell and his ‘outrages’ became fixed in the public mind.⁸⁸

The section on Hooke in Richard Hayes’ later work *A biographical dictionary of Irishmen in France*, published in 1949, again presents the edited version of Hooke’s identity, with only the briefest mention of anything less than straightforward in his past:

Born at Corballis, Co. Meath in 1664. [Nathaniel Hooke] entered Trinity College in July 1679, left soon afterwards, became an enthusiastic Jacobite and *reverted* [my italics] to Catholicism, the religion of his immediate forebears.⁸⁹

The use of the word ‘reverted’ presents a problem. None of Nathaniel Hooke’s documented immediate ancestors were Catholic. His father and grandfather, a minister and lay elder respectively were dissenting Protestants. His mother, if we

⁸⁸ The Rev. Denis Murphy’s *Cromwell in Ireland: a history of Cromwell’s Irish campaign* (Dublin, 1883) would cement Cromwell’s dark legend in Irish history.

⁸⁹ *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, 127.

believe she was an English Hooke, was most likely also Protestant, and also her parents, Hooke's maternal grandparents. From Hooke's six immediate forbears, only his paternal grandmother, Eleanor O'Kelly (if we believe Hooke's own creative genealogy) may have been Catholic.

Hayes may have been following O'Callaghan's account for some of his extract but there is no mention of Hooke's attendance at Trinity College in that passage. Quite possibly he drew on the *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, 1891) for further details, but this again raises problems as it mentions not only Hooke's attendance at Trinity but also Glasgow and Cambridge, his puritan beliefs and his role and active participation in Monmouth's rebellion. In addition to the *DNB* article, Hooke's published correspondence containing Macray's information on the Hooke family background had been in print for almost 80 years.

Given the availability of these sources, which reveal the real history of the Hooke family rather than the previous rather romanticised version, we might be justified in reaching the conclusion that while an Irish Catholic Jacobite officer and gentleman could be accepted in the historiography of Ireland in 1949, perhaps a less black and white, more ambiguous identity, Irish/English, Catholic/Protestant, Jacobite/Whig with strong connections to the infamous *bête noire* of Irish history, Oliver Cromwell, could less readily be accommodated. When in doubt leave it out may have been the guiding motto, with the simplified picture fitting much more easily into the homogenised spirit and outlook of the times.

In reality Nathaniel's early life was shaped by his family's circumstances. Like his elder brother John, he received an expensive education, firstly in Dublin

and Drogheda, then at Kilkenny Grammar School and finally in Trinity College Dublin.⁹⁰ His early education reflected the family's religious outlook and the continuing strong influence of the past in the shape of a network of non-conformist connections. Nathaniel's first two teachers were recorded as Mr Shaw in Dublin and Mr Scott in Drogheda.⁹¹ Joseph Scott and John Shaw were in Ireland during the 1650s and both had been involved in attempts to propagate English and Protestant values in Irish society through religious and educational reforms. Both had been officially sanctioned Independent preachers; Scott had been appointed a fellow of Trinity College, Dublin in 1655 by Samuel Winter, provost of the college and one of the leading luminaries of Independency in Dublin.⁹² Both became masters of schools which were funded by an endowment drawn on estates awarded to Erasmus Smith, who had benefited from the land settlement. Thomas Hooke's associations in this case aptly demonstrate the interconnected network of links established among likeminded religious and political activists in the 1650s, links which survived and were maintained after the Restoration. Thomas Hooke, as we have already seen, had been charged with playing a part in the selection and appointment of properly qualified ministers, such as Scott and Shaw, in the 1650s. Hooke was also close to both Winter and Mather, and had been nominated as a trustee of the school system in 1657. This web of nonconformist links established in the 1650s remained active after the Restoration, and the beliefs and values which Hooke, Winter, Mather, Scott and

⁹⁰ Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, part I, vol. II.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 203.

Shaw espoused, continued to have an influence into the 1670s.⁹³ The very early formation of Nathaniel Hooke's intellectual, political and religious mentality can be traced to this residual Independent influence found in his family and early educational experience.

Hooke's later educational trajectory was more regular, moving on to Kilkenny College, mirroring the path of close contemporaries Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) and William Congreve (1670-1729).⁹⁴ It is possible that Hooke and Swift were in Kilkenny at the same time. Swift attended from 1673 to 1682,⁹⁵ while Hooke arrived c.1670 and left in 1679.⁹⁶ They may have encountered each other previously in Dublin. Hooke's relatives owned a house on the south side of Castle Street, close to the townhouse of the Earl of Cork, the eponymous Cork House, and facing a property owned by William Petty.⁹⁷ Directly behind Castle Street and the Hooke's four storey house was Hoey's Court, where stood number seven, 'a fine house in a prime location'⁹⁸ in which Jonathan Swift was born in 1667.⁹⁹ As Swift's memories, probably similar to Nathaniel's experiences, of his schooldays demonstrate, life involved a high degree of physical punishment.

So I formerly used to envy my own happiness as schoolboy, the delicious holidays, the Saturday afternoon and the charming custards in a blind alley; I never considered the

⁹³ Ibid., pp 192-94; Scott was dismissed from his post of master of the Drogheda Erasmus Smith school in 1669 for his 'total nonconformity', *ibid.*, p. 203.

⁹⁴ Glendinning, *Jonathan Swift*, p. 20.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

⁹⁶ Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, part I, vol. II.

⁹⁷ *Fifty first report of the deputy keeper of the public records and keeper of the state papers in Ireland* (Dublin, 1919), pp 558-9.

⁹⁸ Glendinning, *Jonathan Swift*, p. 17. If one could block out the regular reverberations of Christchurch's bells and accommodate oneself to the steep ascents and descents of the area. Though even today tourists trudge stoically up the incline of Castle Street in search of the last vestiges of Swift's birthplace.

⁹⁹ A few of the houses on the south side of Castle Street still remain and one has been purchased by the Dublin Civic Trust. Hoey's (or Hoys) Court has unfortunately met the more familiar fate of Dublin's old streetscape, disappearing under the developer's bulldozer.

confinement ten hours a day, to nouns and verbs, the terror of the rod, the bloody noses, the broken shins.¹⁰⁰

Kilkenny College had been refounded by the duke of Ormond in 1667 and by the 1670s it was regarded as Ireland's finest school so that at 'the height of its fame, [...] young Irish noblemen and gentlemen crowded its classes for the most approved preparation for University honours. It might called the then Eton of the sister country.'¹⁰¹ The scion of what had recently been a minor Dublin merchant family was now mixing in an altogether different social milieu, to judge by this description. The master of Kilkenny during Hooke's time there was Edward Jones (1641-1703), a man who later went on to be bishop of Cloyne and then of St Asaph in Wales.¹⁰² Nathaniel left Kilkenny in 1679 to pursue his studies in Trinity College Dublin.

Trinity had recently welcomed a new Provost. Narcissus Marsh (1638-1713), arrived in Dublin from his former post of principal of St Alban's Hall, Oxford.

In the beginning of March 1677 Doctor Fell bishop of Oxford made me the offer of the provostship of Trinity College near Dublin in Ireland when it should be void. & this offer he made me from the duke of Ormond, then lord lieutenant of that kingdom. I embraced the offer & the place becoming void in December next by the promotion of Doctor Ward, the then provost of the bishopric of Ossory, I left Oxford December 23 1678 being then 40 Years old and two days & arrived at Dublin January the 19th after, & was sworn & invested provost 24 January 1678.¹⁰³

Marsh was to recall later that he was immediately underwhelmed by his surroundings and by the calibre and conduct of his new charges. His recollections give an insight into the college, its scholars and surroundings on Hooke's entry

¹⁰⁰ Glendinning, *Jonathan Swift*, p. 20.

¹⁰¹ John Browne, 'Kilkenny College', in *Transactions of the Kilkenny Archaeology Society* [now *The Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland*], i (1849-51), pp 223, 227.

¹⁰² See H. T. Welch, 'Jones, Edward (1641–1703)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14996>, accessed 22 Dec. 2005]

But finding this place very troublesome partly by reason of the multitude of business & impertinent visits the provost is obliged to, & partly by reason of the ill education that the young scholars have before they come to the college, whereby they are both rude and ignorant; I was quickly weary of 340 youngmen & boys in this lewd debauched town; & the more so because I had no time to follow my always dearly beloved studies. This I represented to my lord Arran, then lord deputy of Ireland, in the absence of his father the duke of Ormond, then in England.¹⁰⁴

Hooke is recorded as enrolling as one of Trinity's 'rude and ignorant scholars' in early in 1679. Not surprisingly given the non-conformist sympathies of his father and grandfather, and we may surmise Nathaniel himself, Trinity, the bastion of the established church in Ireland, seems to have failed to satisfy his yen for puritan theological rigour. Seemingly at odds with the ethos of the only college available to aspirant religious ministers of the cloth in Ireland, Nathaniel decided to leave Trinity, and his family, friends and native city behind, and seek out a college whose curriculum more closely reflected his own religious opinions.

Nathaniel duly arrived at Glasgow University in Scotland.¹⁰⁵ There he appears to have sought an academic and religious setting more akin to his personal beliefs 'as the Scottish universities [at this time] retained their own religious character and traditions'.¹⁰⁶ Glasgow University's Presbyterian ethos was more likely to suit Hooke than the Anglicanism of Trinity.¹⁰⁷ The established church in Scotland was officially episcopalian in structure and doctrine, as laid down by the Restoration religious settlement. However, in reality the Scottish Church was still much more Calvinist in tone than its Irish counterpart. An Irish Protestant traveller in Scotland in the early years of the Restoration commented that 'those

¹⁰³ Raymond Gillespie (ed.), *Scholar bishop: the recollections and diary of Narcissus Marsh, 1638-1696* (Cork, 2003), pp 22-3. The year as understood by Marsh and his contemporaries began on 25 March, therefore 19 January was continuation of 1678.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 409.

¹⁰⁶ Colin Barr, *Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-65* (Leominster, 2003), p. 29.

who go under the name of Episcopal men in Scotland would seem to us to be rank fanaticks'.¹⁰⁸ The Hooke's Independent brand of dissenting Protestantism had much in common with the 'rank fanaticks' of Scotland.

Besides a religious affinity the universities in Scotland at this time 'existed mainly to make lawyers and ministers out of the children who attended them: these were drawn from the middling ranks of society, merchants and lesser lairds',¹⁰⁹ the social milieu familiar to Hooke. In addition to the college's theology and social composition, Nathaniel had arrived in Glasgow at a time when a campaign was underway against the governing administration's attempts to suppress independent Presbyterian conventicles.¹¹⁰ The restoration of bishops to the Kirk of Scotland in 1662 had aroused deep divisions within Scottish society. There were suspicions that Charles II aimed to stamp out all vestiges of Presbyterianism in Scotland.¹¹¹ A sequence of Acts regulating Church government confirmed this in the minds of many. The 1669 Act of Supremacy granted the sovereign complete authority to 'settle, enact, and emit such constitutions, acts and orders, concerning the external government of the Church, and the persons employed in the same, and concerning all ecclesiastical meetings and matters to

¹⁰⁷ *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, p.ii; O'Connor, *An Irish theologian in enlightenment France* (Dublin, 1995), p. 13.

¹⁰⁸ John Hartstonge to Sir James Graham, 7 Nov. 1675 (Huntingdon Library, HA 14960), cited in Tim Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms 1660-85* (London, 2005), p. 115.

¹⁰⁹ Rosalind Mitchison, *Lordship to patronage: Scotland 1603-1745* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 23.

¹¹⁰ Norman Davies, *The Isles: a history* (London, 1999), pp 508, 510. See Julia Buckroyd, *The life of James Sharp Archbishop of St Andrews 1618-1679: a political biography* (Edinburgh, 1987). This gives a full treatment to the issues that motivated the rebellion.

¹¹¹ Buckroyd, *The life of James Sharp*, pp 93-4; Charles II's own humiliations in Scotland in 1650-51, having to denounce the sins of his father and promise to impose Presbyterianism on England in return for Scottish covenanter military aid against Parliament, led to a profound distaste for such a constitution of church government. Indeed he was to recall later that all the sermons he was forced to sit through had 'only served to confirm his attachment to the Church of England', see John Miller, *Charles II* (London, 1991), p. 9. Hooke referred later to Queen Anne being suspected of having the same aim in the 1700s, Hooke to de Torcy, 2 Jul. 1702, [n.p.], (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 52v). See chapter six for Hooke's activities at this time.

be proposed and determined therein, as they [...] think fit.’¹¹² To move from a decentralised Presbyterian system of synods and presbyteries to ‘having the king [as] our pope’ caused deep resentment. To offset continuing resistance the enactment of a Militia Act on the same day gave the king the right to raise a force of 22,000 men in Scotland (for use in any of the three kingdoms) and the Conventicle Act of 1670 laid down harsh sentences for those refusing to conform. Combined these acts ensured that, in the words of the Scottish secretary of state John Maitland (1616-82), duke of Lauderdale, there ‘never was [a] king so absolute as you are in poor old Scotland’.¹¹³ From 1662 a large body of Presbyterian nonconformity existed outside of the Established Church, posing a major problem for successive Scottish administrations.¹¹⁴ The mainstay of all of these ministries was the wily and Machiavellian-minded Lauderdale. While capable of manoeuvring adroitly to maintain his own grip on power and patronage he proved unable to suppress the independent conventicles, despite rigorous enforcement of severe penal laws.¹¹⁵

Another key figure over the entire course of this controversy was Archbishop James Sharp. Sharp had been delegated by the Presbyterian Church at the time of the Restoration to travel to London and represent their case against greater state interference in the Scottish church.¹¹⁶ For some years he assiduously championed this cause but against ever increasing odds. Eventually, having been seriously compromised by his long stay in London, he himself became the chief

¹¹² Tim Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms 1660-85* (London, 2005), p. 120.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp 120-21.

¹¹⁴ Ronald Hutton, ‘The triple crowned islands’, in Lionel Glassey (ed.), *The reigns of Charles II and James VII and II* (London, 1997), pp 74-5.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹¹⁶ Buckroyd, *The life of James Sharp*, pp 60-1.

instrument, and beneficiary, of the reintroduction of the Episcopal system in Scotland.¹¹⁷ Following this ‘betrayal’ he earned the deep and abiding hatred of many Presbyterians in Scotland. A failed attempt was made on his life in 1668. His successful assassination in 1679 by Presbyterian dissidents triggered severe repression and sparked off widespread rebellion.¹¹⁸ Government forces led by John Graham, later viscount Dundee, were compelled to abandon the country west of Stirling, including the city of Glasgow.¹¹⁹

The rebellion was characterised, between the military engagements, by a series of wide-ranging religious debates conducted in the open air. These deliberations were intended to map out the nature and direction of the Scottish church once the uprising was successful.¹²⁰ To a young dissenter such as Nathaniel Hooke these intellectual debates on the nature of religion would have been as irresistible as a candle to a moth. Unfortunately for the young Irishman metaphysical debate and military discipline were uneasy bedfellows in the midst of an armed uprising. King Charles II sent an English army under the command of his able, unacknowledged, son James Scott, Duke of Monmouth, to deal with the recalcitrant Scotsmen.¹²¹ Charles was mindful of the fate that had befallen his executed father, King Charles I, following his entanglement with Scottish religious rebels in the Bishop’s wars of the late 1630s.¹²²

Monmouth quickly brought order back to Scotland and dispersed the Presbyterian rebels. With an eye firmly on the Exclusion crisis in London, where

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp 71-2.

¹¹⁸ Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms 1660-85* (London, 2005), pp 120, 196-7.

¹¹⁹ A. M. Scott, *Bonnie Dundee: John Graham of Claverhouse* (Edinburgh, 2000), p. 24.

¹²⁰ Davies, *The Isles*, p. 510.

¹²¹ Scott, *England’s troubles*, p. 190.

¹²² Ibid.

moves had been underway since March to displace the King's Catholic brother James, duke of York, from the succession, Monmouth treated the Protestant rebels with notable leniency. Charles II trying to reduce tension in London, grew worried at the acclaim Monmouth's actions received; it appeared he was positioning himself as a potential successor. Charles had hoped he had closed the issue by publicly declaring Monmouth to be illegitimate, and therefore barred from the succession.¹²³ Reports now suggested that far from accepting his debarment from the crown, Monmouth was 'manifestly in the councils against the duke his uncle'.¹²⁴ Monmouth's popular support was not reflected in the House of Commons as yet, though growing connections with the parliamentary opposition led by the Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621-83), earl of Shaftesbury, further increased the king's concerns.¹²⁵ The conflation of the two increasingly hostile interests could prove too strong to resist.

Hooke's stay in Glasgow was as short as that of his sojourn at Trinity. In the aftermath of the defeat of the rebellion the religious and political atmosphere in Scotland was not conducive to students of radical Protestant theology, especially those from Ireland. The government was aware that some of the leading agitators in south west Scotland had been transient radicals from the north of Ireland. Authorities in both countries had long been preoccupied with the security implications of this unwelcome religious cross pollination.¹²⁶ Such was the severity of the government's general crackdown against the disaffected and

¹²³ Miller, *Charles II*, p. 305.

¹²⁴ Michael Mullett, *James II and English politics 1678-1688* (London, 1994), p. 23.

¹²⁵ Miller, *Charles II*, p. 304.

¹²⁶ R. L. Greaves, *God's other children: Protestant nonconformists and the emergence of denominational churches in Ireland 1660-1700* (Stanford, 1997), pp 94-95, 224; Harris, *Restoration*, p. 116.

disgruntled, that the early years of the 1680s in Scotland came to be remembered as the ‘the killing time’.¹²⁷ If the battle for the true Protestant interest in Scotland had ended in defeat, beyond the southern border the crisis in the English political nation intensified. Increasingly engaged by popular politics,¹²⁸ Nathaniel crossed the border into England and travelled south to Cambridge, another university town closer to the major events unfolding in London.

It may have his family’s link with the Cromwellian regime in Ireland that drew Nathaniel, in 1681, to enrol in the University’s Sidney Sussex College.¹²⁹ This was Oliver Cromwell’s *alma mater* and retained a reputation as a ‘hotbed of Puritanism’.¹³⁰ Sidney Sussex seemed eminently suited to fulfil Nathaniel’s religious, and indeed his political, requirements. He is recorded as registering as a sizar at Sidney Sussex on the 16 July 1681.¹³¹ Enrolment as a sizar may point to a diminution in his, or more accurately, his family’s, financial situation. The Hooke family, as prosperous merchants, had given the younger scions of the family up to this point the best education possible, regardless of the expense involved.¹³² They appear to have had strong hopes that both John and Nathaniel would benefit professionally from university formation. In the case of John Hooke their hopes were realised. After several years in Kilkenny Grammar School, he progressed to

¹²⁷ Mitchison, *Lordship to patronage*, p. 78.

¹²⁸ As early as 1679 Hooke had been drawn into politics, being one of the signatories in that year of petition calling for a parliament to be convened, see Melanie S. Zook, *Radical whigs and conspiratorial politics in late Stuart England* (University Park, PA, 1999), Appendix: Radical whig careers, p. 198.

¹²⁹ Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, p. 82; Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, part I, vol. II; Melanie Zook discusses the broader topic of Protestant dissent and radical politics running in families in Zook, *Radical whigs*, p. 30.

¹³⁰ Reilly, *Cromwell: an honourable enemy*, p. 12.

¹³¹ Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses*, part I, vol. II.

¹³² Glendinning, *Jonathan Swift*, p. 20.

Trinity College, Dublin and then to Lincoln's Inns in London, and entry into the ranks of the English legal profession.¹³³

However, Nathaniel's path in life proved more complicated than his brother's. He had been maintained as a pensioner at Trinity, a status befitting 'usually the sons of wealthy businessmen.'¹³⁴ However, perhaps because of a change in family circumstances, at Cambridge he enrolled as a sizar. This required those unable to pay the full costs of tuition to render part payment of their fees by acting as part time servants to those students able to pay in full.¹³⁵ 'The life of the servitor and sizar was often hard as well as degrading. Bed-making, chamber-sweeping, and water-fetching [were] doubtless great preservatives against too much vain philosophy.'¹³⁶ This experience did not hinder the future prospects of the sizar. Isaac Newton, a member of staff at the college during Nathaniel's time there, had himself been a sizar during his undergraduate days.¹³⁷ However it must have come as somewhat of a shock to the system for Nathaniel.

Outside of his studies Nathaniel's interest in politics and religion drew him in the direction of political agitation against the government of Charles II.¹³⁸ Associations such as the Green Ribbon Club, (also known by its formal name as the King's Head Club), functioned as a focal point for those seeking to express opposition to what they perceived as the increasingly autocratic nature of Charles

¹³³ Humphrey W. Woolych, *Lives of eminent serjeants-at-law at the English bar* (2 vols, London, 1869), ii, 466-68; *DNB.*, vol. XXVII, (London, 1877), p. 279.

¹³⁴ *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, p.i; Michael White, *Isaac Newton: the last sorcerer* (London, 1997), p. 46.

¹³⁵ White, *Isaac Newton*, p. 46.

¹³⁶ G. M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (paperback edn., 2002), p. 13.

¹³⁷ White, *Isaac Newton*, pp 46-7.

¹³⁸ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish Card*, p. 11.

II's reign and the prospect of a Catholic succession.¹³⁹ The main figure in this political activism was the earl of Shaftesbury.

Shaftesbury was a skilled political survivor, 'a strange, warped and talented politician'.¹⁴⁰ He was one of several figures of consequence from the Commonwealth era to negotiate successfully and adroitly the Restoration settlement. In 1672 he became lord chancellor of England, but was dismissed for being at odds with the king's pro-French and pro-Catholic policies in 1673.¹⁴¹ Relations between Shaftesbury and Charles II deteriorated sharply as issues relating to religion and the succession became more divisive.¹⁴² Shaftesbury's marshalling of support for the election of three exclusion parliaments between March 1679 and March 1681,¹⁴³ his overt hostility to the duke of York, and his energetic and determined orchestration of disaffected elements in English society into an effective Whig opposition further antagonised Charles II. 'Knowing how highly obnoxious and disaffected his lordship [was] to the king and government'¹⁴⁴ he was arrested for high treason on 2 July 1681.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁹ Hooke referred to Charles's actions in his later writings. See Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702, (A.A.E., CP, Angletterre supp. vol. 3, f. 164r); On the Green Ribbon Club see D. S. Shields, 'Anglo-American clubs: their wit, their heterodoxy, their sedition' in *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, li, no. 2 (Apr., 1994), p. 300: 'Organised by Shaftesbury, the club met at the King's Head Tavern, London. It earned its sobriquet, "The Green Ribbon Club," by the identifying token worn on clothing during street disturbances. It lasted from 1680 to 1681 when it dispersed after the dissolution of the exclusion parliament. There is some debate about whether Locke was a member'.

¹⁴⁰ Fraser, *King Charles II*, p. 418.

¹⁴¹ K. H. D. Haley, *The first earl of Shaftesbury* (Oxford, 1968), p. 342.

¹⁴² Scott Mandelbrote, 'Religious belief and the politics of toleration in the late seventeenth century', in *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkeschiedenis/Dutch Review of Church History*, lxxxii, no. 2 (2001), pp 93-114, examines the dynamics and mentalities of toleration in England, and includes a brief comparison with the Huguenot experience in France.

¹⁴³ Williams, *Dictionary of English and European history*, p. 412.

¹⁴⁴ F. A. Middlebush, *The dispatches of Thomas Plott (1681-1682) and Thomas Chudleigh (1682-1685): English envoys at The Hague* ('S-Gravenhage, 1926), p. 181.

¹⁴⁵ Haley, *Shaftesbury*, p. 654.

A Whig-leaning Grand Jury denied that the evidence of treason proffered against him by the crown was strong enough to warrant a trial by his peers.¹⁴⁶ The judges overseeing proceedings denied jurisdiction over prisoners from the Tower, stating that the Shaftesbury case would have to be brought before the Court of the King's Bench.¹⁴⁷ For fifteen weeks Shaftesbury languished in the Tower until released on bail on the 24 November 1681.¹⁴⁸ However, on 28 September 1682 when two Tory sheriffs were voted into office, the Whigs lost control of London, their stronghold which had sustained attempts to bring about the duke of York's exclusion. If the crown took another case against Shaftesbury he could no longer rely on a compliant Whig jury selected by Whig sheriffs. Faced with this prospect he promptly went into hiding and was reported to have reached the Netherlands, accompanied by a number of other exiles, by the 5 December 1682.¹⁴⁹ English agents in Amsterdam soon reported to the English resident in The Hague, Thomas Chudleigh, that 'his lordship [Shaftesbury] had [Robert] Ferguson with him and it is said that he intends to take a noble house in the city and reside there'.¹⁵⁰

Chudleigh, with the characteristic instincts and outlook of a career diplomat could see both positive and negative connotations in these developments

I am glad to see the birds of prey are no longer able to agree with the English air but flock hither apace, where though I do not much like their company yet I can the better bear it for that you are no longer pestered with them.¹⁵¹

Nathaniel Hooke, abandoning his course of studies at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, became one these 'birds of prey' who flocked to exile in the

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 658.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 683.

¹⁴⁹ Middlebush, *The dispatches of Thomas Plott and Thomas Chudleigh*, p. 188.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 190. The information reached Chudleigh on 6 December 1682.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 189. Chudleigh to William Blathwayt, secretary to Lord Edward Conway, Secretary of State for the Northern provinces from 1681-3.

Netherlands.¹⁵² There he may have encountered John Locke, who was part of the household of the Earl of Shaftesbury during his exile in the United Provinces and remained there following his patron's death in January 1683. Other well known 'birds of prey' included in the circle of Whig exiles reported to have been sighted in the Netherlands by English diplomatic representatives included the 'great villain' and arch plotter Robert Ferguson, Titus Oates, of Popish Plot fame, Abraham Kick, a merchant and former preacher of the Independent church, with whom Shaftesbury resided on first reaching Amsterdam, Forde Grey, a close associate of the duke of Monmouth, and the duke himself.¹⁵³

These were the most high profile members of what, by 1683, had become a large anti-government exile community in the United Provinces.¹⁵⁴ Despite causing less trouble for Charles II and his ministers by having left England, the harmful efforts of these 'rebels' were far from completely nullified. This assorted collection of political and religious radicals continued to plot and disseminate propaganda in England, including influential and damaging pamphlets such as *Recherche et découverte du cruel et barbare assassinat du dernier comte d'Essex* and *An Impartial enquiry into the administration of affairs in England with some reflections on that Kings Declaration of 27 July 1683*. This political scheming and

¹⁵²As a nonconformist Hooke could not graduate in good conscience while the rules of the University required all students to subscribe to the Thirty Nine Articles of the Established Church prior to graduation, see Barr, *Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-65*, p. 29; Macray, *The correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ii, p. iii.

¹⁵³ Middlebush, *The dispatches of Thomas Plott (1681-1682) and Thomas Chudleigh (1682-1685)*, pp 190, 202, 232, 249.

¹⁵⁴G. F. Nuttall, 'English dissenters in the Netherlands 1640-89', in *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkeschiedenis/Dutch Review of Church History*, lix, n.s. (1978-9), pp 37-54; James Walker, 'English exiles in Holland during the reigns of Charles II and James II', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, xxx (1948), pp 111-25.

print subversion led to repeated demands for the States General of the United Provinces to arrest and deal with those responsible¹⁵⁵

Le soussigné envoyé extraordinaire d'Angleterre se trouve obligé par les ordres exprès du Roy, son Maistre, de se plaindre à Vos Seigneuries de la liberté dont jouissent en ce pais les ennemis de Sa Majesté d'outrager impudemment par des libelles les plus exécrales qu'on ait jamais vues ou que la malice mesme de l'enfer ait peu produire....les outrage, insulte et diffame d'une manière plus que barbare, et on ne peut pas assez s'étonner comment les plus abandonnés des scélérats et des traîtres auraient osé commettre un si humble attentat sur l'honneur de Sa Majesté dans un Estat ami que luy est si proche voisin et si étroitement allié, et qu'il y ait aussi dans la domination de VV.SS [members of States-General] des gens capables d'imprimer et puis de débiter et vendre sans scrupule de pareils écrits; Sa Majesté veut toujours espérer que c'a été à l'insceu de VV.SS et qu'elles en témoigneront leur aversion et horreur, en faisant faire une recherché exacte de l'auteur et de l'imprimeur et une punition exemplaire de tous ceux là qui ont osé distribuer et vendre lesdits libelles—desquels VV.SS trouveront dans la liste cy jointe les noms de quelques uns, dont ledit envoyé les a fait acheter luy mesme en François et Flamand--; c'est ce que Sa Majesté se promet de l'amitié et de la justice de VV.SS.¹⁵⁶

However the internal divisions of the Dutch polity, chiefly the ongoing struggle between those favouring the strong influence of the House of Orange and republicans who stressed the rights of each of the individual states, ensured that English agents received little cooperation.¹⁵⁷ Amsterdam, the capital of the powerful state of Holland and one of the great commercial cities of Europe, zealously guarded its sovereignty from external interference. It was renowned as a centre of republican ideology and religious and political toleration. Consequently it attracted the majority of the exiles.¹⁵⁸ Appeals from the English authorities to the provincial States of Holland to act against the activities of these 'villains' fell on deaf ears. Indeed after 'Shaftesbury and his fellow exiles informed the burgomasters at Amsterdam that they had been forced to leave England for

¹⁵⁵ Middlebush, *The dispatches of Thomas Plott and Thomas Chudleigh*, pp 243, 286.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 286, Thomas Chudleigh's memorial to the States-General, 30 January 1685.

¹⁵⁷ Deric Regin, *Traders, Artists, Burghers: a cultural history of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century* (Assen, 1976), pp 186-8; W. P. te Brake, 'Provincial histories and national revolution in the Dutch republic', in M. C. Jacob & W. M. Wijnand, *The Dutch republic in the eighteenth century: decline, enlightenment and revolution* (New York, 1992), p. 77.

¹⁵⁸ Jeremy Black & Roy Porter (eds.), *A dictionary of eighteenth century history* (London, 1996), p. 530.

religious reasons and desired to be made burghers of the city' they were granted civic rights, despite the strong protestations of the English representatives

My Lord Shaftesbury notwithstanding the ill air of the place does intend, as far as I can understand, to continue for the sake of the company at Amsterdam, and endeavours I am told to be made a burgher of that town. To prevent which, least that should prove a protection to him, and serve them for a pretence not to deliver him up in case His Majesty should at any time have cause to demand him, I have been with the Pensionary of Amsterdam, who is one of their deputies in the States of Holland, and represented to him, how ill His Majesty would have reason to take it at their hands, if they should afford any countenance or protection to a man that is so highly obnoxious and disaffected to the King and the Government.¹⁵⁹

Nathaniel Hooke was granted official citizenship status in Amsterdam in 1686.¹⁶⁰

Precisely when he arrived in the Netherlands is unknown but like many other exiles he appears to have enjoyed unofficial protection in Amsterdam for a number of years before this date.¹⁶¹

The new arrivals in the United Provinces availed themselves of the assistance offered by sympathetic fellow countrymen, already resident in ports and towns such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht.¹⁶² Glimpses into this underworld, in which Nathaniel Hooke settled, perhaps as early as 1683 given that he left Cambridge in 1682, come chiefly from the intelligence information gathered by representatives of the English government on the exiles and relayed to the English secretaries of state.

Yet despite this scrutiny the company of exiles began working assiduously to transform their abiding antipathy to Charles II and his brother James, duke of York, into a coherent plan of action. Sightings of members of the group were

¹⁵⁹ Middlebush, *The dispatches of Thomas Plott and Thomas Chudleigh*, pp 196, 201.

¹⁶⁰ Amsterdam Gemeentelijke Archief, 5022, n. 8, *plakkart*, Den Haag, 20 May 1686. Quoted in Ginny Gardner, *The Scottish exile community in the Netherlands, 1660-90* (East Linton, 2004), p. 104.

¹⁶¹ Gardner, *Scottish exile community*, pp 105-107. The attempts of English diplomats and agents to circumvent this state of affairs are discussed later in the thesis, in chapter two.

¹⁶² K. L. Sprunger, *Dutch puritanism: a history of English and Scottish churches of the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Leiden, 1982), p. 3.

made in Bremen, Cleves, Brussels, Utrecht and Rotterdam. English diplomatic representatives became increasingly uneasy. Something was clearly in train, but what? They appealed to London to send help to keep these groups under surveillance, and, where necessary and possible, to take action. Some success was achieved in this early version of ‘counterinsurgency’ as one of the conspirators was persuaded to betray his comrades. In the form of a ‘Letter from Utrecht’ the unsigned source reported regularly with the latest information on the activities of the plotters and those who aided and abetted them.

In one of these reports to England, the Utrecht informer writes of a clandestine meeting with the duke of Monmouth’s chaplain where the monetary affairs of the rebels were discussed. The spy named the chaplain, who travelled to the meeting incognito, as Nathaniel Hooke.¹⁶³ Obviously Hooke had managed to secure a post in the duke’s household and won a position of some trust among the exiled conspirators. Now though he appeared to be dicing with danger in discussing sensitive affairs with the unmasked spy.

Fortunately for Hooke, despite reports such as this one concerning his own activities and those of his comrades, gathering intelligence proved easier for the English government than actually taking effective countermeasures. The English officials and agents found themselves virtually powerless in the absence of co-operation from the Dutch authorities. Their reports clearly outline the ambivalent attitude of the Amsterdam authorities when it came to measures requested against the potential rebels

We have with the greatest trouble and impatience that profitably can be imagined, awaited from hour to hour, to have received orders and authority from the States and Admiralty, or

¹⁶³ Sergeant Solomon Slater to Ambassador Bevil Skelton, 26 July 1685 (B. L., Ms. Add. 41817, f. 120).

either or them, to seize upon his Majesty's rebellious subjects here and such ships as we should find employed in their service; and for my part I cannot but stand astonished in the highest regard that after all the care and pains your honour hath taken it is not yet obtained, and now I must take the liberty to say its seems to me most plain that the time is protracted on set purpose, to give the villains an opportunity of escape but your honour, who hath with all vigilance and industry prosecuted this affair will best know how to represent the disappointment; and I shall only now give your honour an account of how happy you might have been in the catching at once (as I believe) the whole knot of rogues; for as I yesterday gave your honour an account , there came to this island a seeming gentleman, and after a short stay they dispersed, some went by water to reach the vessel they expected, some went to the [Tly?] and others stayed in the village adjacent; This is then what I could give your honour an account of.¹⁶⁴

Upon his accession to the throne James II strenuously complained about the indulgent attitude of the Dutch authorities towards the conspirators. However, James's protest had no effect on the exasperatingly slow response from all parts of the hydra-like Dutch administration. His agents continued to grumble constantly at their humiliating treatment. The would-be rebels though, also found little practical aid forthcoming from William of Orange despite his much vaunted and extensively propagated image as the champion of Protestantism.¹⁶⁵ The Dutch stadholder, the next ruler of the Three Kingdoms if James II remained without an heir, was too astute to compromise his own prospects of succeeding.

The exiles efforts at mounting an expedition were allowed to proceed but only to such a level as would allow them to deliver a jolt to James, and test the strength of his defences without any real prospect of displacing him from the throne. If such an occurrence seemed possible, then William could see to the speedy transport home of the English and Scots regiments in Dutch service, and claim the credit for graciously coming to the aid of his uncle.

Despite the efforts of the English government to obstruct their efforts by the spring of 1685 the exiles had managed to create the nucleus of a small

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., f. 120.

¹⁶⁵ H. H. Rowen, *The princes of Orange: the stadholders in the Dutch Republic* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 137.

invasion force. Ships, men and money had been assembled without great hindrance in Amsterdam in full sight, and to the utter fury, of English agents. Despite the close attention, the duke of Monmouth was making ready to launch a bold project to unseat his newly crowned uncle James and claim the throne of England. His private chaplain on this venture would be Nathaniel Hooke.

CHAPTER 2: MONMOUTH'S REBELLION

In June 1685 Monmouth's small squadron of three ships sailed from the Netherlands to England. On board were around one hundred dissidents, including Nathaniel Hooke, who accompanied the duke as his personal chaplain.¹ The purpose of the expedition was to overthrow Monmouth's uncle James, now King James II since his coronation in April 1685. A landing was planned in the south west of England. During the 1680s when Monmouth had toured England to build support as the Protestant claimant to the throne, his warmest reception had been in this region.² Historically the West Country was associated with support for religious disaffection and dissent. Additionally, Shaftesbury and other Whigs had close personal and economic connections in this region.³

The success of the invasion scheme was dependent upon news of the duke's arrival spreading quickly. It also relied on the small body of returning exiles acting as the nucleus for a larger regular army of local volunteers. Through the existing network of radical Whigs, via a clandestine cross-channel communication system, carefully laid contingency plans had been arranged in preparation for the duke's return. Hooke gained valuable experience from being involved in the planning and execution of the enterprise. Such practical

¹ Anonymous informant to English ambassador Bevil Skelton in Amsterdam, 23 May 1685 (B. L., Add. Ms. 41817, f. 49).

² *An historical account of the heroick life and magnanimous actions of the most illustrious Protestant prince, James Duke of Monmouth* (London, 1683), pp 100-111; *A true narrative of the Duke of Monmouth's late journey into the west in a letter from an eye-witness thereof, to his correspondent in London* (London, 1680); Henry Clark, *His grace the Duke of Monmouth honoured in his progress in the west of England in an account of a most extraordinary cure of the kings evil given in a letter from Crookhorn in the county of Somerset from the minister of the parish and many others* (London, 1680); *A True and wonderful account of a cure of the Kings-evil by Mrs. Fanshaw, sister to His Grace the Duke of Monmouth* (London, 1681), p. 1.

³ Haley, *Shaftesbury*, p. 7.

experience proved useful later in his career when organising a French invasion of Scotland.⁴

In 1685 simultaneous uprisings were envisaged in various other areas of England.⁵ As part of the overall strategy it was intended that the earl of Argyll, ‘as was so resolved before [leaving] Holland’ would foment rebellion in Scotland in conjunction with the other prong of the invasion in south west England.⁶

The two main groups of exiles, Englishmen and Scots, had gravitated around these two magnates in Holland. Cooperation between the parties was vital in order to mount a challenge to James II. Different elements of the fissiparous ‘factious cabals’ or ‘fanatick party,’⁷ the labels under which their opponents contemptuously lumped them together, had their own favoured scheme. After long discussion, a pincer movement against the regime in the shape of mutually reinforcing landings had agreed. Preparations and intricate groundwork was undertaken to prepare the situation in advance. Sympathetic contacts were identified and sounded out, estimates of men and money likely to be available were prepared and discrete enquires made regarding the potential levels and greatest concentrations, of support among the population at large.

⁴ See further details in chapter seven.

⁵ *Edinburgh June the first* (Edinburgh, 1685), p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷ *The Conspiracy, or, The Discovery of the fanatick plot to the tune of let Oliver now be forgotten & c* (London, 1683); James Brome, *The original of plots, or, Some seasonable reflections upon the late horrid fanatick conspiracy in a sermon preached at St. Mary's in Dover, on Sunday September 23, 1683* (London, 1684); Bartholomew Lane, *An appeal to the conscience of a fanatick showing that the King of England, by the fundamental laws of it, is as absolute and independent a monarch as any of the kings mentioned in Scripture, and consequently, as free as any of them from any humane coactive power to punish, censure, or dethrone his: whereunto is added, a short view of the laws both foreign and domestic, against seditious conventicles* (London, 1684); William Smith, *Contrivances of the fanatical conspirators in carrying on their treasons under the umbrage of the popish plot laid open: with depositions sworn before the secretary of state wherein it most clearly appears, this present horrid rebellion hath been designed by the republicans many years, and that James the late duke of Monmouth, &c. were long since highly concerned therein. With*

However, unknown to the plotters, the comprehensive penetration of the Whig exile network on the Continent by English government agents undermined these arrangements. In Scotland, the earl of Argyll failed to attract any significant support. Years of repression during the ‘killing times’ had left the country pacified through terror and exhaustion. Along with this, James II’s chief minister in Scotland, Charles Middleton (1649/50-1719), earl of Middleton, acting decisively on the intelligence gathered from Holland, had instituted an effective state of emergency throughout Scotland.⁸ Indemnified by a blanket pardon in advance for all ‘slaughter-blood, mutilation, fire-raising, burning of ships, or such war-like conveniences as may follow,’⁹ when meeting with ‘hostile opposition,’¹⁰ the king’s forces in Scotland were given *carte blanche* to suppress outbreaks of rebellion.

Argyll’s attempt was a damp squib.¹¹ Widespread support never materialised despite his famous name and formidable local connections. Rather than striking a blow at his authority the attempt strengthened James’s hand in both his kingdoms. In Scotland the Parliament reinforced the country’s already draconian laws against ‘the fanatical party’ by passing two new acts on 9 May.¹² One rendered preaching or attendance at a field or house conventicle, ‘the

some account of Mr Disney who was lately apprehended for printing the rebellious traitorous declaration (London, 1685), p. 31.

⁸ *A proclamation for putting the kingdom of Scotland in a posture of defence against the enemies of the king and government* (Edinburgh, 1685), issued 28 April 1685.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *A true and perfect account of the earl of Argyles landing in the north of Scotland: with the particulars of the whole transaction* (London, 1685), p. 1.

¹² *An account of the proceedings of the two houses of parliament now assembled in England and Scotland, and the Whigs declaration in Scotland together with Argyle’s Declaration at large, as it was published by him and his accomplices* (Dublin, 1685), p. 1.

nurseries and rendezvous of rebellion' punishable by death.¹³ The other made 'the giving or taking of the National Covenant or the Solemn League and Covenant' 'or writing in defence thereof, or owning of them as lawful or obligatory' a treasonable offence.¹⁴

Far more importantly for a newly crowned monarch, the Scottish parliament voted James £216,000 in perpetuity to commence immediately and without conditions.¹⁵ On the 23 May 1685 Argyll's declaration was read in the English Lords and Commons, following which the English Parliament resolved to 'assist his majesty with their lives and fortunes against the said rebels, and all other his enemies whatsoever.'¹⁶ The difficulties which James II was expected to encounter in regard to finance now melted away as Parliament was gripped by an atmosphere of trepidation, triggered by the spectre of the civil strife of the 1640s come again. Unexpectedly, the matter of finance, which had been expected to be the sternest test of James's early reign, a fractious bone of contention between the new Catholic king and his Protestant parliament, was now resolved quickly and without quibble. Moved by news of Argyll's landing the English Commons voted 'that the revenue which was settled on his late majesty for his life be settled on his present majesty for his life.'¹⁷

In Scotland news was also good. Argyll's actions had backfired, undercutting parliamentary opposition and motivating the political nation to rally round James. By mid June 1685 the Scottish feint had collapsed completely, 'the

¹³ *An account of the proceedings of the two houses of parliament now assembled in England and Scotland*, p. 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Printed address of Charles Middleton, secretary of state, to parliament, 13 June 1685 (London, 1685), p. 2.

rebels taken, killed and dispersed to that degree, that the kingdom [of Scotland] is entirely [restored to] peace and tranquillity.’¹⁸ Buoyed by success in Scotland, and exceptional ‘parliamentary generosity’ James’s government was now stronger than at any point since his coronation.¹⁹ The English rebels faced a difficult task.

At dawn on Thursday 11 June 1685 a boat landed four miles east of Lyme Regis in Dorset.²⁰ Two ‘gentlemen’, rowed ashore by ‘ten oarsmen from the largest of three ships’, asked news of local fishermen from the village of Chideock.²¹ Remote as they were from events, the fishermen obviously had access to news. They replied that there was a rebellion in Scotland, led by the earl of Argyll. The gentlemen then said there would be a rebellion in England and Ireland as well. To which the fishermen answered that they hoped there would not be a rebellion ‘but the gentlemen had smiled at each other and spoke in some foreign language.’²² These two men from Monmouth’s entourage were the advance scouts for the landing.

The encounter ended with the gentlemen enquiring the way toward Hawkchurch.²³ A council of war was held shipboard and it was decided the enterprise should proceed. Shortly afterwards the rebellion commenced. The rebels landed and swiftly took control of Lyme itself. The duke addressed the

¹⁷ *The addresses of the Lords and Commons presented to his Majesty*, (London, 1685), p. 2.

¹⁸ *An account of the most remarkable fights and skirmishes between his majesties forces and the late rebels in the kingdom of Scotland with what other passages happened, from the first landing of the late earl of Argyle, to his utter rout and defeat*, p. 8.

¹⁹ Mitchison, *Lordship to patronage*, p. 114.

²⁰ ‘An exact relation of the manner of James, duke of Monmouth’s proceedings on the day of his invading and possessing himself of His Majesty’s town and port of Lyme Regis in the county of Dorset – testified to the king in council’, [n.d.] (B. L., Harleian Ms. 6845, f. 252).

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.* The men were Thomas Dare and Hugh Chamberlain. They proceeded to acquire horses for Monmouth’s intended cavalry, see W. MacDonald Wigfield, *The Monmouth rebellion: a social history* (Bradford upon Avon, 1980), pp 33, 34.

town's population and stated the reasons that underlay his actions. He claimed to have arrived to safeguard the well being of the country and its people, and uphold the cause of the Protestant religion. He appealed for all like-minded loyal subjects to rally to his standard and fight the unjust and oppressive policies of French and Catholic influenced regime of James II.²⁴

Monmouth's appeal readily attracted support amongst some sections of the population. It was made in an area renowned for both resistance to Charles I forty years earlier and its continuing nonconformism.²⁵ Additionally it was cleverly couched in terms recalling the spectres of such traditional bogeymen as resurgent Catholicism and a despotic monarch menacing liberties. In a country recently convulsed by political and religious controversy centred on the events of the Popish plot, the Exclusion crisis and the Rye House plot,²⁶ many were suspicious of the king. Parallels with the crises of forty years before were all apparent to many observers. James II, reflecting on the period later, pointed out that the events of the late 1670s 'had so perfect an air of the fabulous reports which proceeded the late Revolution [of the 1640s], that those who remembered it,

²⁴ Anon., *The declaration of James duke of Monmouth, and the noblemen, gentlemen & others, now in arms, for defence & vindication of the Protestant religion, & the laws, rights & privileges of England, from the invasion made upon them: & for delivering the kingdom from the usurpation & tyranny of James duke of York* (n.p., 1685).

²⁵ Lyme sustained a lengthy siege during the civil wars and was strongly puritan. See David Underdown, *Fire from heaven: life in an English country town in the seventeenth century* (London, 1992), p. 229; The looting of two nearby towns after they had agreed terms with the royalist army (the troops ignored their officers and the agreement) had further emboldened Lyme to defiance. Royalist forces were refused entry in August 1643 and were finally forced to lift the siege by the advance of a parliamentary army in June 1644, see Haley, *Shaftesbury*, pp 44, 50

²⁶ The timbre of the times is well illustrated in *Strange and wonderful news from Bristol* a pamphlet published in 1678. The subtitle goes to the heart of the mentality of the period: *being a true relation, how several sheep were found killed near that city; their bellies being ripped open, and their fat only taken out of them; all the rest of the carcass being left entire, in order (as it is to be feared) to the kindling more dreadful fires, for carrying on the horrible and damnable Popish plot and conspiracy for the destruction of His Majesty, and the Protestant religion and government now by law established.*

thought themselves gone back to forty one'.²⁷ In Ireland too the situation was seen as 'very like the case in the beginning of the late Revolutions.'²⁸ It seemed like the battle standards of the civil wars were being raised again throughout the Three Kingdoms.²⁹

Equally the economic situation in 1685 was severely depressed, especially cloth manufacture, which was mostly concentrated in the south west of England. It was logical for Monmouth to attempt to draw on these negative sentiments in order to present himself as an alternative to James II. Fears of a dismal future in a recatholicised kingdom had already led to plans for the creation of a place of refuge for those of 'tender conscience'. A widespread and deep seated sense of foreboding affected much of society. Popular prophecies forecast an apocalypse to come. The only certain hope of escaping from the unstoppable tide of poverty, popery and tyranny seemed to lie in the untainted colonies of the New World.

This led to some extraordinary schemes combining politics, religion and

²⁷ J. S. Clarke (ed.), *The life of James II* (2 vols, 1816), I, 515; cited in Tim Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms 1660-85* (London, 2005), p. 35.

²⁸ Harris, *Restoration*, p. 131.

²⁹ *A Sober and seasonable discourse by way of a dialogue between a states-man and a country-gentleman making it manifest that the sober and truly religious people of this nation, formerly called Puritans and of late Presbyterians, were not the designers and promoters of the last war: and proving by unanswerable reasons that there is no such danger of a second war, as is generally feared / written by a true lover of his king and country for the quieting the spirits of all sorts of people* (London, 1681); *The the [sic] good old cause revived* (London, 1680); *Henry the Sixth, the second part. Or The misery of civil war as it was acted at the Dukes Theatre. Written by Mr. Crown* (London, 1681), pp i, 72; Blair Worden, *Roundhead reputations: the English civil wars and the passions of posterity* (London, 2001), p. 4 and Scott, *England's troubles*, pp 24-7. A very prominent feature of these years was the publication, or republication, of many books and pamphlets recounting the events and history of the 1640s, notably from an Irish perspective Sir John Temple's *The Irish rebellion, or, An history of the beginnings and first progress of the general rebellion raised within the Kingdom of Ireland upon the three and twentieth day of October, in the year 1641 together with the barbarous cruelties and bloody massacres which ensured thereupon* (London, 1679) ; among the cascade of 1640s related material, other works recalled the trial (or mistrial) of Strafford, Cromwell's rule (or misrule) and Charles I death (or martyrdom) with the positive or negative gloss determined by writers 'party' stance.

trade, in which the Hookes were deeply involved.³⁰ In a document written later Nathaniel Hooke reflected on the motivation and intent of those involved. He stated that the

familiarity I used to have with the earl of Peterborough, leader of the expedition, and with Mr Penn his friend, who is very well versed in the affairs of America, gives me the ability to speak of their designs with great clarity.³¹

Rather astonishingly, the plans Hooke refers to included the foundation of a new state, a republic in the Americas, some one hundred years before the American Revolution. It is significant that Hooke describes his comrades from the period, and by implication himself, as malcontents

King Charles II being restored to his throne for 19 years, the malcontents, supported by the Dutch, thought of establishing themselves in America in the form of a Republic, and chose the earl of Peterborough to execute it. This project was very far advanced by the end of the third year of the reign of James II [1687], when the hope of impending revolution in their favour, coupled with the cooling of the Dutch, made the malcontents desist with their designs.³²

The practical success of this enterprise necessitated the seizure of strategic territory. Various places were suggested in North America and the Caribbean. In Spanish America, thoughts focused on Havana in Cuba, ‘the key to Spanish

³⁰ Earlier schemes founded on the same desire had seen the migration of colonists to New England and to the Caribbean. Recalling the similarity between the crisis periods of the 1630s/40s and the 1670s/80s, in 1630, as England was increasingly troubled by religious and political controversy, an attempt to establish a colony on the hopefully named Providence Island, off the coast of Nicaragua. This Protestant refuge scheme, like that which Hooke describes in the 1680s, had been supported by a number of leading dissenter lords, including the earl of Warwick, lord Saye and Sele and John Pym. The question of whether these actions were motivated by bravery or cowardice was the subject of debate, in England and in the new colonies. An important question concerned the best means of defending the Protestant religion and England itself: was it by resisting unsavoury practices at home or creating prosperous and powerful settlements in the Americas from where attacks could be launched on the Spanish Empire, the mainstay of Catholicism? Crusade at home or abroad? For an interesting discussion on these points see Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ‘Errand to the Indies: puritan colonisation from Providence Island to the Western Design’, in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., xxxv, no. 1 (Jan. 1988), pp 70-99. This long standing puritan-inspired plan to strike the Spanish Empire at the source of its strength strongly influenced Hooke when he analysed the strategy England might adopt in the 1700s during the War of Spanish Succession, and his own experience in the 1680s and his family’s nonconformist links underpinned and facilitated this thinking.

³¹ ‘England’s reason for embarking upon war’, memoir sent by Hooke to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 179r).

³² Ibid.

America' or, foreshadowing the later Scottish Darien project, somewhere on the Panamanian isthmus.³³ Dutch support would be vital in achieving their objective. Once established, the new colony would seek to disrupt and harass Spanish shipping. Eventually they would be forced to allow ships of the new entity to carry at least a portion of their trade. 'The first overtures [on such a scheme as the Darien idea] came from the earl of Peterborough, it was his favoured project in 1686 and 1687.'³⁴

The Dutch interest and involvement in the project, as protectors of the new republic, might have been motivated by the chance to muscle on the highly profitable but zealously guarded trade of the Spanish American empire. This would remain a strong current of strategy at the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession in 1702, when Europe's major powers fought over the dismemberment of the Spanish Empire. Though plans for the invasion of England subsequently overshadowed Dutch support for the English dissident's enterprise, various schemes and plans continued to be discussed against the background of political turbulence in England.

One of those deeply involved in these enterprises was Nathaniel's brother John Hooke. At this time he obviously shared his brother Nathaniel's Whig outlook and dissenting religious views. John Hooke's involvement with the American enterprise endured longer than that of Nathaniel and could be termed a success, though in different terms to those originally envisaged. Knowledge of his continuing involvement comes from the records of a dispute with a former

³³ Ibid. The Darien project was an attempt to establish a Scottish colony in Panama in the late 1690s. It also hoped to benefit from trade transshipment. It will be discussed in greater length in chapter seven.

³⁴ Ibid.

business partner Daniel Coxe, regarding the latter's claim for payment for services rendered.³⁵ This dispute escalated into a legal tussle that came before the Court of Chancery in 1706.³⁶ Interestingly both Hooke and Cox were married to daughters of Major General John Lambert (1619-84), a very influential military and political figure during the Commonwealth and Protectorate, and viewed as a possible successor to Cromwell.³⁷ This underlines another of the Hooke family ties to the Protestant and parliamentary *milieu*.

Evidence given by John Hooke in this case provides a glimpse of the trepidation with which at least some from nonconformist backgrounds regarded the anticipated accession of James II.³⁸ Such unease existed in all three kingdoms. In Ireland in early 1685 'the Ormond baronies [in Tipperary] were swept by rumours that the coronation of James II would be attended by a Catholic massacre of Irish Protestants, as had occurred in Ulster in 1641'; consequently declared one local dissenter, 'all Sober people here are inclined & pr[e]p[ar]ing to go to West

³⁵ Dr Daniel Coxe (1640-1730) was a medical doctor, an author of learned works on vegetables and a colonial entrepreneur. Coxe had engaged in colonial ventures in the mid 1680s, acquiring property in West New Jersey. Later he sold the bulk of his interests there to the West New Jersey Society, a group of forty-eight London merchants, and turned his interest further south toward the Carolinas, Georgia, Florida and Louisiana. He was involved in various attempts to establish settlements in these areas, including one aimed at establishing a Huguenot colony on the Gulf of Mexico in opposition to French efforts in the area. Commerce, colonial expansion and religion were again interlinked in opposing what were seen as threatening rivals in America and Europe. Coxe was described as a pioneer of the idea that 'the destiny of the English in America embraced more than the settlement and exploitation of the Atlantic seaboard', V. W. Crane, *The southern frontier, 1670-1732* (New York, 1928), p. 50. His son, Daniel Coxe (baptised 1673) also migrated to West New Jersey and became involved in the political and commercial affairs of the 'province'. See Michael Hunter, 'Coxe, Daniel (1640-1730)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37319>, accessed 27 December 2005]

³⁶ Bill of complaint of Dr Daniel Coxe v John Hooke, Serjeant-at-Law, 1706 (P.R.O. [now The National Archives], C9/374/45).

³⁷ David Farr, 'The military and political career of John Lambert, 1619-57' (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1996), p. 150.

³⁸ Bill of complaint of Dr Daniel Coxe v John Hooke, Serjeant-at-Law, 1706 (P.R.O. [now The National Archives], C9/374/45). Thoughts of a new start in the American lands had been a consideration for Oliver Cromwell in the 1630s, as prospects in England looked bleak, see Reilly, *Honourable enemy*, p. 15.

Gurseay [Jersey].³⁹ Such anxieties prompted John Hooke, and a group of likeminded associates, to acquire property in this American colony in early 1685. This would be their haven from persecution ‘where the most murderous plotters against the Stuarts planned a yeoman utopia of dissent, religious and political.’⁴⁰

Hooke testified that at the time he

and many other persons of his acquaintance were under apprehensions of the prevalency of Popery in England and had thoughts of providing a place of refuge in the West Indies in case the Popish interest should prevail. And this def[enden]t [was] informed that diverse of his friends and acquaintances were making purchases for the same reason in West New Jersey.⁴¹

In 1683, in the wake of the fallout from the Rye house plot a large number of other Irish nonconformists had already fled to New Jersey.⁴² The land to which John Hooke had acquired rights consisted of some 3000 acres in total in the proprietorship of West New Jersey along the River Delaware.⁴³ West New Jersey in 1685 was barely 21 years old and little settled except for a scattering of Swedes, Danes and Finns.⁴⁴ There were however relatively strong Irish dissenter connections to the colony. William Penn acquired part title to the colony in 1676,

³⁹ Kerby Miller, Arnold Schrier, Bruce Boling, & David Doyle (eds), *Irish immigrants in the land of Canaan: letters and memoirs from colonial and revolutionary America* (Oxford, 2003), p. 15.

⁴⁰ S. S. Webb, *Lord Churchill's coup: the Anglo-American empire and the Glorious Revolution reconsidered* (New York, 1995), p. 268.

⁴¹ Bill of complaint of Dr Daniel Coxe v John Hooke, Serjeant-at-Law, 1706 (P.R.O. [now The National Archives], C9/374/45); also quoted in Farr, ‘The military and political career of John Lambert’, p. 150.

⁴² Miller, Schrier, Boling & Doyle (eds), *Irish immigrants in the land of Canaan*, p. 15.

⁴³ John Hooke eventually placed his interests in the West New Jersey colony at the disposal of the [Anglican] Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. See P.R.O.[now The National Archives], C9/374/45. The society was founded in his house in London on 8 Mar. 1699. Hooke, now conforming to the Church of England, was one of the five original members. See S.P.C.K., Society Minutes, 8 Mar. 1699 (S.P.C.K. Archives, London), I am indebted to Dr Thomas O’Connor for the reference and copies of the documents; W. O. B. Allen and Edmund McClure, *Two hundred years. The history of the SPCK 1698-1898* (London, 1898); Craig Rose, ‘The origins and ideals of the S.P.C.K. 1699-1716’ in John Walsh, Colin Haydon and Stephen Tayler (eds), *The Church of England c.1689-1833* (Cambridge, 2002), pp 172-190.

⁴⁴ Gabriel Thomas, *An historical and geographical account of the province and country of Pennsylvania, and of the West-New-Jersey in America ... with a map of both countries* (London, 1698), p. 13; *An Abstract or abbreviation of some few of the many (later and former) testimonies from the inhabitants of New-Jersey and other eminent persons who have wrote particularly concerning that place* (London, 1681), p. 27.

as well as Pennsylvania, ‘and invited other dissenters to settle there’.⁴⁵ In 1681 a company of Dublin Quakers took lands on the east side of the Delaware River opposite the site of Philadelphia. This ‘Irish Tenth’ became the nucleus of Gloucester county, and for several generations Irish Quakers would settle on both sides of the Delaware.⁴⁶ Following a reorganisation in the colonial government in 1683 when Penn extended his ownership, settlements on the Delaware and Cohansey rivers ‘began to fill with Irish Quakers and Baptists, attracted by economic prospects as well as by guarantees of religious freedom and civil equality’.⁴⁷ John Hooke and his companions in this enterprise, (Nathaniel also had some involvement in the scheme), hoped that this favourable situation on the Delaware, with a deep water anchorage, would prove a fortuitous site for an *entrepôt* enterprise.⁴⁸ This would allow them to pursue trade as well as reaping profits in rents from their positions as landed proprietors.⁴⁹ The mercantile background of the Hooke family in Ireland proved valuable in forging these plans.

The projected American schemes were still in their formative stages by the time of Monmouth’s venture. James II was a mere two months on the throne of England and no judgment indicative of the long-term character of his reign could yet have been reached. In this sense Monmouth’s enterprise was prematurely launched. Yet had he waited longer James’s agents in the United Provinces might

⁴⁵ Miller, Schrier, Boling & Doyle (eds), *Irish immigrants in the land of Canaan*, p. 14.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Thomas, *An historical and geographical account of the province and country of Pennsylvania, and of the West-New-Jersey in America ... with a map of both countries* (London, 1698), pp 15, 19, 27.

⁴⁹ *An abstract or abbreviation of some few of the many (later and former) testimonies from the inhabitants of New-Jersey and other eminent persons who have wrote particularly concerning that place* (London, 1681), pp 4, 24.

have scuttled the entire operation. While the timing was precipitative, Monmouth and his party had had little choice.

The English government were aware of the rebel's intentions for some months.⁵⁰ Reports from agents in Holland gave information regarding their plans and the names of a number of their collaborators in England. Many of these suspects were subject to preventative arrest and detention, cutting off at source 'the supplies of money, secretly conveyed through their hands, and transmitted for the assistance of the rebels and maintenance of the war.'⁵¹ Even benefiting from this insider information the authorities' response was less effective than it might have been, though far more decisive and determined than the slow and vacillating reaction to William's much more serious incursion three years later.

In 1685 William watched events in south west England closely. With an eye to his own ambitions, his attitude to Monmouth was ambivalent. At times the young duke was a valuable pawn, useful to remind James of the inherent limits to the pursuit of his policies of toleration and strong monarchy. Officially the Stadholder could not condone the activities of King James's rebellious subjects in the Netherlands, but he could point to being limited by law in dealing with them. Yet, at other times, Monmouth proved both a nuisance and an embarrassment to

⁵⁰ Paul Hofstijzer, " 'Such only as are very honest, loyall and active': English spies in the Low Countries, 1660-88," in Paul Hofstijzer and C. C. Barfoot (eds), *Fabric and fabrications: the myth and making of William and Mary* (Amsterdam, 1990), pp 73-92.

⁵¹ Charles Allestree, *A sermon preached at Oxford before Sir William Walker, Mayor of the said city; Upon the 26th of July 1685: Being the day of thanksgiving for the defeat of the rebels in Monmouth's rebellion* (Oxford, 1685), p. 25. Allestree's opinion of James and his policies, sycophantic in July 1685, became critical later in the reign. Ironically his opinions changed again following 1688. He first welcomed and then decried the religious policy of William III. 'He is remembered with horror: for the members of the Church of England were never threatened with so much danger from popery, as from a set of men that He countenanced and abetted in their wicked contrivance to destroy the Established Church', he wrote following William's death in 1702, see Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999), p. 268. See Hooke's comments on William's religious policy in chapters four and five.

the stadholder. In openly plotting insurrection, Monmouth heightened tensions between England and the Dutch Republic, contrary to William's wishes.

While William had no qualms about quietly destabilising James' regime, he had no desire to see his uncle propelled into a French alliance. With James childless and advancing in age it seemed likely that William, through his marriage to James's daughter Mary, would soon have influence over English commercial and military resources. Monmouth's claims to safeguarding the Protestant religion and liberty, shibboleths constantly rehearsed by the Whigs, was fine in theory and propaganda, but the prospect of another male Stuart, even the Protestant Monmouth, forcing his way on to the throne was one that did nothing for William's designs.⁵² His aim was to gain access to the English 'sinews of war',⁵³ which were required for impending conflict with France. He did not want Monmouth upsetting his careful schemes for constructing a continental alliance of such strength as to be able finally, not only to stymie, but to roll back the territorial gains of Louis XIV. Unbeknownst to Nathaniel Hooke at this time, his later career in European diplomacy was to be shaped by events that unfolded from the ensuing clash between the Dutch stadholder and the French monarch.

With William watching the progress of events in England closely from over the Channel, Monmouth and his entourage, Hooke, Ferguson, Fletcher and Lord Grey in the West Country were desperately trying to form a serviceable fighting force and arrive at a plan of campaign. How quickly, and even more

⁵² See Wouter Troost, *William III, the stadholder-king: a political biography* (translation, Aldershot, 2005), p. 174.

⁵³ Allestreet, *A sermon preached at Oxford before Sir Will. Walker, Mayor of the said city; Upon the 26th of July 1685: Being the day of thanksgiving for the defeat of the rebels in Monmouth's rebellion* (Oxford, 1685), p. 26.

importantly, how effectively could they turn inexperienced civilians, mainly artisans and farmers, into disciplined and capable troops?

Reports soon reached London of the landing in Lyme.⁵⁴ Local militias in the surrounding areas were ordered to a state of readiness, although there were concerns regarding their reliability. A naturalized French Huguenot, Louis Duras (1641-1709), earl of Feversham and nephew of the renowned French commander, Marshal Turenne, was entrusted with overall charge of the forces sent to deal with the insurrection. Tactical command, however, was held by John Churchill (1650-1722), later duke of Marlborough, James' most skilled and most trusted officer. As Marlborough commented sourly at the time, and ominously in light of future events, 'I see plainly that I am to have the trouble and that the honour will be another's'.⁵⁵

Providing there was any honour to be claimed. In the twenty five years there had been no major military engagement in England. The persistent refusal of Parliament to countenance a permanent standing army, and a preference for a strong navy, less likely to interfere in politics,⁵⁶ had curtailed the military

⁵⁴ James issued a proclamation on the 13 June 1685, two days after the landing, stating that 'James Duke of Monmouth, Ford, Lord Gray outlawed for high treason, with divers other Traitors and Outlaws, are lately landed in an hostile manner at Lyme' were to be considered traitors and rebels. James II, *A proclamation given at our court at Whitehall this Thirteenth day of June 1685* (London, 1685). Samuel Dassel, deputy searcher of customs at Lyme and the collector of customs Anthony Thorold had ridden from Lyme to London in a little over thirty hours with the first eyewitness reports, Earle *Monmouth's rebels*, p. 58.

⁵⁵ David Chandler, *Marlborough as military commander* (London, 1973), p. 15.

⁵⁶ J. D. Davis, 'International relations, war and the armed forces', in L. K. J. Glassey, (ed.), *The reigns of Charles II and James VII & II* (London, 1997), p. 219; Paul Kennedy, *The rise and fall of British naval mastery* (London, 1976), pp 57-67; Jacques Abbadie, *The history of the late conspiracy against the king and the nation* (London, 1696), p. 110; Anon., *Remarks on the present condition of the Navy, and particularly of the victualling in which the notion of fortifying of garrisons is exploded, and 'tis clearly proved that the only security of England consists in a good fleet : in a letter from a sailor to a member of the House of Commons* (London, 1670), pp 3-6, 21-23; Nathaniel Boteler [Butler], *Six dialogues about sea-services between an high-admiral and a captain at sea* (London, 1685), p. 4.

resources of the English crown.⁵⁷ Attempts to circumvent these restrictions saw forces in England placed on the Irish military establishment and regiments transferred from the disbanded base at Tangier to ‘temporary’ quarters in England. Hooke mentions later that these 3000 veteran ‘Tangerines’ were used as a purposeful method of royal intimidation on their return to England in 1684.⁵⁸

In European terms, James’s 8000 professional troops were an insignificant force.⁵⁹ The tiny German duchy of Jülich-Berg was maintaining 5000 troops by 1684 and states such as Hanover, Saxony and especially Brandenburg-Prussia, smaller and economically less developed than England, maintained far larger military establishments.⁶⁰ The major players in the European military stakes were France (130,000), Sweden (65,000), Austria (60,000) and the Dutch Republic (50,000).⁶¹ England’s position was a far cry from the heady days of the Commonwealth, which in July 1652 had over 70,000 men in arms, though the untapped potential was obvious.⁶²

Monmouth, after consulting his advisors was proclaimed king by Joseph Tilley in Taunton on 19 June. The new ‘King’ James proceeded to issue a Proclamation declaiming the many and various crimes of James II.⁶³ This ensured

⁵⁷ Though Parliament were well disposed to vote subsidies for the navy, Charles II’s problems with the Whig and Exclusion-minded Parliament from 1678 onwards saw a decline in even this blue ribbon branch of the military. Samuel Pepys lamented the run-down of the navy’s state of readiness in *Memoirs relating to the state of the Royal Navy of England, for ten years, determined December 1688* (London, 1690).

⁵⁸ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702, (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 164r).

⁵⁹ John Childs, *Warfare in the seventeenth century* (London, 2003), p. 90; Earle, *Monmouth’s rebels: the road to Sedgemoor 1685* (London, 1977), p. 59.

⁶⁰ Childs, *Warfare in the seventeenth century*, pp 89-90.

⁶¹ Peter Wilson, ‘Warfare in the old regime 1648-1789’ in Jeremy Black (ed.), *European warfare 1453-1815* (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 80. Figures quoted refer to 1683; Austria is the term used in the text; Davis, ‘International relations, war and the armed forces’, p. 219.

⁶² Childs, *Warfare in the seventeenth century*, p. 91.

⁶³ Anon., *The declaration of James duke of Monmouth, and the noblemen, gentlemen & others, now in arms, for defence & vindication of the Protestant religion, & the laws, rights & privileges*

that anything less than victory would see severe repercussions for the rebels. Monmouth's belligerent role in the Exclusion Crisis and the hostility of the 'Protestant duke's' supporters towards 'the Catholic duke' was no doubt seared into James' consciousness.⁶⁴

Making his intent clear in a flurry of proclamations, James declared Monmouth and 'diverse other traitors'⁶⁵ who are 'lately landed in an hostile manner at Lyme [...] and have sent and dispersed some of their traitorous accomplices into neighbouring countries'⁶⁶ to be 'outlawed for high treason' on the 13 June 1685.⁶⁷ On 15 June James struck against the 'vile and traitorous paper [...] entitled the Declaration of the duke of Monmouth' ordering it to be 'burnt by the hands of the common hangman, as containing the highest of treasons'.⁶⁸ Anyone in possession of the declaration, and who failed to report it would be adjudged guilty of high treason, as would anyone 'receiving or entertaining the said traitorous paper'.⁶⁹ Suitably warned of the 'danger they will inevitably incur thereby', and now deprived of the defence of ignorance, guilty parties failing to comply 'will answer the contrary at their peril'.⁷⁰

Monmouth attracted a large number of recruits, but few men of influence in the region. An assault on Bristol was planned as the next objective. Seizing the

of England, from the invasion made upon them: & for delivering the kingdom from the usurpation & tyranny of James duke of York (1685), p. 2.

⁶⁴ Pamphlets such as *A dialogue between Monmouth-shire and York-shire about cutting Religion according to fashion* (London, 1681) and *An answer to a scoffing and lying libel, put forth and privately dispersed under the title of a wonderful account of the curing the King's Evil, by Madam Fanshaw the Duke of Monmouth's sister* (London, 1681), p. 1, encapsulated the bitter tone engendered in the representations of the two rival dukes as the figureheads of the Protestant and Catholic parties respectively.

⁶⁵ James II, *A proclamation* (London, 1685).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ James II, *A proclamation against the spreading of a traitorous declaration published by James Duke of Monmouth* (London, 1685).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

chief port and city of the region would have constituted a significant success due to the city's well supplied munitions stores and its strategic function as a trade and communication centre between Scotland, Ireland and the Continent. Allowing for the need for training and consolidation of his forces, Monmouth's army nevertheless took a long time to set about the intended *coup de main* on the city. This allowed the duke of Beaufort to assemble troops and reinforce Bristol before the rebels could act. Following this setback, Monmouth's efforts floundered.

To resuscitate the insurrection Monmouth considered the possibility of moving on London.⁷¹ Prominent Whigs who had been in communication with the conspirators in Holland were based in London. Most prominent among these were John Wildman and Henry Danvers. They were old hands in the underworld of opposition to Charles II and James II. Wildman had been an active Cromwellian and remained an unreconstructed republican. Danvers, a Baptist, was an inveterate opponent of the later Stuarts and unremittingly harassed the regimes of both brothers with hostile political activities. Both had been actively involved in the plotting preceding the invasion and were intimately aware of when and how it was planned to come to pass. Yet nothing happened in London.

Monmouth was determined to force events in the capital by sending an emissary to the city. He chose Nathaniel Hooke to carry out the mission. Monmouth placed a considerable degree of trust in his young Irish chaplain. In what would become a recurring theme in his career, Hooke was assigned an onerous mission, to travel to hostile territory incognito in an attempt to alter the

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Allestreet, *A sermon preached at Oxford before Sir Will. Walker, Mayor of the said city; Upon the 26th of July 1685: Being the day of thanksgiving for the defeat of the rebels in Monmouth's rebellion* (Oxford, 1685), p. 12.

course of events in favour of his master.⁷² Directly after the battle of Norton St. Philip, Hooke made his way from Bridgwater, through the opposing military lines, evading capture on the route to London, and then slipped past the encampments of royal troops quartered around the city.⁷³

In London, Hooke met Danvers, leader of the would-be rebels in the city and tried to chivvy him into action. The two men had very different ideas concerning the best way to act in support of Monmouth. To Hooke's horror, Danvers plans (in so far as he seems to have had any) centred on an assassination plot, based on 'the dispatching of the king.'⁷⁴ The operation was to be carried out when the king was most vulnerable and exposed, 'by shooting him as he was coming in his barge to Somerset-House, or stabbing him at Whitehall or St James'.⁷⁵

Hooke completely opposed this line of action. He was adamant that they [Monmouth, Hooke and the other leading rebels] were for 'open war'⁷⁶ not cowardly actions such as that being proposed by Danvers. He was aghast at this prospect of assassination being contemplated let alone executed. It ran counter to the often-stated revulsion with which the majority of the Whig-minded political interest claimed to hold assassination. Pamphlets had been produced setting out various strands of political thought mitigating resistance to unjust laws.⁷⁷ These

⁷² Hooke would later undertake the same type of mission for James II and Louis XIV.

⁷³ James MacPherson, *Original papers containing the secret history of Great Britain from the restoration to the accession of the House of Hanover, to which are prefixed extracts of the life of James II as written by himself* (Dublin, 1775), p. 148.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ William Atwood, *Jani anglorum facies nova* (1680); William Petyt, *Antient right of the Commons of England asserted* (1680); John Somers, *Brief history of the succession* (1680); Thomas Hunt, *The great and weighty consideration...considered* (1680); W. G., *The case of the succession to the crown* (1679); *An impartial account of the nature and tendency of the late*

theories shared a common origin based on the long established supremacy of constitutional legalism. No matter how exalted the monarch, legitimacy derived, it was argued, from enforcing just laws for the greater good. Where the monarch or his officials acted without consent to the detriment of the governed, resistance was justified. Opinions differed over whether resistance should be passive or active but agreement still surrounded the maxim that the monarch's own person was sacred and inviolate. Harming the king would be a series infraction of the law, undermining any claims to legitimate resistance. The legacy of revulsion at the regicide of Charles I married practical politics to abstract theory. A scheme to assassinate Charles II in 1683, during the Rye House Plot, had been condemned by Whigs 'with the greatest detestation imaginable, as a most base and bloody action, which they never would have their own hands imbued in, nor their posterity stained with'.⁷⁸ Assassination was a tactic the Whigs associated with the popish party,⁷⁹ and decried as a dark method wielded by operatives of the Jesuits

addresses (1681); Charles Blount, *An appeal from the country to the city* (1679); *A dialogue at Oxford between a tutor and a gentleman* (1681); *Vox populi: or, the people's claim to their Parliament sitting* (1681); William Jones and Algernon Sidney, *A just and modest vindication of the proceedings of the last two parliaments* (1681); Edward Hiceringill, *Second part of the history of Whiggism* (1682); Samuel Johnson, *Julian the apostate* (1682); Elkanah Settle, *The character of a popish successor* (1681). The Tory response in defence of divine right absolute monarchy was spearheaded by the (posthumous) publication of Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarchia, or the natural power of kings* (1680) originally written in the 1620s. Other Tory contributions to the pamphlet wars included John Nalson, *Common interest of king and people* (1678); William Falkner, *Christian loyalty* (1679); George Hickes, *Discourse of the sovereign power* (1682) among hundreds of examples. See Mark Goldie, 'Restoration political thought', in Glassey (ed.), *The reigns of Charles II and James VII & II* (Basingstoke, 1997), pp 12-35 and Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms 1660-1685* (London, 2005), pp 146-162.

⁷⁸ John Tutchin, *A new martyrology, or, The bloody assizes now exactly methodized in one volume : comprehending a complete history of the lives, actions, trials, sufferings, dying speeches, letters, and prayers of all those eminent martyrs who fell in the west of England, and elsewhere, from the year 1678 to 1689: with the pictures of several of the most eminent of them in copper plates : to this treatise is added, The life and death of George Lord Jeffries* (London, 1689), p. 45.

⁷⁹ *A letter from his holiness the Pope, to the most illustrious Protestant Prince James Duke of Monmouth* (London, 1682), satirises the supposed link between the Catholicism and the use of assassination; *The Catholic cause, or, The horrid practice of murdering kings, justified, and commended by the Pope in a speech to his cardinals, upon the barbarous assassination of Henry the Third of France, who was stabbed by Jacques Clement, a Dominican Friar: the true copy of*

like Ravailiac.⁸⁰ A central and damning element in the furore surrounding the popish plot were allegations from Titus Oates and Israel Tonge charging individuals with being ‘daggersmen’,⁸¹ sinister black-cloaked figures flitting through the streets under the cover of darkness with a mission to cut the throats of those seeking to defend the Protestant interest.⁸² Once the tide of the popish plot turned against the Whig interest after 1682 the most horrific charge the Whigs had levelled against others was turned against them. Many of the Whig exiles including Hooke had been forced to seek safety abroad.

What could possess the London would-be rebels to add substance to the government’s claims against them by actually planning to carry out an assassination? Did Danvers and his group really believe that taking Guy Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot, another famous, and Catholic, assassination plot, as their template for safeguarding the Protestant religion and liberties would gain approval? Hooke was livid at the very thought of having anything to do with an assassination plot. Despite his politics, morally he could not allow it to happen. ‘It

which speech, both in Latin, and also faithfully rendered into English, you have in the following pages (London, 1678), harked back to the French wars of religion to provide an example of what was claimed as justification of killing for religious reasons.

⁸⁰ *The Jesuit’s ghostly ways to draw other persons over to their damnable principle, of the meritorious ness of destroying princes, made clear in the two barbarous attempts of William Parry, and Edward Squire on our late Gracious Sovereign Elizabeth of ever blessed memory* (London, 1679).

⁸¹ Smith, *Contrivances of the fanatical conspirators in carrying on their treasons under the umbrage of the popish plot laid open: with depositions sworn before the secretary of state wherein it most clearly appears, this present horrid rebellion hath been designed by the republicans many years, and that James the late duke of Monmouth, &c. were long since highly concerned therein. With some account of Mr Disney who was lately apprehended for printing the rebellious traitorous declaration* (London, 1685), p. 14.

⁸² *A dialogue between Monmouth-shire and York-shire about cutting religion to fashion* (London, 1681), p. 2, has the duke of Monmouth consigning all Catholics, even the duke of York, to the role of ruthless, self-interested, cold-blooded murderers, ‘I believe there’s not one of you wou’d stick to cut his Brothers Throat for interest, and that your red lettered Calendar signifies well enough.’ Besides tainting Catholicism with a deep-seated propensity for murder this quote also may indirectly insinuate that James, duke of York would not draw back from countenancing the death of his own brother to gain the throne; allegations to this effect resurfaced in the wake of the death of Charles II in February 1685.

would be base to do it, and if they would not promise him to desist from the attempt, he would discover them all.’⁸³

Hooke faced down the motley collection of aspiring regicides. His ultimatum prevailed among the Londoners and no assassination attempt was made. Instead in an attempt to throw off the apathy within underground groups in London preparations were renewed for a general rising in the city. It remained a debatable question if all of the constituent elements of the broad Whig alliance were still singing from the same hymn sheet. John Wildman for one, a man of considerable influence within the city, had long harboured fears over a rebellion that simply saw the crown changing hands. He wanted a much more radical overhaul of the institutions of state. Monmouth’s proclamation as king without prior discussion left a bitter taste, enervating his enthusiasm for the cause. Wildman’s predicament reflected a wider disquiet in the disparate Whig ranks that explained in part the passivity of London and other areas sympathetic to Monmouth.

Amid the intense atmosphere surrounding the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis, moderate and extreme opposition factions had been drawn together into working relationship. However toleration of each other’s views was grudging at best. Once the crown reaction began to bite, elements of the Whig constellation had begun to return to their natural orbits. Substantial agreement dissolved once debate moved beyond the semantics of words like ‘tyranny’ and ‘arbitrary government’. Concepts could be defined with plasticity great enough to create a broad coalition of interests but when discussion turned to practicalities

⁸³ MacPherson, *Original papers containing the secret history of Great Britain*, p. 145.

such as the structure and mechanics of government, sectional interests came to the fore. Distrust had undermined the façade of what was ostensibly a common struggle and accounted for the lack of any concerted action in London prior to Hooke's mission. However, sentiment in the capital, traditionally the core of the 'good old cause', remained broadly in favour of a move against the government, 'Men were ready for it.'⁸⁴ Having knocked the assassination scheme on the head Hooke and Danvers, were now to lead an insurrection in the capital, despite rumours of their plans having leaked and 'the King [having] augmented the guards to twelve or fourteen thousand men.'⁸⁵

However no rising ever took place in London. At Sedgemoor on 6 July a bold stroke by Monmouth and his army had almost caught the royal army asleep. However the daring gambit of a dawn attack had in the end been rumbled. As it turned out Hooke's comrades, having come close to 'destroying the royal army as they lay asleep in their beds'⁸⁶ found themselves the victims of a wholesale rout.

Within a matter of hours Monmouth's forces were scattering to the four winds. Many fell prey to the harsh retribution of Colonel Percy Kirke's regiment, caustically termed 'Kirke's Lambs', some ending the day deposited in the bottom of a drain or adorning a makeshift gibbet on the roadside. Monmouth himself was found hiding in a ditch on 8 July and unceremoniously transported back to London.⁸⁷ Despite impassioned pleas to his uncle James he was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death. He was executed on 15 July 1685.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 148.

⁸⁶ Earle, *Monmouth's rebels*, p. 118.

⁸⁷ *An Account of the manner of taking the late Duke of Monmouth* (London, 1685), p. 3.

⁸⁸ *An Account of what passed at the execution of the late Duke of Monmouth on Wednesday the 15th of July, 1685, on Tower-Hill together with a paper signed by himself that morning in the*

Following the last set pitch battle on English soil the backlash in the West Country was marked by the extreme severity of George ‘Hanging Judge’ Jefferies. In the immediate aftermath of Sedgemoor a cordon of troops was established to prevent the escape of wanted fugitives. Local militia and leading notables in the surrounding counties were ordered to be vigilant in apprehending anyone suspected of rebel activity or involvement with the rebels.

James II and his advisors determined to set an example *pour encourager les autres* and finally put an end to ‘dissembling hypocrites, by Hells aid appointed to create plots, to grieve the lords anointed’.⁸⁹ Throughout the summer and autumn of 1685 as fugitives were ensnared in the government’s dragnet, sentences of death, transportation and imprisonment were dispensed from the bench of Judge Jefferies and his colleagues.⁹⁰ The authorities’ intent was to ‘flame viperous rebels to a sudden smoke’.⁹¹ Monmouth’s reputation and motives were traduced in a series of pamphlets, broadsides, elegies, sermons and popular ballads. An official day of thanksgiving for the rebellion’s defeat was decreed for the 26 July 1685. Participation was ‘strictly command[ed]’ and adherence ‘with

Tower, in the presence of the Lords Bishops of Ely, and Bath and Wells, Dr. Tenison and Dr. Hooper: and also the copy of his letter to His Majesty after he was taken, dated at Ringwood in Hampshire, the 8th of July (London, 1685).

⁸⁹ John Pike, *A loyal subject’s loving advice: or, the only way to happiness heere and hereafter, is to fear God and honour the King, which is to be obtained by earnest prayer* (London, 1685).

⁹⁰ *The arraignment and condemnation of the late Rebels in the west: with a discovery of the rise and grounds of their rebellion* (London, 1685); *An account of the proceedings against the rebels at an assize holden at Exeter on the 14th of this instant September, 1685 where to the number of 26 persons were tried for high-treason and found guilty;* (London, 1685); *An Account of nineteen rebels that were executed at Taunton-Dean, in the county of Somerset, on VWednesday the 30th of September, 1685, for high-treason against His Most Sacred Majesty, &c.*(London, 1685); *An account of the proceedings against [sic] the rebels, at Dorchester in the county of Dorset; at an assize holden there on Friday and Saturday the 4th. and 5th. days of this instant September, 1685 Where to the number of ninety eight persons were brought to be tried: sixty eight confessing the fact upon their arraignment; and the other thirty pleaded not guilty to their indictment; and upon their trials twenty nine was found guilty, and one acquitted.,* (London, 1685); *A Further account of the proceedings against the rebels in the west of England, who on the 10th of September, 1685, to*

all sobriety, reverence and thankfulness' was mandatory.⁹² Finally in November James's victorious forces assembled on Hounslow Heath outside London. There the army, strongly bolstered by the presence of many new regiments raised on an emergency basis to suppress the rebellion,⁹³ was marshalled for a review by the victorious monarch. It was an effective form of intimidation.

While this public display of martial power may have been designed to set the seal on the victory achieved over the rebels and also as a powerful warning, it had an altogether different effect when perceived from outside England. In recent bouts of conflict between France and the United Provinces England's lack of military capability had rendered it almost useless as an ally. Now however James's creation and deployment of a large effective military machine had added a new destabilising factor to the geo-political situation in Europe. Unwittingly James had sown the seeds of his downfall by arousing the interest of France and the Netherlands.

Nathaniel Hooke in the autumn of 1685 was probably unaware of the full import of these developments in international relations, though they were to be hugely influential on the course of his later life. With the rebellion over Nathaniel Hooke was a wanted fugitive, trying to avoid becoming one of the rebels flamed

the number of two-hundred fifty one, received sentence of death at Dorchester for high-treason (London, 1685).

⁹¹ Pike, *A loyal subject's loving advice*.

⁹² James II, *A proclamation for a solemn and public Thanksgiving throughout the kingdom, for His Majesties late victories over the rebels* (London, 1685); *A proclamation for a Thanksgiving throughout the Kingdom of Scotland, for the late defeat of the King's enemies* (Edinburgh, 1685) specified different dates for different dioceses. Interestingly the English proclamation used the firm tone of 'direct and appoint' when referring to the reading of the proclamation in churches and chapels, while the Scottish version only 'recommended' to the Scottish archbishops and bishops that the proclamation be read.

⁹³ John Childs, *The army, James II and the glorious revolution* (Manchester, 1980), pp 96-97.

to a 'sudden smoke'.⁹⁴ Still in London, Hooke was in a precarious situation. The city was swamped by troops. As captured rebels were questioned, information concerning the names, roles and whereabouts of those involved was amassed and acted upon. On the date appointed for thanksgiving, 26 July 1685, a proclamation was issued in London summoning 'Colonel' Henry Danvers, John Wildman, John Trenchard, Francis Charlton, and George Speake, 'being persons suspected of several traitorous practices against Us and Our government' to present themselves to the privy council within twenty days or be held in contempt of royal commands.⁹⁵ Contradictorily, the proclamation also stated that these men 'are fled, do abscond themselves on purpose to avoid Our justice.'⁹⁶ Long years of machinations had produced a radical Whig underground network experienced in helping its members evade the attentions of government. Instead of joining the duke of Monmouth,⁹⁷ Alicia Lisle,⁹⁸ Henry Cornish⁹⁹ and others on the executioner's list, Reverend Nathaniel Hooke utilised these channels to escape the scaffold and flee back to exile in the Netherlands.

⁹⁴ Pike, *A loyal subject's loving advice*.

⁹⁵ James II, *A proclamation to summon in George Speake Esquire, Francis Charlton Esquire, John Wildman esquire, Henry Danvers Esquire, commonly called Colonel Danvers, and John Trenchard esquire* (London, 1685).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *An Account of what passed at the execution of the late Duke of Monmouth on Wednesday the 15th of July, 1685, on Tower-Hill together with a paper signed by himself that morning in the Tower, in the presence of the Lords Bishops of Ely, and Bath and Wells, Dr. Tenison and Dr. Hooper: and also the copy of his letter to His Majesty after he was taken, dated at Ringwood in Hampshire, the 8th of July* (London, 1685).

⁹⁸ *An Elegy on Mrs. Alicia Lisle which for high-treason was beheaded at Winchester September the 2[n]d 1685* (London, 1685); *The last words of Coll. Richard Rumbold, Mad. Alicia Lisle, Alderman Henry Cornish, and Mr .Richard Nelthrop who were executed in England and Scotland for high treason in the year 1685* (London, 1685).

⁹⁹ *The trials of Henry Cornish, Esq. for conspiring the death of the King, and raising rebellion in this kingdom: and John Fernley, William Ring, and Elizabeth Gaunt for harbouring and maintaining rebels, at the Sessions-house in the Old-Bailey, London and County of Middlesex, on Monday, October. 19, 1685* (London, 1685).

Slightly over a month after the initial landing at Lyme, Hooke's life had reverted to one of exile. His situation was different now because of the added complication that his name and role in the rebellion were known to the government. Although a minor figure in the Whig firmament Hooke's importance lay in the fact that as the personal chaplain to Monmouth he had had privileged access to the duke. Obtaining information and intelligence from the Irishman, therefore, was of great interest to the English authorities. He was one of the few members of Monmouth's inner circle who remained at large, second only to Robert Ferguson in terms of insider information and knowledge of the organization of the radical underground. Hooke's comrade in arms, and Monmouth's deputy, Forde, Lord Grey of Warke, once captured had bartered his information in return for a pardon. Nathaniel Wade, a senior officer in Monmouth's army also gave an account of his activities, but in less fulsome detail, to escape the gallows. Hooke was another potential source of invaluable intelligence. He was aware of this fact and like the sword of Damocles it hung over his renewed residence in the United Provinces.

CHAPTER 3: EXILE AND CONVERSION

In 1686, one year into the reign of James II, a general pardon was issued with a number of exceptions, including Nathaniel Hooke.¹ Hooke was still considered a threat to the stability of the Stuart polity in the eyes of James and his advisors. He was back in Holland, a country that still attracted opponents of the English government. These opponents were fewer in number but not a completely spent force. Plotters and pamphleteers such as Robert Ferguson, John Locke, Henry Danvers, and John Wildman remained opposed to what they perceived as the tyrannical aims of James II. Charles Mordaunt, the Whig-inclined earl of Peterborough continued to investigate the possibility of establishing a refuge for political refugees in the American colonies whilst at the same time casting about for a means of altering conditions in the home kingdoms.

The three kingdoms were now vital to William III's strategic designs against France and he was attempting to convince the United Provinces' Estates General of this. In time he succeeded in winning their support, commandeered the services of the exiles in Holland and recruited conspirators in England itself. His efforts culminated in the Dutch invasion of England on 5 November 1688. While it could reasonably be expected that Nathaniel Hooke would be involved, when the invasion fleet arrived off Torbay he was not on board. Instead he was on the other side, literally and metaphysically. How can one account for this astonishing sea change in political outlook, religious belief and attitude?

¹ James II, *A proclamation of the His Majesties most gracious and general pardon* (London), 10 March 1686.

When Hooke returned to Holland after the failure of Monmouth's rebellion, he was 'on the run' in the netherworld of the English *émigré* community. His renewed exile was in even more testing than his previous experience. The failed rebellion had drained the resources of the Whig grouping, Monmouth and Argyll were dead, and Grey turned King's evidence. The *émigré* milieu was now also the focus of King James's wrath. He was determined to follow up his military victory by eradicating the remaining opposition. In England, those suspected of hostility towards the government, such as the earl of Delamere, were neutralised. Abroad, the greatest aggravation remained the surviving radicals holed up on the continent. James ordered his ambassadors and agents to track them down.

The English ambassador to the Netherlands, Bevil Skelton (c.1641-96) was eager to seize the opportunity to redeem a reputation which had been tarnished by his failure to prevent the Monmouth's expedition.² He went to work quickly. Firstly he sought to undermine any support or sympathy for the exiles. On 26 July 1685, the day set aside for thanksgiving for the defeat of the rebellion, a hard-hitting sermon was preached to English merchants in Dordrecht in the Netherlands, that fiercely condemned the insurrection and the surviving rebels. Their 'sin' was compared to Lucifer's revolt against God, if not 'in some respects more criminal [...] Certainly such men must expect to receive damnation above that which belongs to ordinary sinners [...] to be reserved in everlasting chains

² Skelton had served as a soldier in France before undertaking diplomatic assignments in the German states, France and Denmark in the late 1670s. Overtly Francophile, his posting to the United Provinces in March 1685 was a deliberate insult to William III, designed to repay the latter's indulgence of Monmouth. As a result Skelton's influence with the political authorities in the Netherlands was negligible. Transferred to France in 1686, he converted to Catholicism in 1691. He died at St Germain in 1696.

until Judgement Day’ and then cast ‘cursed, into the Everlasting Fires prepared for the devil and his angels.’³ It was printed in Rotterdam, bearing a dedication to Skelton, and disseminated throughout the Netherlands.

Skelton then sought to undertake more practical steps. He was not short of precedents for successful action against political fugitives. Two well-known and highly publicised incidents stood out. Sir Thomas Armstrong’s fate illustrated what could befall men sought by the Stuart regime. It was the subject of much attention in print due to his social standing and to the dramatic manner of his capture. Armstrong had been an important ‘malcontent,’ one of the chief ‘ill affected and desperate persons’ involved in the ‘most traitorous and horrid conspiracy [...] to compass the death and destruction of His Royal Person, and his dearest brother James Duke of York’ in the Rye House Plot of 1683.⁴

Following the discovery of the plot he had been named in a proclamation of the 28 June 1683, along with the duke of Monmouth, Lord Grey, and Robert Ferguson⁵. A £500 reward was offered for information leading to the apprehension of any of the conspirators.⁶ Along with a large number of other Whigs he fled to the Continent, beyond the reach of Tory-dominated juries, where he managed to remain one step ahead of his pursuers, at the cost of a nomadic existence throughout Europe. Reports reached London of his and other wanted

³ Augustine Frezer, *The wickedness and punishment of rebellion* (Rotterdam, 1685), pp 28-29.

⁴ John Turner, *The history of the Whiggish-plot: or, a brief relation of the charge and defence of William Lord Russell, Capt Thomas Walcott, John Rouse, William Hone, Captain Blague, Algernon Sidney Esq., Sir Sam Barnardiston, John Hampden, Esq., Lawrence Braddon, Hugh Speak, Esq., together with an account of the proceedings upon the outlawry against James Holloway, and Sir Thomas Armstrong* (London, 1684), p. 2.

⁵ Charles II, *A proclamation for the apprehending of James, Duke of Monmouth, Ford Lord Gray, Sir Thomas Armstrong Knight, and Robert Ferguson* (London, 1683).

⁶ *Ibid.*

fugitives being present in Amsterdam, Berlin, Julich-Cleves, Bremen, Hamburg, Brussels, Utrecht, Leiden, and Rotterdam.⁷

These reports were not always accurate. One relation of Armstrong and Monmouth's supposed capture came from Ireland in August 1683.⁸ It described the landing of 'two gentlemen [...] within seven miles of Dublin'.⁹ Judging by their appearance 'the Country people [...] began to make their constructions that they were some of the goody-hangs in the proclamation that had fled out of England'.¹⁰ Motivated by the reward offered, the two were detained and sent to Dublin where they were identified as an upholsterer and a soldier travelling to England. The narrative demonstrates that royal proclamations did have an effect throughout the three kingdoms, and the allure of rewards and the resultant precarious existence of wanted fugitives.

Being aware of these dangers and being constantly alert and vigilant was no definite safeguard. The English minister in Amsterdam, Thomas Chudleigh (1649/50-1702?) learned that Armstrong, Grey and Ferguson had 'lain some months at Berlin'.¹¹ Chudleigh initially had a good working relationship with the various layers of the Dutch Republic's political machinery, though this

⁷ I.C., *News from Sr. William Waller, the lord Grey, and Sir Thomas Armstrong and of several others fled from justice, in a letter from Amsterdam to his friend in London* (London, 1684).

⁸ W. Law, *An account of the apprehending two persons supposed to be the D. of Monmouth and Sir Thomas Armstrong* (London, 1683), p. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *A letter from Amsterdam to M. C in London discovering the taking of Sr. Thomas Armstrong with the narrow escape of My lord Gray and Mr Ferguson at Leyden in Holland* (London, 1684), p. 1. Chudleigh was the brother in law of influential courtier and lord treasurer Thomas Clifford (1630-1673), Lord Clifford of Chudleigh. He served in a variety of diplomatic postings prior to his Dutch mission. Aggressively anti-Whig, he was rewarded by James II by being nominated as an MP in 1685. In 1687 he converted to Catholicism. He left England in 1688 for France. His later life is obscure.

deteriorated later.¹² The unsuspecting fugitives made their way from Berlin in Brandenburg to spend time with the duke of Monmouth before moving on to Amsterdam and finally Leiden.¹³ Chudleigh at this stage, acting ‘on notice’, managed to obtain warrants for the seizure of the three.¹⁴ Grey and Ferguson managed to evade the search party.¹⁵ Armstrong proved true to his reputation for belligerence and a volatile temperament.¹⁶ He ‘resolved to dye upon the spot before he was taken’ but was apprehended after a scuffle, prevented from carrying out repeated attempts to kill himself, taken aboard an English yacht and transported ‘fast bound in chains’ to London.¹⁷ Arriving back in England on the

¹² *A true relation of the behaviour and execution of Sr. Thomas Armstrong who was drawn, hang'd, and quarter'd at Tyburn for high-treason on the 20th. of this instant June 1684. As also an account of his deportment, since he was brought over a prisoner, with several particular circumstances of his life and conversation to the day of his execution* (London, 1684), p. 3

¹³ *An Impartial account of all the material circumstances relating to Sir Thomas Armstrong Kt who was executed at Tyburn for high-treason on Friday the 20th of June 1684 from the first discovery of the plot to the day of his execution, as his being impeached of high-treason for conspiring the death of the King &c., his flight and His Majesties proclamation issued out thereupon for his apprehending, his continuance in Holland, the indictment of high-treason against him and process of outlawry entered thereon, his being apprehended at Leyden in Holland and brought into England, his commitment to Newgate and the award of death against him at the Kings-Bench-Bar at Westminster, the manner of his behaviour till the day of his execution: together with his last dying words at the places of execution &c* (London, 1684), p. 4

¹⁴ *An Account of the award of execution of death against Sr. Thomas Armstrong who received sentence of death at the Kings-Bench-Bar at Westminster to be drawn, hang'd and quarter'd, on the 14th of this instant June 1684, upon the motion of Mr. Attorney General, forasmuch as the said Sr. Thomas stood attainted of high-treason by out-lawry, for conspiring and contriving the death of the King and the antient established government of this kingdom to subvert, &c* (London, 1684), p. 1.

¹⁵ *A letter from Amsterdam to M. C in London discovering the taking of Sr. Thomas Armstrong with the narrow escape of My lord Gray and Mr Ferguson at Leyden in Holland* (London, 1684), p. 2; *An Impartial account of all the material circumstances relating to Sir Thomas Armstrong Kt who was executed at Tyburn for high-treason on Friday the 20th of June 1684* (London, 1684), p. 4.

¹⁶ ‘His [Armstrong] courage was more unquestionable than any moral virtue, he either was or ought to have been imbued withal. He was for several years an officer in his Majesty’s troop of horseguards during which time as a soldier he was often engaged in quarrels, either upon a mistaken point of honour or the violence of passion which puts a man’s life upon the point of his own or his enemies sword, either to prevent a presumptive injury or vindicate the truth of some trifling argument’, *A true relation of the behaviour and execution of Sr. Thomas Armstrong, who was hang'd, drawn and quarter'd at Tyburn for high-treason on the 20th of this instant June 1684. As also an account of his deportment since he was brought over a prisoner, with several particular circumstances of his life and conversation to the day of his execution* (London, 1684), p. 2.

¹⁷ *An Account of the award of execution of death against Sr. Thomas Armstrong who received sentence of death at the Kings-Bench-Bar at Westminster to be drawn, hang'd and quarter'd, on*

11 June his objections to the legality of his prior outlawry were dismissed and a request for a new trial refused. On the 20 June 1684 Armstrong was hanged, drawn and quartered at Tyburn. If this was not a powerful enough demonstration of the danger of opposing the king, Charles II ordered Armstrong's head to be 'fixed on Westminster Hall, beside the heads of Bradshaw and Cromwell' as a symbol of the fate of traitors.¹⁸ It was clear what treatment captured dissidents could expect.

Armstrong's capture, sentencing, execution and final macabre fate were the subject of a great deal of attention in print and popular culture.¹⁹ For a refugee such as Hooke it emphasised his lack of security. It was entirely possible that he might be cornered in his lodging, or surrounded and ambushed on the street and spirited back to England. A colleague of Hooke's, who succumbed to the pressure of being hunted thus, was Robert Ferguson. Before escaping to Amsterdam

he had lain in a hay loft for 30 weeks since the Rebellion, and was there fed by his host. In all that time he had hardly adventured abroad; only twice in the time he was in Exeter, to try to make his escape from thence into Holland, [...] He was now extremely fearful of everybody and everything, only he had some confidence in the Schout Boreel, who he did believe would give him timely information when anything should be designed upon him...he keeps close to his chamber not daring to stir out day nor night [...] he had plastered up all his windows towards the street, [and] only in the study was there a hole left

the 14th of this instant June 1684, p. 1; *A letter from Amsterdam to M. C in London discovering the taking of Sr. Thomas Armstrong with the narrow escape of My lord Gray and Mr Ferguson at Leyden in Holland* (London, 1684), p. 2.

¹⁸ Stephen, (ed.), *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. ii (London, 1885), p. 101.

¹⁹ *An Account of the award of execution of death against Sr. Thomas Armstrong* (London, 1684); *The Bully Whig, or, The poor whores lamentation for the apprehending of Sir Thomas Armstrong to the tune of, Ah! cruel, bloody fate! &c* (London, 1684); *An Elegie on the never to be forgotten Sir Thomas Armstrong, Knight executed for conspiring the death of His Most Sacred Majesty and royal brother, June 20, 1684, with some satyrical reflections on the whole faction* (London, 1684); *An Elegy on Sir Thomas Armstrong who was executed June the 20th 1684, for conspiring the death of the king, and his Royal Highness the Duke of York* (London, 1684); *The hue and cry after J---- Duke of M----, Lord G--y, and Sir Tho. A-----g* (London, 1683); *Sir Thomas Armstrong's deportment, since he was brought over a prisoner, with several particular circumstances of his life and conversation to the day of his execution* (London, 1684); *The proceedings against Sir Thomas Armstrong in His Majesties Court of King's Bench, at Westminster, upon an outlawry for high-treason, &c. : as also an account of what passed at his execution at Tyburn, the 20th. of June 1684 : together with the paper he delivered ...*(London, 1684).

open, in the form of a half moon through which the shining of the candle might be seen when he was in there.²⁰

Significantly this description of Ferguson's fears was recorded by an English agent seeking to capture him. Ferguson's fear that he might be targeted by the English government was well founded. His pursuer Solomon Slater was working for the English ambassador, Bevil Skelton. Slater also sought out John Locke in the hope of gleaning information on Ferguson's whereabouts. He enquired of Locke 'whether he [Ferguson] might not be brought to do something which would give him hopes of a pardon'²¹ and would Locke seek to persuade Ferguson to this course of action. Slater in his report makes it clear that his principle aim in this undertaking was 'that by this means I might be ascertained from Locke of his [Ferguson] being in his Chamber'.²² The wily Locke agreed to talk to Ferguson but put off the meeting.

Slater was more successful in his attempts to extract information from a Mr. Tilley, possibly the Bristol clothier 'Captain' Joseph Tilley who had proclaimed Monmouth king in Taunton. Acting on the information, however, was difficult as the Amsterdam municipal authorities allowed Ferguson to make

his escape from the top of the house, and by the same way had his information, for had he come into the streets we were prepared to force him to the next Guards; and though we would not have hurt him, if we could possibly avoid it, yet rather then miss him, had we once set eye on him, I was resolved to have dispatched him; thinking it no crime to send such a monster out of the way.²³

The fact that Slater believed it permissible to 'dispatch' someone in cold blood in public view shows the real dangers facing the exiles.

²⁰ Sergeant Solomon Slater to Ambassador Bevil Skelton, 16/26 July 1685 (B. L., Add. Ms. 41817, f. 120).

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

The case of James Holloway, a minor figure in the Whig organisation in the 1680s, showed that Hooke's lesser prominence was no safeguard. Holloway, a linen trader from Bristol, became familiar with political affairs by the 'following of parliaments for perfecting designs [...] to the improvement of the linen manufacture'.²⁴ Similar, perhaps, to Hooke, he explained his deepening entanglement in politics.

The more I knew, the more I was desirous to know, and did by some scribblers and news-mongers constantly know most of the public affairs that were acted, which they undertook to represent according to their own humour; many actions being represented very illegal, much against the protestant interest in favour of papists, &c. Shamming the popish plot upon the protestants, abusing the rights and privileges of subjects, the truth of which I leave to the judgement of all; but hearing many such-like things, was easily prevailed with to be concerned in the plot, according as it was proposed to me.²⁵

Holloway's flight was the most ambitious of the Rye House conspirators. He had great difficulty organising his voyage, with only his wife's help, 'all other friends thereabout fearing to act for me.'²⁶ Escaping to Barbados, he again 'heard [his] name being in the Gazette' and 'thinking it not safe to lie long there' began island hopping around the Caribbean.²⁷ Holloway was eventually captured, without resistance, on the island of St. Eustace, admitting that

I submitted tho' [I] had an opportunity and might have escaped, but was rather willing to cast myself at His Majesties feet for mercy, than live such a life any longer, not daring to appear [...]²⁸

Even distant colonies the psychological pressure had been too much. In constant fear of apprehension, Holloway had been deserted by his friends, his

²⁴ S. Lee, (ed.), *DNB.*, (London, 1891), vol. xxvii, pp 178-80; *Some reflections on the paper delivered unto the sheriffs of London, by James Holloway at the time of his execution* (London, 1684), p. 2.

²⁵ *Some reflections*, p. 2.

²⁶ *The free and voluntary confession and narrative of James Holloway addressed to His Majesty written with his own hand, and delivered by himself to Mr. Secretary Jenkins ; as also the proceedings against the said James Holloway in His Majesties King-Bench Court, Westminster, and his petition to His Majesty ; together with a particular account of the discourse as passed between the sheriffs of London and the said James Holloway at the time of his execution for high-treason at Tyburn, April 30. 1684 ; with his prayer immediately before, and the true copy of the paper delivered them at the same time and place* (London, 1684), p. 7.

business bankrupted, forced to leave his wife and home and harried around the islands of the Caribbean. In human terms life as a fugitive was costly.

For Nathaniel Hooke too, the cost occasioned by ‘the intolerable tension of living on permanent alert’²⁹ became too great. In June 1688 he surrendered himself to James II’s authorities. He had spent some time contemplating this step. He had been spotted in London in 1687 and on the 29 November a warrant was issued ‘to Thomas Lee, messenger, for apprehending Nathaniel Hook (*sic*) for high treason, being concerned in the late rebellion and excepted out of the proclamation of pardon’.³⁰ Facing a sentence of hanging, drawing and quartering, illustrated in gruesome detail in the newsheets of the time, Hooke’s state of mind was unsettled. Apparently suffering a crisis of conscience, Hooke’s own words regarding his motivation suggest he had spent a considerable time in a state of psychological turmoil concerning his hopeless situation. It was reported in July 1688 that

Nathaniel Hook, the late duke of Monmouth his chaplain who was concerned in the rebellion, and hath ever since skulked up and down without being able to attain his pardon threw himself lately at His Majesty’s feet, desiring His Majesty’s pardon, or to be speedily tried and executed since now life itself as well as the sense of his guilt was wearisome to him; whereupon His Majesty thought fit to extend his gracious pardon to him.³¹

Pleading to be pardoned or ‘speedily tried and executed since now life itself was wearisome to him’ suggests a strong feeling of despondency. Many of those who were captured in the various plots of the 1680s attempted suicide. Suicide had become so prevalent in English society since 1680 that it was termed the ‘English

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *The free and voluntary confession and narrative of James Holloway*, p. 7

²⁹ Geoffrey Parker refers to such debilitating tension in *Empire, war and faith in early modern Europe* (London, 2002), p. 164.

³⁰ *C.S.P.D., June 1687-Feb 1689* (London, 1972), p. 108.

³¹ George Ellis, *The Ellis correspondence. Letters written during the years 1686, 1687, 1688 and addressed to John Ellis esq.... edited by Hon. George Agar Ellis* (2 vols, London, 1829), i, 171.

malady.’³² The years from 1680 to 1685 were marked by a number of high profile suicides. Questions began to be asked if this unhealthy trend was a reflection of something broader: was man a microcosm of the state?³³ To contemporaries unsettled states of mind seemed to be linked to the increasingly troubled state of the nation’s politics.³⁴ Many cases of suicide involved a person who had suffered a period of psychological crisis due to a change in circumstance, practical or ideological. In an age bound to interest, place, honour, duty and constancy any radical change triggered a period of reflection on the character of the individual. John Temple, (a descendant of the John Temple of 1641 fame) ended his life because of shame at what he believed was his failure to fulfil his duties to the king, leaving a note to apologise for his inadequacy. John Child, a former Baptist minister, whose introspective reflection led him to doubt his belief and eventually to convert to Anglicanism, killed himself because of what he came to see as his disloyalty in 1684. More directly connected to Hooke, a man who had been a lieutenant of Monmouth’s, and also a chaplain, killed himself in 1685 when he lost his place.³⁵ Robert Long, another of Hooke’s former comrades also committed suicide when captured.³⁶ Such widespread and high profile suicides

³² See Michael MacDonald and T. R. Murphy, *Sleepless souls: suicide in early modern England* (Oxford, 1990).

³³ Georgina Laragy, ‘Melancholy: a microcosm of early modern England’ (unpublished M. Litt. thesis, NUI, Maynooth, 1998), p. 111. The nature of the relationship between politics, mental health, the individual and the state in the early modern context is examined in section iv, pp 108-115.

³⁴ During the strife of the 1640s Edmund Calumny published a pamphlet with the thought provoking title of *An indictment against England because of her self murdering tendencies* (London, 1645).

³⁵ Georges Minois, *History of suicide* (Johns Hopkins University Press paperback edition, Baltimore 2001), p. 180.

³⁶ *A Sad and dreadful account of the self-murder of Robert Long, alias Baker some time a captain under the late Duke of Monmouth in the western rebellion, who being apprehended on Monday the 19th of October 1685 and committed to the county-goal of Newgate for high treason on the 20th of October, hanged himself in his chamber in the press-yard: together with the remarkable circumstances that attended it &c* (London, 1685).

were a powerful example to Hooke, as his situation grew increasingly hopeless in the years after 1685.

Related to this was the impact that failed attempts against the later Stuart monarchs had on defeated opponents. Politically motivated opponents would be likely to grow discouraged by the repeated failures. For religiously minded opponents however the fallout from failure went further. These men believed that their actions were blessed by God and were in keeping with His wishes for the good of the entire community. When defeat followed defeat the question of whether Providence truly directed them in their mission arose. If their cause was a Godly cause why should it have failed and failed so often? Could it be that they erred in discerning God's will? Did the outcome of events not point to this conclusion?

These lines of questioning, not of faith *per se*, but of where faith should lead, occupied religious opponents of James II. Even such staunch and unremitting exponents as the Covenanters of Scotland fell prey to such doubts. 'Victory [by government forces in 1679] brought many who had hitherto supported the unrest to doubt whether armed resistance to the government was in truth the will of God.'³⁷ Hooke's outlook on the world therefore may have been seriously affected by the pressure of exile and a troubled conscience. James II appeared to be the beneficiary of divine protection.³⁸ God had had many opportunities to strike him down and apparently had refused all of them. To deny or explain this away was now impossible. The only course of action for Hooke appeared to lie in admitting his errors.

³⁷ Mitchison, *Lordship to patronage*, p. 77.

John S. Gibson raises a pertinent point regarding Hooke's submission when he asks if Hooke can be viewed as a 'sinner come to repentance or devious young Irishman seeing his chance to benefit from James's toleration of dissenters?'³⁹ Could his confession of guilt merely be a well worked out plan? Perhaps on his return to London in 1687 he was biding his time, having noted during his exile the favourable shift in James's attitude towards dissenters. On the other hand it may have been that Hooke was forced to wait for his pardon, and that the prospect of rehabilitation was dangled before him for some time before it was agreed to grant it. James, or his ministers, may have been playing on the need for new allies by delaying Hooke's pardon till June of 1688. At that point James had cut himself off from his traditional Anglican Tory supporters. Perhaps the dissenters might be courted? An opportunity to demonstrate publicly the king's magnanimity would have been welcome. The reprinting of Hooke's submission in a newsletter proves the success of the venture in propaganda terms. If there was an element of opportunism then it was present on both sides. James granted the pardon on the 13 July 1688.⁴⁰

Hooke converted to Catholicism,⁴¹ as many already had in the later period of James' reign.⁴² Again this could be explained as opportunism or the outcome of

³⁸ James himself inclined to this view. See James II to the earl of Dartmouth, 20 Oct. 1688 O.S (*H.M.C. Dartmouth MSS*, vol. i, p. 169).

³⁹ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 11.

⁴⁰ *C.S.P.D., June 1687-Feb 1689*, p. 234. Eleven other men were pardoned on the same day, seven of whom were from Taunton or Lyme Regis. This suggests a conscious attempt to win over the Dissenting community by demonstrating James's clemency.

⁴¹ Exactly when he converted is unclear. It may have been at the time of his pardon or perhaps later, when James fled to France.

⁴² Robert Spencer (1641-1702), earl of Sunderland, became the most powerful man in James II's ministry by allying with the Catholic interest at court as a means of overcoming his Anglican rivals, Laurence Hyde (1641-1711), earl of Rochester, his brother Henry Hyde (1638-1709), second earl of Clarendon and George Saville (1633-95), marquess of Halifax. He also advised the strategy of reconciliation with Protestant non-conformists. Sunderland, as pragmatic as he was power hungry, made public his own conversion to Catholicism in June 1688, after the birth of a

a crisis of conscience. He also began a new career in James' service as a Royal Messenger.⁴³ He was assigned to serve the chief justice of the king's bench, Robert Wright (c.1634-89).⁴⁴ His metamorphosis from militant Protestant Whig to loyal Catholic Jacobite was remarkable. Also noteworthy was his exchange of the role of hunted fugitive for that of the fugitive hunter. One of the duties of these members of the royal household establishment was to execute search and arrest warrants for the king's enemies. Hooke had now become what he himself had quite recently referred to contemptuously in a 1685 letter as 'birds of prey'.⁴⁵

The sincerity of his Damascene conversion was tested quickly, when William of Orange landed in November 1688 with over 15,000 troops. A number of Hooke's old radical Whig comrades were in William's entourage. Hooke was faced with a dilemma. His new political allegiance to James II and religious adherence to Catholicism, though recent, proved strong. Presented with the dilemma of choosing between old friends or his new master Hooke held firm to his oath of service binding all King's Messengers, swearing 'on the Holy Eucharist and by the contents of This Book [...] and by Almighty

son to James II seemed to assure a Catholic dynasty. Sunderland's opponents for James's ear based their policies on retrieving Anglican support via more limited toleration of Catholicism. Therefore few other leading politicians converted. Those who did, such as James Drummond (1648-1716), duke of Perth and his brother John (1649-1714), duke of Melfort were accused of political opportunism. At other levels there were more conversions such as Hooke's, motivated by self interest or sincere belief, or both. These included the poet John Dryden (1631-1700), Alexander Fitton (1613/14-1697), lord chancellor of Ireland, Sir Edward Hales (1645-95), earl of Tenterden and lieutenant of the Tower of London, Admiral Sir Roger Strickland (d.1717), Peter Manby (d.1697), former Church of Ireland dean of Derry, and Alexander Stewart (d.1701), earl of Moray and secretary of state for Scotland.

⁴³ *C.S.P.D.*, June 1687-Feb 1689, p. 411.

⁴⁴ Wright was more renowned for his political loyalty to James II than for his legal acumen. He was involved in a number of controversial judgements. He had ruled in favour of James' power to dispense individuals from religious disabilities in 1686, purged the fellows of Magdalen College, Oxford for resistance to royal authority in 1687 and ruled the address of seven bishops to the king a libel in 1688, though he was outvoted in the latter case. He was impeached and imprisoned following William's landing, dying in Newgate prison on the 18 May 1689.

⁴⁵ Nathaniel Hooke to Fr. Ambrose Grimes, July 1685 (B.L., Ms. Add. 81714, f. 87).

God to be a true servant unto our Sovereign James by the Grace of God King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland.’⁴⁶

Hooke was a part of James’s entourage in Ireland in 1689. It is not known if he followed James to France in December 1688 or joined him following his landing in Ireland in 1689. Building on his previous role as a royal messenger, Hooke’s task was to act as a liaison between the king in Ireland and his supporters in England and Scotland. Hooke referred in later writings to a mission to Viscount Dundee’s Jacobite forces in Scotland. The level of danger involved in these undercover liaison missions was high. William of Orange was still unsure of the security of his position in England. Fears of secret communication between Jacobite loyalists in England and Scotland and James II gave rise to close surveillance of ports. In June 1689 Nathaniel Hooke was apprehended at Whitehaven harbour in Cumbria.⁴⁷ He was taken captive in possession of military commissions intended for James’s partisans, who were attempting to organise a clandestine rebel army in the northwest of England.⁴⁸

Hooke was transferred to the Tower in London and detained with other prisoners who were suspected of being opposed to William’s new regime. Hooke attracted much interest from the authorities, and was visited and interrogated by Bishop Gilbert Burnet. His brother, John Hooke, now a lawyer based in London was allowed access to his brother for discussion on two occasions. Unusually, warrants were issued on two occasions to the governor of the Tower for the

⁴⁶ P.C. Cady, *The English Royal Messenger Service, 1685-1750* (London, 1999), p. 37.

⁴⁷ Whitehaven’s main trade was in conveying coal from Cumbria to Dublin, so Irish ships and Irishmen were common. Hooke may have gambled, and lost, on this leading to complacency on the part of the town’s officials.

⁴⁸ For more details on this operation and its later evolution, see Eleanor Lord, *The Stuarts’ secret army: English Jacobites 1689-1752* (Harlow, 2004), pp 18-24; Paul Monod, ‘Jacobitism and country principles in the reign of William III’, in *The History Journal*, xxx, no. 2 (1987), pp 296.

conveyance of Hooke to William's headquarters in England, Hampton Court Palace.

There, located in detached tranquillity of the English countryside, he appears to have had interviews with Charles Talbot (1660-1718), duke of Shrewsbury, secretary of state, and then with King William himself. No record of what passed survives. However we can surmise that Hooke was viewed as a prisoner of exceptional importance. Due to his position as a royal courier he was of interest because of his knowledge of the secret correspondence and schemes being orchestrated by the Stuart court in Ireland. In this respect he was potentially a valuable asset for Williamite counter-intelligence. Secondly his recent past as a Whig activist marked him out from other prisoners for special attention.

Pressure was put on Hooke to come over to the Williamite side, but despite this opportunity to recant his surrender to James, Hooke stood by his new master. Soon after his initial capture he was asked to explain his stubborn unwillingness to repudiate James. The interrogators on this occasion were members of the Commission to Reform the Army, empowered by William III to weed out those suspected of disaffection. By chance, they were passing close to Penrith in Wales where Hooke was being held. A member of the party, Dr George Clarke (1661-1736) later thought the circumstances and the prisoner notable enough to recount the details in his account of his own life and career, which he began in November 1720.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Clarke studied law at Oxford and was appointed as judge advocate-general of the army in 1681. In 1685 he was elected to parliament. Clarke was appointed secretary at war by William III and accounted him to Ireland, where he was the battle of the Boyne, the battle of Aughrim and the siege of Limerick. Clarke remained active in administration of military affairs under Queen Anne. Out of office after the accession of George I he travelled in Europe. In 1715 he again met Nathaniel Hooke 'at Versailles, an officer of distinction in the French army, I think a Brigadier or

The Commissioners sent for Mr Hooke, and as we were told when we came next day drank with him pretty freely, and used many arguments to persuade him to leave King James' interests. His answer was that King James had given him his life when he had forfeited it in the Duke of Monmouth's rebellion, and that as long as it was a life it should be at his service.⁵⁰

To contemporaries, no less than to modern observers, Hooke's dramatic change in political and religious allegiance posed perplexing questions. What had occasioned his change of heart and what continued to underpin his dogged fidelity to a monarch Hooke himself had striven to topple four years before?

With legal assistance from his brother John Hooke, a barrister trained in Gray's Inn, Hooke was brought before court by a writ of *habeas corpus*, sureties for good behaviour given and released on bail in the autumn of 1689. A sense of honour seems to have motivated Hooke as he refrained from any anti-Williamite activity that would have endangered the indemnities of his sponsors. He was fully discharged from the conditions attached to his bail in January 1690. He now had an opportunity to remain quietly in England and let his commitment to the Jacobite cause lapse. Instead he made his way to Ireland and rejoined James II as the conflict for control of the Three Kingdoms escalated.

Hooke undertook further assignments in James' service, though little detail exists on his activities. It was noted in June 1690 that 'Major Hooke came from France with an account of 15,000 men coming in the French fleet, which was a flame, though much talked of.'⁵¹ Evidently Hooke was combining his espionage work with the role of military officer. This status indicates recognition of the multifaceted nature of his abilities. Such an intertwining of intelligence/diplomatic and military roles was to be an enduring feature of Hooke's career. It was

Major General, in good credit.' See H.M.C., *Report on the manuscripts of F. W. Leyborne-Popham* (Norwich, 1899), p. 270.

⁵⁰ Ibid. I am indebted to Mr Thomas Doyle for bring this most valuable reference to my attention.

emblematic of the versatility highly regarded in an age where the processes of bureaucratisation and task specialisation, hallmarks of later enlightenment rationalism, were still in their embryonic stages.

Hooke's mission to France appears to have been part of an exchange of communication between James and Louis XIV. James was dissatisfied with the French contribution to his military forces and repeatedly at odds with the views of French *attachés* on his military staff. James had agreed to campaign personally in Ireland as a reluctant concession to Louis's entreaties. French strategists emphasised that through consolidation in Ireland lay the surest path to eventual restoration of the entire Stuart patrimony.

Unconvinced or uninterested in the broader perspective of French war aims, James had his eyes set firmly on the main prize, a swift return to England. He was confident that all that was required for a quick victory in England was his own presence. On the basis of scant evidence he believed that the majority of the population still hankered after the return of their rightful monarch and would rally to his standard if given the opportunity. Rather than act as an auxiliary to Louis, James wished to reclaim his rightful status as speedily as possible.

Hooke fought at the battle of the Boyne in July 1690. As the despondent James again overreacted and fled another of his kingdoms in the face of William, Hooke stayed with the army in Ireland. The military situation was far from irretrievable. Jacobite writer Nicholas Plunkett (1629-1718?), in his 1711 *Narrative of the war in Ireland*, severely criticised James II and his advisors for irresolution, failure in leadership and the abandonment of his Irish army in Ireland. Patrick Sarsfield's (c.1650-93) reported comment that he wished to

⁵¹ 'A diary of events in Ireland from 1685 to 1690', 4 June 1690, in *H.M.C. Ormonde*, viii, 384.

change kings and refight the Boyne reflected the same strain of thought.⁵² Charles O'Brien (c.1630-1690), viscount Clare, wrote to the French minister of war François-Michel Le Tellier (1641-91), marquis de Louvois, in August 1690 requesting Louis XIV to take over direction of affairs in Ireland as James II would 'do best [...] to pass the remainder of his days praying to God in a cloister than to think of commanding armies or governing a state.'⁵³ Such sentiment intermingled with internal rivalry and the reservations of the French court were to prove corrosive to Jacobitism in later years.⁵⁴ Hooke too, became increasingly disenchanted and dispirited with developments.

In the wake of 1691 Treaty of Limerick, he was one of thousands who left Ireland for France. The number who departed in the following years is still subject to debate, with recent research, applying more rigorous methods of analysis, suggesting that the figure was much lower than previously contended.⁵⁵ Figures for those leaving Ireland in 1691 are also disputed, varying between 12,000 and

⁵² James propensity for flight was contrasted with William's stalwart leadership. He 'was a brave, bold Prince, not [like King James] a poor running King', John Partridge, *Merlinus liberatus. Being an almanack for the year of our redemption, 1692* (1692). Cited in Rose, *England in the 1690s*, p. 23.

⁵³ Guy Rowlands, 'An army in exile: Louis XIV and the Irish forces of James II in France, 1691-1698', in *The Royal Stuart Papers*, lx (London, 2001), p. 4.

⁵⁴ See Hooke's disillusioned tone when referring to the exiled court in chapter four and five.

⁵⁵ See Colm Ó Conaill's research at <http://www.tcd.ie/CISS/mercenaries/index.php> for a new perspective on the numbers involved. The Abbé MacGeoghegan claimed that more than 450,000 Irishmen had died in French service between 1691 and 1745. See *Histoire de l'Irlande, ancienne et moderne, tiré des monuments les plus authentics* (3 vols, Paris and Amsterdam, 1758-63), translated by Patrick O'Kelly as *History of Ireland, ancient and modern* (3 vols, Dublin, 1831-32), iii, p. 471; Charles Petrie may have adapted this figure when suggesting a figure of 480,000 left Ireland between 1691 and 1791. See *The Jacobite movement* (London, 1932), p. 92. For a discussion of the figures see Éamonn Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite cause, 1685-1766* (Dublin, 2002), pp 32-36; L. M. Cullen, 'The Irish diaspora of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', in Nicholas Canny (ed.), *Europeans on the move: studies on European migration, 1500-1800* (Oxford, 1994), pp 113-49 and David Bracken, 'Piracy and poverty: aspects of the Irish Jacobite experience in France, 1691-1720', in Thomas O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), p. 127.

19,000.⁵⁶ The majority of these men were retained in the military units in which they had been serving. In France these forces remained under the command of James II.⁵⁷ Hooke continued to serve in James' army, in the Queens Regiment of Horse under the command of Piers Butler (1651/2-1746), viscount Galmoy.⁵⁸

James himself seems to have recovered his nerve and a semblance of his former determination. He was buoyed by the continued support of Louis XIV, who promised to employ his forces to restore James. Initial efforts seemed promising. As control of the sea was the *sine qua non* for an invasion to roll back Dutch hegemony in England, the French navy needed to score a significant victory over their English and Dutch opponents. The battle of Beachy Head, off Normandy, opened a window of opportunity for a descent on England in the mould of Monmouth's in 1685 and William's in 1688. Despite intense preparations and the muster of the Jacobite contingents in readiness for an embarkation the moment was lost when at the battle of La Hogue, the Dutch/English fleet made amends for their earlier defeat, regaining superiority over the French and ended plans for a crossing in the near future. Hooke had been one of those officers who had watched from the cliffs above La Hogue while the battle had been under way.⁵⁹ After the failure of the invasion plan the Jacobite

⁵⁶ J. G. Simms cites 12,000 in *Jacobite Ireland, 1685-91* (reprint, Dublin, 2000), p. 260 as does Frank McLynn, *The Jacobites* (London, 1985), p. 18. 19,000 was the figure claimed by MacGeoghegan, *Histoire de l'Irlande*, ii, p. 278 and also cited by Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, 'Les Jacobites à Paris et Saint-Germain-en-Laye', in *Revue de la B. N.*, no. 46 (Winter, 1992), p. 45 and G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, 'Les Jacobites au xviii^e siècle', in *Annales E. S. C.* (1973), p. 1098. Guy Rowlands disputes both these figures and suggests, on the basis of his research in the French war archives, that 15,000 is a more accurate figure. See Rowlands, 'An army in exile', p. 5.

⁵⁷ For the early years of the Irish regiments in France see Rowlands, 'An army in exile'.

⁵⁸ Service file of Nathaniel Hooke, 1691-1738 (Service historique de l'Armée de Terre, 4YD 1464). I am indebted to M. Guillaume Vautravers for locating and copying these documents on my behalf.

⁵⁹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 150v).

army became more closely linked to the regular French army, but James II remained as the official commander in chief.⁶⁰

With any imminent prospect of a swift return to the three kingdoms now ruled out the Stuart regiments were drafted into the mainstream fray of the Nine Years War. This war of containment, as the Grand Alliance saw it, was a baptism of fire for the Jacobite regular forces during their engagement in the main theatre of European war.⁶¹ However despite hard fighting by both sides, stalemate ensued. Continuing efforts at Jacobite subversion in England, in which Hooke was involved, had been ineffectual since 1692.⁶² By 1696 the Jacobite court was able to interest Louis XIV and his ministers in another proposal to invade England as the surest way of ending the war. Conflict in England, it was argued, would divide and distract William's forces on the Continent.

A major bone of contention in regard to an invasion was whether it would be launched before or after a rebellion in England. The French were wary of risking their forces in a futile attempt if local support was not forthcoming. Previous claims of Jacobite strength in England had been shown to be exaggerated: Hooke, evidently disillusioned by his experiences during these years, disparaged such claims and the ineffectiveness of Jacobites in England in his later

⁶⁰ See Edward Corp, 'The Irish at the Jacobite court at Saint-Germain-en-Laye', in Thomas O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), pp 145-46.

⁶¹ See Bracken, 'Piracy and poverty: aspects of the Irish Jacobite experience in France, 1691-1720', in Thomas O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), p. 129.

⁶² Though there is little documentary evidence detailing Hooke's activities in this period, the testimony of his contemporaries make it clear he was frequently employed by James II. Hans Heinrich von Stöken (d.1709), Danish ambassador in The Hague in 1702, referred to Hooke being 'known for having been employed in enterprises and affairs by King James', Hooke to de Torcy, 30 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 233r). A former colleague of Hooke's in James' service, the comte de Bada (alias Dujardin) who had become marshal of the court of Hesse, also warned English and Dutch politicians about him in 1702, emphasising that Hooke had been 'much employed in the secret affairs of King James', Hooke to de Torcy, 11 Jul. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 65v). Anthonie Heinsius, *de facto* foreign minister of the Dutch

writings, discussed in next chapter.⁶³ The English Jacobites argued at the time that that they were wary of revealing themselves without the assistance of the James' exiled troops and their French allies.⁶⁴ James and his advisors agreed to try to coordinate a rising among Jacobites in England with a French landing.

The seriousness of the plans being undertaken was reflected by the number and seniority of emissaries sent to England by James II. Hooke was one of the agents sent to negotiate with leading Jacobites. Others included James' illegitimate son, James FitzJames (1670-1734), duke of Berwick and Brigadier-General Sir George Barclay (1636-1710). Barclay was commissioned by James II to concert the enterprise. However plans for a regular military campaign mutated into a plot to assassinate William III. Two of the conspirators, Irishman Captain Thomas Prendergast (1660-1709) motivated by distaste at murder, and Francis de la Rue seeking profit, separately informed the authorities of the details.⁶⁵ Proclamations were issued and the ringleaders arrested. The English army and navy were placed on high alert. William informed Parliament of the 'murderous' scheme underway. His popularity increased markedly among his English subjects, whose resentment at war and privation had been reaching dangerous levels. In France it was evident that the Jacobite plans had backfired badly. James II's last attempt at restoration had failed. With William more secure on his throne than for

republic, described Hooke as 'a dangerous man'. See Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 169r) and chapter six.

⁶³ 'In 1695 [...] they promised to campaign at the head of 4,000 horse when they were not in a state to assemble 800, though they had made provision of saddles and arms for an even bigger number', Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163-164v);

⁶⁴ Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite cause, 1685-1766*, p. 88.

⁶⁵ Prendergast received a pardon in April 1696. William, convinced by his sincerity, also granted him £3000 and an Irish estate. Prendergast moved back to Ireland, converted to Protestantism and married Penelope Cadogan, daughter of Henry Cadogan, a Dublin lawyer and sister of General William Cadogan. In 1699 he was created an Irish baronet and 1703 he became MP for Monaghan.

many years, the invasion plans were cancelled. When peace was agreed at Ryswick in 1697, Louis XIV recognised William as the *de facto* king of England.⁶⁶

Hooke was named in arrest warrants after the demise of the plot but escaped capture. He continued to serve as a soldier until the end of the war. Peace, however, brought it own challenges.

Subsequently he became colonel of an Irish infantry regiment. Prendergast died of his wounds at the battle of Malplaquet in September 1709.

⁶⁶ On the Assassination Plot of 1696, see Jane Garret, *The triumphs of Providence: the assassination plot of 1696* (Cambridge, 1980). On the wider perspective of Jacobite plans, see Lord, *The Stuarts' secret army*, pp 24-30; Paul Hopkins, 'Aspects of Jacobite conspiracy in the reign of William III' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1981).

CHAPTER 4: ENTERING FRENCH SERVICE

Hooke's activities in the period immediately after the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick are poorly documented. The peace brought welcome relief to long suffering civilians. Conversely for those in military service, there was no peace dividend as expensive war machines, and their personnel, became redundant. Rapid demobilisation of hundreds of thousands of men ensued. From a wartime figure of more than 400,000 in 1696 the French army fell to a peacetime level of 154,000 in 1699.¹ Despite his troops' honourable service, James II lacked the resources to retain a large military establishment. Louis XIV, in deference to his obligations to James and a desire to uphold the dignity of his fellow monarch, incorporated a substantial body of the Stuart forces as distinct units within the French army.²

However, this left a sizeable number of Jacobite soldiers unemployed.³ Many localities, and their administrators, were now concerned at the huge numbers of men demobilised and left to their own devices.⁴ Vauban, the foremost French military engineer,⁵ forecast that 'it will create an infinite number of beggars, and considering the poverty of the peasants and their lack of charity towards soldiers, a great many will perish of hunger and cold during the winter'.⁶ Vauban's comments referred largely to men of French origin. The men of the Irish

¹ John A. Lynn, *Giant of the grand siècle: the French army 1610-1715* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 396.

² Rowlands, 'An army in exile', p. 8; John Callow, *King in exile: James II warrior, king and saint* (Stroud, 2004), pp 298-99.

³ Corp, 'The Irish at the Jacobite court of Saint-Germain-en-Laye', in O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), p. 152.

⁴ John Lough, *France observed in the seventeenth century by British travellers* (Stocksfield, 1985), pp 166-68.

⁵ F. J. Hebbert and G. A. Rothrock, *Soldier of France: Sebastian Le Prestre de Vauban 1633-1707* (New York, 1989), p. xiii.

⁶ Lynn, *Giant*, p. 396.

brigades, foreign and mainly non-French speaking faced an even more difficult situation.⁷ Many officers were soon surplus to requirements.⁸

In May 1698 a group of disbanded soldiers presented a petition to James informing

him of the state they are in, and to entreat assistance from him [...] [having] remained silent until now, in expectation of what might be his Majesty's pleasure to order respecting them; but that the extreme necessity, to which they had been reduced, has constrained them to break that silence, in order to lay before his Majesty the pitiable condition of their affairs. That they had fought during ten years, in defence of their religion, and of their legitimate sovereign, with all the zeal and all the fidelity, that could be required of them, and with a devotion, unparalleled, except among those of their unhappy nation.⁹

Nathaniel Hooke's position was scarcely better. He remained in the service of James II, but in reduced circumstances at a court marking time while awaiting the king's death. Extant documentation throws little light on Hooke's activities between 1697 and 1700. Later members of the family believed that Hooke had attempted to profit from the skills and experience he had gained in the War of the League of Augsburg. It was believed that he had made his way to Sweden where the initial preparations for what would later be termed the Great Northern War were proving a boon for many of those at a loose end in the military profession. Tensions were growing in regard to the duchy of Holstein-Gottorp between

⁷ Ó Ciardha, *Ireland and the Jacobite cause, 1685-1766*, pp 107-108; Corp, 'The Irish at the Jacobite court of Saint-Germain-en-Laye', in O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe, 1580-1815*, pp 150-53. Negative associations of Irishness, dating back to the early seventeenth century, made life more difficult for those demobilised. See Eamon Ó Ciosáin, 'Voloumous deamboulare : the Wandering Irish in French Literature, 1600-1789,' in Anthony Coulson (ed.), *Exiles and migrants: crossing thresholds in European culture and society* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997), pp 32-35; idem., 'A hundred years of Irish migration to France, 1590-1688), in O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe, 1580-1815*, pp 93-106. Demobilised soldiers also inevitably made their way back to England and Ireland, where many lived on the margins of society. See Peter Linebaugh, *The London hanged: crime and civil society in the eighteenth century* (London, 1991), pp 288-331.

⁸ Bracken, 'Piracy and poverty: aspects of the Irish Jacobite experience in France, 1691-1720', in O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe 1580-1815*, pp 127-42. Huguenot soldiers in England suffered the same unhappy fate when the English parliament eventually forced William III to drastically reduce the size of the standing army in England in February 1699, see J. R. Jones, *Country and court: England 1658-1714* (London, 1993), p. 306.

⁹ Callow, *King in exile*, p. 299.

Sweden and Denmark-Norway.¹⁰ It was thought that Hooke's intention was to offer his sword as a soldier of fortune.¹¹

However Hooke's own papers from 1702, now held in the French diplomatic archives, unravel the threads of this family lore. While he did have an intention to seek employment in 'the North' this did not come about until he had secured his formal release from the service of James II in August 1701.¹² Hooke never progressed very far in this projected Scandinavian enterprise. While passing through Holland in October 1701 he encountered Major General John Cutts (1661-1707),¹³ one of William III's most trusted officers. In 1701 he was overseeing the build-up of English troops in the Netherlands in anticipation of war with France. Hooke's conversations with Cutts at this point gave rise to ideas that shaped the future course of Hooke's life and career. In turn, developments in Hooke's thought and analysis directly influenced French political and military strategy during the course of the war.

Hooke wrote of meeting Cutts in a memoir he drafted for the French secretary of state for foreign affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1665-1746), marquis

¹⁰ Preben Torntoft, 'William III and Denmark-Norway, 1697-1702', in *The English Historical Review*, vol. 81 (Jan., 1966), pp 1-25.

¹¹ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card* (Edinburgh, 1988), p. 13.

¹² James II to Hooke, 19 Aug. 1701, H.M.C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers belonging to his Majesty the King preserved at Windsor Castle* (7 vols, London, 1904-23), iv, (London, 1910), 3, 'Granting him his discharge, as he wishes to take service under other princes, and certifying that he has always served loyally and diligently.' Full copy contained in Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Français, Cabinet d'Hozier: Dossiers bleu, (National Library of Ireland microfilm pp 156-157, no. 9350).

¹³ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 149v). Cutts, baron Gowran in the Irish peerage, was a military officer, MP and Governor of the Isle of Wight 'and very much in the confidence of his master' William of Orange. Survived a disastrous landing near Brest in 1694 and rose to be lieutenant general during the War of Spanish Succession and commander-in-chief in Ireland from March 1705 until his death. Also noted for his literary ability; see Stanley Simpson Swartley, *The life and poetry of John Cutts* (Philadelphia, 1917).

de Torcy in March 1702.¹⁴ De Torcy was the best qualified holder of the post of foreign minister in the history of French diplomacy.¹⁵ He was the son of Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy, foreign minister from 1679 until his death in 1696 and nephew of Jean Baptiste Colbert, one of Louis's most powerful and accomplished ministers. De Torcy's entire education had been conceived to groom him for the post of foreign minister. His apprenticeship saw him study law, and languages and well as undertaking a diplomatic grand tour of Europe in the 1680s, visiting Portugal, England, Scandinavia, Italy and Germany. He was perceived by his contemporaries as eloquent, persuasive and honest, with a penetrating insight into men and their driving forces.¹⁶

De Torcy's desire for order and efficiency saw him organise a permanent diplomatic archive in the Louvre and set up a training academy for diplomats, *l'Academie Politique* in 1712.¹⁷ As befitted a man with an intelligent curious mind he amassed a collection of over 4000 books. Heeding the advice of his father, who had placed great emphasis on the study of history, the majority of these were

¹⁴ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 149v).

¹⁵ De Torcy has been the subject of a number of articles in historical journals, though surprisingly, given his importance in foreign policy during the later reign of Louis XIV, there is no standard biography in English. See William Roth, 'Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy', in Roland Mousnier (ed.), *Le conseil du roi de Louis XII a la révolution* (Paris, 1970), pp 175-203; John C. Rule, 'A career in the making: the education of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy', in *French Historical Studies*, xix, no. 4 (1996), pp 967-996; John C. Rule, 'King and minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy', in Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds), *William III and Louis XIV: essays 1680-1720* (Liverpool, 1968), pp 216-36; John C. Rule, 'Colbert de Torcy, an emergent bureaucracy, and the formation of French foreign policy, 1698-1715', in R. Hatton (ed.), *Louis IV and Europe* (London, 1976), pp 261-288; John C. Rule, 'The aesthetic impulse: Colbert de Torcy's education in the fine arts', in David L. Rubin (ed.), *The sun king: the ascendancy of French culture during the reign of Louis XIV* (Washington D. C., 1991), pp 154-84; in French see the short biography by Abbé François Duffo, *Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, ministre des Affaires Étrangères sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1934).

¹⁶ Roth, 'Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy', in Mousnier (ed.), *Le conseil du roi*, pp 175-203; Joseph Klaitis, 'Men of letters and political reform in France at the end of the reign of Louis XIV: the founding of the *Académie Politique*', in *The Journal of Modern History*, xxxiii, no. 4 (1971), pp 577-597.

¹⁷ Roth, 'Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy', pp 175-203; Klaitis, 'Men of letters and political reform in France', pp 577-597.

historical works, ranging widely from ancient to modern, and from religious to secular histories.¹⁸ Torcy's breath of interest paralleled Hooke's, as his memoir demonstrated. In addition, the two men had an unlikely shared interest in fashion.¹⁹ After Hooke's death in 1738, de Torcy's regard for his former agent was evident in his personal intercession to ensure that his widow received a pension.²⁰

The memoir referring to his meeting with Cutts and commenting on the political situation in England is the earliest document currently known to have been written by Hooke to de Torcy. Not surprisingly, in the early stages of what was for Hooke a potentially important correspondence, it reads as self promoting in places. Intriguingly Hooke describes Cutts not only as an old friend but also as a close relative from whom he sought letters of recommendation.²¹ Events at this stage worked in Hooke's favour as news of James II death arrived in Holland. This led Cutts to believe that James's death had occasioned Hooke's departure from France and that his connection with St Germain was ended. Hooke reported that Cutts 'talked to me on everything with a great frankness.'²²

¹⁸ Roth, 'Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy', p. 194.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193, refers to Torcy's 'considerable collection of clothes, cut to the latest fashion, valued at 4, 412 livres. Hooke even in his youth as a minister avowing simple and severe puritan principles was noted for his rather ostentatious and well tailored attire, see Grymes to Skelton, 1 Jul. 1685 (B. L., Ms. Add. 41817 f. 200), Appendix A.

²⁰ Service file of Nathaniel Hooke, 1691-1738 (Service historique de l'Armée de Terre, 4YD 1464).

²¹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 151v). The exact nature of the familial link between Hooke and Cutts is unclear. In another interesting kinship link Cutts was related to, and corresponded with Henry St John, later viscount Bolingbroke. See David Green, *Queen Anne* (London, 1970), p.149. Hooke's second wife Helen, *née* St John, also claimed to be related to Bolingbroke in a letter to Nicloas-Prosper Bauyn d'Angervilliers (1728-40), Minister and Secretary of State for War, November 1738, (Service Historique de l'Armée de la Terre, 4Yd 1464, document two, page three in Hooke's military service file).

²² Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 150v).

Their conversation included a discussion of the last war, in particular an attempted English ‘descent’ on the French coast at Camaret Bay in 1694.²³ Intended to raze the important naval base at Brest and pave the way for a full scale invasion of France, the operation ended in rancorous failure when the landing force was met by a well prepared French defence.²⁴ Charges of cowardice were levelled at Cutts for not pressing the attack, and treachery at John Churchill, (then earl of Marlborough), for betraying the mission to St Germain. Although Hooke had been with the army of the marquis de Refuge²⁵ on the coast of Normandy while Cutts passed before Cherbourg towards Brest, he was unable, or unwilling, to enlighten him.²⁶ However Cutts’s enthusiasm for descents was undiminished. He explained to Hooke, in detail, a number of plans for English landings in France.²⁷ He complained of having being stymied in 1694 because

²³ On the concept of descents in this period, see K. A. J. McLay, ‘Combined operations and the European theatre of the Nine Years’ War, 1688-97’, in *Historical Research*, lxxviii, no. 202 (Nov., 2005), pp 506-39.

²⁴ See G. N. Clark, ‘The nine years war, 1688-1697’ in J. S. Bromley (ed.), *The new Cambridge modern history*, vi: *The rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 248. The Camaret Bay episode reflected rather badly on all concerned. Suspicions arose in England that the commander of the expedition, Thomas Tollemarche, had been ill served by his subordinate commanders during the battle, Cutts in particular, and by Marlborough in England who was alleged to have passed word to the French. These actions were attributed to the envy of discontented rivals, as Tollemarche was the only Englishman promoted to a senior position in William III’s armies. Marlborough’s reputation in particular was traduced by Thomas Babington Macaulay in volume seven of *The history of England from the accession of James II* (London, 1858), pp 133-39, where he described the episode as ‘the basest of all the hundred villainies of Marlborough’. It has been widely accepted that Marlborough did communicate information on the expedition to the exiled court at St. Germain. However debate arose at an early stage concerning the usefulness of this knowledge, see E. M. Lloyd, ‘Marlborough and the Brest raid of 1694’, in *The English Historical Review*, ix, no. 33 (1894), pp 130-33 and Godfrey Davies, ‘MacPherson and the Nairne papers’, in *The English Historical Review*, xxxv, no. 139 (1920), pp 367-76. Hooke in later correspondence refers to the fact that the duke of Hamilton (the then earl of Arran) was angry not to be credited as the source who forwarded this information to the French court via St Germain. He claimed to have informed the earl of Melfort of the plan two months before the expedition sailed, rendering the impact, if the import, of Marlborough’s actions much less important. See *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, i, 392. Cutts, a man sensible of his reputation for extreme bravery was obviously still affected by the issue.

²⁵ Pomponne de Refuge (d. 1712), French military officer.

²⁶ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 150v).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, ff 150v-151r.

then England had been governed by a ministry of the Anglican Church (that is to say the Old), that these men had no vigour, and that they had such a strong hatred of the Protestants of France that they wanted no dealings with them.²⁸

Cutts had wanted to coordinate a landing with a local rebellion, arguing that ‘he would have found there many friends, [and] that he knew the country, having lived there for more than a year’.²⁹ He was still in favour of such a scheme, and the merits of descents in general, taking pains to impress upon Hooke that

provided that one took some small number of measures, *nothing is easier than a descent*. That besides that of Brest (which had failed because of the badly chose landing point) one finds that one succeeds almost always. That the English have descended more than once on Normandy without having any port open to them; that they had done the same thing at Cadiz and Lisbon during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. That during the time of Charles I they had landed at the Isle of Rhé, despite the opposition of the French...that all the descents that had been undertaken by England had always succeeded.³⁰

Hooke observed that it was clearly a business close to Cutts’s heart and the discussion proved important for Hooke’s later career. He adopted Cutts’s idea of an armed landing on enemy soil coordinated with a rising of disaffected native elements. It would inspire the 1708 French expedition to Scotland discussed in chapter seven.

In the short term, Hooke made the most of his encounter with Cutts. Instead of continuing to the Baltic he revised his plans. He realised that his relationship with Cutts gave him access to valuable intelligence information in a rapidly changing international situation. The death of King Carlos II of Spain on 1

²⁸ Ibid., f. 150v. Hostility to Huguenots in England, such as that recounted here by Hooke, is examined by Bernard Cottret in *The Huguenots in England* (Cambridge, 1991), pp 190-228. See also Robin Gwynn, *Huguenot heritage: the history and contribution of the Huguenots in Britain* (2nd edition, Brighton, 2001), pp 159-65.

²⁹ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 150v). It appears that Cutts residence in France has not come to light before; possibly he was attached to the English regiments in French service at some point between 1672 and 1678.

³⁰ Ibid., f. 151v. A plan to carry out such a descent in Normandy was under discussion. Ironically given Cutts complaint of the lack of vigour among High Anglican Tories in regard to such enterprises, the most enthusiastic supporter of the project was the High Tory Earl of Nottingham. See Bert van ‘t Hoff, *The correspondence of John Churchill, first duke of Marlborough and Antonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1701-1711* (The Hague, 1951), pp 86-7.

November 1700, without an heir, had precipitated a destabilising succession crisis in Europe. The deaths of James II in September 1701 and the only child of Princess Anne, the duke of Gloucester, in July 1700, had also reopened the question of the English succession. The death of William III in March 1701 and the succession of Queen Anne ensured that the destiny of the English throne would be bound up with that of the Spanish. The fragile peace established by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 was wilting rapidly.

Against this background Hooke recognized that his ability to supply information on England could be of interest to potential employers in France, especially as rumours were already circulating of an embarkation of troops being planned in England for an unspecified destination. Expelled from Holland later in 1701, he sounded out the French over the course of the winter and spring of 1701-02.³¹ Hooke had a number of potential contacts. The French ambassador in the United Provinces in 1701, the comte d'Avaux had previously served as the French liaison with Jacobite forces in Ireland, while Hooke was acting as King James's emissary.³² D'Avaux had been close to Charles Colbert, marquis de Croissy during his period as Foreign Minister (1679-96) and was similarly close to his son, de Torcy, who succeeded his father in 1696. De Torcy frequently sought d'Avaux's 'advice on affairs in the Low Countries, Sweden and England'.³³ It

³¹ In his first written memoir to de Torcy, Hooke referred to personal interviews he had with the foreign minister in late 1701, when he returned to France after his expulsion from Holland. See Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 149v).

³² H.M.C. *Ormonde Papers*, viii, 384; (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 233r).

³³ John C. Rule, 'Colbert de Torcy, an emergent bureaucracy, and the formulation of French foreign policy, 1698-1715', in Ragnhild Hatton (ed.), *Louis XIV and Europe* (London, 1976), p. 264.

would not have been unexpected therefore for de Torcy to consult d'Avaux when making appointments.

Hooke also had a pre-existing friendship with Francois de Callières (1645-1717).³⁴ De Callières was an experienced and respected figure, active in diplomacy since 1670. He had been centrally involved in the negotiations prior to the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, and in 1698 he was rewarded with the post of cabinet secretary to Louis XIV.³⁵ Close to de Torcy, he remained active and influential in foreign affairs. He later wrote a seminal book on the theory and conduct of diplomacy, *De la Manière de négocier avec les Souverains*, published in Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and London in 1716, which became the standard work on the subject.³⁶ It emphasised the utility of low profile personal contacts as a precursor to peace negotiations. Prior to publication he requested Hooke, as a friend and fellow diplomat, to comment on this work.³⁷ De Callières, who had experienced setbacks of his own, seems to have identified with Hooke's position.³⁸ In 1701/02 he appears to have acted as a mentor at the outset of Hooke's diplomatic career and lobbied on his behalf.³⁹ The two men viewed the world, and the art of diplomacy, in a similar light and it is possible to identify aspects of de Callières thought in some of the methods that Hooke adopted in his

³⁴ See K. W. Schweizer, *François de Callières: diplomat and man of letters: 1645-1717* (New York, 1995).

³⁵ In this role, de Callières was one of three people able, and authorised, to mimic Louis XIV's own handwriting. The others were the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy and one of his senior officials, Antoine Pecquet. See J. C. Rule, 'The king in his council: Louis XIV and the *Conseil d'en haut*', in Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott (eds), *Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe: essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 227.

³⁶ See François de Callières, *The art of diplomacy*, eds. H. M. A. Keens-Soper and K. W. Schweizer (London, 1983).

³⁷ Hooke to de Callières, 6 Feb. 1704, Paris, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 48.

³⁸ In the early stages of de Callières life, a seemingly promising career had stalled on a number of occasions. See Keens-Soper and Schweizer, *The art of diplomacy*, pp 5-7.

³⁹ Hooke to [de Callières], 4 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 56r, 56v).

own diplomatic career. This connection was particularly valuable for Hooke, since de Callières' diplomatic *forte* was Franco-Dutch relations. He had written a number of policy papers to de Torcy on the subject and throughout the War of Spanish Succession de Callières' expertise on Dutch affairs continued to be utilised by de Torcy. It appears to be on the strength of this relationship that Hooke entered French service.

Hooke succeeded in gaining an interview with de Torcy at Versailles in the early months of 1702, where he recounted the likely disembarkment of English troops under Lord Cutts in Holland.⁴⁰ He evidently made a favourable impression on the foreign minister. From March 1702 Hooke was commissioned to write detailed memoirs for de Torcy, not only concerning the political scene in England but dealing with broader political, military and economic developments likely to help or hinder the interests of France.⁴¹ Thus Hooke began his employment in the service of France as an analyst and advisor.

He summed up where his loyalties now lay by emphasising that 'I regard myself as his [Louis XIV's] subject and am resolved to serve him as such, without consideration of the interests of the king of England [James III], whatever he may order me to do.'⁴² Hooke also made clear his loyalty, and gratitude to de Torcy, pledging to

obey you Monseigneur as if I was in the army [...] allow me to take the liberty of having no fear if I can render service to the King in any way [...] I beg of you only to continue to

⁴⁰ Hooke to de Torcy, 22 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E. CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 220v).

⁴¹ See Appendix II.

⁴² Hooke to [de Callières?], 4 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 56r); Hooke's comment in relation to serving Louis XIV 'without consideration of the interests of the king of England [James III], whatever he may order me to do' was designed to ward off worries over a conflict in loyalties. This was no idle fear as in the next year, 1703 when the duke of Berwick applied for naturalisation, the license from the court at St Germain, granting permission for him to do so, contained a clause which stated that the duke should be ready to place himself at the service of the James III when he needed him, see Peggy Miller, *James* (London, 1971), p. 74.

extend to me the honour of your protection and to look on me as the most loyal and most submissive of all your creatures.⁴³

Some confusion as to Hooke's status appears to have lingered in de Torcy's mind. Hooke called on de Callières to reiterate to de Torcy, 'because I see that he still regards me as English', that his definitive loyalty was now to Louis XIV and France,⁴⁴ and 'that I have no other interest at heart than that of France, which I regard henceforth as my country'.⁴⁵ It is important to appreciate the full extent of Hooke's transformation of loyalty in 1702. Some contemporaries and later commentators overlooked or misjudged this, regarding Hooke as still inhabiting some middle ground in employment between St Germain and Versailles.⁴⁶ Hooke himself was at pains to make it clear that having been released from service to James II, he was now honour-bound to the service and interests of Louis XIV alone. He emphasised that his unbending principle was 'to be rigorously faithful to those who employ me'.⁴⁷ He had demonstrated this while serving Monmouth and James II, and would adhere to the same principle of honour when serving Louis XIV. If he could aid James III and Jacobite endeavours in the course of his French employment that would be well and good, but his overriding priority was now carrying out the wishes of Louis XIV and his ministers. Hooke's changing loyalty was not atypical in early eighteenth century terms. A number of other Jacobite officers transferred to the regular French army and pledged their

⁴³ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 93r, 93v).

⁴⁴ Hooke to [de Callières?], 4 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 56r).

⁴⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 88v).

⁴⁶ See for example the unfavourable comments on Hooke in George Lockhart, *Memoirs concerning the affairs of Scotland, from Queen Anne's accession to the throne, to the commencement of the Union of the two kingdoms of Scotland and England, in May, 1707* (London, 1714). Lockhart, a leading Scottish Jacobite, regarded Hooke's efforts in Scotland in 1705, 1707 and 1708 as verging on treachery because he recognized that Hooke's priority was in carrying out French orders. Lockhart failed to understand, or refused to accept, that as a naturalised Frenchman, an officer in the French army and an operative of de Torcy's, Hooke was actually serving his new master, Louis XIV, as faithfully had previously served Monmouth and James II.

⁴⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 11 Jun. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 28r).

allegiance to Louis XIV.⁴⁸ In England, a number of Whigs, disillusioned by William III, became Jacobites. Among these ‘Whig Jacobites’ were Sir William Whitlock and Edward Harvey, both MPs, William Penn, Stephen Lobb, who like Hooke was an ex-Independent clergyman, and Edward Nosworthy, a Presbyterian lawyer. John Wildman and Robert Ferguson, old comrades of Hooke’s in the Monmouth rebellion also became Jacobites. Ferguson had condemned those, like Hooke, who had taken advantage of James II’s mercy in 1687 and 1688. By 1690 he was a Jacobite.⁴⁹ Conversely the career of James Waldegrave (1684-1741), first earl of Waldegrave, in many respects presents a mirror image of Hooke’s negotiation of the loyalty question. Waldegrave, grandson of James II and nephew of James III and the duke of Berwick, was born into a staunchly Catholic and Jacobite family. Raised and educated in France, presented to the Pope as a young boy, he seemed destined for a career in continental exile. However after the death of his wife in 1719, Waldegrave appears to have experienced a crisis of conscience. He returned to England, converted to Protestantism and took the oaths of allegiance to the George I. Remaining loyal to his new religion and politics until his death, he went on to play an important role in English diplomacy and intelligence, as ambassador in Vienna and Paris ‘where his sympathy for Catholic culture’ and personal insight into Jacobitism (in the same way as Hooke’s intimate knowledge of Protestant culture and English and Dutch politics made him a valuable asset in France) served him well.⁵⁰ A variety of personal, political and practical factors played their parts in such transformations and fluidity in religion, residence and adherence such as Hooke’s was not uncommon.

⁴⁸ Rowlands, *An army in exile*, p. 4.

⁴⁹ See Harris, *Politics under the later Stuarts*, pp 214-15.

⁵⁰ Jeremy Black, *A system of ambition? British foreign policy 1660-1793* (Stroud, 2000), p. 73.

Hooke's ideas and suggestions led him beyond mere theoretical analysis of international relations, to hands-on involvement in the world of intelligence and diplomacy. Perhaps not surprisingly given his experience in clandestine operations for James II, he was selected to put a number of his proposed schemes into operation personally. The seeds of these future developments flowed from the memoirs which he began to write in the early months of 1702. These documents provide a valuable insight into Hooke's thought and mentality in this crucial period in his own life and a perspective on an important period in European history.

Hooke's memoirs to de Torcy were drawn up when war between France and the Maritime Powers, England and the Netherlands, was imminent. The reasons for the war and the involvement of the Holy Roman Emperor featured only incidentally in the memoirs. They concentrated on what practical measures might be taken in regard to England and the Netherlands. The memoirs of 9, 14 and 20 March are extremely focused in their content, being concerned with potential threats to France and counter measures that may be taken to defeat, divide or distract her enemies. In the first memoir Hooke examined means of neutralising the English threat to French security. He cast his analysis against a background of the political and economic state of England. His explanation of what made England a dangerous and potent enemy to French interests, displayed an acute understanding of the interplay of political, religious and economic factors in determining English attitudes and actions.

Hooke pointed out that England, in contrast to France, was (openly) internally divided. Various factions wielded influence based on their strength in

the two houses of parliament. He explained these factions as arising from religious differences, and his own formative experiences as an active participant in the political and religious turmoil of 1680s England clearly informed his thinking in this regard. It was precisely this that made him so useful to the French. As an analyst and planner, Hooke devised a number of potential courses of action reflecting his personal expertise in affairs relating to England. On occasion Hooke's tone does convey a sense of 'selling his product' and indirectly promoting himself, as befitted a man aiming to secure his position.⁵¹

Hooke contextualised the current situation with a short political and religious history of England from the restoration, opening with an explanation of the origin of the factions

During the reign of the late king Charles II England was divided into two factions: that of the Anglican Church and that of the Non-Conformists, which itself is generally divided into several sects and generally known under the name of Presbyterians.⁵²

He traced the changing balance of power between two groups whose differences lay in their attitude to non-conformists who had separated from the Anglican Church on issues concerning church government and doctrine. Hooke described the importance of the concept of Comprehension, of changing the Anglican Church sufficiently to 'comprehend' those Protestants who were then outside its bounds. He defines this, perhaps not surprisingly given his religious background, as the central issue which influenced political loyalties from the reign of Charles II onwards. During Charles's reign the strength of the 'Anglican faction'

⁵¹ Timothy Garton Ash, commenting on the pressure on modern political analysts to get themselves and their analysis noticed, remarks that many books and articles could have 'A job application' as an unwritten subtitle. See Garton Ash, *Free world: why a crisis of the West reveals the opportunity of our time* (London, 2004), p. 97. Hooke was also aware that his analysis and his future, personal and the political, were entwined.

⁵² Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 146r).

consisted of the bishops and the clergy engaged by their own interests to support it, and the greater part of the lords were devoted to it, and the king declared himself for it. This rendered them all powerful in the upper chamber of parliament. The other faction was strongest in the lower chamber, much more numerous, and reinforced by several members of the Anglican Church even, who disapproved of the severity exercised against the Non-Conformists, making efforts to broaden the terms of the Communion and to allow these last to enter into the Church, by removing several ceremonies which were the cause of their separation.⁵³

Hooke explained that Charles II had been adamantly opposed to Comprehension, refusing favour and advancement to those who supported the project. The conduct of his brother James II had been very different, allowing the Non-Conformists to make inroads into the power of the Anglican faction. William III had completed the process

because more than two thirds of the Bishoprics have become vacant since he has been on the throne and he has granted them to ecclesiastics who favour Comprehension, to which it is now being worked towards in the assembly of the clergy. All the new peers of his creation are of the same sentiment and many more of the others are coming around.⁵⁴

Hooke categorised the division prevailing in England near the end of William's reign as a religious one, a distinction between what he termed the Old Anglican Church and the New. Hooke's is a version of the traditional High and Low Church classification. However Hooke's understanding and terminology are distinctive. For him the terms 'Old' and 'New' Church encompassed both religious and political dimensions seamlessly. He saw the religious issue as the main faultline at the centre of political loyalties. He subsumed politics, economics and foreign policy into this basic religious cleavage. It is noteworthy that he rarely used party labels such as Tory or Whig in his analysis in his early memoirs, although he does adopt them more frequently in later texts.

Hooke went on to claim that the Old Church had been reduced to a faded remnant of its former self

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., f. 146v.

composed only of two or three Bishops, old, cowardly and timid; of very few lords and gentlemen, of Jacobite ministers who refuse to take the oaths of loyalty to the Prince and of some known to be true but without credit.⁵⁵

King William had now recognised this. For most of his reign William had ‘usually let affairs follow their natural course, waiting to profit from the occasion, which he waited for with surprising patience and application.’⁵⁶ In this way he had ‘sometimes favoured the one, sometimes the other without declaring himself for either’.⁵⁷ Now however

having recognised that that [party] of the New Church is the most numerous, the most rich, the most zealous against the Catholic religion, the most animated against France and the young king of England, and knowing moreover that the tendency of these men is to push their point to the extreme, he has thrown himself absolutely into their arms without looking after any measures with the others.⁵⁸

For Hooke this was a major departure in policy. William had hitherto studiously refrained from this type of overtly partisan policy to avoid antagonising the English.⁵⁹ ‘By this means not only did he highlight his moderation and his fairness but avoided upsetting the English who, while no-one is seen to be interfering with their liberties and privileges, are naturally very just’.⁶⁰ Hooke noted that William had reserved his ‘intrigues for party affairs’, and had not exerted his influence in determining the outcome of elections.⁶¹ He ‘tried to render justice exact, when he acted according to a specific law, even when badly affectioned to his government’.⁶² However,

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Douglas Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch: British opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague, 1958), p. 58.

⁶⁰ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 147r).

⁶¹ C. Roberts, ‘Party and patronage in later Stuart England’, in S. B. Baxter (ed.), *England’s rise to greatness, 1660-1763* (Berkeley, 1983), p. 195.

⁶² Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 147r).

then, this prince, seeing that the House of Commons declared itself so openly in favour of the New Church, no longer took much notice of the Old. He stripped their leader, the earl of Rochester of all his posts. The earl of Ranelagh and Mr Blathwayt, one the Treasurer and the other Secretary of War, were said to have been removed to please the faction which always hated them. Therefore after having undermined for a long time the party of the Old Tories, and having reduced it to a pitiful state, he came to defeat it entirely by this last coup: in removing all means to show resentment and leaving no hope of a recovery in his time. Here is the present state of the factions in England; if by the Anglican Church one understands the faction which carried that name before, it is no more. If one understands those who are in possession of the Benefices and revenues of the Church, it is the party of the Presbyterians and their friends: it is they who dominate today in the parliament and the court.⁶³

This was Hooke's reading of the current political state of England in early March 1702. Against this background Hooke moved on to consider what the change in English affairs meant for France. He stressed that commercial and economic factors were going to impact decisively on English-French relations. William, as Hooke pointed out, was manoeuvring to take advantage of the fact that

the greatest part of the rich merchants are of this [New Anglican] faction and [William] serves himself usefully by their apprehensions for their commerce to draw them into his interests and make them wish for war.⁶⁴

He noted that funds for 15,000 men had been agreed upon by parliament. Where were these men bound for? Hooke acknowledged that the sixth article of the Treaty of The Hague of 7 September 1701 'insinuated a design for a descent on America, but if the 6th article serves for anything other than to cover their true designs and to give reason for their embarquement remains to be seen.'⁶⁵ In Hooke's analysis there were other possibilities.

He then cited his reasons for thinking an attack on Spanish possessions in the Americas, whether in the Caribbean or on the mainland, would be so difficult

⁶³ Ibid., f. 147v. It is interesting to remember that but for his religious and political conversion in 1688 Hooke might well been among this grouping which dominated England, and he was, in a sense, a man out of his natural element.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid. The treaty is more commonly referred to as the Grand Alliance, made between England, the Netherlands and the Emperor.

as to be unlikely. He referred to the length of the voyage, the rigors of the climate which had previously decimated Cromwell's fleet and the Darien colony, and the sheer distance involved. Hooke pointed out that '15,000 men are hardly enough to make progress in a country so vastly spread out and where the villages are so far distant from one another.'⁶⁶ The towns along the Caribbean and Atlantic coasts would 'reimburse only a quarter of their expense' while the 'sea to the south is inaccessible to them because of the impossibility of transporting an army through the straits of Magellan' and to attempt to send an army by land, 'without being assured of several thousand miles of country, and of several major towns, would demand, beyond the troops it would be necessary to deploy to safeguard their lines of communications, almost all their army to guard them'.⁶⁷ In addition the silver mines of Peru, the most likely target, were well guarded, as were the mines at Santa Fé in New Mexico. All of these projects would be more costly in terms of time and expense than any prospective return. 'In the present circumstances [...] nothing they do will bring an immediate profit to them or their Allies. Therefore only time and money are to be lost.'⁶⁸ Moreover the Dutch themselves, though part of the combination marshalled by William, had serious misgivings about allowing the English a foothold on the [Spanish] American mainland. The intrinsic mismatch between English and Dutch commercial interests was to be a major theme of Hooke's analysis. Strategically, he considered that the Dutch would

never want to give [the English] the upper hand and allow them to become masters of the riches of the West Indies, as they [...] have of the East; and from the experience often seen

⁶⁶ Ibid., f. 148r.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

such as Amboyna, and several other places in the two Indies, a shared presence is not practical.⁶⁹

Rather, Hooke suggested, they might attempt a descent closer to home, possibly in the Canaries or Azores. From there they could intercept French trade with America. He considered such a conquest ‘not in truth to be very difficult, witness the Spanish taking of the Azores on Don Antonio of Portugal.’⁷⁰ However Hooke mused that there were problems with this scenario as well. He questioned whether

they would be willing to labour so hard, if they would reduce the power of France by much, or if the pretensions of the Emperor would be well advanced, the very things that they proposed to do in their Alliance.⁷¹

In lieu of this Hooke suggested that the most likely course of action on the part of the English was a descent on Portugal, Spain or somewhere in the Mediterranean. Hooke considered it unlikely that they had any long term plans to establish themselves on mainland Europe. ‘The English knew from much experience’ that this would not succeed.⁷² They had been unable to hold Tangier, where Hooke said, ‘they had only to deal with the Moors, who were without discipline and drive’.⁷³ The difficulty had lain with ‘sending help by sea against those [enemies] who could come all the time from the mainland.’⁷⁴ Implicitly then, withstanding a concerted assault from a well organised European enemy to maintain a permanent possession in Spain or Portugal was unrealistic.⁷⁵ To conceive of 15,000 men

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., f. 148v.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., f. 149r.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Hooke’s assessment here was proven wrong when English forces took Gibraltar in 1704, largely as an afterthought after having failed to seize Barcelona. Initially ‘the Rock’ was seen as of doubtful strategic value, and ‘for many years was to remain an expensive symbol’ which might easily have been restored to Spain, see J. S. Bromley (ed.), *The new Cambridge modern history*, vi: *the rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 567. Britain retains

without cavalry advancing into either Portugal or Spain, carrying all their necessary provisions with them, since those interiors were largely barren and hostile, was impossible. Even if such ‘invincible obstacles’ could be overcome, without a guarantee of aid and support from sympathetic partisans within the country, 15,000 men could not subjugate a Kingdom.⁷⁶ An alternative plan might be to land at Cadiz, which ‘they would be very happy to seize [...] having a port at the entry to the straits, to assure the commerce of the Levant’.⁷⁷ Though again difficulties arose with this plan. Hooke referred back to the experience of the earl of Essex during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Beset by ‘the illnesses that attacked the English in hot places, the bad situation of the place, the distance from England, [...] and the worms who pierce all the ships, (as happened recently to Admiral Russell)’, Essex at the head ‘of 19,000 men [was obliged] to quit after 12 days, despite having defeated the fleet and the army of Spain: [the English today] would be reduced to the same necessity’.⁷⁸

Therefore, Hooke reasoned, any descent was likely to be designed as a strategic diversion to draw off and distract a significant body of forces from the main theatres of operations. This might come in Italy, perhaps in the Kingdom of Naples to ‘support the partisans of the Archduke’.⁷⁹ However the presence of ‘His Catholic Majesty [Philip V of Spain] with the corps of troops that he has [in Naples] will probably make them abandon this.’⁸⁰ It was possible that the Allied

the rock today and Gibraltar’s legal position still remains governed by the provisions of article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). See J. G. O’Reilly, *Gibraltar: Spanish and United Kingdom claims* (Durham, 1992).

⁷⁶ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 149r).

⁷⁷ Ibid., f. 149v.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

fleet would sail into the Adriatic, land on the Italian peninsula, and bring pressure to bear on the Venetians to ‘declare themselves for the Imperials. This was the idea of Milord Somers, then Chancellor of England, in a treatise that he made on the Succession of Spain.’⁸¹ Hooke then wrote that this could be a very popular course of action in England, because

as [the English army] comes near Rome, this would reawaken the blind zeal of an infinite number of people, who would offer themselves with eagerness for service because there is nothing *so zealous as an English Presbyterian* [my italics].⁸²

Hooke, perhaps unwittingly or maybe with an intended irony, is giving an insight into the nature and depth of his own views on Catholicism prior to his remarkable conversion in 1688. Given that the fact of his conversion was relatively well known he may indeed have been engaging in some gentle satire at his own expense, mocking the zealous fervour which he too had once espoused against Rome.

He returned to the serious business of possible descents by explaining that that since all the reported designs that he had spoken of faced difficulties of distance by sea and lack of friendly ports *en route* ‘I have seen people who are persuaded that they will try to seize some, and among the English [there is] often talk of Port Mahon in Minorca.’⁸³ The advantage was that attack and defence would necessarily be an affair of the sea, more the *forte* of the English and Dutch, as the strongest fleet would undoubtedly be the master.⁸⁴ The present state of the

⁸¹ Ibid., f. 150r. John Somers (1651-1716), later Baron Somers, is believed to have written a number of unattributed pamphlets in the early 1700s. One work by an anonymous author, *A letter to a friend concerning the Partition Treaty* (London, 1701) contains a passage with a similar argument on page three. Hooke refers to Somers at greater length in later memoirs, where his career will be dealt with more fully.

⁸² Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 150r).

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

island's defences made the chances of a successful assault high. Once taken Minorca could act as 'a marshalling point from which to carry out new enterprises.'⁸⁵ Hooke now commented on the benefits accruing from interesting alliances between Christian England and the Muslim states on the North African coast. If the English did take Minorca

they would not be obliged to bring their provisions from England. The Barbary Coast which is their ally, can furnish them with everything they need. The Emperor of Morocco and the Government of Tunis have already made this offer. By this means Port Mahon would go to [the English], and with Port Farine always being open to them, with these two ports, each of which is able to receive their entire fleet, they would be in a very secure position and Masters of the Sea, facilitating their commerce with the Levant and though they would be distant from England, they are still very close to Italy, or Spain, and within reach of those two places in case they wish to undertake something in the Mediterranean.⁸⁶

Hooke then surmised that maybe

these rumours are only spread to distract attention, and while they talk of the Mediterranean they have in mind the coast of France as the surest method of making a diversion by dividing the troops of the king who carry all the burden of the war.⁸⁷

Hooke recalled the potential schemes for descents on France referred to by Lord Cutts. Hooke made use of what he had learned from Cutts as evidence that a real interest existed in England to undertake such enterprises. That a senior commander and a close confidant of William III warmly supported such ideas indicated that they might well come to fruition.⁸⁸ Cutts was still keen on such

⁸⁵ Ibid. Hooke's strategic analysis was borne out when Minorca was taken by the Allies in 1708 by a force led by Lieutenant General James Stanhope, brother of Alexander Stanhope, England's ambassador in the Netherlands and an acquaintance of Hooke's. The island was retained by Britain as an important base of naval operations giving 'the law to the Mediterranean in war and peace' until the late 1700s. See A. J Veenendaal, 'The war of Spanish Succession in Europe', in J. S. Bromley (ed.), *The New Cambridge modern history*, vi: *the rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 434.

⁸⁶ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 150r).

⁸⁷ Ibid., f. 150v.

⁸⁸ Hooke posited that as 'he [Cutts] is an enterprising man, brave, knowing and with much credit, and as his faction governs all today, and one tells me that he has been recalled from Holland recently, where he commanded the English troops, it may be likely that in the end he has been listened to, and that he may have a major part in the descent that he had spoken to me about'. A footnote in the margin of this document however updates the situation with recent news, 'I have learned in recent days that he remains in Holland on new orders from his master, and it is intended

strategic gambits was clear, despite the failure of the Brest expedition. Hooke quoted him asserting that ‘provided that one took some small number of measures, *nothing is easier than a descent* [my italics]. That besides that of Brest (which had failed because of a badly chosen landing point) one finds that *one succeeds almost always* [my italics].’⁸⁹ ‘I clearly saw that it was a business close to his heart.’⁹⁰ It was also to become a business close to Hooke’s heart.⁹¹

Having demonstrated that the English were keen on a descent, Hooke proceeded to assess how the English might finance such an enterprise. He displayed an astute understanding of the intricate workings of commerce and war finance.⁹² While Hooke was quoting information received from other sources,⁹³ his elucidation and manipulation of the data indicates familiarity with such matters. In explaining Hooke’s expertise in the area of finance and economics it is useful to recall his family’s mercantile background in Dublin.⁹⁴

In dealing with English financial readiness, Hooke was frequently plainspoken in his reports, at times almost blunt. He was careful to stress that his honesty was motivated solely by duty

to employ in the descent the corps of troops that he commands there’, *ibid.*, f. 152r. The death of William III ten days later placed existing plans in abeyance.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 151v. My italics.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ See chapter seven for the importance of the concept of ‘descent’ in Hooke’s later career.

⁹² His additional memoir of the 20 March consists of 8 manuscript folios entirely devoted to an analysis of the financial state of England and the ability of its economy and tax revenues to support warfare in the long term. It expands on his initial treatment in great detail quoting at length interest rates, tax returns and potential revenues, see Hooke, ‘Memoir relative to a memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy, 9 March 1702 on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 20 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, ff 158r-161v).

⁹³ As early as 1692 a pamphlet appeared in English debating the real strength of France. See *The present condition of France, in reference to her revenues, comparing them to the infinite expenses she is forc’d to be at, demonstrating thereby that it is impossible for her to support her self if the war with the Confederates continues* (London, 1692).

⁹⁴ Although this residual penchant for the world of trade and financial dabbling would have less positive results later in his life, see chapter eight.

It is certain that the undertaking would cost them a lot; I know that several believe that England is not in a state to meet the expenses of a new war; I would wish that with all my heart, but the same inclination and the same zeal which attaches me to the service of the King, obliges me to say that those who have examined the present state of affairs with the greatest of care, are of a different mind.⁹⁵

The wording is marked by an element of self promotion. Implicit criticism of ‘several’ unnamed others, possibly former colleagues at St Germain, was calculated to highlight Hooke’s greater ability and usefulness as an advisor. The memoirs serve at once as advertising and audition as well as analysis.⁹⁶

Hooke’s argued that figures available in England clearly indicated a capacity to engage in a renewed conflict with France.

The reform of all the currency that they made has made them aware of the quantity of coin in the country; they have attempted to have an exact knowledge of the number of people in England through the books of the collectors of the excise, by those of the capitation, and those of the tax on marriages, baptisms and deaths. They have books of taxes on estates, and on houses, [...] they have calculated the revenue coming from commerce and manufacture, and after having diligently compared everything, they have found that on the basis of £8 sterling per year for each person, the annual revenue of England is presently £43 million sterling.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 152r).

⁹⁶ In a modern context Timothy Garton Ash describes how ‘as analysts jostle for attention in the crowded market of ideas they have to shout loudly [and] cast and trim their analyses to get the job – or at least of continued access to and influence upon those who hold the top job.’ See Garton Ash, *Free world*, p. 97. Hooke had something of a similar need to stand out from the crowd and make a telling impression. He was not the only applicant for a post as adviser at this time. An M. de Verdun wrote to offer his services to de Torcy in separating the English from the Dutch in March 1703. See de Verdun to de Torcy, 9 Mar. 1703, Paris (A.A.E., CP Hollande, vol. 200, ff 45r-46r).

⁹⁷ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 152r). On the ‘great recoinage of 1696’ see Stephen Quinn, ‘Gold, silver and the Glorious Revolution: arbitrage between bills of exchange and bullion’ in *The Economic History Review*, new series, xlix, no. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp 473-490; Ming-Hsun Li, *The great recoinage of 1696 to 1699* (London, 1963), and Peter Laslett, ‘John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-98’ in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, xiv, no. 3 (Jul., 1957), pp 370-402. On English public revenue see John Brewer, *The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London, 1989); D. W. Jones, *War and economy in the age of William III and Marlborough* (Oxford, 1988); P. G. M. Dickson, *The financial revolution in England* (Oxford, 1967).

Having arrived at this figure for the annual revenue the question arose of how best to tap this resource.⁹⁸ Hooke explained that

one tax, general and equal, on all consumption, such as is raised in Holland, would produce £5 million sterling per year, this would only be $\frac{1}{8}$ part of the national revenue; one tax on estates well administered would produce £1 million sterling more than heretofore; this surplus would almost pay the interest on the debt that remains from the last war; and in case of necessity one could raise more and pay a fifth of the revenue without preventing the people from enriching themselves, provided that the tax is equally put as in the United Provinces.⁹⁹

The last point was crucial. War expenditure based on the schemes under consideration could not be allowed to retard economic growth or to alienate the tax paying public.¹⁰⁰ If these points were borne in mind, England's capacity to finance and maintain warfare seemed to present a real threat to France. In this Hooke's forecast was accurate. When Louis XIV died in 1715, France was bankrupt and its longterm financial situation precarious.¹⁰¹ In contrast Britain's debt was under control and actually acting as a spur to economic growth. Such

⁹⁸ Hooke's attitude to new ideas in financial affairs was quite forward looking, in contrast to many of his contemporaries. See Julian Hoppit, 'Attitudes to credit in Britain, 1680-1790' in *The Historical Journal*, xxxiii, no. 2 (Jun., 1990), p. 322.

⁹⁹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 152r). Hooke was prescient in his belief in the effectiveness of an equitable land tax. See Colin Brooks, 'Public finance and political stability: the administration of the Land Tax, 1688-1720' in *The Historical Journal*, xvii, no. 2 (Jun., 1974), pp 281-300. There were also some echoes in Hooke's commentary of Vauban's later ideas on the benefits of a single land tax. See Joël Félix, 'The economy', in William Doyle (ed.), *Old regime France 1648-1788* (Oxford, 2001), p. 15. In late 1710 a Tory newspaper even praised the Dutch for their fairness in allotting taxes. See *The Examiner*, i, no 14 (2 Nov., 1710), quoted in Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ Hooke was right to identify and emphasise the importance of public acceptance of tax. Colin Brooks contends that the operation of the Land Tax was 'essential to the achievement and perpetuation of domestic order and political stability'. As it was locally administered, 'the political nation was attached to the state and not alienated from it.' Indeed he sees the Land Tax as integral to 'tying together the provinces and the nation as a whole', thereby resulting in political stability. He contrasts this with the situation in France, 'where the havoc wreaked on public morale by fiscal exaction was as crucial to the disruption of political society and the local economy, as was the actual burden of taxation.' See Brooks, 'Public finance and political stability: the administration of the Land Tax, 1688-1720', p. 283. See pp 289, 293, 296-98 and 300 for comparison to France.

¹⁰¹ See 'Bâville on fiscal policies after Louis XIV's death', in Orest and Patricia Ranum (eds), *The century of Louis XIV* (London, 1973), pp 411-13.

firm foundations gave Britain a decided advantage in clashes with France later in the century.¹⁰² Hooke summed up by saying that the Allies

having therefore the desire and the means to make an embarkment, it is almost certain that they will try something, and while they may not succeed in the end, it will not prevent them from causing a lot of trouble.¹⁰³

As troubling as this prognosis was, Hooke had a plan to alleviate the threat to France. His proposal took the form of a pre-emptive strike. In his view the best means of defence was attack, in this case a French descent on the Channel Islands.

The discourse of Mr Cutts gave me the occasion for much thought, and having found among my papers a memoir made by the governor of Jersey, by order of the late king of England, which was communicated to me by the governor himself. I have discovered from it that it would be easy for the King, to seize those Isles, which are on the coast of Normandy, and by this not only to prevent a descent on this coast, but to ruin entirely the commerce of the English in the Manche, and to render the passage unsafe to any fleet of transports.¹⁰⁴

Hooke highlighted the additional advantages of such an undertaking by recalling the ‘utility of the privateers in the Channel’ during the last war, ‘for which there is no better cover than can be found in these isles.’¹⁰⁵ Supporting his contention by historical citation Hooke referred to how

in the times of Cromwell, a small number of capers,¹⁰⁶ bearing commissions from Charles II, had taken refuge in Jersey [and] despite all the opposition of the English fleet and the other Isles, not only took many vessels from England to defray the expenses of the government of the Isle for three years and to enrich themselves, but the Governor alone profited by £60,000 sterling.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² See Ann Carlos, Larry Neal and Kristen Wandschneider, ‘The Origins of National Debt: The Financing and Re-financing of the War of the Spanish Succession’, p. 6. Paper delivered to the International Economic History Association, Helsinki, August 2006. Available at <http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Carlos.pdf>. Accessed 15 Aug. 2006.

¹⁰³ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 152v).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. The governor referred to may have been Sir Thomas Jermyn (d. 1703) whose term in office spanned 1684-1689. In addition to the memoir, similarities in Hooke’s description suggest he may have drawn on a work by Philip Falle, *An account of the isle of Jersey* (London, 1694).

¹⁰⁵ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 153r).

¹⁰⁶ Privateering vessels, so named from an East Frisian word, *kaper*, meaning to steal.

¹⁰⁷ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there’, 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 153r). The waters around Jersey had been renowned for piracy. As early as 1625 petitions were sent to London seeking some measure to address the situation. See *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic series, of the reign of Charles I: addenda March 1625-January 1649* (London, 1897), pp 57, 60, 224, 373, 375, 376, 437, 453. By September 1650 reference was being made to the ‘Jersey fleet of six sail’ attacking a

Hooke contended that taking the Channel Islands would be strategically and economically beneficial to France because

by their capture, one would remove the advantage from the English privateers in favour of whom the parliament works at present to make an act; one would protect St Malo and western coast of Normandy, and make oneself master of the entry to the Channel. By that one could inflict irreparable damage on the English, which after having lost the commerce of Spain and the Levant (which is the best they have) would have all the rest prevented by the privateers of Dunkirk, Nieuport and Ostend at one end of the Channel, and by those of St Malo and these Isles at the other, and not only by the privateering frigates but vessels of the King himself, who can find safe haven there where enemies cannot follow them.¹⁰⁸

In effect, Hooke's plan was to make the English Channel virtually inaccessible to English shipping. Neither military raids on France nor commercial shipping could evade French seapower. This was a very ambitious scheme but one which Hooke considered to be achievable. He believed France was justified in invading because

today, now that the English interfere in the affairs of the King, with such insolence and injustice, and in contravention of the express words of the treaty of Ryswick, it would be very easy for His Majesty to seize these leftovers of the Duchy of Normandy.¹⁰⁹

Addressing the practical issues involved he highlighted the poor defensive condition of the islands. Jersey itself was very close to France, had only around 2,500 men capable of bearing arms dispersed around the island. There were only three mediocre castles on the island, and no insurmountable redoubts. Hooke stated that there were seven safe landing places on the island, all out of sight of the castles. The sea around the coast of the island was quite deep allowing even large vessels to approach the shore. However, most of the coast was surrounded by a series of rocky outcroppings at a distance from the shore. The passage between the rocks was easy (in regard to this Hooke stated he had an 'exact

parliamentarian convoy and preparations made for 'reduction of Jersey', see *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic series, 1650* (London, 1876), p. 354. One of the last areas under royalist control Jersey eventually fell to parliamentary forces in October 1651.

¹⁰⁸ Hooke, 'Memoir on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 9 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 153r).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 153v.

description of the ports, harbours, tides, rocks, and channels, a part of which are not found even on the best map’) and, after passing them, a fleet ‘can travel around the island putting troops where ever is desired, being always in the shadow of these rocks where one cannot be attacked.’¹¹⁰ Once taken the island could be settled by subjects of the king as the ‘island could maintain more people than are needed to defend it and add money into the coffers of the King.’¹¹¹ Evidently Hooke envisaged a long term settlement on the islands.

He claimed a small number of frigates positioned behind the rocks would be sufficient to defend the island once taken. The other islands of Guernsey, Alderney, Sark and Herms could be taken in the same fashion. Hooke recommended that any intended invasion force could be assembled and embark from the Channel coast or the coast of Poitou, ‘under the pretext of sending these troops to the American Islands [...] the troops [already] assigned to defend those coasts would be sufficient.’¹¹² He made it clear that while the information he was quoting originated some years earlier, he had ‘taken care to inform [himself] of any changes in the meantime, but there are very few.’¹¹³ The memoir in his possession went into much greater detail, so much so, Hooke wrote, that it was impossible to recount all of it in the current report.¹¹⁴ However if called upon, he

¹¹⁰ Ibid., f. 154r.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., f. 154v.

¹¹³ Ibid., f. 154r.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., f. 154v. Hooke’s additional memoir of the 14 March 1702 elaborates in great detail on the fortifications on Jersey and Guernsey. Hooke gave details of the state of the castles of Mont Orgueil (‘appears to be useless’), Elizabeth Castle (weak walls in need of repair, and commanded by a height 160 paces away; its main strength came from its situation 3315 feet from the main island, surrounded by the sea, however for 4½ hours each day it was exposed to direct attack) and St Aubins (only a small fort, also commanded by rock 80 paces away). He promised to continue ‘at greater length if the detail is judged useful to the service of the King’, see Hooke, ‘Addition to the memoir I gave to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy on the 9 March 1702’, 14 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, ff. 155r-156v).

could expound the merits of his plan more fully; in making this point Hooke did not miss the opportunity to again press his own desire to serve Louis XIV.

However feasible Hooke's plans¹¹⁵ and whatever hopes he had of recommending his initiatives to the French monarch, they were overtaken by the death of William III on 19 March 1702. His work thus far had not been in vain and de Torcy now displayed an interest in his opinion at an important moment in European political affairs. Hooke, a man in the right place at the right time, was now called on to comment on the changed situation in England and possible wider ramifications.¹¹⁶ Within days Hooke was writing another memoir on the international situation for his new master in the light of William's death, which helped to shape French policy in regard to England. Hooke's document led to the initiation of informal contacts (undertaken by Hooke) with English ministers in Holland, designed to establish the likelihood and terms of peace between England and France.

A factor in the favourable reception of Hooke's analysis may have been his willingness to challenge orthodox views of the situation within England. Emanating largely from some of Hooke's former colleagues at St Germain's, these depictions of a country so bitterly divided, so economically enervated and so replete with well organised Jacobite loyalists as to present little threat to France and make a second Stuart restoration a foregone conclusion jarred with Hooke's

¹¹⁵ The English government certainly appreciated the danger of such a scheme. The deputy governor of Jersey, Col. Collier, wrote to secretary of state Henry Boyle in June 1708 'giving an account that they were under great apprehensions of an immediate invasion from France.' Thirteen men of war under Admiral Byng were despatched to protect Jersey and transports sent to Ireland for reinforcements. See Boyle to the duke of Marlborough, 22 June 1708 (O.S), H. M. C., *Eighth report, part one* (London, 1881), unpaginated, letter group 34b.

¹¹⁶ Prior to news of William's death arriving Hooke was already engaged on his memoir of the 20 Mar. 1702, 'Memoir relative to a memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy, 9 March 1702 on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there' (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, ff 158r-161v).

more sober reflections. This divergence of opinion may have been a contributory factor in Hooke's desire to enter French service. In his preamble to the memoir of the 20 March 1702 he made his point quite forcefully, suggesting a degree of personal disapproval behind his views, views which he had aired previously at St Germain but which had been ignored. Hooke's comments ring with the plaintive frustration of the unheeded prophet. He now attempted to turn this to his advantage by pointed out his own prescience

I have seen on several occasions that there is a fear to inform the [French] Court of the true state of England; but as I have no interest beyond that of service to the king, *I feel I must expose the truth* (my italics), knowing well that the hopes of a division were very much unfounded, as one sees today.¹¹⁷

Hooke's reference to divisions in England had a specific meaning. He did not, of course, argue that there were no divisions *per se*; as we have seen in his memoir of the 9 March he regarded such religious and political factionalism as fundamental to the functioning of the English system. Hooke's point was that these internal divisions should not and could not be translated into probable advantage for a potential invader. Simply extrapolating pro and anti French positions from the discord and competition between Whig and Tory, or High Church and Low, (Old Church and New in Hooke's own phraseology), was at best unhelpful, at worst, misleading. Many Jacobites believed that if the French Court was too well acquainted with the actual state of how things stood in England, support for the Stuart cause could not but suffer. It was far better, they

¹¹⁷ Hooke, 'Memoir relative to a memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy, 9 March 1702 on the present state of England and on the designs that can be undertaken there', 20 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 158v). The Dutch ambassador in London had also reported to the States General in January 1702 that both Whigs and the Tories supported the war. L'Hermitage to the States General, 13 Jan., 1702 (B. L., Add. Mss. 17,677 XX, f. 157), quoted in John B. Hattendorf, *England in the war of Spanish Succession: a study of the English view and conduct of grand strategy, 1702-1712* (New York, 1987), p. 5.

calculated, to exaggerate and inflate the true circumstances rather than lose their most powerful ally.¹¹⁸

Now formally distanced from St Germain, and possessed of a pragmatic and realistic outlook, Hooke gave an unvarnished account of what William's death might mean to affairs in England, and relations with France. He began by recapping on the division of England into factions between the Old Anglican Church and that of the New (or Presbyterians). As he had stated in his memoir of the 9 March the latter faction was the most powerful at court and in parliament, as it was composed of the richest and most popular lords. 'However it did not have a proper leader, it is the propensity of the nation that supports it, visibly strengthened in the last several years.'¹¹⁹

The most powerful leaders of the other, much diminished, party 'bearing the name Tories' were the duke of Leeds, the earl of Rochester, and lord Godolphin: 'the others follow their movement'.¹²⁰ These were well known and liked by the heir to the throne, Princess Anne. However much both factions might contest with one another it remained the case that 'both are equally animated against France; if one shows more animosity than the other it is the Tories.'¹²¹ Indeed it was the Tories who had enabled the Revolution to succeed, who vigorously waged the last war and been vociferous again in recent parliaments in seeking war. This was a central point in Hooke's analysis. France could not hope to profit from these factional divisions in the short term to stave off conflict. All

¹¹⁸ English poet and diplomat, Matthew Prior had echoed Hooke's views on the court of St Germain in a report of April 1698. See *H. M. C. Bath*, iii, 210.

¹¹⁹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 162r).

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* The lack of discipline within Tory ranks had led, at least in part, to William's preference for dealing with a Whig ministry. See Hattendorf, *England in the war of Spanish Succession*, p. 6.

¹²¹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 162r).

one can hope for from their divisions is the slowing down of their preparations [for war] and not a resolution to maintain the peace. War has been resolved with unanimous consent of the two parties; and it was not King William who inspired in them a desire to make war, but it was a desire to unite themselves with King William, as one can see from the address of the two Chambers in the last parliament as well as this.¹²²

Hooke explained both parties' behaviour by the fact that 'they fear France; however ill-founded this fear may be, it is so strong and so universal that the best reasons in the world will only pale against their caution.'¹²³ He continued

England is today a type of Republic, and it is a natural part of the Republican mind to fear, more than to hope, even when the appearance of good and bad are equal; more so when those of the bad seem the best founded.¹²⁴

Hooke's views on English 'republicanism' and its defects may stem in part from his experience of the world of English radicalism in the 1680s, where fear and paranoia were common. That was a world whose bold pledges of support, failed policies and personalities had left Hooke disillusioned. Chastened by the outcome of the rebellion of 1685 and its aftermath Hooke had eventually recanted and joined James II's court. His comments here suggest further evidence that he had also grown disheartened and disenchanted with his English associates at St

¹²² Ibid., ff 162r-162v. Hooke's understanding of the situation in England was well judged. 'While political issues of great and continuing importance set man against man, family against family and party against party, Englishmen were, nonetheless, united in their recognition of the necessity of supporting [the] government'. See Brooks, 'Public finance and political stability: the administration of the Land Tax, 1688-1720', p. 282. Hooke was correct in the English war preparations being delayed. See C. W. Wood, 'A study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the Grand Alliance, 1701-1706' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina, 1971), p. 113.

¹²³ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 162v).

¹²⁴ Ibid. Again, Hooke's assessment of the situation was not unfounded. Such was his inability to have his will enacted or his views listened to that in 1699 William 'was so close to despair that he [had] seriously considered withdrawing from the conduct of government, retiring to Holland, and leaving to parliament the nomination of commissioners to act in his absence, whereas during his periodical absences abroad the lords justices who acted for him were nominated by the king.' See Jones, *Country and court*, p. 306. Ironically the erosion of monarchical prerogative in relation to matters of war and foreign policy has been traced by Steven Pincus to the 1670s when the reaction of the political nation against Charles II's alliance with France against the United Provinces saw parliament compel the king to make peace on poor terms with the Dutch in the Treaty of Westminster in 1674, a major policy success for the new stadholder, Prince William of Orange. See Steven C. A. Pincus, 'From butterboxes to wooden shoes: the shift in English popular sentiment from anti-Dutch to anti-French in the 1670s', in *The Historical Journal*, xxxviii, no. 2 (1995), pp 333-61.

Germain. Plotting for a Jacobite restoration during the 1690s had been as badly affected by internal wrangling and as reliant on woolly-headed wishful thinking in relation to support in England as the various radical schemes of the 1680s. His departure from the Jacobite court in exile can be understood more fully in the light of these comments, arising as much from frustration and a sense of estrangement perhaps as from necessity and reduced means. Indeed necessity may have served only to exacerbate existing tensions. Certainly an element of bitterness at unfulfilled promises is also evident in relation to Hooke's attitude to failed Jacobite schemes. His first allusion in the memoir to the Jacobite party in England runs

Besides these two parties, there is a third which was very numerous before, but which is barely taken into account today. It is that of the late King James, and of the young king his son, which is only a shadow of what it was: several being dead, others having abandoned it since the death of King James, and those who maintaining their old inclinations, having being so often betrayed that it is almost impossible to persuade them to trust people, because poor behaviour and the lack of secrecy have reduced them more than once to the greatest extremity. I know however very certainly that they have such a great veneration for the King [James III], that they would not refuse to render him all possible service of which they are capable, provided that they are assured that they will only be involved with His Majesty and his Ministers; but I doubt very much whether they will be in a state to do much in the present circumstances though their wishes are good and at the right occasion great service could be drawn from them.¹²⁵

Hooke then returned to the 'two factions which make up the body of the nation; though divided between themselves because of their own particular interests, they are very much in accord in being enemies of France'.¹²⁶ Divisions among Englishmen, he explained, had a long history but they rarely escalated into civil war. Besides the reigns of Charles II 'who liked his pleasures and sought to maintain peace, and the king his brother who for other reasons followed his example' there had 'always been a maxim in England that it is the interest of the

¹²⁵ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 162v). Hooke would work to bring about such direct contact and the 'right occasion' later in his career. See chapter seven.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

kingdom to engage from time to time in foreign wars.’ Continuing to employ medical metaphor, Hooke explained this by reason of

the anxious and restless humour of the English, who cannot remain quiet; and have such a need for action that if they are given nothing to do abroad, they will seek it at home; it was for this reason that Queen Elizabeth, whose memory they love and whose conduct they adore, occupied them continually in foreign countries; by this means she always had a nursery of good soldiers and by these frequent if relatively light losses she prevented the ills with which the body with too much health is exposed.¹²⁷

England had managed to cure its long running sores in Ireland and Scotland, but perhaps too successfully. In the process, Hooke believed, it had deprived itself of an outlet, a kind of national release valve, for its uncontrollable and unrestrainable internal energies.

It was often suspected on these grounds that the reduction of Ireland, and the union with Scotland did more harm than good to England; because since these wars have ceased the civil wars have succeeded them.¹²⁸

Now, according to Hooke, the old maxim of internal peace founded on external aggression was in vogue again. Since both parties were opposed to France perhaps the danger of internal disputes turning violent could be alleviated by war abroad, by forcing all factions to work for a common national English goal? England was no longer what it was under Charles II and James II: a country unaccustomed to military activity. It was once more familiar with a standing army even in times of peace. ‘In such a way they are voluntarily giving themselves to war’, Hooke wrote, ‘knowing much better the strength of the nation and that they have the means to raise money without impoverishing the people.’¹²⁹

This was obviously a dangerous development for France. Hooke had more bad news to add to his analysis. The current situation in England would be largely

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., f. 163r.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

unaffected by the death of William. Both parties had agreed to the parliamentary acts necessary to plan and undertake a war. Continuity would be maintained as

affairs have already taken their course; because knowing by the laws of England that the death of a king 'breaks' parliament, removing power from the ministers and therefore everything remains in suspense, they made a law several years ago that the parliament that finds itself in being at the time of the death of King William will continue or retake their seats for six months afterwards; that all the Commissions of the Officers will remain in force for the same period, during which it will not be in the power of the successor to dismiss one or the other. By this means Princess Anne will find things where King William has left them.¹³⁰

Anne, whose ascension to the throne was certain, would find that she had no choice but to follow the policy of her predecessor. 'By all appearances and the customs of parliament, the two chambers will continue in assisting the maintenance of the alliances that King William has made.'¹³¹

Even if she desired otherwise the practicalities of the situation would impede her. The Treasury was empty, even her own Household had no provision yet made for it, so that she was dependant on reaching agreement with parliament for supply; she was equally stymied if she contemplated using force to enact her will, there was no army in England nor an equipped fleet. In any event this latter course of action was not in her nature. Hooke described Anne as

a weak princess, irresolute and governed entirely by her two uncles the earls of Clarendon and Rochester, but principally by the latter, and by the earl of Marlborough and his wife; her tendency and her education have made her favour the Old Anglican Church. Prince George, her husband has hardly any power over her; the people like her and she likes tranquillity.¹³²

Hooke, having finished his overview of the state of England, then expanded his analysis to the state of affairs in Scotland. In his brief summation of affairs lay another strand in the genesis of Hooke's later plans in regard to

¹³⁰ Ibid.; W. A. Speck, *The birth of Britain: a new nation 1700-1710* (Oxford, 1994), p. 37.

¹³¹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163r). See Troost, *William III*, p. 262.

¹³² Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163r). The validity of these perceptions of Anne will be examined in the next chapter.

Scotland. He stated that the country was discontented with the English because of the Darien affair and the establishment of a succession without consulting the Scots. He added that the ‘nation is entirely governed by *les grands*, who are always open to bribery; several amongst them favour the young king, and conserving in their hearts the remains of their ancient friendship for France.’ Hooke then turned to the last of the Three Kingdoms, ‘but I say nothing of Ireland, it is a kingdom which necessarily follows England and which is in no state to upset the balance in favour of either side’.¹³³

Hooke understood that it would be ‘natural to hope that the change of leader will give birth to divisions within the parliament, and in the kingdom, but after reflecting’ for a short while on what he wrote he admitted that these hopes appeared ill founded.¹³⁴ Even if Anne favoured the Tory party, and they got the upper hand, there was nothing with which to undermine the Whigs. Hooke characterised Anne as too timid to attempt such an undertaking and forecast failure if she did. The ‘Presbyterian party has no leaders on whom it depends and by whom it could be won’ and in any event it was guaranteed power for six months and ‘it is this advantage that the enemies of France count on, as Mr Stanhope, envoy of England in Holland and Milord Cutts confessed to me five months ago.’¹³⁵ Hooke reiterated his earlier points by asking what ‘advantage France could draw’ from such divisions if they did exist or could be made to do

¹³³ Ibid., f. 163v.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

so, as ‘each party is equally its enemy, the resolutions for war are already made and preparations already well advanced.’¹³⁶

There could be no suggestion that Hooke was presenting an overly positive assessment of the situation in order to curry favour. His information came from reliable sources and his analysis was pragmatic, clear headed and realistic. Following on from this, Hooke’s dealt with alternative approaches ‘as it appears that as the death of their king will not turn them from designs of war, it necessary to search for other means to weaken them.’¹³⁷ He put forward two strategies, one based on immediate military confrontation, the other on longer term political initiatives.

Hooke’s first plan was for a military attack to knock England out of the war quickly by means of an amphibious landing. The intent would be regime change, or at least a change in the attitude and foreign policy of the regime, not outright conquest. A major advantage of Hooke’s plan was the fact that it would employ privateering vessels to transport the landing force, and thus not require major naval preparations (a tactic he would repeat in his plan for a Scottish landing in 1708). A conversation with James II had directly influenced this aspect of Hooke’s thinking.

If the King judges it in his interest to attack a nation which has made clear its ill wishes towards him, and which has treated him with such insolence, it would be easy to find the means to land 15-20,000 men from the river at London or Rochester, before they are in a state to oppose their passage. And as I know from the late King of England, that M. Bart, who knows the Channel perfectly, offered six years ago to land [such a force] in safety, without the burden of building a great fleet. I do not doubt that if he cannot find the means to do it at present, in taking his time a favourable opportunity will present itself. By then the

¹³⁶ Ibid. See also van ‘t Hoff (ed), *The correspondence of John Churchill, first duke of Marlborough, and Anthonie Heinsius*, p. x and Wood, ‘A study of Anglo-Dutch relations’, pp 38-41.

¹³⁷ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163v).

King will be able to catch them unawares, without troops, who are almost all on this side of the sea, without a fleet and without money.¹³⁸

Perhaps more important than the military impact of the landing would be its detrimental effect on the economy of England. This was a far sighted aspect of Hooke's proposal: as he had said in his earlier memoir, England's strength lay in its economic assets, the foundation of which was the city of London, centred especially on the finance-raising capability of the Bank of England. A landing in or near the city would neutralise this crucial resource, rendering greater damage to England's ability to wage war than years of regular warfare. 'From the moment an army is seen close to London, no one will lend to them and they will be without credit.'¹³⁹ Furthermore

a foreign army in England, wherever it may be, would prevent these people giving aide to their allies, and disconcert all the measures of the enemy that the same number of troops could never do in another country.¹⁴⁰

Hooke attributed this disproportionate effect to the English national character, of which he seems to have had quite a dim view, judging by periodic references to drunkenness, debauchery, querulousness, restlessness, cowardice

¹³⁸ Ibid. This initiative had much in common with the Dutch landing at Chatham in June 1667 which had 'struck a blow at English pride that shook the entire kingdom to its foundations [...] and caused panic in London, a run on the bank, and a flight to the provinces', Pieter Geyl, *Orange and Stuart 1641-1672* (trans., London, 1969), pp 265-66.

¹³⁹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163v). The Bank of England since its foundation in 1694 had become one of the most important institutions in the country. See Craig Rose, *England in the 1690s*, pp 132-144; Dale Hoak in his introduction to a collection of essays on the revolution of 1688 argues that the true revolution of the seventeenth century 'occurred neither in the 1640s (the period of the civil wars) nor in the 1650s (the era of the Commonwealth and Protectorate), but in the 1690s. This revolution, part of the post-1689 settlement, marked the origin of the modern British state- the financial, military, and bureaucratic product of England's costly wars, incessant warfare against Louis XIV. The centrepiece of this settlement was the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. Although private – it was capitalised chiefly with Dutch money – the bank became an engine of public credit enabling the British to generate sufficient cash during the next century to defeat a far richer French adversary'. See Dale Hoak, 'The Anglo-Dutch Revolution of 1688-89', in Dale Hoak and Mordechai Feingold (eds), *The world of William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch perspectives on the revolution of 1688-89* (Stanford, 1996), p. 12. See also Julian Hoppit, 'Attitudes to credit in Britain' in *The Historical Journal*, xxxiii, no. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp 305-22.

¹⁴⁰ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163v).

and a devotion to self interest. Perhaps something of the puritan remained in Hooke's character or the 'national' animosities in play at St Germain between Irish, Scot and Englishman had jaundiced his outlook. In any event he stated that the propensities of the English would facilitate and 'give much strength to the propositions that might be made either to re-establish the young king or [negotiate terms to] recognise Princess Anne.'¹⁴¹ This was because

the English are the people of the world who are the most full of themselves when the danger is far away and the most submissive when they see it close, of which we can see an example in the time of the late King Charles II: all the nation was declared against his brother [Including Hooke himself]. They obliged him to dismiss an army that he had commenced to raise in 1678; but no sooner had he [...] brought back the garrison of Tangier to England to support his authority than one saw the nation change all of a sudden. Never had been seen a people more submissive and the universal applause with which the duke of York mounted the throne made it very easy to see the effect the presence of fear can make on the mind of the English.¹⁴²

When the attacker was from abroad the effect was further compounded

It is even stronger when it is an affair with a foreign enemy; they fight each other furiously in their civil wars because they do not fear a conquest; they do all they can to prevent an enemy from entering into the country, but once they have entered, there is hardly any opposition. They always remember that the right of conquest granted all the lands of the kingdom to William of Normandy, who distributed them to his favourites: they have since then a fear of a second conquest, that since that time there has not been one example where they have repulsed a foreign army after it had put foot on the land, but several where they aimed only at making the best conditions that they could, to assure their privileges and their property.¹⁴³

Hooke stated that he had no reason to believe that any fundamental shift had taken place in the English character that would render their reaction different on this occasion.

One can only judge the genius of a people by their past conduct, and while their inclinations, their maxims, and the reasons for these maxims continue to subsist one can

¹⁴¹ Ibid., f. 164r.

¹⁴² Ibid. Hooke would have had good reason to remember the men of the Tangier Regiment. Many, notably their commanding officer Percy Kirke, had been prominent in suppressing Monmouth's Rebellion in 1685. For an excellent account of the place of fear in the English mind in the period Hooke is discussing, including the impact of the 'army [Charles II] had commenced to raise' see Justin Champion, 'Popes and Guys and anti-Catholicism', in Brenda Buchanan, David Cannadine, Justin Champion, David Cressy, Pauline Croft, Antonia Fraser, Mike Jay, *Gunpowder plots: a celebration of 400 years of bonfire night* (London, 2005), pp 80-117.

¹⁴³ Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 164r).

reckon that they will take after the same behaviour: that is then that each will look to their own particular interest, that the spirit of faction and or animosity will yield to their need for conservation, as the animosity of the Spanish against the French has been extinguished by, or at least reduced, all of a sudden by the desire to conserve their Monarchy in its entirety.¹⁴⁴

Hooke conceded that the zeal for the Protestant religion was very strong and would be a difficult obstacle to surmount. He pointed out that this made progress by way of standard diplomatic overtures unlikely, so ‘there is little to hope for in a negotiation.’¹⁴⁵ This reinforced the case for a military intervention to bring about political change. Added to this was the fact that once a force was ashore, the country was open to attack. It was well known in England that the country was ‘not in a state to defend itself, having not even one fortress.’ According to Hooke ‘their factions and their divisions prevent them from uniting, each suspects his neighbour and the friends of the young king [James III] and all the malcontents would profit from the opportunity.’¹⁴⁶

All that was necessary to carry out the expedition successfully would be a policy of ‘hearts and minds’. Demonstrating creative thinking and a shrewd awareness of the importance of personality and public relations, Hooke recommended that the best way to proceed after the landing to win over the populace

was to put at the head of the troops some general of open heart, noble, generous, of an easy humour and obliging, who by the impression that he will give them of his good faith and his gentleness will win their friendship; because the English are easily won over by those who, having power in their hands, treat them with gentleness.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. Hooke may perhaps have been alluding obliquely to James II’s illegitimate son James FitzJames, duke of Berwick. Berwick, like Hooke, had left St Germain and entered French service, becoming a naturalised Frenchman.

This was the first course of action set out in Hooke's memoir. However 'if the King does not judge it appropriate to use force [at the outset of Anne's reign] it will be very difficult to take other sure measures until one sees what the new Queen wants to do.'¹⁴⁸ The subject of courtly etiquette would then determine the course of events. A short delay by the newly crowned Queen Anne in giving formal notice of her accession to the throne should not be taken as deliberately offensive. On the other hand however, waiting too long would give her time to put her affairs in order, but it 'is not in keeping with the King's Grandeur to make the first advances'.¹⁴⁹ If she did give notice she would again win time; if the King were to recognise it, he 'would tie his own hands, and launch himself again into an engagement of which he was delivered by the death of king William'.¹⁵⁰ If the King was to deliberate over according recognition, perhaps in the hope of gaining some advantage, this too would give valuable time to the English, time that they badly needed to arrange their affairs and 'to take measures with the Emperor, the House of Brandenburg and Hanover which are so involved in the new project of the [Spanish] Succession'.¹⁵¹ Hooke's next comment was to have profound implications for his own short term and long term future: 'However the sending of one man, without consequence, could prevent these delays and discover what can be expected.'¹⁵² Is this reference a veiled application for the task by Hooke? If it was, and it can be read as such, it succeeded. The proposal was taken up and Hooke was the man assigned to the mission. The task itself, the subject of the next

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., f. 164v.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. English preparations for war proceeded at a slow pace. See Wood, 'A study of Anglo-Dutch relations', pp 75, 113.

¹⁵² Hooke, 'Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William', 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 164v).

chapter, was to prove a good deal more complicated and demanding than Hooke could have foreseen.

Hooke himself was aware of the difficulties of achieving much in England. This attitude did not chime with many who ‘believed that Princess Anne, seeing herself without children, is not far from re-establishing her brother’. In Hooke’s analysis, the situation was more complicated. He did not

wish to dispute her inclinations but one finds insurmountable difficulties in the execution. She depends absolutely on Parliament, which comes in a few days to condemn her brother to death; the will of the late King [James II] established the Queen [Mary] as the guardian of her son. Her Majesty will not consent to abandon him at such a young age, and it is very certain that the English will never suffer the Queen to return to England; they have conceived an aversion beyond the imagination. Her excellent virtues do not in the least diminish their hate, and though it might be wished that Her Majesty would defer a little to the prayers of her servants, who still beseech her to try to acquire the friendship of the nation, I doubt very much whether she would succeed. Moreover besides this aversion, *les grands* of the kingdom are opposed to her return by the principle of interest; they want to have the king [James III] in their hands, to profit from his young age, which the presence of the Queen would prevent.¹⁵³

The succession was established in the Protestant line by the Act of Settlement of 1701. This specified that if Queen Anne died childless, the crown of England would pass to the house of Hanover, her nearest Protestant relatives.¹⁵⁴ This act of Parliament bypassed not only the queen’s half-brother James but many other Catholic claimants. Whatever her own wishes, Anne would be forced to follow the law. If she was supported by an army, Hooke thought, overturning the succession could be easily accomplished, ‘but there is no reason to hope that a Princess so timid and irresolute, and obsessed with the enemies of her brother, would wish to enter into a negotiation to bring foreign troops into the kingdom.’¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Ibid. On the reputation of Queen Mary of Modena as a ‘female Machivel’, see Janet Southorn, ‘Mary of Modena, Queen consort of James II and VII’ in *Royal Stuart Papers*, xl, (1992), p. 6.

¹⁵⁴ George I (1660-1727) was the great-grandson of James I.

¹⁵⁵ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 164v).

Hooke's head was not easily turned by naive daydreaming or wishful thinking. His default position of scepticism in regard to the majority of English Jacobites was once more displayed when he considered the possibility of orchestrating some design with them

I do not doubt that one could first make some propositions to [illegible] and some lords of England; but it would be good to regard them with caution. They would without doubt promise a lot; as they did in 1695 when they promised to campaign at the head of 4,000 horse when they were not in a state to assemble 800, though they had made provision for saddles and arms for an even bigger number.¹⁵⁶

Hooke's proposal to alter the political regime in England to one less hostile to France, rested on resolving the central contentious issue of the future of James III, the rightful heir for the French, an attainted Pretender in England. While that divergence remained there could be no durable peace. He was

certain that the leaders of the Anglican Church would find it in their interest to have the young king under their tuition: this is what a man of quality told me in the past few days. All the offers the King [Louis XIV] could make to assure the English of a good peace, will never be accepted while they are persuaded that the young prince is kept in France on purpose to maintain divisions among them. Only the offer of which I have spoken [to return James III to be raised in England] could convince them that the peace would be durable. It would be received more readily when he is still young than when he has obtained the age of majority. The King, on sending him on the basis of the late King James' [proclamation] in 1693, would be following his own interests in preventing the King of England becoming an absolutist power.¹⁵⁷

Hooke was suggesting discreet contact with powerful elements of the English political nation who, he surmised, might be well disposed (or convinced to be so) to accepting the return to England of the young James III. Establishing the viability of such a *demarche*, and the exact details if it were deemed possible,

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. Hooke's attitude had derived from his involvement in the plots and schemes culminating in the furore surrounding the Assassination Plot of 1696. The end result of these endeavours had simply been to reinvigorate William's popularity, while never presenting a realistic hope of restoring James II.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. The 1693 Proclamation promised that James II, and future Catholic monarchs, would not alter the position of the Anglican Church nor interfere in its internal affairs. Hooke appears to be suggesting here that such an English king or queen, already trammelled by parliamentary resolutions in most areas of politics and finance, would lose control of religious policy as well. Such a monarch would be little more than a figurehead. On the concept of absolutism see Andrew Lossky, 'The absolutism of Louis XIV: reality or myth?' in *The Canadian Journal of History*, vol. xix (April, 1984), pp 1-15.

would of course require much discussion, ‘for whoever treats with the English Lords it will be a long term project.’¹⁵⁸ The timing of such a delicate, not to say controversial, undertaking would be an important factor. Initial and necessarily vague overtures could be made to some of the leading lords considered receptive to approaches on such a matter. These were, not coincidentally, all inclined to Tory or Old Anglican views, to use Hooke’s own descriptor. As all were men of influence already, and seemed likely to increase their power and credit during the next reign, it would be necessary

to offer something to the duke of Leeds, and to the earls of Rochester and Marlborough to compensate them for the authority that they have had in England, and which renders them much more considerable figures in times of war than in peace. One could hope in the end for something from their credit with Princess Anne; they are the leaders of their party, and perhaps they would not refuse to listen to propositions that would put themselves in a state to elevate themselves further [in the new king’s regime].¹⁵⁹

All three of these men, Thomas Osborne (1632-1712), duke of Leeds (formerly earl of Danby), Laurence Hyde (1642-1711), earl of Rochester, and John Churchill (1650-1722), earl of Marlborough had had active involvement in public affairs since the 1670s, highlighting the high degree of continuity through the 1680s, 1690s and into the first decade of the 1700s. This continuity was similarly evidenced in Nathaniel Hooke’s career, and one reflected in his decision to commence his survey of the state of England in the late 1670s.

Hooke recognised the fact that merely dealing with Tory notables alone would be inadequate. Prominent Whigs needed to be approached and

if one sounded out also some of those most considerable among the Whigs one could at the least gain the advantage of knowing their sentiments; the easiest, and the least suspect, [...] to sound out would be Milord Cutts in Holland [about] the recognition of the Princess [Anne] and in regard to the conditions which would establish a firm and solid peace. He is a man who has all the secrets of his party, and he is also an intimate friend of the earl of Marlborough; he is vain and ambitious; in addressing him one could take him by these

¹⁵⁸ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 165r).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

weak spots. His attachment was to the person of the king [William III] and if he came to be discontent in England, he is Master of the Isle of Wight, which has always been regarded as the key to that kingdom.¹⁶⁰

As in Hooke's earlier recommendation to send a man of 'no consequence' to England it seems likely Hooke was consciously putting himself forward as the man best qualified to carry out this mission. It will be remembered that in his earlier memoirs he had highlighted his meeting with Cutts the previous October. Who better to undertake such a mission then, than Hooke? Indeed one could wonder whether an important subtext of this entire set of memoirs was not to further his position in French service.

Hooke also suggested that useful negotiations might be undertaken in Scotland

where the Great Lords are always available to the highest bidder. Several advantages would result: one would break the union that King William was going to recommend in Parliament; it might [also] be possible to [cause] the rejection of the succession that has been established in England. By this means one can cause the English a lot of alarm and jealousy, seeing the Scots on the point of separating from them, and as the people of Scotland depend absolutely on their lords, one could make more certain measures there than in England, where to form a faction it would be necessary to lay the foundation of something agreeable to the multitude, but [in Scotland] when one wins a small number of lords, one is sure of the rest.¹⁶¹

This casts an interesting light on the nature of politics and polity in England and Scotland. Popular politics, and popular opinion, appear from Hooke's assessment, to be insignificant in the Scottish context. The country was dominated by the great magnates, free from the need to placate a politicised or mobilised populace. Negotiations in Scotland with some of the 'grandees' could be fruitful. The

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. Hooke went on to name the other leading Whigs, after the duke of Shrewsbury who was too far distant in Italy to negotiate with, as the dukes of Bolton and Devonshire, the earls of Pembroke and Jersey, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the Bishops of Chichester and Gloucester. He pointed out that it would be equally important to contact prominent Whigs in the Commons 'who sometimes have more interest among the people than the lords [...] though their names are hardly known in France: I will only say that one cannot take too many precautions in addressing these men, who are naturally distrustful'. Shrewsbury was contacted to act as a mediator for French peace proposals in 1704 but he refused the role.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

English political nation, on the other hand, had very different ground rules, he believed. While the proportion of those enjoying direct involvement in politics and government might be small, the reaction of the ‘multitude’ had at least to be considered.¹⁶² For Hooke’s designs, amounting essentially to gradual subversion of the house of Hanover’s succession to the English throne, this need to assuage popular sentiment presented grave difficulties, requiring a long term effort; hence his preference for a rapid military strike to alter quickly the situation in England, since

which ever way things turn, it is very certain that the change of Prince in England will retard their preparation for war and will give a favourable opportunity to His Majesty to attack the Dutch or the English, as he pleases, before these last are in a state to oppose him, which will perhaps be the most sure means of making them understand reason.¹⁶³

Hooke was correct in stating that the English war preparations were moving slowly. His analysis of the various strategies open to the English pointed to one of the reasons for this. A number of militarily sound options existed, such as an expedition to the West Indies, a landing in Italy, a new front in Spain or a concentration of forces in the Spanish Netherlands and the Rhine. However these courses of action were entangled in internal political power struggles within the English administration and related debates on England’s role in the war. High Tories, such as the earl of Nottingham, were eager to prevent England’s resources and interests being sacrificed to benefit the Dutch in a war of attrition in the Spanish Netherlands. They preferred a ‘blue water’ policy, combining naval

¹⁶² Tim Harris makes this point in regard to English politics in his conclusion to *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms*. ‘The opinions of ordinary people mattered; it was important to have these people on one’s side, and to be seen to have them on one’s side [...] To make its rule effective, the crown depended on the cooperation and unpaid assistance of a wide range of people at the local level’. See pp 412-413. Conversely then, as Hooke recognised, to subvert the crown in England, also required winning over these people, ‘the multitude’, a difficult and time consuming task.

¹⁶³ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 165r).

operations against France and French commerce, especially the hugely profitable West Indies trade, with landings in Italy and Spain to aid the Emperor and bring the war to a rapid close.

Marlborough, following William III's policy, and in close consultation with the leading Dutch figures such as Grand Pensionary Heinsius, saw operations in the Spanish Netherlands and along the Rhine as the key to winning the war. For economic reasons the Dutch were concerned to limit Imperial involvement in Italy, and English expansion in the West Indies. Equally a strategy of aggressive trade war with France, and the Spanish Empire threatened the financial wellbeing of the Republic, as did a long war. Whigs in England, generally more sympathetic to the Dutch, largely supported the land war strategy. Thus English war planning became caught up in political rivalry making practical preparations slow and confused.

Hooke obviously hoped that France could take advantage of this situation by striking quickly. However Louis XIV wished to avoid a long and ruinously expensive conflict. It might not be feasible to avoid war entirely, but it might be possible to reduce the number of France's enemies. Hooke's appearance on the scene and his memoirs presented a means of exploring this potential. Late in March or early in April 1702 Hooke was charged with a mission combining the proposals he had made in his memoirs. He was to make his way to the Netherlands to sound out Lord Cutts, and other leading English figures there, on the possibility of peace. If the chance arose, he was also to travel to England as 'the man of no consequence' and undertake more discussions there. Additionally he would be in a position to investigate more readily political and military

developments in English strategy, and also relations between the allies. Equally Hooke was to investigate the potential of French overtures to Dutch politicians. Such a twin track approach to peace, with Hooke exploring the possibilities of peace with both English and Dutch contacts, presented the best chance of success. It was to be a difficult and dangerous assignment but one that would make or break Hooke's career in France.

CHAPTER 5: MISSION TO HOLLAND AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION

Hooke's covert mission to the United Provinces commenced in April 1702. His major objective of establishing the likelihood and means of maintaining peace was a difficult task in regard to both England and The Netherlands. Since the revolution of 1688 English foreign policy had been closely aligned with that of the Dutch. This made Hooke's task even more complicated as relations between France and the Netherlands had deteriorated in the latter part of the seventeenth century. The two countries had shared a common enemy in Spain during the Thirty Years War. After the peace of Westphalia established Dutch independence, relations had remained cordial. An alliance treaty was signed in 1662 for French help in the United Provinces trade wars with England. However, opinion in the United Provinces had come to regard France as an acceptable ally, but not a welcome neighbour. French ambitions for territorial expansion in the Spanish Netherlands, evident during the War of Devolutions (1667-68), exacerbated existing fears about the security of the southern Dutch border. A neighbouring territory administered by a tired Spain, or a weak autonomous region, suited Dutch commercial and political interests: an aggrandized France did not. The dilemma of Dutch foreign policy hinged on trying to steer a middle course between the dangers posed by England at sea and by France on land. Having defeated the English and signed the treaty of Breda in 1667 from a position of strength, the Dutch looked to shore up their position against France by creating a 'Triple Alliance' of The Netherlands, England and Sweden in 1668. This agreement, ostensibly to mediate between France and Spain, pledged the

three signatories to aid Spain militarily in the absence of agreement. While a treaty was signed between France and Spain, Louis XIV deemed the Dutch action a betrayal by an ungrateful ex-ally. In 1672 French forces, with (temporary) English support, invaded The Netherlands and came close to wiping the country off the map. Total defeat was avoided but the shock of the attack lingered in Dutch memory long after peace was signed at Nijmegen in 1678. The legacy of conflict, renewed in the Nine Years War (1688-97), and the unresolved issue of border security, remained a powerful defining feature of Franco-Dutch relations.¹ However elements in Dutch politics, centred in the powerful trading towns such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were also worried at the continuing threat to their trade from England and the potential danger of an ambitious House of Orange to the State's liberty. Ambassador d'Avaux had managed to manipulate these sentiments in France's favour for a time in the 1680s.² Could such attitudes be harnessed once more to split the Dutch from their allies?³ Hooke's task was to take soundings and find out if this was politically and diplomatically feasible.

¹ See Olaf van Nimwegen, 'The Dutch barrier: its origins, creation and importance for the Dutch Republic, 1697-1718' in J. A. F. de Jongste and A. J. Veenendaal (eds), *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688-1720* (The Hague, 2002), pp 147-177.

² On Franco-Dutch relations see A. C. Carter, *Neutrality or commitment: the evolution of Dutch foreign policy 1667-1795* (London, 1975), pp 1-26; J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its greatness, rise and fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1998), pp 700-863; Simon Schama, *The embarrassment of riches: an interpretation of Dutch culture in the Golden Age* (New York, 1997), pp 257-288; Bély, *Les relations internationales en Europe*, pp 231-263; *idem*, 'Les temps modernes (1515-1789)' in Dominique de Villepin (ed.), *Histoire de la diplomatie Française* (Paris, 2006), pp 310-330; Maarten Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century: the Golden Age* (Cambridge, 2005), pp 45-60.

³ The issues at stake were immense. Jonathan Israel, who points out that the 'the Dutch regents went to war only after some hesitation, and might well have been persuaded not to do so', concludes that if the Dutch had been kept out of the war, or a separate peace had been negotiated, 'there can be little doubt that the French and not the allies would have had the upper hand in the continental war [...] with the Dutch neutral, neither could there have been any British interruption of the French and Spanish colonies with France and Spain [...] In all likelihood it would have made a dramatic difference.' See J. I. Israel, 'The emerging empire: the continental perspective, 1650-1713' in P. J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford history of the British empire*, vol. ii: *the eighteenth century* (Oxford, 1998), p. 443.

With these points in mind, Hooke's mission was to be multifaceted. The informality of the mission was designed to prevent suggestions that France was suing for peace, as such allegations would be a propaganda coup for England, The Netherlands and the Emperor. Potential allies such as Portugal and Savoy might be deterred from declaring for France if it appeared to be in a weak position. Therefore Hooke was very useful as an unofficial emissary. With no overt connection to France, there was little to be lost if he was arrested. The Dutch assignment suited Hooke by drawing on his experience in The Netherlands as a political refugee in the 1680s.⁴ Having lived various parts of the country he was familiar with its geography, customs and mores. He had contacts with a number of old acquaintances and access to information regarding Dutch politics. Furthermore, his understanding of the labyrinthine complexity of Dutch government, frequently baffling to outsiders,⁵ provided him with the ability to ask the right questions and to analyse the answers cogently.⁶

That there was an urgent need for such up to date information and analysis is demonstrated by communication between de Torcy and one of his officials, Yves de Saint-Prest, in April 1702. Saint-Prest was one of de Torcy's *premiers commis* in the Foreign Ministry⁷ and a future head of the *dépôt des Archives des*

⁴ Hooke to Torcy, Amsterdam, 20 May 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 269r).

⁵ Jonathan Swift described it as 'crazily constituted'. See J. G. Stork-Penning, 'The ordeal of the States – some remarks on Dutch politics during the War of Spanish Succession', in *Acta Historiae Neerlandica*, ii (1967), p. 109.

⁶ In his study of the American presidency, Professor Stephen Graubard emphasises that even the military might of a superpower cannot rectify a lack of 'historical, cultural, political and diplomatic understanding' of one's enemy when seeking to arrive at a settlement of a conflict. See Graubard, *The Presidents: the transformation of the American presidency from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush* (London, 2006), p. 29. De Torcy also appears to have appreciated that France's military pre-eminence was no guarantee of victory, especially at a negotiating table. Consequently, he was eager to secure accurate and informative reports on the internal affairs of the Netherlands and England and make use of Hooke's familiarity with both countries.

⁷ John C. Rule, 'Colbert de Torcy, an emergent bureaucracy, and the formulation of French foreign policy, 1698-1715', in R. Hatton (ed.), *Louis XIV and Europe* (London, 1976), p. 266.

Affaires Étrangères, established by de Torcy in 1710.⁸ Evidently his skill in archival research was longstanding, to judge from his letter to de Torcy of 24 April 1702. Saint-Prest responded to an earlier request of de Torcy's by enclosing a copy of a memoir concerning the government of the United Provinces.⁹ De Torcy had requested this information as Hooke was making his way into the Netherlands. He wanted to reacquaint himself with the state of knowledge on the political institutions of the United Provinces before his agent began relaying reports. Drawing on the earlier collection of documents deposited in the Louvre, by order of de Torcy's father in 1680, Saint-Prest expressed the view that the memoir contained many good things but with the understandable reservation that 'as it was composed in 1647 [...] there have been many changes since that time in the form of government and in the practices'.¹⁰ He went on to add that he had made some notes on these changes in the margins of the memoir but that on the whole he thought it 'better to make a new memoir'.¹¹

Additional difficulties for those seeking to come to terms with the structure of power in the United Provinces arose in the period after the death of William of Orange in March 1702. As Stadholder, Captain-General of the armed forces, and 'deliverer' of the Dutch from French conquest in 1672, his influence within the Netherlands had been great. Following his death, however, his legacy in the United Provinces threatened to crumble. Republican elements within the Dutch polity had no desire to see Orange dominance continue.

⁸ Ministère des Relations Extérieures, *Les archives du ministère des relations extérieures depuis leur origines: histoire et guide* (2 vols, Paris, 1985), i, 17.

⁹ Saint-Prest to Torcy, 24 April 1702, Paris, (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 224r).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, f. 224v.

The delay in reading William's will allowed emotional sentiment after his death to dissipate. William had purposely kept his will vague. Potential heirs thus had a strong motivation to cooperate with his schemes. However after his death this tactic proved counter-productive: the armed manoeuvres of the two leading claimants, John William Friso van Nassau and Frederick I of Prussia-Brandenburg¹² greatly deflated the prestige of the office.¹³ The Netherlands did not have another Stadholder until the 1740s. In the absence of one dominant figure, therefore, the internal affairs of the United Provinces again became a cause of bother and bewilderment to foreign diplomats. The Grand Pensionary (of Holland), Anthonie Heinsius, the most powerful and influential official in the Netherlands, made the import of the new situation clear: 'In place of one master, now that the stadholderate is no more, I have 40'.¹⁴ We have already seen some evidence of this potential for federalised filibuster during Hooke activities there in the 1680s. After William's death in 1702,

the constitution of the Republic, having become much more flexible under the influence of William of Orange, returned to its old rigidity. It was no longer with only a sole ally that England had to deal; she had to come to terms with thirty, forty bodies: the States General, the provinces, the towns, all of whose consent was required to take the most minimal decision. All acts of the Republic were first of all submitted to a special commission, then discussed and approved by the generality, and the sent to the provincial states who were seven in number: Holland, Zeeland, Gueldreland, Utrecht, OverYssel, Frise and Groningen. The consent of each of the towns was required before it could be approved. All decisions were taken unanimously except on very rare occasions where special circumstances or urgency would see the approval of a majority suffice [...] The rivalry between the provinces, for example Holland and Zeeland, even more between towns, such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, further aggravated the situation.¹⁵

¹² Frederick von Hohenzollern (1659-1719). Frederick III, as elector of Brandenburg, and Frederick I as king in Prussia from 1701.

¹³ [Anon] to Paris, 31 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 149r).

¹⁴ Van Hulst to Ellis, 4 April 1702, [n. p.] (B. L. Add. Ms. 28910, f. 419). Cited in Gabryelle van den Haute, *Les relations Anglo-Hollandaise au début du XVIII^e siècle d'après la correspondance d'Alexander Stanhope 1700-1706* (Louvain, 1932), p. 104.

¹⁵ Van den Haute, *Les relations Anglo-Hollandais* (Louvain, 1932), p. 5. This was the way the Union of the Provinces was designed to work. In reality, ways and means were found to circumvent what appeared to be endless layers of officialdom. See Wood, 'A study of the Anglo-Dutch relations', pp 23-40; A. J. Veenendaal, 'Who is in charge here? Anthonie Heinsius and his

These seemingly endless layers of authority confounded allies and enemies alike. The political system often served as an excellent excuse for time wasting and made it difficult for outsiders to gauge how the Dutch state was reacting to the changing configuration of European diplomacy.¹⁶ A strong motivation, therefore, in sending Hooke to Holland was the need to rectify a lack of up to date intelligence on the current state of affairs in the United Provinces. The crisis of the Spanish succession made the rapid acquisition of such information urgent.

The War of Spanish Succession has been called a world war.¹⁷ The scale of the conflict reflected the importance of the issues at stake. Tensions arose in November 1700 when Charles II (1661-1700) of Spain died without an heir. Given his chronic fragility, his demise had been expected for nearly forty years. In the absence of a designated successor, diplomatic endeavour had attempted to deflect armed confrontation on the issue through a pre-emptive division. However contrary to the partition agreements, Charles's will named the grandson of Louis XIV of France, Philip, duc d'Anjou (1683-1746), as successor to the throne of Spain and the entirety of the Spanish Empire. If this came to pass the Bourbon dynasty would supplant their long-term rivals, the House of Habsburg south of the Pyrenees, with the enormous resources of the Spanish empire at their disposal.

The potential for an escalation of conflict increased when Louis XIV decided to accept the terms of the testament, while maintaining the (theoretical)

role in Dutch politics' in J. A. F. de Jongste and A. J. Veenendaal (eds), *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688-1720* (The Hague, 2002), pp 11-24.

¹⁶ Wood, 'A study of Anglo-Dutch relations', p. 99.

¹⁷ Henry Kamen, *Philip V of Spain: the king who reigned twice* (New Haven, 2001), p. 29; A. J. Veenendaal gives an excellent overview of the European theatres of the Spanish Succession War in his chapter, 'The war of Spanish Succession in Europe', in J. S. Bromley (ed.), *The new Cambridge modern history*, vi, (Cambridge, 1971); Joseph Bergin discusses the wider prevalence of war and its impact in the long seventeenth century, 'the age of the soldier', which makes it 'stand out against those of the previous or the next century' in his introduction to Bergin (ed.), *The seventeenth century: Europe 1598-1715* (Oxford, 2001), pp 9-10.

right of Philip to inherit the French throne.¹⁸ England and the Netherlands, as well as Habsburg Austria, were now concerned at the prospect of a dynastic, and commercial, union of France and Spain. However this was still a war that nobody claimed to want. After nine years of debilitating warfare from 1688-97, few voices argued for renewed conflict and a negotiated settlement seemed feasible.

However these hopes proved elusive, as the law of unintended consequences took hold. Peace hopes were dashed by a combination of what were viewed as provocative acts on Louis's part. Extensive French and Imperial war preparations in Northern Italy quickly escalated into actual combat as thoughts of war coalesced into deeds. Rapidly drawing in other allied states, this initiated the the first decade of the new century as one of 'death and devastation, taxation [and] food shortages.'¹⁹

While 'war though in a state of peace' had become a reality in Italy, a final attempt was made to arrive at a negotiated settlement.²⁰ Talks were convened between the French ambassador, d'Avaux and representatives of the States General. Neither side was completely engaged in the search for peace. Both were concurrently pursuing alternative strategies. The French were attempting to drive a wedge between the Dutch and the English. In turn the Dutch and the English,

¹⁸ Louis faced a desperate dilemma regarding the testament. If he accepted the terms, war would certainly be declared by those powers anxious for a share of the spoils. However if he declined, the testament stipulated that the entire inheritance would then go to the next claimant, Archduke Charles of the Austrian line of Habsburgs. This again would force France to go to war to defend its own interests. Louis protested vigorously, and genuinely, that he did not want war but given the warlike history of his reign, he in some respects, despite his best efforts in this case to avoid war, reaped the legacy of having cried wolf once too often. See Mark A. Thomson, 'Louis XIV and the origins of the War of Spanish Succession', in Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds), *William III and Louis XIV: essays 1680-1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson* (Liverpool, 1968), pp 140-61; David Parrot, 'War and international relations', in Bergin (ed.), *The seventeenth century*, pp 135-36.

¹⁹ Jeremy Black, 'Warfare, crisis and absolutism', in Euan Cameron (ed.), *Early modern Europe* (Oxford, 1999), p. 209.

²⁰ Secretary of war, William Blathwayt to George Stepney, 21 July, 1701 (P. R. O. [now T.N.A.], SP 105/63 f. 116). Quoted in Hattendorf, *England in the war of Spanish Succession*, p. 15.

partners in the Grand Alliance, were rapidly rearming. Talks soon broke down, with d’Avaux convinced that his counterparts had little genuine interest in reaching a peaceful agreement, and the Maritime powers equally dissatisfied at the lack of French concessions. Ultimately d’Avaux was recalled to Paris by Louis XIV in protest, it was said, at the lack of progress made and half-hearted participation of the opposing diplomats.²¹

There was also an element of calculated brinkmanship in this move designed to bring a note of urgency to the talks. The French military position gave them a decisive strategic advantage, as ‘the United Provinces were ringed by enemies on the landward side.’²² French forces, along with those of their ally the elector of Cologne, had occupied forward strong points in the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish Guelderland and were in an excellent position to invade the United Provinces.²³ The advantage however only lasted until such time as the Dutch, and their English allies, were able to deploy fully their still coalescing forces. The dilatoriness of the talks suggested to the French a purposeful attempt to negate their military advantage.²⁴ Hence the frustration of Louis XIV and the move to a confrontational stance.

Leadership of the French mission in The Hague now devolved on Monsieur Barré. Until d’Avaux’s abrupt departure Barré had been the secretary of the embassy. This position betrayed his status as a more junior diplomat, inexperienced for such a responsible post. In diplomatic terms, this signalled that

²¹ The Dutch were especially wary of engaging with d’Avaux as he had manipulated internal divisions successfully in the 1680s, playing Amsterdam off against William III. See Troost, *William III*, p. 260.

²² Baxter, *William III*, p. 390.

²³ Van den Haute, *Les relations Anglo-Hollandaise* (Louvain, 1932), p. 70.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, (Louvain, 1932), p. 53. With William’s blessing the States General had authorised recognition of Philip V as King of Spain partly in order to prolong the talks, ‘En temporisant, ils avaient, dans tous les cas, l’occasion de se préparer à la guerre’.

French patience was running out. The death of William III in March 1702²⁵ had encouraged the French in the view that the Grand Alliance was now on less secure foundations because ‘his death is going to bring great change in this country’.²⁶ Reports of ‘consternation’ in The Hague strengthened hopes that the Dutch would be more willing to negotiate.²⁷

William, however, as Hooke pointed out, had not left affairs to chance.²⁸ Considering the future political situation in the Netherlands, shortly before his death he had sent Arnold Joost van Keppel (1669-1718), earl of Albemarle in the English peerage, to The Hague. Keppel was entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the Orange interest loyal to William rallied to his legacy after his death. In the days after news of William’s death broke they acted quickly to capitalise on the shock felt by the Dutch body politic. On the 25 March 1702 the States General published a *Resolution on the death of King William*. The tone was elegiac. The States were

very aware and sensible of the great sadness brought about by the disastrous, regrettable, and premature death of the king of Great Britain, a leader by sea and land, who had linked the allies into a united body against their enemies, harnessing unanimous support for the common cause. This blow is a blow from the hand of god, and by the same hand which strikes us, perhaps it will be the instrument of our recovery. In the expectation of blessing from Heaven, it is necessary to make all preparations and to put in train everything in our power to prevent the advent of misfortune. We will use for this the means that the same God has bestowed on us: common defence for the conservation of liberty and for the maintenance of the exercise of the true Reformed Religion and we will sacrifice our goods and our blood and all that is in our power rather than see perish, the Republic, Liberty and Religion.²⁹

²⁵ [anon.] to Paris, 23 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 120r): ‘News arrived of the death of this monarch between 8 and 9 o clock, Sunday 19 March’; Baron de Malknecht, Bavarian diplomat in The Hague, to de Torcy, 23 March 1702, The Hague, f. 122r, reporting the same time and date. Lucien Bély, *Les relations internationales en Europe XVII^e – XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 2001), p. 388.

²⁶ [anon.] to Paris, 23 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 121r).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, ff 123r, 123v, 124r.

²⁸ ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, Hooke to de Torcy, 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163r).

²⁹ Printed copies of *Resolutions of the States General on the death of King William* (The Hague, 1702), enclosed by M. Barré in his dispatches which arrived in Paris 4 April 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, ff 126r – 131v).

Undoubtedly the threat which might see ‘the Republic, Liberty and Religion’ succumb was France. In the following days the situation deteriorated further as the declarations of the individual provinces were sifted through and analysed. Utrecht wrote that it was sensible of

this incomparable loss which affects and aggrieves us to the depths of our soul; as much Our Dear Fatherland, and our Province in particular, as in relation to the importance to the affairs of all Europe in general, which suffers by this death a loss almost irreparable, as well as the whole body of Protestantism.³⁰

The perception of William as the defender of Europe and Protestantism is clear. They concluded by pledging themselves to the ‘conservation of Our Dear Fatherland in the enjoyment of a liberty which cost us dear, and in the reformed religion’.³¹ OverYssel proclaimed its ‘grief not only for Our State but for the repose and union of all of Europe’.³² Frise’s statement in Churchillian-sounding tones warned that the ‘liberty tottered all across Europe.’³³ In this way William acted posthumously as a rallying point for a Grand Alliance against France.

Religious motivations had not ceased to be a factor in European politics with the peace of Westphalia. Indeed it obvious from this evidence that there were fears that another war of religion was about to break out. One apprehensive Dutch Catholic wrote in January 1702 that ‘the war will be very widespread and very violent because the interest of religion enters into it... [and] will surely make it cruel.’³⁴ Intertwined with these apprehensions was the deeper visceral worry for the Dutch Provinces, expressed in the Utrecht declaration, that the Republic’s

³⁰ Ibid., f. 131r.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., f. 133v.

³⁴ [anon.] to Paris, 16 Jan. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 48r). He was not convinced by the reassurances of ‘one of the deputies of the town [...] that the pretext of religion which enters the war of England will be faulted by many people here. I believe he told me this because he knows we are apprehensive that the pretext of religion will make us leave the town’.

hard won liberty would again be contested by the Continent's most powerful state. Replacing Spain in this renewed struggle for survival would be their overmighty neighbour, France. Deputies of the States were soon anxiously talking of the fact that it was a good time for France to strike Holland and that if France 'exerted itself to the full by land and by sea' Holland would soon be reduced to seeking peace.³⁵

This piece of evidence came via an overheard conversation and was relayed to Paris by an informant in the Netherlands. Internal evidence from the reports indicates that the correspondent was a Dutch Catholic resident in Amsterdam.³⁶ He shared in the religiously driven fears of the moment, but in counterpoint to his fellow citizens. 'Le Cousin', as he signed himself, stated that the 'death of William caused the Catholics of Amsterdam to fear being chased from the town' now that the power and credit of Catholic Germany might no longer be allied to the Dutch.³⁷ This was a major question preoccupying many diplomatic minds. Would or could the alliance of The Netherlands, England and the Empire be maintained in William's absence? His diplomatic talents had been crucial in bring such a coalition together. Might one or more of its members now be induced to reach a separate settlement with France? Hooke's intelligence gathering activities would be devoted to finding out the answer to this question.

The existing French intelligence system in the Netherlands at the outset of the war was effective in gathering information. If anything its greatest problem was the fact that it acquired too much rather than too little intelligence. In the

³⁵ [anon.] to Paris, 27 March 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 138r): anonymous informant using the cover name 'Le Cousin' relaying details of an overheard conversation to Paris.

³⁶ Ibid., f. 138v.

³⁷ Ibid., f. 138r.

mass of detail it was difficult to recognise what was useful.³⁸ De Torcy was faced with a variety of reports from French diplomatic sources, Dutch informants, Spanish and Bavarian diplomats whose countries were now allied to the France, diplomats from non allied countries with French sympathies and printed gazettes and pamphlets.³⁹

To complicate matters further there was not just one French information gathering enterprise but two rival French networks in the Netherlands. De Torcy's sources orchestrated by the Foreign affairs department were duplicated by and, quite often, in competition with a another spy ring operated by the Minister of War, Michel de Chamillart. Rivalry was keen and sometimes detrimental to French interests. It sowed seeds of discord between the ministries of Foreign Affairs and War that were to have serious long term consequences.⁴⁰

Hooke crossed into the Netherlands in April and his first report was received by the ministry in Paris on 22 April 1702.⁴¹ An unusual aspect of the

³⁸ Lucien Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1990), pp 92-94.

³⁹ The official diplomatic personnel as already mentioned were the ambassador d'Avaux and the secretary (later resident) Barré. Hooke represented the unofficial, unaccredited wing of this diplomatic/information gathering endeavour in 1702/03. 'Le Cousin' and a longer lasting, equally anonymous correspondent, from The Hague were examples of Dutch informants who relayed valuable insider information and rumour to Paris. The difficulty was in distinguishing between the two. Freiherr von Malknecht, a Bavarian diplomat was in contact de Torcy while Spanish officials such as Bernard de Quiros, ambassador in The Hague and Baron von Bedmar, military governor of the Spanish Netherlands came within the French ambit after Philip V's accession to the Spanish throne. De Quiros later defected to the service of Archduke Charles of Austria, the rival claimant to the Spanish throne. Baron Nils Lillieroot, the Swedish envoy in The Hague, and mediator of the peace of Rijswijk 1697 was widely, and rightly in view of his correspondence, suspected of being pro-French. Franz Mollo, representative of the King of Poland though less reliable and less committed to French interests also served de Torcy's network in a number of practical ways in the Netherlands.

⁴⁰ This rivalry between the ministries was surprisingly enduring. The intense desire of Foreign Affairs and Defence officials not to share information with each other, even when based in the same embassy, was remarked upon in 1975. See François Bizot, *The gate* (translation, London, 2003), p. 183. There is also 'a long tradition of internecine warfare between the [American] State Department and the Defense Department.' See Christopher Meyer, *DC confidential: the memoirs of Britain's ambassador to the US at the time of 9/11 and the run-up to the Iraq war* (London, 2006), p. 211.

⁴¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 22 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 220r).

reports is that they are sent directly to the marquis de Torcy himself, who also replied to Hooke. The reports of other agents and informants in Holland were dealt with by his officials. Thus Hooke's mission was personally overseen from the outset by the Foreign Minister himself and he was intimately involved in the details. This level of interest and involvement amidst many pressing demands reflects the importance of Hooke's mission. In effect, he was acting as de Torcy's personal agent.

Hooke's reports to de Torcy are unlike regular diplomatic dispatches. From accredited emissaries 'the best diplomatic reporting, indeed the ideal from the point of view of the government to which it was directed, was terse, impersonal and concerned exclusively with the business at hand, which was current developments in matters of policy'.⁴² Hooke's position was altogether different, as he operated outside the bounds of 'normal' diplomacy. His reports reflect the conditions under which he operated. Specifically Hooke had forfeited the rights and protections of those acting openly abroad in the French diplomatic service. As a result it often possible to detect indications of the stress and anxiety he experienced as a clandestine agent. This was a strange *déjà vu* experience for Hooke, reliving something of the harried existence he endured in Holland after Monmouth's rebellion.

Hooke made his way to the Netherlands from France via Antwerp in the Spanish Netherlands. He crossed into the United Provinces near 'Posthorn, four leagues from Moerdijk'.⁴³ His mission almost came to grief immediately. 'I was stopped by an English guards officer [...] who detained me for some hours.' This

⁴² Phyllis S. Lachs, *The diplomatic corps under Charles II and James II* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1965), p. 246.

⁴³ Hooke to de Torcy, 22 April 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 220r).

was a dangerous situation. It was fortunate that ‘he did not search me. He wanted to take me to the Earl of Athlone, but I displayed so much indifference, and having taken a care to get on his good side, that he finally let me go.’⁴⁴ This episode illuminates something of Hooke’s character, especially his ability to maintain outward composure in trying circumstances and his winning way. Not only did Hooke convince the officer to let him go, he told de Torcy that ‘it was he who told me all the news which you find in my letter, except for the troops movements, which I got from a better hand.’⁴⁵ This display of nonchalance and bonhomie secured Hookes passage onwards to The Hague. It is a prime example of Hooke’s skill in manipulating his persona as the situation demanded.

Hooke sent his first report to de Torcy when he reached The Hague. It was addressed and posted from Delft. Hooke’s reports to de Torcy were usually posted from Delft, Amsterdam, or Rotterdam, seldom from The Hague itself. This was to allay Dutch and English misgivings. The primary objective of the initial phase of his journey was to gain an interview with John Cutts. However, Hooke discovered he had been in England since 9 April.

I await his return with impatience, not daring to go far from The Hague for fear that he might pass without stopping and it would be difficult to see him then. It is said that he is coming but I believe rather that he will disembark with the troops of the descent, as I have already had the honour of telling you at Versailles.⁴⁶

Though unable to meet Cutts until he arrived with the troops from England, Hooke had used his time valuably. From conversations en route he was able to shed light on the sentiments of the people of Flanders. This was useful information for French forces in the region. Again he had adopted the persona of

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

an amiable Englishman, intentionally seeking to project what appears to have been an established stereotype of ‘*le bon anglois*’.⁴⁷ The area was ruled *de facto* by the French but their presence was resented. Hooke had found a high level of hostility present among the population. Indeed he was ‘very surprised to find the Flemings so mutinous’.⁴⁸ The post masters even told him that they were hiding their best horses from the French, hence, perhaps, Hooke’s adoption of what was an obviously English identity. In this way we see one of the main advantages of Hooke as an agent: his apparent non-Frenchness. Confident they were in the presence of a ‘loyal’ Englishman, the Flemings were quite willingly to converse.

They talked to me agitatedly of their present state and wished a son to the Emperor. I wanted to see if it was the same among the rest of the people. I stayed in several inns at the recommendation of the coachmen. There I found the same sentiments as in Brussels where I stayed on purpose for one day; I fear greatly that these people resemble those of the Milanese, and even among the post masters there are enemy spies.⁴⁹

French occupation of Spanish-ruled territories in Italy had also encountered resistance. Ostensibly the French armies were only present in the Spanish Netherlands and Italy at the invitation of the new Spanish monarch. While Philip V was settling into his new role, his grandfather’s French troops would guarantee the security of these parts of the Spanish monarchy until such time as Spain’s own badly neglected military forces could be remodelled. However benign the objective, England, the Empire and The Netherlands feared Louis XIV’s intentions. The Dutch especially were worried at having French soldiers on there border. While still not eager for war Hooke ‘found that from talking to a great number of people here [in the Hague] that they are disposed to peace, provided

⁴⁷ Ibid., f. 220v.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

they are given some security.’⁵⁰ The issue of the security of the southern Dutch border would be a factor to be addressed in any peace talks.

Peace was to be the main theme of Hooke’s mission to the Dutch Republic. He had only general instructions on what to do in Holland. Such a degree of freedom of action was unusual, especially in French diplomacy. The absence of precise instructions demanded intelligence, quick thinking and self reliance. Hooke had to identify possible opportunities to advance French interests and to determine how this might be best achieved. Without precise instructions it was all too easy to overstep one’s authority. This brought with it also a high degree of stress for an agent far from the contact and guidance of his political superior.

Hooke was to start his mission by talking with Cutts, ostensibly to seek his support in an effort to return to England. In the course of conversation Hooke was to sound him out on his views and opinions concerning European political and military affairs. These views were important as Cutts was an influential member of the English court. In the frequent absence of the duke of Marlborough he was commanding general of the English forces in Holland. He was also an MP for Newport and governor of the Isle of Wight, a position which gave him considerable political influence.⁵¹ In addition he was an experienced diplomat and had been involved in the negotiations for the treaty of Rijswick in 1697.

Rijswick had been based on talks initiated by the respective army commanders in the field, the Comte de Tallard and the Earl of Portland, in the wake of the deadlock of formal diplomatic preliminaries. Both men benefited

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ *DNB.*, vol. 14, p. 851; Cutts had been able to promise six votes for the king in 1693 from the island, H. M. C. *Frankland-Russell-Astley* (London, 1900), p. 75.

from ending the conflict. However, there was another reason why Cutts might be willing to listen to overtures from France. He was deeply in debt. Entreaties for help to William III and then Anne, requesting monetary recognition for past services fell on deaf ears. Despite his rank and close connections at court, Cutts was successfully prosecuted for failing to pay his debts and faced jail. He avoided imprisonment but remained in a vulnerable position.⁵²

In the wider context of formal peace negotiations, shortly before Hooke began his mission, an express from France had informed Secretary Barré that he had been promoted to Resident and on 31 March he presented his letters of accreditation to the current president of the assembly of the States General, M. Dyckvelt.⁵³ Barré was also granted an audience with the States General the following day where he presented a ‘Memoir [...] of the Most Christian Majesty to the States General’.⁵⁴ The memoir had been drawn up by d’Avaux. Barré believed that the memoire would be helpful and would contribute to facilitating changes to the current situation.⁵⁵ His forecast was half right. The memoire did change the prevailing circumstances but not, however, in any way favourable to France. While it was intended to defuse the situation, it actually succeeded in inflaming it.

The document contained a rather indelicate and ill-judged melange of military threats and economic inducements, proffered in a tone perceived as both patronising and provocative to its Dutch audience. Its tenor proved counterproductive and demonstrated how desperately the French needed accurate

⁵² On his death in Ireland he was interred in Christchurch Cathedral. Still deeply in debt it was rumoured his aides des camp met the burial expenses from their own pocket. No memorial marks his resting place.

⁵³ [anon.] to Paris, 31 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 156v); *Extrait du registre vendredi 31 Mars 1702 de LHP States Généraux des Provinces Unies*, 31 Mar. 1702, (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 163r).

⁵⁴ [anon.] to Paris, [n. d.], The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 164r).

⁵⁵ Barré to Marshall Boufflers, 31 Mar 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 169r).

intelligence on the fluid situation in the Netherlands. The reaction to the memoire showed that D'Avaux, absent from the United Provinces since the autumn of 1701, was out of step with the political climate in the Dutch Republic.

The memoire was a missed opportunity. Sections of the document suggested that an understanding did exist of the main points of contention with the Dutch. It also appeared to concede that some of the recent actions of France had contributed to fear and suspicion in Holland. The entry of French troops into the Spanish Netherlands was recognised as a mistake, that these troops should be withdrawn and replaced by Spanish forces as soon as possible. Economically, the freedom and safety of Dutch commerce would be guaranteed, the privileges of the port of Anvers/Antwerp would remain restricted and the treaties of Munster, Nijmegen and Rijswick would be reconfirmed.⁵⁶

However, the sweet core of the memoir was coated in bitter threats. It was impossible for the Sun King to defer entirely to the Dutch and accept all of the blame for the current impasse. 'Before the numerous armies the King [Louis XIV] has ready are obliged to go into action it is worthwhile recalling efforts made to maintain the peace established by the treaty of Rijswick.'⁵⁷ It went on to dangle briefly the carrot of peace and its benefits before recounting a litany of acts on the Dutch part that left the French with no recourse but to attack.⁵⁸ To make matters worse there was a none too subtle implication that Holland would be the main focus of French military activity in the absence of agreement.⁵⁹ This combination

⁵⁶ These were concessions, safeguarding territorial and trade security, that were very important to the Dutch. If made in a more appropriate manner they might have attracted some support among some factions in Holland. See Wood, 'A study of Anglo-Dutch relations', p. 62.

⁵⁷ Barré to Marshall Boufflers, 31 Mar 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 164r).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 165r.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 165v.

of threat and inducement could not be calculated to make the Dutch more amenable.

Indeed it inevitably evoked painful and emotive memories of the *rampjaar* (year of disaster) of 1672 when the Republic had been in mortal danger because of French invasion.⁶⁰ The unfortunate fact was that the substance of the document was actually a fair reflection of the prevailing situation. A faction of the States General, opposed to an expensive war, was receptive to such arguments, believing that agreement could be reached with France on the issues of trade and security. However the hectoring style of presentation cut the ground from beneath them. A Dutch contact wrote to Paris saying that

the deputies well intentioned for peace have testified to him of their distress that the memoir had been presented without having taken any assessment beforehand with some of the deputies well intentioned for peace. The memoir, having being presented in the manner that it was, served the design of those who have a plan to achieve by war the authority that had been King Williams; it was said the memoir was more feared than loved. Two deputies said that if they had seen it before it was presented they could have better explained His Majesty's intentions and presented it in a better manner. As it was the memoir seemed to say that the Most Christian King had a design to separate the States from the Emperor, to have time and facility to reduce him to abandon his pretensions, and once that was done the two kings [Louis XIV and Philip V] would then fall on the States.⁶¹

The informant, however, continued that there was still a possibility of peace. If the king's armies were pulled back from Dutch borders, well intentioned deputies would draw up their own memoir. 'I assure you that these sentiments are true, easy to follow up and execute. It is necessary only to sow a little money.'⁶² However, little came from this recommendation. Instead the situation worsened. A letter from the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Don Francisco Bernardo de

⁶⁰ J. L. Price, *Dutch Society 1588-1713* (Harlow, 2000), p. 227.

⁶¹ 'Le Neveu' to Paris, 6 Apr. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, ff 192r, 192v).

⁶² *Ibid.*, f. 192v.

Quiros⁶³ (d. 1709) informed de Torcy that a conference had been held between Marlborough, Heinsius and the Imperial ambassador Johann Peter, Count de Goes (1667-1716). It was agreed that more troops were needed before war could be declared officially. Quiros went on to say that the best chance for peace was if de Torcy himself was to come to The Hague. ‘The memoire presented by M. Barré has disturbed even more than was feared. I am persuaded that if you were to come here with full powers to negotiate, you could prevent the ensuing tragedy of a most bloody war.’⁶⁴ The Swedish minister in The Hague, baron [de] Lillieroot wrote to de Quiros on the 17 April 1702 that ‘war was not far off. We will soon even have a formal declaration.’⁶⁵ The following day an informant in The Hague wrote

all these rumours are not having a good effect in present circumstances and that confirms me in my opinion that if the King for his part would send a person with some propositions which can reassure us here of the falsehood of charges of great ambition and power-seeking of the Most Christian King, this could very well dispel these clouds so heavy and terrible which threaten to fall over all Europe.⁶⁶

There was reason to believe that the information forwarded to Paris from these sources was accurate and war was indeed close. On the same day that the French memoir had been submitted, the duke of Marlborough made his way by carriage with a large entourage to the States. He addressed the assembled members and forcefully argued the case for war.⁶⁷ His harangue moved the then president of the assembly, M. Dyckfeld, to tears.⁶⁸ When one considers that

⁶³ De Quiros defected to the Allies’ pretender to the Spanish throne, Archduke Charles of Austria, or Charles III in the Allied reckoning, later in 1702. He remained as Charles’s ambassador at The Hague and Brussels.

⁶⁴ De Quiros to de Torcy, 11 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 204r).

⁶⁵ Lillieroot to de Quiros, 17 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 212v).

⁶⁶ [anon.] to Paris, 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 214v).

⁶⁷ [Anon] to Paris, 3 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 150r).

⁶⁸ Information received from Baron Malknecht sent via Marshal Boufflers to de Torcy, 31 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 153r).

Dyckveld had for many years been a trusted confidant of William III, and indeed had been remarkably successful as his agent in England in suborning support for the Dutch invasion in 1688, the whole affair takes the aspect of a well managed *coup de theatre* orchestrated to offset the French memoire. Four days before Hooke sent his first report, trenches were opened to begin the siege of the French defended fortress of Keyserwerth on the Rhine.⁶⁹ It is well to remember at this point that, beyond the arcane minuets of diplomatic manoeuvres, real lives stood in the balance. With a haunting sense of perception mixed with prophecy, the earl of Perth had already remarked on the carpet of red poppies that colonised the sites of old battles ‘where lying untilled a scarlet sheet is not of a deeper hue nor seems more smooth than all the ground is with those flowers, as if last years blood had taken root and appeared this year in flowers.’⁷⁰ Contemporaries were aware that if conflict broke out it would be on an unprecedented scale. A French correspondent had already forecast in January 1702, that ‘we are about to witness the bloodiest war that has ever occurred in history.’⁷¹ This was the context to Hooke’s mission and underlines significance of his task.

The misjudged French memoir was another step toward conflict, assisting the cause of those in the English and Dutch camps who argued for war.⁷² In a letter from The Hague to de Torcy, the marquis de Bedmar, military commander of the Spanish Netherlands, asserted that ‘everything was being done to make

⁶⁹ Secretary of the Spanish Netherlands legation to Don de Quiros, (copy forwarded to Paris) 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 218r); [anon] to Paris, 24 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 222r).

⁷⁰ William Jerdan (ed.), *Letters from James earl of Perth [...] to his sister, the countess of Errol and other members of his family* (London, 1845), p. 28. Cited in John Callow, *King in exile: James II, warrior, king and saint* (Stroud, 2005), p. 243.

⁷¹ [Anon] to Paris, 23 Jan. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 63v).

⁷² Van den Haute, *Les relations Anglo-Hollandaise* (Louvain, 1932), pp 75-77, 90-94.

France declare war [because] the States are working to justify everything they have done until now.⁷³ The memoire had made this task much easier.

The memoir and the events following its presentation had also, at one and the same time, made Nathaniel Hooke's mission more important and more difficult. Hooke paid a series of visits to contacts in The Hague. Diplomatic activity had quietened somewhat with the 'days of Easter having brought stillness to news'.⁷⁴ Hooke first consulted 'two people who while not friends of France, are very much mine.'⁷⁵ These friends are not identified. Hooke adds that 'I was open with them regarding my design to return to England.'⁷⁶

Displaying the usefulness of his Dutch contacts, Hooke asked his friends what they thought of his plan: 'They approved and promised their help, but at the same time they counselled me not to appear publicly until I had secured the protection of England since being so well known in this country I would attract an order to leave.'⁷⁷ Hooke took their advice and called on Alexander Stanhope, the English Ambassador in The Hague.⁷⁸ Hooke had made his acquaintance while travelling in Holland the previous year. This meeting took place in secret because

⁷³ Isidoro Juan José Domingo de la Cueva y Benavidès, marquis de Bedmar, to de Torcy, 28 April 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 229r).

⁷⁴ [Anon] to Paris, 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 216r).

⁷⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 30 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 231r).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Alexander Stanhope (d. 1707). English diplomat, son of the earl of Chesterfield and brother of James Stanhope, first earl Stanhope. Strongly in favour of the Revolution, Stanhope was appointed English envoy to Spain by William III in 1689. He remained there until diplomatic relations between England and Spain broke down in 1699 due to the signing of the Treaty of Partition. Stanhope was then appointed ambassador to the equally important post of The Hague, the diplomatic nerve centre of Europe. Strongly Whig in political outlook Stanhope was much less in favour after the death of William III. Following Queen Anne's accession and the election of a ministry with a much more Tory hue, Stanhope's position seemed precarious. With Marlborough becoming the main conduit of high level communication between England and Holland, Stanhope himself applied to return to England at his own behest citing health reasons. However it proved difficult to fill the post and he was left *in situ* until he was incapacitated by an attack of apoplexy in 1706. He died in England in 1707.

Stanhope ‘though a minister of England did not dare, as he said to me, to see me in public.’⁷⁹ He requested Stanhope’s help in solving his most immediate and pressing problem: being in the Netherlands without permission. He explained that he was in Holland in an attempt to set his affairs in England in order. Would Stanhope be prepared to act as his protector while he went about this business?

This was nerve indeed as Hooke was effectively asking for the protection of England while carrying out his mission to engage in espionage for France. Stanhope responded that he could do nothing. Everything passed through the ‘hands of milord Marlborough or milord Cutts, and they being my friends I would be better to address myself to them’.⁸⁰ Hooke gathered from this that Stanhope was rather jealous of Hooke’s connection with the two leading English figures in the Netherlands. Nevertheless the English minister did advise Hooke to remain hidden until Cutts returned. Hooke, ever the assiduous agent, took advantage of the situation to explore Stanhope’s views and opinions on general affairs. An insight into English thinking on matters at hand would be quite useful.

Hooke first observed that Stanhope ‘did not much want war.’⁸¹ To draw him out further Hooke told him that he ‘had a great fear that neither England nor Holland would much profit from the war.’⁸² Stanhope answered by saying Louis XIV’s recognition of the Prince of Wales as James III ‘had so irritated [England] that they could not help being driven along by the animosity generated by the action.’⁸³ He continued that there were many people who did want peace but that now there had already been a resort to arms it would be very difficult to obtain.

⁷⁹ Hooke to de Torcy, 30 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 231v).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid., f. 232r.

This difficulty was reinforced all the more, in Stanhope's view, since 'people are so persuaded that his Most Christian Majesty did not want peace willingly'; even the Dutch General Obdam,⁸⁴ in a recent conversation with Stanhope, had stated himself that peace was much more 'in the interest of the [Dutch] state, but that his Majesty [Louis XIV] had no intention of maintaining it; a vigorous war [was] more desirable than a peace without security' and he did 'not believe that his Majesty wished to give them any.'⁸⁵ Obdam had been especially wary of French promises, 'as all clauses without security are suspect, unless very positive and precise.'⁸⁶

Hooke professed his surprise 'because it seemed that France had held very loyally in all the treaties to the clauses which they had made.'⁸⁷ Stanhope agreed that this was true but that there had been complaints about the fact that 'M. d'Avaux had been underhand' by many people in regard to a number of clauses he had agreed to, that 'when they wanted to enter into the material, he disavowed all and declared that he had acquiesced to nothing of the kind.'⁸⁸ The perception that Louis XIV had gone back on his word in signing the Partition Treaties and later ignoring them poisoned international relations and made allegations of bad faith credible.

Next, Hooke went to see Hans Heinrich von Stöken, the minister of Denmark, whom Hooke described as 'a friend of milord Cutts and of mine.'⁸⁹ Queen Anne's husband, Prince George, was Danish and the nature of links

⁸⁴ Jacob van Wassenaer (1635-1714), baron Obdam. Governor of Bois-le-Duc, 1703 and Dutch envoy to the Palatinate, 1708-1712.

⁸⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 30 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 232v).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 232r.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 232v.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

between England and Denmark could be important in the context of European alliances. It was unclear whether relations would be as close as between England and The Netherlands under William and Mary but a diplomatic realignment from an Anglo-Dutch to an Anglo-Danish alliance might be useful for France. The Dutch and the Danes had a long standing and keen political and commercial rivalry in the Baltic. If Danish influence could be brought to bear, even at this late stage and possibly through von Stöken, to persuade England not to engage in the war?

As such Hooke's friendship with von Stöken was fortuitous. Again Hooke gave his alibi of being in Holland to sort out his affairs in England. He asked that if he should be successful in his request, would von Stöken 'be able to protect me when he was in England?'⁹⁰ The minister promised to do all that he could within his power, but again advised him to address himself first to milord Cutts 'who was known for being very much my [Hooke's] friend.'⁹¹ Hooke said that that was his intention but that he might experience some difficulty in getting to see Cutts on his return. Von Stöken offered to try to help lift these difficulties but in the interim he strenuously warned Hooke to stay hidden as he was

known for having been employed in enterprises and affairs by King James and if it was known I was here without permission, I would be suspected of conducting some quite secret negotiations. The States General have such a fear of being abandoned that they would not scruple to sacrifice a dozen people to their dread to show the Emperor that they would entertain no proposals without his participation.⁹²

⁹⁰ Ibid., f. 233r. Hans Heinrich von Stöken (senior) (d. 1709) was the Danish minister in The Hague from 1699-1709. His son, Hans Heinrich von Stöken (junior) followed in his father footsteps as Danish envoy in The Hague. He was on his way to England to carry the King of Denmark's congratulations to Queen Anne on her accession to the crown. France recognised her half brother as James III and French ministers and officials continued to refer to Princess Anne of Denmark. She is referred to by this term in all of Hooke's correspondence.

⁹¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 30 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 233r).

⁹² Ibid.

Hooke promised to follow his advice, and reiterated to him that he had only come to deal with his own affairs and did not want to be mixed up in those of others!

Hooke left the house of this minister ‘very content to have taken these measures to persuade milord Cutts that I desire above all to return to England.’⁹³ He was satisfied that his alibi would get back to Cutts and serve to alleviate any suspicions. Hooke now sought to investigate the accuracy of what he had learned from the two ministers concerning the disposition of the States General. He visited an Amsterdam Republican opposed to the Orange interest, who enjoyed close relations with the city’s magistrates. Hooke told him a version of the story he had related to Stanhope, von Stöken and his Dutch friends in The Hague. He made one important alteration to his tale by claiming that he was in Holland because he had received an order from the Princess of Denmark [Queen Anne] to return if he wanted to regularise his affairs. He added that as soon as his affairs were in order he intended to join the Allied armies.

Hooke explained to de Torcy in his report that he knew this ploy was ‘the best way to insinuate myself’ with him and ‘I knew this was the best way to make him talk.’⁹⁴ Hooke’s artifice worked, with his friend applauding his intention to become involved in the fight for ‘the liberty of Europe, and above all England and the United Provinces.’⁹⁵ Hooke’s friend provided him with an interesting perspective on how William’s death had changed affairs in the Netherlands. He agreed with the French view that Williams’s death was significant but he was adamant that it would lead not to peace, but to the war. He went on to explain that

⁹³ Ibid., f. 233v.

⁹⁴ Ibid., f. 234r.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

‘all the *bon hollandais* [my italics] had feared his [William III] power, but his death had put an end to this fear and that they were all now resolute for the war.’⁹⁶ Hooke was puzzled at this bellicose attitude as the anti-Orange interest was usually more sympathetic to peace with France. Hooke asked him why the change in outlook? His friend answered that with the Spanish Netherlands in the hands of France, as they now were, Holland was threatened. If they retained them by exchange for other territories or as compensation for damages they would never be removed after a peace was made. ‘In that case the United Provinces would no longer be able to defend themselves and it was absolutely in their interest to end all this while they had the Emperor, [...] and England with them.’⁹⁷

This was unwelcome news for France. It appeared that the Dutch would be far less easily displaced from their alliance with England and the Netherlands than had been hoped. Their latest peace initiatives were premised on the view that King William had maintained an oppressive hold over power in the Netherlands and that with his death the French interest would improve. The ill-judged French memoir too had expected a collapse in Dutch confidence and an increased susceptibility to intimidation. Hooke’s report made it clear that this was not the case. Obtaining his information from someone who was not an Orange partisan made it even more dejecting reading. Republicans such as his friend were meant to be the mainstay of the peace party, not avid supporters of the war. Plainly, King William had not been the sole directing force behind the war after all; a large measure of anti-French feeling was at this stage a genuinely popular phenomenon based on a fear engendered by the French ‘invasion’ of the Spanish Netherlands.

⁹⁶ Ibid., f. 234v.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Evidently French policy needed some major adjustments in the light of Hooke's information.⁹⁸

Attempting to gain a greater insight into what would satisfy the Dutch, Hooke asked if they wanted to keep 'Flanders for themselves?'⁹⁹ His friend replied no. He said that he would rather see it in the hands of the Archduke or even England rather than France, though their preferred option was that those lands remain in the hands of Spain, provided that the Dutch were assured of their security there as they had been when they had held the fortresses so recently taken by the French.¹⁰⁰ The Dutch fear of having France as a neighbour was clearly a central tenet in the development of their foreign policy. The issue of the 'Dutch Barrier' fortresses became a fixed point of consensus in Dutch politics.¹⁰¹

Hooke next wrote to de Torcy on the 6 May 1702, again from Delft. He had some good news to report as he had met Stanhope again and the minister had permitted him to remain in The Hague under his protection. He was to see Cutts the next day but wrote his report before leaving because he knew he would be under observation whilst visiting Cutts.

⁹⁸ Jonathan Israel stresses that Dutch support for the war against France was not simply a continuation of William III's policies. '[...] merchants, manufacturers, and the public remained solidly behind the States of Holland in going on with the war [...] convinced that the Dutch trading system of past decades could not survive without the defeat of France and removal of the Bourbon king from the Spanish throne, closure of the Scheldt, and restoration of Dutch commerce with Spanish America. [...] Consequently the anti-Orangists in Holland [...] concurred wholeheartedly with Heinsius.' See J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its greatness, rise and fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1998), pp 972-973; 'The Republic embarked on the Spanish War of Succession without enthusiasm but with an exceptional unanimity of opinion,' A. J. Veenendaal, 'The War of Spanish Succession in Europe' in J. S. Bromley (ed.), *The new Cambridge modern history*, vi, 415; J. G. Stork-Penning, 'The ordeal of the States-some remarks on Dutch politics during the War of Spanish Succession' in *Acta Historiae Neerlandica*, vol. ii (Leiden, 1967), pp 107-141; Wood, 'A study of Anglo-Dutch relations', pp 35-38; Coombs, *Conduct of the Dutch*, pp 21-25.

⁹⁹ Hooke to de Torcy, 30 Apr. 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 235r).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ See Nimwegen, 'The Dutch Barrier', pp 147-177; Roderick Geike and Isabel A. Montgomerie, *The Dutch barrier 1705-19* (Cambridge, 1930).

During his visit to Stanhope, Hooke reported to de Torcy that he had asked him several questions on ‘King James III.’¹⁰² Stanhope had also expressed discontent that the Tories were now masters of the Court. He felt it augured badly for the war effort. Prince George had been rejected by the States and the mistrust between the two nations was great.¹⁰³ Stanhope attributed this to ‘the death of the king of England which had broken the link which had kept them united.’¹⁰⁴ The States General only wanted the war to prevent France having the Spanish Netherlands, and complained greatly of the slowness of the English in making preparations to dislodge them. Stanhope confessed that in this respect they had reason to complain. His own son had a regiment which should already have embarked, but it was so badly under strength that his son was still recruiting in Ireland.¹⁰⁵

To complete Stanhope’s gloomy prognosis he said he believed that Parliament, which was opening on Monday 8 May, would be prorogued in 15 days and then dissolved.¹⁰⁶ Stanhope was firmly convinced that the new parliament which would be convoked would change the new act of succession. Hooke took the opportunity since he was talking of the succession to enquire if a draft project had been found from the King William to exclude the Princess of Denmark? Stanhope replied ‘no, but that the Whigs had been accused of this

¹⁰² Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 249r).

¹⁰³ The attitude of the Dutch to Prince George’s candidacy can be discerned from the fact that the only positive response to news of his nomination came from ‘delighted wine merchants of this town’, no doubt pleased with his reputation for indolence and indulgence, ‘Le Cousin’ to Paris, 27 Mar. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 139r).

¹⁰⁴ Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 251r).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 249v.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* Following the Revolution settlement the sitting parliament’s life automatically extended beyond the death of a monarch until the new sovereign had acceded to the throne. See David Green, *Queen Anne* (London, 1970), p. 92.

design and that this was the reason for the dissolution of parliament.¹⁰⁷ He had it suggested that the earl of Sunderland might be brought back to court, but since there were many in the present parliament opposed to him this would cause divisions. Holland was also beset by division as the ‘towns were occupied examining how they had lost privileges and the means of recovering them.’¹⁰⁸

To draw him out further Hooke commented that there were other malcontents shouting loudly in Holland against the elector of Brandenburg.¹⁰⁹ Stanhope’s answer showed the complexity, and quite possibly the brittleness of the allied coalition facing France. He said that the States were indeed wary of the sincerity of the intentions of the elector of Brandenburg, and with reason. He ‘seemingly awaited the opening of the will of the late king of England to act according to what suited his interests.’¹¹⁰

The opening of William’s will was one of the major issues preoccupying the Netherlands. As William had given conflicting promises to various parties during his lifetime situation was one of confusion. The lawyers, as ever, were busy.¹¹¹ In his will William would dispose of his personal wealth and hereditary lands and offices in the United Provinces. The major beneficiary would occupy a powerful position in the political and social life of the Netherlands. To complicate matters further the elector of Brandenburg was firmly convinced that not only would he be the chief beneficiary but also that some of the lands were his by right,

¹⁰⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 249v).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp 959-968.

¹⁰⁹ France had not recognised the elevation of the elector of Brandenburg to the title of king *in* Prussia by the Emperor in 1701. Throughout Hooke’s official written reports therefore references remain to the elector of Brandenburg. When in actual conversation the use of this nomenclature would have been highly suspicious so commonsense and pragmatism obviously dictated the use of the usual formula, ‘king of Prussia’, commonly used in The Hague.

¹¹⁰ Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 250r).

¹¹¹ [Anon] to Paris, 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 216v); [anon] to Paris, 2 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 239r).

irrespective of the testament. As soon as news had arrived of William's death Prussian troops had moved to take possession of a number of towns in the disputed territory and the Dutch had even been requested to remove their troops entirely from the county of Meurs.¹¹²

This was the background to Hooke's question. It was important to the formulation of French policy to be informed of the progress of this dispute between two members of the Grand Alliance. Such divisions heralded the possibility of perhaps eventually detaching the Prussians entirely from the alliance. Stanhope went on to say that the States were 'not overly worried, for they hoped to use the king of Sweden to hold the elector of Brandenburg on a tight rein.'¹¹³ The problem inherent in this Dutch policy was that all the Swedish council were for France. So far they had not managed to bring King Charles XII (1682-1718) around to their view. At present campaign his in Poland against Augustus II (1670-1733), king of Poland and elector of Saxony, was progressing well. Stanhope was sure that in a short time Augustus would be dethroned. The Dutch policy appeared to be to play the victorious Swedes off against the Prussians who would then have far too much to worry about on their eastern and northern borders to have time to interfere in Holland.

¹¹² [anon] to Paris, 31 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 149r); Correspondent of Baron Malknecht, passed by Boufflers to Paris, 31 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 155r). The Prince of Nassau-Saarbruck also attempted to seize Meurs but arrived too late. The States had sent a party of Swiss halberdiers to guard Loo; the Princess de Frise called the Prussian actions violent and pointed out the succession was still very much contested. By the 11 April it was reported that the king of Prussia was assembling 20,000 men at Wesel just over the Dutch border, and was claiming the Stadholderate, [anon.] to M. de Quiros, 11 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 204r). The will was eventually opened on the 8 May and the Prince of Nassau, Stadholder of Frise was named as sole beneficiary in a will dating from 1695. The Prussian ambassador Baron Wolfgang von Schmettau objected that there was a later will made in 1701 and expressed his discontent. See de Quiros to de Torcy, 9 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 256r). The dispute rumbled on, unresolved, for many years, leaving the Prussian king always slightly estranged from the alliance and susceptible to French overtures.

¹¹³ Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 250r).

The downside of the Swedish victory for the alliance's cohesion and effectiveness was that the Emperor had been counting on the availability of some 8,000 Polish troops from Augustus to reinforce his own forces in their campaigns against the French on the Rhine and in Italy. Now he not only had a menacing Swedish army close to his territories but the loss of the Polish troops, combined with growing unrest in Hungary, was seriously affecting Imperial campaigning in Italy, where Prince Eugene was short of men and supplies.¹¹⁴ So while the Dutch

¹¹⁴ Eugene's greatest setback in the Italian campaign had come at Cremona, where his advance had stalled in February 1702. Having successfully surprised the town while most of the defenders were asleep, and captured the commanding French general Villeroi, it had seemed impossible for the town not to fall. However a small force, made up mainly of Irish units held out and eventually forced an Imperial withdrawal. The events were widely reported, and reverberated for weeks, especially in diplomatic circles in the Hague, and 'so occupied the spirits it seemed to suffocate all else', 'News from the Hague 16 Feb. 1702', sent by Marshall Boufflers to de Torcy, 18 Feb. 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 98r). As more detailed news emerged talk of the affairs abounded for weeks. 'I was at all the assemblies of this town where all the talk is of this affair. I am not in the least surprised therefore that the action is judged incomprehensible by both military officers and politicians. Nobody can understand how a general (Prince Eugene) who surprised a town with troops more numerous than the garrison, who is master of the magazine and several of the gates, taken the commander and a great number of officers and soldiers, could be set to flight after 12 or 13 hours of combat. It seems not only extraordinary and unheard of but supernatural. I dare say Monsieur that never has an action of France surprised the enemies of France so much as that of Cremona which is regarded as a sort of miracle which in the view of all the world has saved the Milanese.', [anon] to Paris, 6 Mar. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 110r); General officers 'of all nations' in the Hague were amazed and confounded, as indeed were the Huguenots of the city. The formidableness of French arms was reasserted, the string of Imperial victories in Italy was halted and a pause for thought given amongst those states in Italy weighing up offers of alliance from the Emperor and France, [anon] to Paris, 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., Hollande vol. 198, f. 215r). Other repercussions were also evident. An English officer in the Hague assured the French informant that 'the bravery and the rewards to the Irish had made them a mortal danger, and it is said that if France continues these rewards and good treatment she will attract in England, Scotland and Ireland all the Catholics who are in a state to carry arms. These troops could drive the Prince of Wales into Ireland, and then into England.', [anon] to Paris, 6 Mar. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 110v). See Eoghan Ó' hAnnracháin, 'Irish involvement in the 'surprise' of Cremona (1702)', in Thomas O'Connor and Mary Ann Lyons (eds), *Irish communities in early modern Europe* (Dublin, 2006), pp 429-56. By mid March a naval supply line was rumoured to be in the offing with the strategy seeing ships from the city state of Ragusa, on the Dalmatian coast, land supplies for Eugene's men in the Gulf of Venice. A conjectured French response involved sending frigates into the Gulf of Venice to bombard and burn Ragusa. Striking a rival of Venice might also win some credit with the Republic and deny access to that territory to Eugene, [anon.] to Paris, 16 Mar. 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 114r). Eugene's concerns about French preparations in Italy met a slow response. The allied states feared that sending English or Dutch troops [at one stage five Huguenot regiments raised in England, under the command of the earl of Galway, Ruvigny, had been considered as auxiliaries for the Imperial forces in Italy, Boufflers to de Torcy, 13 Jan. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 42r)] to Italy would provoke the elector of Bavaria, who had his own interests

had peace of mind, their ally the Emperor was discommoded. The overall result for the military balance was that the Grand Alliance had lost the services of the Polish troops, potentially faced the loss of the Prussian contingents and saw the effectiveness of the Imperial armies much diminished.

Little wonder then that Hooke was moved to comment that ‘with such mistrust, there was no great expectation of success in the war.’¹¹⁵ He may have overstepped the mark here, and Stanhope may have had rather more acuity than Hooke had given him credit for previously, when he answered that ‘therefore it was necessary to make peace and then you can return to France’!¹¹⁶ Hooke confessed to being surprised by these words but attempted to excuse his comment and deflect any suspicion by arguing that ‘if I desired to go to England now when I saw that it was in confusion, all the more reason that I would stay there when the peace was made to end it. He seemed to be content at my response.’¹¹⁷ With Hooke unsettled a little, Stanhope asked him if the ‘court of France desired peace as much they showed the desire in the memoire that had been given; we believe that it is proof of the contrary. But even if there had not been so much pride as one saw in the composition of M. d’Avaux, one could still interpret it in a bad way.’¹¹⁸ Hooke made no response to this and Stanhope returned the conversation to the war asking if it was true that the French had no good general officers?¹¹⁹ Hooke

in Italy, to war on the French side, [anon] to Paris, 16 Mar. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 117r).

¹¹⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 250r).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., f. 250v.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., f. 251r.

asked ‘if they had better?’ and Stanhope admitted ‘no, the Emperor has two, that’s all.’¹²⁰

From this exchange we can see that, according to Hooke, John Churchill, then earl of Marlborough, had yet to establish his military reputation as a commander. Though remembered primarily as one of the best generals in the War of Spanish Succession, Marlborough’s initial involvement in the Netherlands was essentially diplomatic and political. Since he had been out of favour for much of the Nine Years War he had not seen a great deal of active service since his exploits at the taking of Cork and Kinsale in 1690.¹²¹ He did not arrive in the Netherlands with impeccable military credentials and for much of the 1702 campaign he remained as just one allied military commander among many. The Swedish ambassador in the Hague, Lillieroot referred to Marlborough mentioning Prince George for the post of generalissimo as late as mid April 1702, but was unsure if this was true; he was certain however that the Alliance ‘badly needed to find a good general to direct overall.’¹²²

Clearly Marlborough was not an obvious choice for the post. Even when it was agreed, almost by default, that Marlborough would act in this capacity¹²³ Dutch generals and politicians retained operational control over their forces and frequently disputed with Marlborough’s operational directives. With the aid of

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Marlborough’s action in taking Cork involved proposing a naval expedition to take the city on 17 August, the fleet leaving Portsmouth on 27 September, a landing at Passage West on 3 October, and the surrender of the city on the 11 October; a rapid and spectacular success. See J. G. Simms, *Jacobite Ireland 1685-91* (paperback edition, Dublin, 2000), pp 174-86. It is interesting to note the similarities between Marlborough’s undertaking and Hooke’s conception of various schemes for descents.

¹²² Lillieroot to de Quiros, 17 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 212v).

¹²³ Secretaries of the Spanish Netherlands delegation to Ambassador de Quiros, 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 218v) ‘allegations on good information that Marlborough had not pushed the issue of Prince George as overall commander with two much interest, because his the absolute command that he now had over the English troops.’

hindsight later historians and commentators deplored this obstructionism on the Dutch part, for getting in the great man's way. But, as is evident from this exchange, Marlborough had yet to stamp his authority in the military sphere and even his own fellow Englishmen did not yet rate him as an especially capable general.

Hooke summed up by saying he very much believed that Stanhope wanted peace, but that he wanted it 'because the Tories were on top and the war would not be conducted by his party.'¹²⁴ He added two items of news he had learned from the Danish ambassador: that the union between Denmark and England had not yet shown much fruit and that the 'voyage of Mr Methuen to Portugal where he has many friends promised many advantages.'¹²⁵ The news concerning Portugal was of great importance. Its coastline provided a number of ports for disembarking troops for an attack on Spain. Additionally control of these ports would permit great disruption and harassment of Spanish commerce with the Americas. If Portugal could be drawn into the Grand Alliance, the strategic possibilities for a successful campaign against France and Spain increased greatly. This kingdom, while officially allied to France was known to be wavering in its intentions. The Dutch had threatened to send a fleet to concentrate the king's mind but the English preferred a more subtle approach sending, as Hooke reported, John Methuen as emissary. Methuen had a longstanding involvement in Portugal, where he was familiar with internal politics and had a wide network of contacts.

¹²⁴ Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 251r).

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 251v. The dynastic link between England and Denmark in the form of the royal marriage between Queen Anne and Prince George was less close than that between England and Holland during the reigns of William and Mary. This may have had much to do with the personality (or lack of it) of Prince George. The Danish ambassador was distinctly unimpressed with this state of affairs, 'having seen nothing of the supposed close union.'

Eventually in 1703 he succeeded in pulling off a spectacular coup by persuading the Portuguese to reverse their treaty pact with France and join the Grand Alliance.

De Torcy received the first two of Hooke's reports (30 April and 6 May) on 17 May 1702. This hiatus between the dispatch and the reception of letters was to add to the pressure on Hooke. He was never quite sure whether his letters had been lost or intercepted.¹²⁶ As time elapsed without contact fear mounted over discovery and arrest. Equally, the agent without updated orders was in the dark about what he should do or say, unaware of whether he was doing more harm than good. The longer the situation went on the more pressure was felt. De Torcy replied to Hooke quickly, the next day, 18 May. However, such delays in communication usually resulted from the physical transit of letters from Paris to The Hague or vice versa. Obviously letters could not be written directly addressed to Nathaniel Hooke, French secret agent, care of Mr Stanhope, English ambassador! Nor indeed would false names necessarily be of much benefit. All mail coming from Paris to a rather notorious and very recently lapsed Jacobite would be suspect. Equally the sight of a former close adherent of James II posting large numbers of letters at frequent intervals could not but raise questions.

De Torcy endorsed Hooke's dealings with Stanhope, and added that 'it would be good to cultivate this acquaintance that you have renewed and he can render you service in affairs.' He commended Hooke for 'talking only to M.

¹²⁶ For an example of the how postal communication could be scrutinised see S. P. Oakley, 'The interception of posts in Celle, 1694-1700' in Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley, *William III and Louis XIV: essays by and for Marl A. Thompson* (Liverpool, 1968), pp 95-117.

Stanhope in general terms. It is up to you to deal with him in the manner you judge the best.¹²⁷

The Dutch also were painfully aware of ‘how the Whigs are at present treated, this not being the means to establish a close union between the two countries.’¹²⁸ De Torcy believed that ‘these two governments are not made to be together for too much longer, their interests are too opposed.’ Their opposition to what they saw as the power and aggrandisement of France was counterproductive to their own interests, only serving to ‘strengthen the bond between this crown [France] and that of Spain.’¹²⁹ He reiterated that France had no desire to ‘acquire the Spanish Low Countries by any means whatsoever.’ They simply wished to secure His Most Catholic Majesty [Philip V] and preserve his estates from invasion by his enemies. ‘If England and Holland are blinded to this by animosity to France, one could find nothing more suitable to the peace of Europe than to leave things as they are.’¹³⁰ These comments on political affairs served as general instructions from which Hooke could extrapolate. De Torcy ended his letter by strongly advising Hooke that ‘if you are permitted to return to England, I believe that it would be as well that you would make the voyage; you could still be very useful, and then return to Holland after a sojourn in England. You would be suspected even less than you are now.’¹³¹ It appears that de Torcy’s trust in his agent and his abilities was now confirmed.

However, as de Torcy was writing to Hooke on the 18 May, Hooke was also writing to de Torcy. He expressed his concern at not having received de

¹²⁷ De Torcy to Hooke, 18 May 1702, Marly (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 254r).

¹²⁸ Ibid., f. 254v.

¹²⁹ Ibid., f. 255r.

¹³⁰ Ibid., f. 254v.

¹³¹ Ibid., f. 255r.

Torcy's orders, 'all I have received is a letter from M. de Callières on the 1 May who was anxious to know if I had arrived.'¹³² It is worth remembering that by this stage Hooke had been in the Netherlands since 22 April. He had written four letters to de Torcy without reply. Indeed he would not receive his first letter until 30 May.¹³³ For over a month he was without instructions and lacked confirmation on questions that had arisen from his conversations. He had only risked writing the letter from The Hague because Cutts returned from England and this had given rise to both opportunities and problems: 'since his arrival I have been with him often having spent the greatest part of the night drinking alone with him.'¹³⁴ Not surprisingly Hooke said that because of this (he does not clarify whether the main problem was lack of time or the level of inebriation) he had had no opportunity to write a full account of what had passed between them, and 'besides I was watched very closely.'¹³⁵ As Cutts was leaving for the army that evening Hooke would travel to Amsterdam and 'send [de Torcy] details of all.'¹³⁶ What was obviously preoccupying him prompting him to write this shorter letter from The Hague was the fact that

I have been offered employment. My [Catholic] religion serves to excuse me from the service of England but the Pensionary [Heinsius] concerns himself, having been asked by M. Cutts, to find a place for me among the Allies. If I refuse after having used this pretext, I will be arrested. I am in a very awkward position. I ask you to do what you can to help me out of this situation and I ask you to do it soon, because after having seen M. Marlborough who is awaited since Saturday, it will be necessary for me to declare. I would already have left according to the liberty you have already given me if I had already seen him. But you have ordered me to see him and I will execute your orders to the peril of my life.¹³⁷

It can be seen from the tone of this letter that Hooke, in a difficult quandary, wanted to return to France as soon as an opening presented itself. He evidently

¹³² Hooke to de Torcy, 18 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198., f. 265r).

¹³³ Hooke to de Torcy, 31 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 299r).

¹³⁴ Hooke to de Torcy, 18 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 265r).

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., f. 265v.

hoped that establishing contact with Cutts and Marlborough would be enough to fulfil his assignment. He could then fabricate some excuse to return to France. It was this pretext that he was asking de Torcy to supply when he pleaded to be ‘helped out of the situation.’¹³⁸ Hooke’s letter, however, was not received by de Torcy in Paris until 28 May.

Lack of information from Paris placed a great weight of responsibility on Hooke’s shoulders. He had a great opportunity to prove his worth to the Foreign minister but also many chances to end his career in French service. The unfortunate Barré, the resident who delivered the ill fated memoire, experienced both sides of this flexible career path. Following his good fortune in earning promotion when Ambassador d’Avaux was recalled, he was just as swiftly returned to anonymity after the poor reception of the document. Whatever his level of involvement he may have had in the affair it was enough to tarnish his career permanently. As far as can be determined he never again held any diplomatic post of importance and even his first name has largely been excised from history.¹³⁹

Hooke reported on his time with Cutts from the safety of Amsterdam on Saturday 20 May 1702.¹⁴⁰ Hooke reported that he had spent the ‘most part of 5 days and 2 nights’ with Cutts since he had returned to The Hague.¹⁴¹ While in

¹³⁸ Ibid., f. 265r.

¹³⁹ He is invariably referred to simply as M. Barré, see Hooke to de Torcy, 6 May 1702, Delft (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 251r). Secondary literature such as Van den Haute, *Les relations Anglo-Hollandaises*, pp 98, 101, also give only the surname as does Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Groß, *Repertory of the diplomatic representatives of all countries since the peace of Westphalia (1648)*, (2 vols, Berlin, 1936), i, 226. Barré is not mentioned in Lucien Bely’s *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps des Louis XIV* (Paris, 1990).

¹⁴⁰ Hooke wrote an addition to the report on Monday 22 and then a postscript to latter letter on the same day. All of this material was sent to Paris later on 22 May and was received in Paris on 30 May.

¹⁴¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 22 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 282r).

England Cutts had been confirmed in all his posts by Queen Anne and had been told that he would soon be promoted to Lieutenant General. Cutts then showed Hooke a Commission that gave him powers of life and death over all the troops of England.

Hooke commented to Cutts, that he was surprised at Cutts zeal for the Old Church [Anglicanism]. Cutts replied that he claimed the ardour of the convert, which reads very much like a barbed comment on Hooke's own, more rather radical, journey from dissenting Protestant to Roman Catholic. On a rather more serious note Cutts went on to say that his change in religious views was motivated at least in part by the rise of the [staunch Anglican] earl of Marlborough in recent years. This had come about when Marlborough, seeing the health of the king [William III] weakening, had sought to prevail on his close friendship with the Princess of Denmark to gain control over the troops.

Their friendship had increasingly alienated the King of England, to such an extent that he had come to believe that he [Marlborough] had a design to raise the army in support of the Princess of Denmark: to ward this off the king had sent last year, Milord Marlborough to Holland to make himself familiar with the state of affairs there as the king felt his death approaching.¹⁴²

Hooke expressed astonishment at this, having 'being informed that the king of England had a design to exclude the Princess of Denmark?'¹⁴³ Cutts confirmed that this was true, that there had been 'such a design in which the king of England had been involved but he had let it go.'¹⁴⁴ Hooke then availed of the

¹⁴² Ibid., f. 282v.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. William had, in fact, invited the electoral prince George August to visit England in autumn 1701. This had been forestalled by Princess Anne pretending to be pregnant. Her worry, fanned by the Tories, was that the visit portended a move by William to supplant her with George in the succession. William Legge, second lord Dartmouth, himself a Tory, claimed that two Whig grandees, the dukes of Bolton and Newcastle 'had proposed such a plan to him, "and used the strongest argument to induce me to come into it, which was, that it would be making lord Marlborough king, at least for her time, if the Princess succeeded; and that I had reason to expect nothing but ill usage during such a reign. Lord Marlborough asked me afterwards in the House of

opportunity presented by the mention of King William to draw the conversation around to the changes affected by the king's death. Edging closer to the main task of his mission, he asked Cutts was the war still necessary? Cutts answered yes, explaining that

France is too powerful. And it falls to the honour of England to hold the balance of Europe, that they ask nothing for themselves: but certain things had to be, a barrier for Holland as this republic serves as a barrier for England.¹⁴⁵

The increasing power of England is evident from Cutts' remark, as it the fact that France was recognised as its most powerful competitor. Hooke was not persuaded of the altruistic nature of the English actions. He wondered why, if they wanted nothing other than security for the Netherlands and themselves, did they risk everything to have something they could have 'without ever drawing the sword?'¹⁴⁶ Marshalling his knowledge of the European situation, Hooke pointed out the difficulties in winning such a war. He referred to

the discontent of the elector of Brandenburg, the mutual mistrust between England and Holland, the confusion inside the Republic, the torpor of the English, the superiority of France in the Milanese, the poor success of the siege of Keyzerswert, the impossibility of conquering Flanders and the experience which we have had of leagues of several Princes, good for defence, [but] having never succeeded in making conquests. I asked him to reflect on the latter, in which being masters of the Spanish Low Countries, France only have to conserve it, that the links have been weakened by death of the king of England, so that there was no longer an agent accepted by all the Allies to rule their movement.¹⁴⁷

Lords, if I had ever heard of such a design; I told him yes, but did not think it very likely. He said it was very true; but by God, if they ever attempted it, we would walk over their bellies.”, Edward Gregg, *Queen Anne* (2nd ed., New Haven and London, 2001), p. 123; Winston S. Churchill, *Marlborough: his life and times* (Chicago University Press edition, Chicago, 2002), book I, p. 482. Reports of such a design circulated widely in England. A book by a Dr James Drake, *History of the last parliament* (London, 1702) cited William's aides as complicit in just such a design. Whatever the truth of the matter, in any event an element of distrust certainly remained in Anne's mind, and her advisors: 'she has judged it wise to retain the troops in England, for her safety, which were to pass to Holland, disembarking those already embarked.', Boufflers to de Torcy, 27 Mar. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 140v). Since every English head of state following the accession of Charles I in 1625 came to power with opposition dedicated to their undoing, it was an understandable response.

¹⁴⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 22 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 282v).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 283r.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 284r.

Cutts however argued that in the last war France had been attacked where it had been strongest. This time though ‘it would be taken underneath the cuirass, with a major descent.’¹⁴⁸ The English fleet alone had 115 vessels of which 50 were the largest afloat. Excellent preparations had been made and the landing site could be in France, Spain or Italy. Hooke countered by pointing out the difficulties of landing on the well guarded coast of France and the inability of the sterile countryside of Spain to maintain an army, combined with the tiny amount of support for the coalition there.¹⁴⁹ Cutts hinted darkly that there might be intelligence in regard to Spain of which Hooke was unaware. He then questioned France’s ability to wage war since its resources were stretched, that it was ‘well known that they lacked money, that they [the English] had sent soldiers into Flanders, who had mixed with those of France, and they had reported back that there was the most severe misery everywhere in France such was the level of taxes.’¹⁵⁰

Hooke did his best to defend the condition of his newly adopted country. He pointed out that France had at that time been engaged in the reform of its tax system and the situation was much improved. However in his report Hooke admitted he had ‘added two or three little lies on the quantity of money reformed.’¹⁵¹ Cutts accepted Hooke’s contention and took the opportunity to make

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. f. 285r. The usefulness of having foreigners in military or diplomatic service is evident again here. Soldiers from Huguenot regiments in English service could blend relatively easily with French troops.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. Despite Hooke’s attempt to diminish the seriousness of the French financial position Cutts information was accurate. Both Louis XIV’s minister for war and finance, Michel Chamillart, and his unofficial chief of staff, the marquis de Chamlay were far from confident in regard to French ability to wage war for precisely the reasons Cutts had outlined. ‘There was a large deficit in 1699; the imminence of war and the consequent expenditure made it much larger. According to a rough calculation, expenditure on the forces rose from 55 million *livres* in 1700 to 104 million in 1701.’

his own point that the funding of the English army had also been reformed. This would mean that the war would be different to previous conflicts. The Act of Parliament establishing the Commission of Accounts meant that their

troops would be paid their subsistence in the future every fifteen days [...] and their entire pay every two months on pain of the life of the Commissioners [...] They had cut the root of abuses that had been committed then [in the last war], therefore this would leave England in a position to make war for the following twenty years without being discommoded.¹⁵²

This was instructive information regarding English attitudes and preparations for the war. Again it underlined the importance of economic and financial practice in relation to war. Unfortunately it cannot have made cheerful reading for de Torcy, who was to learn that the English second in command believed that they were in a position to fund a long struggle, potentially even longer than the last war. However, as this chimed with what Hooke himself had already opined it seemed all the more important to determine if there was any way to halt the escalation of the conflict even at that late stage.

Hooke suggested that the main obstacle to peace was ‘that the gentlemen of England are extremely irritated by the fact that the king wanted to nominate a king for them.’¹⁵³ He said that this had done the most to unite all the ‘factions’.¹⁵⁴ Hooke had attempted to explain Louis XIV’s actions to Cutts by saying that ‘the king was in no way intending to put him on the throne by force; and it was not in

Mark A. Thomson, ‘Louis XIV and the origins of the War of Spanish Succession’, in Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds), *William III and Louis XIV: essays 1680-1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson* (Liverpool, 1968), p. 151.

¹⁵² Hooke to de Torcy, 22 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 285v).

¹⁵³ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 270r). The phrase ‘gentlemen of England’ was used at this time to refer to Tories on occasion, see Ivor F. Burton, *The captain general: the career of John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, from 1702-11* (London, 1968), p. 23.

¹⁵⁴ When William had sought the augmentation of military forces in February, specifically the creation of 10,000 marines, the Tories (wary at the William’s the ejection of numerous Tories and the remodelling of a Whig ministry) had obstructed the measure, ‘It was not appropriate to put such a force in the hands of the king of England without the absolute necessity of the sort not yet reached.’, ‘News from the Hague 16 Feb. 1702’, sent to de Torcy by Marshall Boufflers, 18 Feb. 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 97v).

his interest to do this since this would be an absolute return.’¹⁵⁵ Hooke appears to be suggesting here that if James III was restored by force, he could roll back the parliamentary limitations on the crown’s prerogatives. Such an ‘absolute’ monarch in England might well prove just as detrimental, if not more so, to French interests. On a positive note Hooke suggested that the Anglo-Dutch relationship might be souring. Cutts had declared that

if the Dutch take umbrage at the English presence they have just to send them back. One would not doubt that parliament will not give another 20,000, even if they are needed. The English in the last reign had obtained security for their liberty and they do not want to lose it.¹⁵⁶

The English had no intention of sacrificing themselves for a seemingly ungrateful ally. To further upset relations Cutts told Hooke that the Dutch had also ‘seen fit to refuse Prince George as their general since they had their eye on the elector of Bavaria, notwithstanding his religion, believing to win him over eventually.’¹⁵⁷ Ironically the elector Maximilian Emanuel was at this stage already secretly allied to France.¹⁵⁸

Cutts requested Hooke not to talk to anyone of what had passed between them, continuing that ‘sooner or later it would be necessary to come to a treaty

¹⁵⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 270r).

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 270v. Fears had been expressed in the Netherlands at the presence of so many English troops, especially since they were grouped in one body and retained their own command structure. ‘News from the Hague’ 6 Apr. 1702, sent to Paris by Boufflers 7 Apr. 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 189v) By early May the presence of English soldiers at Rosendaal was causing even more trouble, [anon] to Paris, 5 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 247r). This was the background to the commission Cutts showed Hooke granting him the power of life and death over all English troops, Hooke to de Torcy, 22 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 282r).

¹⁵⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 270v).

¹⁵⁸ Maximilian Emanuel had been in alliance with France since March 1701. His agreement with France stipulated an outward show of neutrality until a suitable juncture arrived to unmask the deception. However, by January 1702 the movement of Bavarian troops to the Bohemian border was already being interpreted as presenting a diversion within the empire so serious as to affect the war in Italy, [anon] to Paris, 30 Jan. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 76v). By late February the emissaries of the Emperor were ‘desperate [...] and feared that the other Princes of the Empire will join with the electors of Bavaria and Cologne.’, [anon] to Paris, 20 Feb. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 99v).

and that then one could profit from [your] views, but for the present spirits are too overheated, that those who talk of peace are received as if they spoke of flooding Holland.¹⁵⁹ Cutts provided Hooke with valuable clarification on the state of affairs in Holland, explaining that the death of William had had a strange dual affect: on one hand it had confounded affairs, but on the other it had animated the Republicans to war. Even the city of Amsterdam, which had never been close to the king or supportive of his enterprises, was now as zealous as the others for war.¹⁶⁰

Hooke confirmed these facts, saying that he had spoken with the pensionary of Amsterdam, Willem Buys.¹⁶¹ He had been received warmly. ‘Believing it would please me, he presented me to all who came to see him, all of whom spoke freely in front of me.’¹⁶² Hooke was informed that the Imperial ambassador, Peter de Goes, had him under observation. This went beyond discreet surveillance and took more invasive and intimidating forms, as ‘one came to my house to inform himself if I spent a lot of time writing.’¹⁶³ The exact nature of what happened next is unclear but Hooke says that the Imperial agent ‘had to leave to regain his confidence.’¹⁶⁴ Thereafter Hooke judged it best to leave before his credibility was further eroded. Before his departure the pensionary told him that there were a lot of people there to sow division and that it was necessary that

¹⁵⁹ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 271r).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ It is likely that Hooke met Willem Buys during his period in exile in the 1680s. Edward Gregg says that Buys was the ‘reputed leader of the peace party in the Republic’, Gregg, *Queen Anne*, p. 217, although this is disputed, see Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs*, pp 464, 526. He was employed on a number of diplomatic endeavours by the states general in relation to peace negotiations. He attended the Gertruidenberg negotiations in 1710 as one of two Dutch representatives and was the Dutch envoy in England in 1712 to discuss the forthcoming Utrecht peace conference. On his return to Holland he was one of the Dutch representatives at the conference.

¹⁶² Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 271r).

¹⁶³ Ibid., f. 271v.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Hooke become attached in some form to the allied cause. This unpleasant, not to say alarming, experience in Amsterdam reinforced Hooke's awareness that his position was increasingly precarious.

On 14 May Hooke was invited to supper by Cutts where the two of them again talked alone. And again the main topic subject was the war. Hooke attempted to plant seeds of doubt in Cutts mind over the attachment of the Emperor to the alliance. Might he not be detached from the league? Cutts argued that the measures to create the alliance were so strong 'that the Emperor could not quit them.'¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless Hooke observed that Cutts was indeed worried over the possibility because he raised the topic several times later. Cutts also seemed concerned over the effects of a long war, saying that the Dutch feared being ruined in that case and that everybody would be in the same boat. This unsavoury prospect brought him back to the issue of peace. He said that 'it will be necessary to talk one day, and we would see what there was to be gained then.'¹⁶⁶ Moving onto more delicate matters Cutts enquired what it was that Hooke had mentioned about the king's [Louis XIV] generosity. Hooke said that he could write to a friend 'who would be in a better position to put this more precisely.'¹⁶⁷

This attempt by Hooke to draw Cutts into dialogue held out the promise of monetary reward in return for his assistance in ending the war. In effect, a bribe was being offered to the heavily indebted Cutts to act in the French interest. Cutts said it was not yet time and made Hooke promise not to discuss the matter with anyone else without his permission. The conversation between the two men went

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

on until ‘three after midnight and we returned to the same things several times.’¹⁶⁸ Cutts suggested to Hooke that he talk to the Grand Pensionary, which Hooke interpreted as a gambit to ‘sound out if I had the propensity to open myself as much to others as besides him. I excused myself on the grounds that if he could do something, I was of the opinion that he and I should have all the honour and the profit.’¹⁶⁹

Later Cutts asked Hooke how a man who professed to be unbending in his engagements could advise him to take the money of the king?¹⁷⁰ Hooke answered nimbly ‘it was not the king of France, enemy, but the king of France, friend of England’ with whom he would be dealing in order to procure peace, which all the ministers of Europe proclaimed they wanted.¹⁷¹ Hooke then followed up by asking Cutts if ‘in this case would he be so delicate as to refuse this present of so great a king, who esteems your merit?’¹⁷² Cutts, no less wily than Hooke, ‘smiled and didn’t answer.’¹⁷³ Another evening after he had had time to think about the situation the verbal sparring resumed with Cutts proposing again that Hooke see the Grand Pensionary, put himself under his protection and speak to him, only very generally, about the factions that hindered the alliance. This may have been an attempt to inveigle Hooke into becoming a double agent.

In more general news from The Hague, Hooke reported that, having formally declared war on France on 15 May, the Grand Alliance of England and The Netherlands were seeking allies. However the Dutch General Slangenberg

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., f. 273r.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

had told him that the Grand Alliance no longer had any hope of bringing the king of Sweden to their side. The hostile relations between Prussia and Sweden had ended such hopes. The situation in Poland was increasingly unsettled. Charles XII was only seven leagues from Warsaw and already planning a diet ‘à cheval’ to install a new king in place of Augustus II who, he claimed, was planning to subjugate the republic.¹⁷⁴ Reports suggested Charles would continue his campaign by crossing through Prussian territory to attack Augustus’s other territory of Saxony. Cutts had informed Hooke that there was great jealousy between the Emperor and the king of Sweden. These two pieces of information together suggested that a major conflict in the east was very much a possibility, thereby diverting attention and resources within the empire from the war in the west. As examined in chapter eight, it would be Hooke’s task to try to exploit such possibilities later in the war.

Hooke had again spoken to the Danish envoy, von Stöken whom he visited often. Von Stöken was a useful contact for Hooke because he was willing to promote pro-French arguments in diplomatic circles. He was sure that the States General would never make peace until they had an assured barrier. Von Stöken had endeavoured to persuade them that the King of France ‘had no design

¹⁷⁴ The Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania was a paradox: a republic and a monarchy headed by an elected sovereign. At Charles’ behest Augustus was dethroned and replaced by Stanisław Leszczyński in July 1704, see Robert Frost, *The great northern wars 155-1721* (Harlow, 2000), p. 230; Norman Davies, *God’s playground: a history of Poland* (2 vols, revised edition, Oxford, 2005), i, 374-75. The election of Polish kings was a truly unique procedure. Every member of the nobility, the *szlachta*, was eligible to vote for the new monarch. They assembled at Wola, outside Warsaw, on horseback grouped by district outside an enclosure. Here the candidates, Polish or foreign nobility, made their case before the electors and discussion ensued on the merits of each before a new sovereign was chosen. Not surprisingly this could be quite a violent occasion and gave rise to disputing claimants in 1576, 1587, 1697 and 1733, see Davies, *God’s playground*, pp 253-56 and Adam Zamoyski, *The Polish way: a thousand year history of the Poles and their culture* (New York, 1987), p. 94. Undoubtedly the method was more representative than any other in Europe but the system (or rather the abuse of the system) opened the way to a high degree of interference from outside interests and the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

whatsoever to seize the Low Countries but that it was impossible to dissipate their fears.¹⁷⁵ Hooke reported that von Stöken had also argued the good intentions of the French when talking with the Pensionary.¹⁷⁶ Considering that von Stöken was the representative of another member of the Grand Alliance, Hooke's efforts to persuade him of France's desire for peace had made a successful impression.

Von Stöken had debated with Heinsius the danger in giving the 'Low Countries' to the Emperor, with the Pensionary arguing that if the 'Emperor gave us reason for umbrage, we would then put ourselves on the side of France.'¹⁷⁷ Hooke added at this point that Cutts had heard the same thing from the other ministers. Hooke had asked would this not mean that the Dutch would 'still expose themselves to the inconveniences of frequent wars, of which they were already complaining?'¹⁷⁸ No, came the reply, 'there will be peace at least until the Emperor is safely confirmed in possession and he will need several years for that.'¹⁷⁹

After the Allies' official declaration of war on 15 May 1702, the French drew up a carefully crafted response. It drew on a wide range of sources, including information and analysis relayed from The Netherlands by Hooke and a number of anonymous Dutch informants. Over twelve pages, it challenged any aggressive intent on Louis XIV's part, categorically denied accusations of intent to unite the two crowns, invade the United Provinces or 'any other projects

¹⁷⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 274v).

¹⁷⁶ The grand pensionary, Anthonie Heinsius.

¹⁷⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 May 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 274v).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., f. 275r.

envisioned for the creation of a universal monarchy.’¹⁸⁰ It charged the allies with bad faith, of having concerted a plan to dismember the Spanish monarchy and share out its territory and trade. The reality of the situation had been neatly inverted and the blame for the conflict placed on France. The actions and accusations emanating from United Provinces were the work of a small clique of King William’s old partisans, desperately attempting to shore up their own power by evoking ‘the memory of the war of 1672.’¹⁸¹

The French document went on to say that while the conduct of Louis XIV and France over the last thirty years had been criticised, nothing had been mentioned, however, about the poor conduct of those who then governed the Republic, nothing said about ‘the cascade of injurious libels and insolent medals that were allowed to be issued before the 1672 war.’¹⁸² It was contended instead, that the most dishonourable action had been carried out by that same group who ‘gave without precedent, a resolution to their Stadholder in 1688 to use their troops and vessels to usurp during a time of peace a king [James II] who had never given them any offence.’¹⁸³ The same group of people, still in power, were now trying to do the same thing to the king of Spain, ignoring international law and the wishes of the Spanish people, and indeed the desires of the ‘good citizens’ of the United Provinces. ‘The authors of these violent counsels will have to give an account of the violent tragedies that they will draw down on their patrie.’¹⁸⁴ The ‘course of events would make the truth evident to their people’, but

¹⁸⁰ ‘On the manifesto published 15 May 1702 in the name of the States General’, 22 May 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 276v).

¹⁸¹ Ibid., f. 278v.

¹⁸² See Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, p. 109.

¹⁸³ ‘On the manifesto published 15 May 1702 in the name of the States General’, 22 May 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 278v).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

meanwhile the only response left to France, which had consciously refrained from making the most of its military advantage over many months, against those who ‘knew nothing of the language of rights and justice’ was now armed force.¹⁸⁵ Hopes of preventing all out war by normal diplomatic means were now much reduced. In the wider perspective intelligence on the Allies military and diplomatic strategy would now be extremely useful to de Torcy, and Hooke was well placed to meet this need.

Hooke’s next letter to de Torcy reflected this situation. He stated that he had had two or three long conversations with Stanhope and milord Barnard, another English politician in The Hague.¹⁸⁶ As a result he had acquired information on Allied military deployments and troop numbers. The English were complaining that the Dutch troop figure of 140,000 men existed only on paper, the reality being closer to 40,000. The Dutch in turn asked where the promised 40,000 English troops were and when exactly the English fleet would be ready to sail.¹⁸⁷ News of such delays would have heartened the French commanders, though this would be offset by concern at the destination of the fleet being equipped.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 281r. There may have been a number of wry smiles on the faces of those who recalled Louis’s own attitude to the language of rights and justice in the earlier part of his reign. Even in control of superior resources Louis was as much at the mercy of contingency and accident as following a detailed expansionist blueprint. Perception and reception were crucial factors determining how Louis’s actions would be seen from the outside world. This often differed markedly from the actual intention, see David Sturdy, *Louis XIV* (Basingstoke, 1998), p. 94; Jeremy Black, *From Louis XIV to Napoleon: the fate of a great power* (London, 1999), pp 33-69; Geoffrey Treasure, *Louis XIV* (Harlow, 2001), pp 255-68; John A. Lynn, *The wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714* (Harlow, 1999), pp 266-270; Ragnhild Hatton, ‘Louis XIV and his fellow monarchs’, in Ragnhild Hatton (ed.), *Louis XIV and Europe* (1976, Basingstoke), pp 16-59; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The ancien régime: a history of France 1610-1774* (Oxford, 1996), pp 228-237.

¹⁸⁶ Christopher Vane (1653-1723), first Lord Barnard of Raby Castle. Grandson of Henry Vane senior and seventh and youngest son of Henry Vane junior, executed for high treason after the restoration. Despite this family background, and his own Whig leanings while an MP for Durham, 1675-79, a consistent Tory in the upper house until 1706 when he defected and left his proxy with a Whig, see Geoffrey Holmes, *British politics in the age of Anne* (London, 1967), p. 46; George Edward Cokayne & Vicary Gibbs (eds), *The complete peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the United Kingdom, extant, extinct or dormant* (reprint, 6 vols, Gloucester, 1987), i, 425.

¹⁸⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 28 May 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, ff 294r, 294v).

Hooke also had intelligence bearing directly on the strategic threat facing France and Spain. Stanhope, envoy to Spain for ten years, believed that Cadiz would be the port of disembarkation, and that, although the expedition would have only 14,000 men, the city could be taken and held. Barnard disagreed with both statements. Both concurred that it was too late for an entry into the Mediterranean. Hooke judged the two men mistrustful of the course of the war, especially the commitment of the Emperor whose ‘finances were exhausted and could not supply the money necessary to continue the war.’¹⁸⁸

On the other hand, Barnard ‘confessed that the Emperor will be too strong if he gets Flanders while he was the master of Italy.’¹⁸⁹ Added to this disunity in the alliance Hooke reported that divisions in England were greater than ever and that the ‘jealousy between her [England] and Holland increases so strongly that if France had not recognised the Prince of Wales, these two nations would not be hand in hand at this moment.’ Such was the lack of accord between the two allies that ‘the Dutch have no desire to have a general from England, nor have their ships as part of a convoy where England has more warships than they.’¹⁹⁰

Moreover it seemed that the political situation in Holland itself might also be about to be upset. ‘The *petit peuple* here begin to ask already for the prince de Frise as Stadholder. It seems that they may force the States General to that end.’¹⁹¹ These welcome divisions within the coalition facing France suggested that despite the declarations, the war would be short. Hooke even reported that the ‘two gentlemen believe that the new Parliament will opt for peace.’ Again Barnard

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., f. 294v.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., f. 295r.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., f. 295v.

reiterated that ‘if there had not been the article on the Prince of Wales, it would have been very difficult to find a pretext for war.’¹⁹² Hooke’s opinion was that Barnard was much inclined for James III.

Stanhope sent to see Hooke again on 2 June 1702. An element of clandestine intrigue marked the encounter, for Stanhope intercepted Hooke at the door saying that ‘he was about to leave so that he would be able to talk to me without disruption.’¹⁹³ As soon as they were out of earshot he gave Hooke several compliments on the fact that ‘he had always found him to be a good Englishman.’¹⁹⁴ It soon became evident that Stanhope was in an agitated mood, with something on his mind that he wished to discuss. He began broaching the matter by asking Hooke if he ‘did not wish to contribute to rendering service to my country’, requesting Hooke to look on him not as ‘a minister but as a man of honour and my friend, and that he spoke to me with an open heart.’¹⁹⁵ He went on to state that

the affairs of England had taken a bad course, and those abroad were not much better; that besides the old factions in England, he had been informed of two pieces of news concerning the earls of Rochester and Marlborough who are come to a great rupture and so open that the friends of the one are the declared enemies of the other, that the party of the first are more united but those of the last more numerous and rich, though less closely linked. That they are at the moment in a power struggle for the post of treasurer, that Rochester asks for it for himself and Marlborough for milord Godolphin.¹⁹⁶

The importance of these developments were explained by the fact that ‘whoever had the Treasurer’s post could do all that they wished with the Princess of Denmark, who is carried away by her ministers.’¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 & 4 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 14r).

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., f. 14v.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

Stanhope's disquiet stemmed from the fact that in terms of English party conflict his political interest lay with the Whigs. Hooke described him as a 'complete Whig.'¹⁹⁸ The 'rage of party' within England had in no way diminished with Anne's accession. Tories of any description would be hard for Stanhope to stomach but the 'High' Tory Rochester¹⁹⁹ was more odious still. Rochester was known for his uncompromising support for the Anglican Church, a strong monarchy and an independent foreign policy, rather than a restrictive alliance with the Dutch; he was in effect diametrically opposed to the outlook and interests of even moderate Whigs. To those of Stanhope's hardline persuasion he was anathema. Moreover Rochester as the uncle of Queen Anne was, potentially, very powerful indeed, if he could wield influence over his niece. The tussle with Marlborough and Godolphin over the Treasury was therefore imbued with more than political significance. Politically, the post was the most powerful office in the administration. Personally, and ultimately more significantly for a queen who was seen as little more than a malleable cipher by many observers,²⁰⁰ the choice of lord treasurer pitted Queen Anne's family, in the shape of Rochester, against her

¹⁹⁸ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 Jul. 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 52r).

¹⁹⁹ Laurence Hyde (1641-1711), first earl of Rochester (second creation) 1682. Son of Edward Hyde (1608-74), first earl of Clarendon, brother of Henry Hyde (1638-1709), second earl of Clarendon, sister of Anne Hyde (1637-71), duchess of York and first wife of James II and uncle to Anne and Mary Stuart. Rochester enjoyed the favour of James II, becoming lord treasurer early in his reign. He conspicuously failed to support Anne in her request for more funds from the king to offset her debts in 1685, refusing even to petition the king on her behalf. Anne enlisted Sidney Godolphin to plead her case and he successfully a grant of £16,000 from James II. This episode was long remembered by Anne who made it clear that 'he possessed no influence with her.', Gregg, *Queen Anne*, p. 39. A skilled political survivor Rochester remained influential during the reign of William and Mary. He further alienated Anne because of his lack of support during these years when she and her husband, Prince George of Denmark, were at odds with William and Mary. When Godolphin was appointed lord treasurer, Rochester was compensated with the post of lord lieutenant of Ireland. Refusing to travel to Ireland to take up the post and continuing to display his pique at being passed over Rochester behaved with ill concealed disaffection. 'Heartily weary of Rochester's presumption and insolence' Anne dismissed him from office on 3 February 1703 and he moved into open opposition, see Gregg, *Queen Anne*, pp 39, 90-91, 156-58, 168,

²⁰⁰ Historiographical portrayals of Anne reflected this contemporary perception for many years. Edward Gregg's *Queen Anne* (New Haven and London, 1980) presented a far more self possessed figure who within her inner councils governed very much in her own right.

closest and most valued friends and advisor, Sarah Churchill, and her husband John.

Confrontation had been brewing for many years. Marlborough and Rochester shared a warm and reciprocal antipathy stretching back to the 1690s. The ultimate victor in the contest would be well positioned to shape ministries and distribute power, place and patronage to friends and political allies. Conversely, those on the losing side could expect banishment from the corridors of power and wealth. The struggle for influence was also seriously disrupting England's ability to wage war. This was the background animating Stanhope's *tête-à-tête* with Hooke. If events turned out the wrong way his future was less than assured and it might be politic to have well placed friends at another court.

Stanhope commented on the state of affairs in England revealing his fears that 'the Old Church is joined almost completely to Rochester, but that party is so hated by the people that if the Court favours it, the queen will never find a Parliament at her devotion.'²⁰¹ Stanhope stated pessimistically that even if Marlborough and Godolphin vanquished Rochester, they 'were subdivided by so many different interests that only confusion was envisaged. This was not the way to finish the war.'²⁰² This factionalism was already news at the court of Vienna, where many were already dissatisfied at reports that the fleet would be sent to Iberia rather than Italy.²⁰³ To add further to the alliance's woes internal rivalries in

²⁰¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 & 4 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 14v).

²⁰² *Ibid.*, f. 15r.

²⁰³ Party rivalry in England extended into military and commercial affairs. The Whigs, much more supportive of war, favoured a military strategy that was designed to reinforce and support the Dutch allies in the Netherlands, attacking France on her northern borders. Marlborough, nominally Tory, became the chief advocate and implementer of these plans. Tories generally believed this policy only benefited the Dutch to the exclusion of English interests, and attacked the French at its strongest point. They much preferred a campaign based on attacks on Spain and her colonies, and

Vienna meant that the ‘Emperor’s council was jealous of Prince Eugene as before they were jealous of the duke of Lorraine.’²⁰⁴ Citing the greater need of the Emperor’s son Joseph, king of the Romans, for supplies along the Rhine, Eugene’s army was not receiving the necessary aide. Even more seriously the ‘finances of the Emperor were exhausted.’²⁰⁵ There were also divisions in Holland, and between England and Holland because ‘all of the [English] nation resented the affront made to the Prince of Denmark.’²⁰⁶ Stanhope then commented on the English Succession, saying

the business of the succession was not so well settled as was thought, notwithstanding the measures taken for the duke of Hanover; that the king of England [James III] would always have a party of support there and that if he was not of the Catholic religion it would be very easy to predict that he would succeed the princess of Denmark.²⁰⁷

He asked several questions on the character of the prince, and then asked Hooke ‘did [he] believe that France would consent to let him go to England to be raised there as successor?’²⁰⁸

This statement might have been expected from the more radical of Jacobite-inclined Tories, but it was utterly strange in the mouth of a dyed in the wool Whig such as Stanhope. Hooke was unsure of Stanhope’s sincerity. The ambassador’s pessimism on the prospects for the alliance and the war seemed to be consistent but Hooke was still wary of endangering his links with Cutts.

a quick end to the war. Commands went to reliable Tory officers, the duke of Ormonde and admiral Rooke for the attack on Cadiz in 1702.

²⁰⁴ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 & 4 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 15r).

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid. Marlborough was concerned that his failure to secure the post of Captain General for Prince George would be used by Rochester to regain favour with the Queen. Rumours were already circulating ‘on good information that Marlborough had not pushed the issue of Prince George as overall commander with two much interest, because of the absolute command that he now had over the English troops.’ See Secretary of the Spanish Netherlands delegation to Ambassador de Quiros, 18 Apr. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 218v).

²⁰⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 & 4 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 15v).

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

I was sure of the friendship of M. Cutts and as he had asked me often to talk in only the most general terms to Stanhope, I did not judge it appropriate to lose his friendship in talking openly to this one who had only to betray me to cloud my relations with the other.²⁰⁹

Audaciously Hooke had told Stanhope that he was not well versed in the intentions of France but that he knew a number of people who ‘would be willing to discourse on it.’²¹⁰ Stanhope asked him to inform himself quickly. Hooke, not wanting to make a direct refusal, alluded to the difficulty of writing to France without being placed in danger and that ‘moreover secrecy was not the virtue of the court of King James.’²¹¹ Stanhope said he ‘had talked not of that court [St Germain] but of Versailles.’²¹² Hooke had evaded making a direct response.

The conversation turned to the war and the reasons for its outbreak. Hooke pointed out that the refusal to receive an ambassador from France at the English court the previous year had irritated the French. Stanhope gave a revealing reply, saying

that was nothing. We vacillated. We did not want peace last year. We made exorbitant propositions on purpose to prevent it: you know this affair passed through my hands, that was our design. But the king is dead and the situation is different. We would be content with less.²¹³

Hooke had reason to be wary of Stanhope but if he was giving a truthful analysis of the changed thinking in England then this could be valuable information for de Torcy. Hooke queried him about his earlier stance on peace as Stanhope had previously said that without a barrier there was nothing that could be done. Evidently Hooke suspected a ploy. Unequivocally he told Stanhope that Louis

XIV

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid., f. 16r.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid., f. 16v.

would not irritate the Spaniards by offering to dismember their monarchy after having given them the hope of conserving it entirely: if the king were to give you even one of those towns that would serve to create for you many partisans in Spain.²¹⁴

Striking back, Stanhope enquired whether the French monarch really feared this situation. If the two crowns were indeed to be separate powers in the future, he asked would not Louis XIV have an interest in weakening a country on France's northern border before handing back full control to the Spaniards?²¹⁵

Stanhope's views well represented the deep mistrust that existed in regard to the motives of Louis XIV. He continued 'we [Hooke and Stanhope] must prevent it. You could employ yourself to obtain something for England; there are those who are ready to listen.'²¹⁶ Hooke hoped that he would elaborate further with detailed proposals but Stanhope responded by saying 'England would not dare make propositions, but that the well intentioned are disposed to turn to good account those that they find; especially if France strikes a decisive blow in the Low Countries, as it seems to be preparing there.'²¹⁷ Hooke again said that he was not in a position to do anything for the reasons he had already outlined. Stanhope ended the exchange by recommending Hooke to 'think upon it! When the letters come from England we'll be better informed.'²¹⁸

This last comment points to a possible line of reasoning behind Stanhope's personal *démarche*. Elections for the new parliament in England had clouded the political situation there. If the Tories, led by the uncompromising Rochester, turned out to be dominant in the next session as well as in the ministry, Stanhope and his Whig friends would see their influence eroded. In 1700 the Tories,

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., f. 17r.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

smarting from their exclusion from office for many years, had eagerly grasped the opportunity to seek revenge by impeaching four Whig grandees for treason. The possible resurrection of such charges and a more general witch hunt caused agitation in Whig political circles. In such a situation the prospect of peace with France could well be more attractive than a long drawn out war directed by the Tories.²¹⁹ The Whigs had retained their hold on power under William largely because they were viewed as more reliable supporters during just such a war situation. If the Tories could use the same expedient to maintain themselves in power under Anne then the medium and even long term prospects of the Whigs looked bleak. On the other hand this had to be balanced against the fact that Stanhope's conversation might be nothing more than a ruse to draw Hooke out into the open, reveal his French connections and unmask him as an enemy agent. It fell to Hooke to consider which of these might be closest to the truth. He admitted he was faced with a difficult conundrum and sought de Torcy's advice on how to proceed.

I ask you Monseigneur to tell me how to act with him. The entreaty that M. Cutts made to me to not reveal my dealings with him led me to believe that he [Stanhope] is not in the interests of milord Marlborough; on the other hand his [Stanhope's] sister was maid of honour to the princess of Denmark at the request of the duchess of Marlborough, and I know he is the enemy of Rochester and that party: this has me perplexed and made me talk with much circumspection, in waiting on your orders concerning the above and the direction I must take. If milord Marlborough does not come, as things change in England, here is no time to be lost.²²⁰

Marlborough arrived back in the Netherlands the very day Hooke wrote his note, 4 June 1702.²²¹ The political situation in England was somewhat clarified by his news. Godolphin had triumphed in the contest for the post of lord treasurer,

²¹⁹ In this period of the war the essential difference between the Whigs and Tories related to war strategy and not to support for the war itself. The Tories favoured a naval and colonial war, with expeditions to the West Indies and coastal raids as opposed to the Whigs desire for land warfare in Flanders and Germany.

²²⁰ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 & 4 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 17v).

²²¹ Bedmar to Paris, 6 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 21r).

In a move many saw as further strengthening his grip on power, Marlborough had married his daughter to Godolphin's son. George Churchill was already the effective commander of the navy, second only to the new Grand Admiral, the nautical nonentity, Prince George. Control of England's army, navy and finances now lay with the Marlboroughs and their relatives. Rochester was named as Grand Equerry to forestall too much bitterness on his behalf and manoeuvres began to secure his safe removal from the heart of politics by posting him to Ireland. In what could be seen as another gesture to reassure the Whigs that a reactionary Tory ministry was not being formed, Stanhope's daughter was indeed named a maid of honour to the Queen, bearing out what Hooke had reported.²²²

With the *status quo* secure in England a change in the political mood was soon evident. M. Barré was ordered to leave by the States and the English government began pressing for an end to all commerce with France including postal communication. This threatened to leave Hooke marooned incommunicado in The Netherlands. To make matters worse he received a letter from de Torcy, commending him on his handling of his mission thus far.

I have seen from the discussions which you had with your friends that could not have been better managed, nor pressed further. This may give rise to occasions to make use of their good intentions, and you have given them by reason of hope of private interest to profit from all occasions to renew those assurances.²²³

The sting in the tail for Hooke was that for this to happen he had to remain in the Netherlands. 'Since you cannot without becoming suspect remain without employment where you are, you must accept what you are offered.'²²⁴ This would be the best way for Hooke to serve his new master, because 'in any of these posts

²²² Ibid., ff 21r, 22r, 22v.

²²³ De Torcy to Hooke, 4 Jun. 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 198, f. 286r).

²²⁴ Ibid.

you will not be far from your friends. I count on the fact that you will be able to give your news as often as you can and your interest will not be forgotten.’²²⁵ De Torcy then went on to say that he had spoken to his friends about Hooke’s intelligence from Holland, specifically the suggestion that renewed endeavours from France might still preserve the peace.

I have talked to my friends about what you proposed to me. They assure me that after all the king has done to conserve peace, one must not hope that His Majesty will make further overtures. He has exhausted all the demarches to re-establish peace at the moment. The poor success of the enemy enterprise will make them aware of the equally poor prospects for future projects. They will carry the weight of the war and it will be up to them to find a means to end it.²²⁶

In an obviously agitated state Hooke responded immediately to de Torcy on the day he received his letter, 11 June 1702. He made his opposition to joining the Allies very clear.

I humbly ask your pardon if I cannot obey you in accepting employment offered to me here: if I had wanted to serve against France or the King of England, I would not have returned there last year. The same reasons which made me refuse at that time still maintain. My honour, my duty and my inclination are opposed to it; It is the only thing which it is impossible for me to do for the service of the king. Moreover I would no longer be in a state to serve the King, having always had for my maxim to be rigorously faithful to those who employ me.²²⁷

Rather than wanting to remain, Hooke said he was actually ready to leave with M. Barré. ‘The talk of ceasing all communication by letter in five days [...] made up my mind.’²²⁸ However opposition from the city of Rotterdam had postponed Barré’s departure for at least fifteen days so, once more making a virtue of a necessity, Hooke said that he believed that

it was his duty to wait longer to see the sentiments of milord Marlborough, who listened to me yesterday and this morning with pleasure and told me he would talk more. I hope to sow some seeds of division and jealousy, because for overtures I have always been persuaded that it is beneath His Majesty to make them as I have often said to M. Barré; but if I could

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 11 June 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 28r).

²²⁸ Ibid.

talk with certainty I could enter into some detail with these ministers in my own stead and without committing the king or his ministers.²²⁹

He says that he will be 'able to return to France with the agreement of these ministers on the pretext of going to sort my affairs there. I will conserve their friendship and I will remain in a state to serve His Majesty the first time the occasion presents itself.'²³⁰ In what has all the appearance of a letter signalling the end of his mission Hooke ended by thanking de Torcy profusely for 'the kindnesses with which you have approved my conduct.'²³¹

De Torcy, however, had other ideas. Commending Hooke's conduct, he said that

the story you related for the people that you saw and the subsequent discourse made a pleasure to read. I am persuaded that the seeds of division that you have sown will increase considerably and it seems impossible that things will remain in their present state for long. But as you said in your second letter there are circumstances where reason makes much less impression than we would wish, leaving them to work against their own interests.²³²

He continued that those who set great store by the League and its designs would eventually see that such designs were useless. Advantages stood to be gained from accepting His Majesty's advances that could not be obtained by the continuation of the war. However some means had to be found to allow this to happen. De Torcy made his orders plain.

I strongly desire that you persist in remaining and to go to the great lengths of your capability to talk to those people you have already established contact with. For this reason I had proposed that you accept the employment offered to you. But as I see from your last letter the distress that you have on that subject I agree that you cannot remain much longer in Holland. It is to be desired before your departure that you acquire the consent of milord Marlborough to see to your affairs in France. Working with him offers important intelligence and to him can be made known proposals in case of need.²³³

De Torcy considered that Rochester's continuing opposition in England must make Marlborough more worried. In addition Marlborough was likely to be

²²⁹ Ibid., f. 28v.

²³⁰ Ibid., f. 29r.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid., f. 31r.

²³³ De Torcy to Hooke, 22 June 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 31v).

‘further disgusted by the States General’s refusal to give him command of their troops especially when he can do nothing solid for himself in trying to establish things in their proper order in his own country.’²³⁴ He endorsed Hooke’s actions in relation to responding to Stanhope only in general terms and concentrating his efforts on Cutts. He ended by again commending Hooke on his actions as evidenced from his detailed letters and accounts and hoped that he could find some way to stay in Holland long-term, ‘but I fear this is impossible.’²³⁵ Hooke now had to change his plans to accommodate his new orders. With the war well under way and suspicions increasing it would be progressively more difficult for him to carry out his altered assignment. Making more overt overtures to Marlborough was a risky venture. If he revealed too much or his gambits were rejected, the consequences could be grave indeed. A French spy unmasked in the diplomatic heart of the Grand Alliance, would, at the very least, face a long imprisonment. The next chapter will examine Hooke’s actions in the face of mounting adversity.

²³⁴ Ibid., f. 32r.

²³⁵ Ibid.

CHAPTER 6: 'A DANGEROUS MAN':¹ INTRIGUE AND OVERTURES

Hooke found himself in a much changed and increasingly difficult position as war preparations gathered pace. There was a sharp divergence between the hostile atmosphere and growing suspicion he now encountered, compared with conditions envisaged in his original mission. However as long as elements of Hooke's task remained viable, his presence in the Netherlands was useful to de Torcy. As such, he was now charged with establishing contacts and opening lines of communications that might, in the longer term, enable peace to be restored.² In this, Hooke was in the end quite successful. First though, he had to negotiate the political and military turbulence that arose from the commencement of war.

On Sunday 25 June a 'grand council of war' was held in The Hague involving Dutch and English generals. The States General assembled and remained in session from 3pm to midnight. Military operations were planned with the overall aim of 'clearing the Meuse' of French forces, starting with a siege at Venlo.³ Imperial forces, who remained almost completely independent of their maritime allies, were already planning to besiege Landau.⁴ After a rather languorous opening phase the tempo of physical confrontation increased. The official French declaration of war only came on 3 July 1702, more than six weeks after the allied declarations. As well as strongly denying responsibility for the outbreak of the war, the French statement prohibited commerce or communication

¹ Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius's description of Hooke in 1702. See Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 169r).

² It was a hallmark of this period that peace negotiations, official or unofficial, but usually secret, continued in tandem with military action. See Lucien Bély, 'Utrecht, un théâtre pour la paix' in Willem Frijhoff and O. Moorman van Kappen (eds), *Les Pays-Bas et la France des guerres de religion à la création de la République Batave* (Nijmegen, 1993), p. 55.

³ [Anon] to Paris, 27 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 41r).

⁴ Bedmar to de Torcy, 17 June 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 37r).

with England or Holland. All passports and safe conducts were revoked.⁵ In the Netherlands all French and Spanish nationals were likewise ordered to account satisfactorily for their presence within the Republic or leave within specified time limits.⁶ This was motivated by a desire to

have a roll call of those here and watch them closely to find enemies who raise malicious rumours among the people to inspire false sentiments. As fair as the order was it did not fail to worry those French who now shuffle along the street.⁷

This made Hooke's position precarious. Although not born in France, he had lived there for almost ten years. The situation worsened further when the English authorities again sought the prohibition of trade and postal communication with France. Marlborough charged that without the loans of Amsterdam banks the French war economy would be seriously weakened.⁸ Dutch commercial interests objected that this was merely a self interested attempt by the English to damage Dutch trade, since France was an important partner for the Dutch economy: the issue of trade and commerce was to remain problematic in the relations between England and the Netherlands throughout the war.⁹ The immediate effect for Hooke was the disruption of his communications with Paris.

In this changed atmosphere he wrote to de Torcy on 2 July 1702 informing him that he had only received his letter of 22 June the day before.¹⁰ He had sounded out Marlborough on his attitude to, and prospects for, peace. Hooke noted that Marlborough had been awarded command over the allies' troops but he was unsure of the full extent of his power: 'Everyone I talked to told me that the

⁵ *Declaration of war against the Emperor, England and the States General, and their allies*, 3 July 1702, Paris (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 39r).

⁶ [Anon.] to Paris, 13 June 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 33r).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., f. 33v.

⁹ Julian Hoppit, *A polite and commercial people: England 1697-1720*, p. 112.

¹⁰ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 July 1702, [n.p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 48r).

troops in the service of the States General and the Elector of Brandenburg are ordered to obey him.¹¹

Before his departure for the army Marlborough was complimented by the deputies of the States General. Hooke, who was present at the meeting, learned that the English army would soon be 50,000 strong and that it appeared likely that an expedition would be sent to Italy.¹² After the meeting, Hooke spoke to Marlborough about his pressing need to arrange his financial affairs in France. Claiming to be short of money, he sought leave to correspond with his bankers in Paris. In reality, Hooke was trying to contrive a means of openly communicating with Paris.

In a hurry as he was, I took the time to tell him that I had not yet written to France for my money because I was waiting for his permission. He made me give an assurance not to write of public affairs. I asked him what I might do in case my money did not arrive and if I could address him for a passport to go get it, he consented.¹³

Hooke, of course, was still obliged to deflect suspicion from himself. By July 1702 he had been in the Republic for over two months without regularising his affairs. The Imperial ambassador, de Goes, was particularly suspicious of this hiatus. Hooke tried to allay distrust by explaining his predicament in the most self exculpatory tones to Marlborough while protesting his unfailing desire to serve his country. He calculated that he might be able to capitalise on the situation.

I risked telling him that if I did not succeed in entering the elector of Brandenburg's service I would be obliged to return to France where I had friends who would give me employment, but that I did not want that since I still entertained hopes of seeing England. If I was reduced to that necessity, I hoped that he would render witness that it was not my choice; notwithstanding that I would not cease to serve my country and him, in particular when they would talk peace. His response was: We are not there yet, we will talk another time; it would be a cruelty to refuse you this permission.¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., f. 48v.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Hooke had opened a potential channel of communication should Marlborough choose to avail of it in the future. However, Marlborough's answer displayed a lukewarm interest at best.

Hooke went on to say that he did not dare to be more open in the circumstances and that, in his assessment Marlborough, 'did not have the appearance of wishing to listen to me, other than on affairs in England which were in a very good state.'¹⁵ Marlborough did acknowledge some problems, saying that

the Princess of Denmark had three enemies to combat: France, Holland [...] and the third enemy, the Whig party who still fear that the Princess of Denmark will be sympathetic to the Jacobites. He complained much that the Whigs had made their court with the duke of Hanover where they had sent the famous Toland,¹⁶ who I have seen here, to maintain the division. I took the occasion to express a wish for a good end to the war, that would deliver the Princess of Denmark from two enemies; He answered that we will have to see what the new parliament will be, we who are called favourites can do nothing ourselves. If the nation grew weary of the war then one could talk of an accommodation.¹⁷

Marlborough was indicating that should political attitudes or circumstances change in England he could well be prepared to seek an accommodation with France; but he would not or could not work to bring about those circumstances. That was the end of the conversation but Hooke added that a short while later he was approached by Lord Barnard who asked him to dinner, where

after we were alone he told that he did not wish to enquire what it was I wanted to do here, but that he would advise me as a friend not to leave Holland but to make a tour during the summer, to draw near to the army from time to time to see M. Marlborough, that after the

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ John Toland (1670-1722) was another peripatetic Irishman in Europe. Born in Donegal, converted to Protestantism and educated in Glasgow and Edinburgh. He moved to London in the early 1690s and then the Netherlands for further study. Embarked on a career as a scholar and returned to London where he was soon embroiled in political and religious debates. Toland published *Christianity not mysterious* anonymously in 1695 causing a storm of controversy Robert Harley, impressed with his defence of the Protestant succession in *Anglia libera* in 1701, nominated Toland as secretary to the embassy to Hanover in 1702 and returning from Berlin spent time in the Netherlands, where he came to the notice of Marlborough, and Hooke, who, based on this passage, at least knew him to see. See Justin Champion, *Republican learning: John Toland and the crisis of Christian culture, 1696-1722* (Manchester, 2003); J. G. Simms, 'John Toland (1670-1722), a Donegal heretic', in *Irish Historical Studies*, xvi, no. 61 (Mar., 1968), pp 304-20.

¹⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 July 1702, [n.p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 51r).

campaign I might succeed. He said this with a smile...and I would have been in a most awkward position if M. Rosenbaum had not come to see him.¹⁸

Barnard's attitude implied a knowing awareness of the real reason for Hooke's presence in the Netherlands, as had earlier comments from Stanhope. Marlborough too, an astute man, must have realised that there was more to Hooke than an errant Englishman seeking to return home. However, he was also one of the most calculating and cautious men of the period. Despite his power, he remained fearful of being undone by his numerous enemies.¹⁹ Keeping open a deniable means of contact with France through Hooke represented a form of political insurance. However, for the moment, Hooke remained at liberty and unmolested. Barnard's comment even suggested a willingness to acquiesce in Hooke's efforts; how far if at all Barnard reflected the feelings of Marlborough himself on the affair is unclear.

Hooke did, however, append directly after the details of his encounter with Barnard another conversation that he had with Marlborough. This focused on Marlborough's curiosity and interest regarding the Stuart court at St Germain.

Milord Marlborough asked me infinity of questions about the king of England, his inclination, his education and the character of his servants. It seemed to me very easy to agree to praise him [James III]. He censured some of these people and praised others. He said he was astonished at his friends that were close to him. I said that many were of the opinion that he would have more friends than the King his father had. He said that might be possible. He asked me what I believed that France designed to do with James. I said that they might accept the division in England until the nation demanded otherwise. You believe that he said? In that case let him [James III] go back without an army! I gave no impression of having doubts. But he said how could we make sure of that; I said that the means could be found if the desire was there. He did not make a definite response.²⁰

When placed with Barnard's comment this could be taken as an expression of some interest on Marlborough's part in James III, or perhaps he was simply

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 51v.

¹⁹ In 1712 he was indeed undone by his enemies when he was accused of corruption and stripped of his army command. True to form Marlborough used his elaborate network of contacts to reestablish himself abroad. He returned to favour when George I succeeded Anne in 1714.

²⁰ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 July 1702, [n.p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 52r).

seeking intelligence from Hooke regarding how much support the French court was prepared to give James III.

Hooke passed on his information to de Torcy and added some further observations. Hooke was wary of potential traps and pitfalls. Conscious he was operating in a world of shadows, subtleties and subterfuge, he gave voice to his suspicions of what Stanhope, in particular, might be aiming at, saying that

Mr Stanhope said to me this morning that a design had been formed in Vienna to send 20,000 men by the Grisons into the Milanese, after the taking of Landau. I do not know if he invented this to see if I would write it to France and perhaps to find it in the Gazette de Paris.²¹

His own critical, not to say sceptical, view of the information he obtained made Hooke's reports more valuable than unquestioning blanket approbation. From conversations with Stanhope, Hooke gave his analysis of the political situation in England and suggested how France might exploit it.

I have found from him that these gentlemen [the Whigs] desired the war provided that they conducted it. They would overthrow everything rather than not govern if the parliament is not of their faction. A little money spread around at the right moment will be useful. They believe the Tories have a design to end the new succession; they [the Whigs] are very discontented with the last harangue of the Princess of Denmark where she declared herself so strongly for the Church of England. They say that she wants to raise the Episcopal party in Scotland and that the protestation of the duke of Hamilton and many others at the meeting of parliament was suggested by the Court. They will cause the rejection of the Hanover succession in that kingdom and then do the same in England. Mr Stanhope has great confidence in me. He might be useful in case his party have the upper hand in the new parliament. Things will clearer in the affairs of England after the election.²²

Hooke then focused on affairs amongst the other allies. He informed de Torcy that he detected 'increasing divisions' in the Netherlands. Magistrates who had been out of favour were restored to their position, including one who had previously been condemned to death.²³ He also reported a rumour current in The Hague that Prince Eugene had defeated French forces under Vendôme in Italy.

²¹ Ibid., f. 53r.

²² Ibid., f. 52v. See Chapter seven for more detail on Hamilton.

²³ Ibid., f. 53r.

Hooke turned this seemingly disastrous news for France to good use. He insinuated to Marlborough that ‘France would not fail to make propositions to the Emperor. These apparently he would not refuse.’²⁴ Rather than being dismayed at the prospect of losing the Emperor as his ally Hooke ‘was surprised to hear him [Marlborough] say that he had always been of the same opinion.’²⁵ Marlborough’s equanimity at the prospect of the losing his Imperial ally seems to have been based on the fact that he was aware Hooke was flying a kite and partly on a genuine feeling that the Emperor could well be more trouble than he was worth.

Further casting the cohesion of the Alliance into doubt Hooke stated that he had learned that the elector of Brandenburg has said that France had offered him 10 million with Spanish Guelderland to quit the allies.²⁶ These were generally regarded as ‘words let slip on purpose to strike fear into the States General with whom he is not happy. He talks of leaving on Thursday but nobody believes him.’²⁷ From this information it appeared that the medium to long term future of the alliance looked shaky in the extreme. However the reason why the Grand Alliance eventually survived through years of war is also hinted at in Hooke’s dispatch. Hooke believed that as Marlborough was acting more and more as a effective coordinator of many of the political and military affairs of the alliance.²⁸

Hooke summed up his thoughts on where Marlborough stood by saying that

Milord Marlborough is a man of the world who remembers the least little thing, he has a thousand kindnesses for me, and since his departure [for the army] M. Stanhope has told me that I was more highly regarded by him than I could think, with so much evenness and

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Such an offer had indeed been made by the French Marshal Boufflers. See Winston S. Churchill, *Marlborough: his life and times* (2 vols, Chicago, 2002), i, 575.

²⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 2 July 1702, [n.p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 53r).

²⁸ Ibid., f. 54v.

patience as I have found from him. I believe strongly that he and the Queen have plans for the king of England. But no demarches have been made, neither as regards him [James III] nor as regards peace until they have knowledge of what the new parliament in England will be. If it is Tory it could be reckoned that they will end the Hanoverian succession, if Whig it can be expected that M. Marlborough and the Queen will reserve their good wishes for another occasion, but for the love of God ensure that the Court of St Germain itself is not involved in the negotiations because milord Marlborough has a great distrust of it, with the exception of milords Berwick and Middleton, and is so indignant regarding the household of the Prince of Wales in the manner that it is constituted now that his ardour on that gave me an indication of his inclination.²⁹

Marlborough's flattering treatment of Hooke might have been an attempt to play on his ego in return for information. However, his attitude toward the household of James III could signify that his comments and intentions might have been more than mere flummery. The makeup of the household was crucial in regard to the formation of the character of the young prince, especially in terms of his religious principles. It is worth noting here that of the two members of the prince's household looked on favourably by Marlborough, Middleton was a very recent convert to Catholicism and Berwick was Marlborough's nephew. A household staffed by those Marlborough regarded as inimical to the proper progress of the prince's education steadily reduced any prospect of a return.³⁰ Hooke was right to emphasise this as something about which Marlborough was passionate. From his point of view to have an heir to the English throne in foreign hands granted a powerful hostage to fortune to France.³¹ He had made clear in an earlier conversation with Hooke that he feared the return of the prince supported by a French invasion force; if anybody understood how successful this strategy could

²⁹ Ibid., f. 57r.

³⁰ A major problem for many in England was the reputed influence of the earl of Melfort, 'leader of the Catholic revanchist faction at St Germain' in the education of James. The relatively easy passage of the Act of Settlement in 1701 could in part be attributed to fears of an intolerant popish successor, hence the crucial nature of the makeup of the prince's household, see Rose, *England in the 1690s*, p. 61.

³¹ Marlborough himself was very well placed to assess the potential influence of those overseeing the formation and education of an heir to a throne, having acted as the governor of Queen Anne's son, the duke of Gloucester until his death, see Edward Chamberlaine, *Angliae notitia, or the present state of England, with diverse remarks on the ancient state thereof* (London, 1700), p. 455.

be it was Marlborough who had done so much to further William III's invasion.³² He also worried that the prince could be used to stir division and insurrection within the three kingdoms.

However the alternative of the Hanoverian succession was not popular.³³ Perhaps after a relatively short sharp war in which France suffered a military rebuff on the battlefield, the negotiating table might present possibilities in terms of the English succession. William himself was reputed to have considered solving the problem by offering to have the James II's young son raised and educated in England under the care of his Protestant family.³⁴ A fourteen year prince might still be malleable enough to be instructed in the essentials deemed necessary by Marlborough and Queen Anne. Always eager to have a safe fallback option, this may very well have been the thought underlying Marlborough's conversations with Hooke in 1702.³⁵

Hooke had now established a connection with the court of Brandenburg through the comte de Wartemberg, the Prussian minister in the Hague. Permission to remain in the Republic had been accorded to Hooke on the understanding that he acquired employment in the service of the allies. Cutts, Stanhope, Marlborough and Heinsius were eager to arrange this on his behalf: Hooke's correspondence

³² Hooke to de Torcy, 2 July 1702, [n.p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 52r).

³³ Rose, *England in the 1690s*, pp 60-61.

³⁴ The seriousness and extent of William's intentions in this regard are unclear. See Berwick, James FitzJames, duke of, *Mémoires du Maréchal de Berwick* (2 vols, Paris, 1778), i, 172 quoted in Peggy Miller, *James* (London, 1971), pp 39-40, Callow, *King in exile*, pp 283-84, Bryan Bevan, *King James third of England* (London, 1967), pp 33-34, Churchill, *Marlborough*, i, 447-48, 506-07 who all believe it to have been at least a serious consideration; Stephen Baxter ruled out William ever countenancing this possibility. See Baxter, *William III*, p. 311. The timing of such a move and indeed the arrangements made for the prince's education would have been as crucial in 1696-97 as Marlborough's later preoccupations with these topics, in conversation with Hooke, suggest they were in 1702. The ultimate stumbling block was and remained the refusal of the prince's parents to agree to such a proposal, but a reconciliation between Queen Anne and her half brother remained the subject of repeated speculation until the end of her life, see Green, *Queen Anne*, pp 304-09.

³⁵ See Edward Gregg, 'Was Queen Anne a Jacobite?' in *History*, lvii (October, 1972), pp 358-375.

made it clear he was wracked by anxiety lest they be successful. He could not in good conscience accept the post and to refuse would force his withdrawal and end his mission.

Hooke had so far forestalled an immediate crisis by resorting to religious disabilities. As a Catholic Hooke could not serve in the English army, nor was the situation in the Dutch army much more amenable. These difficulties complicated matters and slowed the process but the core problem remained. To prolong his stay further Hooke devised a delaying tactic. Brandenburg/Prussia was more tolerant in matters of religion. However, Hooke was aware that the elector had a fractious relationship with his other allies and was much distracted by other concerns, such the Orange succession and the activities of the Swedes. Hooke's thinking assumed that an offer of service from one errant Irishman was not going to rank too highly in the priorities of a court with so many other demands. The longer he could string out the negotiations the longer he could stay in the Netherlands.

Hooke met with Wartenberg at the residence of the elector of Brandenburg in the Old Court of the princes of Orange in The Hague. He was able to inform de Torcy that when he arrived 'this prince talked with great emotion to the earl of Portland and M. Obdam.'³⁶ On the arrival of Wartenberg, he entered abruptly into his cabinet with him and these lords left.'³⁷ It emerged that the Dutch army had entered into the territory of the elector and 'done more harm than that of France.'

³⁶Obdam was sent by the States to Berlin in May 1702, with another diplomat Jacob Hop (1654-1725), in response to French overtures to Frederick of Brandenburg-Prussia, see David Onnekink, 'Anglo-Dutch diplomacy during the opening years of the War of Spanish Succession, 1702-04' in Jan A. F. de Jongste and Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr. (eds), *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688-1720* (The Hague, 2002), p. 53.

³⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 9 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 63r).

The elector, clearly unhappy, had proceeded to berate the two Dutchmen, asking ‘why the army had entered, saying he was assured that the French had not come; so the allies had no reason to be there, that they must not enter into his lands, it was forbidden. The two gentlemen did everything they could to calm him but to no effect.’³⁸

Prussia was an important part of the Grand Alliance necessitating strenuous efforts to mollify the irate monarch. In July 1702 both the Allies and France were still building up their armies for the campaign to come. The war was still gathering momentum as the adversaries defined themselves.³⁹ Frederick of Brandenburg’s troop contribution was an important factor in the allied armies and his support for the alliance influenced other German states in their attitudes. To complicate matters further he had been wooed assiduously by France, but even more effectively bribed with the title of ‘king in Prussia’ by the Emperor. Unfortunately he was only too well aware of his own importance and was not slow to emphasise or play on it. His claim that France had offered him a huge sum of money as well as territory to defect from the alliance was one example of this. His posturing was designed to extract more of the inheritance of William III, whose will had left him dissatisfied and threatening to return to Prussia in high dudgeon.

Hooke was told by the comte de Marlo⁴⁰ that Portland had made a second effort to remonstrate with the king, despite the cavalier attitude with which he had

³⁸ Ibid., f. 63v.

³⁹ Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, p. 274.

⁴⁰ Hooke had known Marlo previously, identifying him as the same person ‘who had been in the Bastille during the war’ but gives no further details.

treated the previous attempt.⁴¹ Reliable news of such discontent from within the inner councils of the enemy would be welcome in Paris. Hooke also reported further dissension in the Republic due to clashes between Orangist and anti-Orangist factions in Guelderland and Zeeland.

Affairs grow complicated here; the disorder is so great in Zealand that a deputation from the States General have gone there in the last few days. There was disorder in Nijmegen regarding the generalship of the earl of Marlborough. The republicans and the greater part of the people believe that there was a conspiracy between the partisans of the late king [William] of England and the nobility to make them slaves.⁴²

Internal troubles continued throughout the summer, especially in Zeeland.⁴³ On the military front Stanhope had told him that the army of the prince of Baden had an effective complement far below the reported 10,000 troops. Hooke suggested that if Marshall Boufflers sent a detachment to Alsace this would render Baden incapable of pressing the siege of Landau. Marlborough claimed to have a force of 50,000, increasing to 60,000 within ten days.⁴⁴

Hooke then moved on to wider European developments which could have an important impact on the geopolitical situation. Due to his connection with the Brandenburg court Hooke was able to inform de Torcy that a Swedish army had passed from Pomerania, through Brandenburg-Prussia, into Poland. The elector claimed that prior to this Swedish move he had have been planning to send his 15,000 regular troops and 4,000 militia to the aid of the king of Poland. The

⁴¹ Obdam in particular was furious with the Prussian king. His amusingly exasperated attitude was revealed in a captured letter to the Dutch special envoy in Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel Bruyninx (1662-1738): 'The king of Prussia wants everything done in a minute that comes to his mind, as if he dominated Asia and Africa. This is confirmed by continual bouts of being incensed [...] He enters into terrible rants and menaces to begin talking to France. You can be assured that we have done everything humanly possible to satisfy him, [though] it is like searching for the Philosophers Stone, because no sooner is one thing done to his satisfaction than he demands something else [...], Obdam to Bruyninx, [n. d.], The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 78v).

⁴² Hooke to de Torcy, 9 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 64r).

⁴³ By July there were serious riots in the province as the struggle for control for political control escalated. Guelderland too descended into turmoil. See Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp 963-967.

⁴⁴ The figures which reported were accurate. See Churchill, *Marlborough*, i, 574.

movement of the Swedish troops appears more likely to have been concerted with the elector, while the element of subterfuge allowed him to remain on relatively good terms with the king of Poland.⁴⁵

Strains in the relationship between the Emperor and Sweden were also evident with the 'king of Sweden informing the Emperor that since His Imperial Majesty had granted passage to the troops of Saxony to pass via Silesia, he hoped that he would not find it bad that in chasing them he would follow the same way.'⁴⁶ Eastern Europe appeared dangerously close to following the west into war, and possibly even uniting the two theatres into one war zone. This would be a welcome turn of events for French strategy, especially if the Empire was gravely distracted.

On 11 July Hooke wrote to de Torcy concerning events at Brandenburg court in The Hague. However this time his *rapportage* was more personal. During one of his calls to the court he recognised another old acquaintance, in this case one whom he was extremely wary about encountering. While having highly placed and far flung connections was useful there were also occasions when it was a disadvantage. Hooke's explanation of the difficulty he faced gives another insight into the hazardous life of an agent.

I found at the court of the elector of Brandenburg the comte de Bada, formerly aide-major of the Guards of King James in France, who calls himself now Desjardin and who is Marshal of the court and favourite of the prince of Hesse, brother of the landgrave of Hesse Cassel; He recognised me and approached me. Although I was alarmed knowing his dangerous mind, I gave nothing away but my alarm was not without reason. Mr Stanhope having come to see me this morning to go walking, said this gentleman had been to his house to make him aware that he knew me to be very jealous for France, and that one must take great care with me; And that I had been too much employed in the secret affairs of King James to be here for nothing.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 9 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 64r).

⁴⁶ Ibid., f. 65r.

⁴⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 11 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 65v). Bada Desjardin is an elusive character. A letter from him in his post as minister to the Landgrave of Hessen-Phillipsthall is contained in the correspondence of the first earl of Portland in the Portland

Since Hooke had been at pains to allay suspicion of his motives this was an unwelcome turn of events. He brooded over the wisest course of action and, ironically, was consoled and advised by the seemingly unwitting English ambassador, ‘M. Stanhope, who is very much my friend, counselled me to prevent the damage that he [Bada] sought to do me by giving these malicious words of his directly to the comte de Wartenberg.’⁴⁸

While Hooke was describing to Stanhope how upset he was by malicious rumours, he was engaged in gathering confidential information from Stanhope’s postbag! From this correspondence he was able to give details to de Torcy concerning the mission to Portugal of the English ambassador John Methuen, ‘who had returned [there] with orders to declare war on the king if he does not cease his liaisons with France and Spain. This makes me think that the fleet will make for that coast there.’⁴⁹ Hooke was also able to report that

Yesterday I saw in a letter from Marlborough to M. Stanhope that his army is complete. There are 137 squadrons [of cavalry] and 61 battalions [of infantry], of which 35,000 are in the pay of England. I am informed that he has held a council of war and sent the resolution to the States General, and that he awaited their response before marching. It is concealed here as much as possible that milord is general of the Dutch.⁵⁰

Marlborough would have liked to have pursued an aggressive strategy against the French. However as a commander of a coalition army he had to defer to collective decision making. Thus for much of July, August, and September the Anglo-Dutch

collection of the University of Nottingham, Pw A 2026, provisionally dated to 1708-09 but almost certainly from the period before the death of William III.

⁴⁸ Hooke to de Torcy, 11 July 1702, The Hague, (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 65v).

⁴⁹ Ibid., f. 66r. John Methuen (1650-1706). Diplomat, barrister and MP. Originally appointed minister to Portugal in 1691. He formed good relations with the Portuguese court. He was appointment lord chancellor of Ireland, and speaker of the Irish house of lords in January 1697. Returned as a special envoy to Lisbon in April 1702. Utilising his contacts and experience he managed to detach the Portuguese from France by August 1702, and negotiated a favourable commercial treaty with Portugal in December 1703. See H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds), *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (60 vols, Oxford, 2004), xxxvii, 963-65; As Hooke wrote the Anglo-Dutch fleet was on its way to attack the Spanish port of Vigo, 15 miles north of the Portuguese frontier. With this miniature armada present off Portugal Methuen was certainly negotiating from a position of strength even if no formal threats were made.

⁵⁰ Hooke to de Torcy, 11 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 66v).

and French armies in the area around the Meuse river engaged in cautious manoeuvre and static siege warfare. A number of minor positions were lost by the French but there was no decisive engagement.⁵¹

De Torcy acknowledged on 20 July the ‘much delayed’ receipt of Hooke’s letters of the 2, 4, 9, 11 and 13 July 1702.⁵² Acknowledging the uncertainty of Hooke’s position in the Netherlands he explained why he wished him to remain as long as possible.

I see that you very much want to return but if you can stay where you are I very much believe it would be much more useful for you and for your friends because I cannot see how you could maintain from here some intelligence with the man who [Marlborough] is gone as if you stayed in place. It might give rise to an occasion from which you might be able to profit. Moreover I can assure you that your affairs are in no way diminished in your absence.⁵³

De Torcy then delivered the news that had had his agent on tenterhooks for over four months.

Your friends have sought the brevet you asked for and they have obtained it. It will be issued very shortly. If you want to see who supported it that can be done [...] I am very pleased that you have it and the satisfaction of mind and the freedom that one achieves when one has what one wants. Although I have emphasised to you how I desire that you will be able to remain where you are, consider however before everything else your safety and do not expose yourself.⁵⁴

Hooke’s entreaties to his master had eventually paid dividends: he now had his coveted rank of colonel in the French army.⁵⁵ Given the unenviable *mélange* of pressures and uncertainties that he had borne, and continued to bear, in his role as undercover agent this served as a welcome relief. He could now focus his mind on

⁵¹ See Lynn, *Wars of Louis XIV*, p. 275, Churchill, *Marlborough*, pp 578-591, Hattendorp

⁵² De Torcy to Hooke, 20 July 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 67r). The discrepancy between the number of letters apparently sent by Hooke and the number received by de Torcy is explained by the fact that the documents in the A.A.E., are predominantly copies of Hooke’s dispatches from the Netherlands, rather than originals. Some are transcribed from a numeric code intended to give added security to the most sensitive items of information. On occasion a number of shorter letters received in the same post, or letters where Hooke has added later postscripts and addenda, are now grouped within the same document. Hence the letter of 9 July continues into the letter of 11 July, and also contains the letter of the 13 July, but without a defined break in the document.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., f. 67v.

⁵⁵ See Pinard, *Chronologie historique-militaire*, (8 vols, Paris, 1760-78), vii, 29.

the task at hand. After setting out the good news de Torcy continued his letter with an update on affairs mentioned in Hooke's dispatches. The seed of de Torcy's developing thought on policy in regard to peace is evident.

There is astonishment here that the Dutch have chosen milord Marlborough for Generalissimo of their troops. One can see from this resolution how they have emphasised the scale of their need for England. Rather than an understanding between two nations one believes that the means [of the Dutch] will not subsist and one can only be persuaded that the Dutch have been seen to be forced to obey an English general; one can reason on the little advantage that they would find in a war whose cause so much divided the Allies. I do not know if this reasoning has made any impression on them [...] One can expect perhaps less animosity [towards France] at the end of the campaign [...] If the Dutch believe all the elector of Brandenburg told them of from France and if they seek to retain him by offering more advantageous conditions they could very easily ruin themselves even given their excellent finances. The beginnings of disorder which one sees in that country could have great consequences [if] they grow weary of ruining themselves for the Emperor. If it was the case that they were to conduct themselves by dint of reason and not passion there would be many things to be done for the States General.⁵⁶

De Torcy recognised the tension inherent in the Alliance, especially in regard to the position of the Dutch. Subsequently French peace strategy as directed by de Torcy included a number of attempts at separating the Dutch from their allies by suggesting that they were wasting their resources on a cause where the lion's share of the spoils would ultimately benefit the Emperor or the English.⁵⁷ Hooke's reports from Holland contributed to the formation of this policy. Thanks to his intelligence gathering de Torcy now had an informed understanding from which to draw up overtures to the Dutch. Information from Hooke was also important in shaping de Torcy's thinking on affairs in England.

I am persuaded that until there is some call and revolution favourable to the young king [James III] France will never consider sending troops with him to that kingdom. They are

⁵⁶ De Torcy to Hooke, 20 July 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 67v, 68r). Jonathan Israel makes the point that the appointment of Marlborough did indeed 'mark a form of subordination of Dutch power to that of Britain.' See Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 972.

⁵⁷ See J. G. Stork-Penning, 'The ordeal of the states – some remarks on Dutch politics during the War of Spanish Succession' in *Acta Historiae Neerlandica/Historical Studies in the Netherlands*, ii (1967), pp 107-131; John C. Rule, 'King and minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy' in Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds), *William III and Louis XIV: essay by and for Mark A. Thomson* (Liverpool, 1968), pp 213-236. The Dutch attitude to the Emperor is demonstrated in the exasperation evident in the captured letter from Obdam to the Dutch ambassador in Vienna protesting Imperial inertia, see Obdam to Bruyninx, 21 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande 199, ff 78r-79v).

needed elsewhere and I can assure you that there is absolutely no consideration given here to dominating England.⁵⁸

The last words of his dispatch to Hooke, however, were less welcome. 'I believe I must tell you that milord Middleton knows where you are and that I have been talking to him.'⁵⁹ The good news of the brevet was tarnished by this last piece of information. As Hooke had already made clear he did not trust the court of St Germain and Middleton in particular, a view not assuaged by de Torcy's own confidence in the Scottish secretary of state.⁶⁰

After Hooke wrote his letter of the 13 July he fell ill for ten days. He described 'his weakness was so great that I had not the strength to decipher [de Torcy's letter of 21 July] until the 5 August.'⁶¹ These irregular though periodic illnesses were to afflict Hooke over the course of his career. While he was convalescing politics in The Hague continued. In diplomatic circles concern was growing over developments in Eastern Europe. Decisive developments there could impact more generally. The Emperor and Prussia might be drawn into the conflict, thus greatly weakening the military coalition facing France. Reports suggested that the king of Sweden was prevailing over the king of Poland⁶² and that the Czar had embarked from Archangel with 'troops, cannons, mortars and bombs [...] and that a great army was on the march from Smolensk to come to the aid of the king of Poland.'⁶³ It was

⁵⁸ De Torcy to Hooke, 20 July 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 68r).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ George Hilton Jones, *Charles Middleton: the life and times of a restoration politician* (Chicago, 1967), pp 280-282; Natalie Genet-Rouffiac, 'Jacobites in Paris and Saint-Germain-en-Laye', in Eveline Cruickshanks and Edward Corp (eds), *The Stuart court in exile and the Jacobites* (London, 1995), p. 34.

⁶¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 88r).

⁶² Ibid., f. 72r; [Anon.] to Paris, 21 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 81r)

⁶³ [Anon.] to Paris, 21 July 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 81r).

believed that Sweden can only engage with France; a banker of Amsterdam called Peltz was declared to be holding 150,000 *livres* for the king of Sweden, that he had received from M. Bernard and company of Paris who had received this sum from M. Pontchartrain.⁶⁴

The possibility of a war on two fronts with France and Sweden as allies in a pincer movement against the German lands would change the strategic situation radically. Memories of the damage done by the Franco-Swedish alliance in Germany during the Thirty Years War did nothing to encourage more German territories to become involved in the war against France. To counteract this and bring the more of the Empire into the war on the Allied side a demonstration of the power and prowess of the allied army was needed. On 8 August Hooke wrote to de Torcy explaining Allied intentions.

M Sidrick, one of the members of the States of Holland, whom I often saw in M. Stanhope's house, told me the States General desired a battle and they have given an order to Milord Marlborough to seek out such an occasion. I told him that I was astonished since, if they were beaten they would lose much more than they could hope to gain by a victory. He answered that they sought to gain a reputation for their army as the best means of bringing the Empire to declare.⁶⁵

Marlborough was pleasantly surprised by the change in attitude in Dutch political circles. However on a number of occasions in August opportunities to force the French to battle were foiled. Hooke describes an annoyed letter written from the earl's secretary to Stanhope saying

that they [the Allies] had lost a chance to ruin the army of France by the obstinacy of the other generals who would not agree to attack the corps who covered the march of the army toward Hassette, maintaining that it was the entire army, opposed to milord Marlborough who believed it only to be a detachment to cover the march of the rest.⁶⁶

Anglo-Dutch relations on a more mundane level were less than perfect, as Hooke described.

The mistrust between the English and the Dutch is much increased. Some days before M. Cutts left for Nijmegen, one of his officers was manhandled and then robbed by some

⁶⁴ [Anon.] to Paris, 23 July 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 83r, 83v).

⁶⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 89r).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 89v.

townsmen he had insulted. Milord demanded reparation and restitution of the money, and being refused by the Burgomasters he gave them only one hour to resolve the situation, adding that if they did not give him satisfaction in this time he would pillage the house of some rich burgher up to this sum; and he began to put things in train to execute his threat. The Burgomasters sent him the money but they complained to the States General and they have sent the complaints to the princess of Denmark; the English on the other hand support my lord.⁶⁷

In addition to this Hooke was able to report that in regard to the colonial aspect of the war, and especially its naval expeditionary strategy, the English were unhappy with the Dutch contribution. Hooke learned this incidentally from Stanhope while the latter was ‘dictating a memoir to the comte de Goes. I volunteered to leave, but he bade me stay.’⁶⁸ Just as Hooke was about to learn the substance of the memoir ‘it was then that Admiral Mitchel came to see him. He [Stanhope] brought him into the room and asked me to keep him company, therefore I do not know what this proposition was.’⁶⁹ This demonstrates aptly the level of access, familiarity and indeed trust that Hooke had achieved in the English ambassador’s residence. The admiral himself revealed nothing consequential and Stanhope later told Hooke that Mitchell ‘was here to complain about missing 15 large ships from the Dutch share of the expedition to America.’⁷⁰

Hooke also elicited interesting news from England from Stanhope and Barnard.

Everybody is occupied by the elections; I have seen a list of almost 100 who for the most part are Tories, but many Whigs in the last parliament were joined to the Tories by a spirit of opposition to the Court. It may be that a party of them will be drawn from the others by the same spirit of jealousy and contradiction. A very intelligent man, newly arrived from England, assured me that milords Marlborough and Godolphin are the leaders of the Whigs; but I believe that the moderation that these lords affect trumps that.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 90r).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., f. 91r. Hooke’s information on the Indies expedition was accurate. See van ‘t Hoff, *Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius*, p. 23.

⁷¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 91r).

The intelligence that Hooke received on Marlborough and Godolphin and his own analysis was prescient. Moderation, as Hooke termed it, worked. Both men managed to survive the rage of party not by adhering resolutely to one but by skilfully refusing to embrace either.

The English elections were, as Hooke wrote, pivotal. For months after William's death English political life was in flux. It would be hard to overstate the election's importance therefore in the affairs of state. In domestic politics would the succession remain as settled by William and parliament? Or would an outright Tory victory signal a backlash against the policies of the previous reign? Was there solid evidence of strong Jacobite sentiment? Linking this to the wider perspective, who could predict the impact of a wholly new parliament on international relations and strategy? Would the Dutch alliance, entailing continental involvement, war and exorbitant expenditure, be maintained? How would the military campaign fare? It was up to Hooke to try and find some of these answers. For the moment, however, he was able to report to de Torcy that

I have the honour to tell you that I believe Milord Barnard well intentioned; I am now completely persuaded. He came to see me the other day very alarmed that the king of England had published (as he is informed) a declaration to maintain his right. He said that the leaders of the Anglican church are persuaded that they can only conserve themselves through means of him, that they had already taken measures to make him succeed after the Princess of Denmark, and that they planned to make Prince George of Denmark king in the new parliament with the intention thereby of striking a blow against the succession of the house of Hanover. That the declaration of the young king would give the Whigs an occasion to ruin the design, that the Princess of Denmark is the most happy medium (to use his words) that the friends of the king of England could desire, but that he feared that this demarche's only effect would be to give his enemies an opportunity to force the Princess of Denmark to let them do as they wanted; and the well intentioned will be forced to let themselves be carried along by the torrent, that in taking the title of king he had made his pretensions very clear. And at the start of a parliament he could do nothing more to stoke the quarrels which have already been stirred up because there are so many ready to seek permission to return [from exile]; They inflate this number to scare people, and they claim that the Princess of Wales [Louise Stuart] will have a passport soon. The Dutch Gazette even in Amsterdam says that if the elections continue as they have started the new ministers will have a parliament which will pass all their designs. Milord believes that the resolutions of this parliament will decide this affair and it will not be difficult to strike up a

correspondence between the princess of Denmark and her brother, *if she finds the Tories much stronger in the House of Commons* [my italics].⁷²

Much then depended on the course of events in the following weeks but Lord Barnard's contention suggested the possibility of a sea change in English politics. Despite the potential for James III's restoration, Hooke now set out to do as much as he could to blacken his own reputation at the Jacobite court. There was method in his madness. Informing de Torcy that Barnard was the reason Middleton knew he was in the Netherlands, he explained his rather puzzling action in casting aspersions on his own loyalty to the Stuarts by saying

I did all the more gladly since I know that Mr Ellis [...] would give news of my stay here to St Germain and that this would make them cry out against me, and that being known here, I would be less suspected. With this in mind I saw Madame Hatcher and Mr Floyd who are at Rotterdam and who pressed me to write to justify myself. I responded that I wanted nothing else but to return to England and that all correspondence with that court would be harmful to me. I will use the same language with the duchess of Tyrconnell who will be here in a few days.⁷³

Hooke's game of double bluff worked well. Within days

the comte de Wartenberg was sent to wish me well, with an invitation to go to Berlin and enter into his service. He made an excellent proposal, putting me into a very awkward position. I will write this evening to M. Marlborough on the above and I will attempt to profit from it.⁷⁴

He was not confident he could make much headway but he emphasised to de Torcy that he would nevertheless do everything it will be possible for 'me to do when milords Marlborough and Cutts return; I do not dare enter into detail with them, nor with the Dutch, on what you said might be done for their advantage for fear of advancing something ill considered.'⁷⁵

Hooke was right to be cautious in his approach. De Torcy's answer echoed Hooke's own sentiments by commenting that

⁷² Ibid., ff 91v, 92r.

⁷³ Ibid., f. 92v.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., ff 88v, 89r.

It is difficult to say at present precisely in what manner one can profit from the dispositions where general affairs will find themselves at the end of the campaign. I do know that no one wants to oppress England or Holland if one could even give them reasonable security.⁷⁶

De Torcy was aware that proposals made at the wrong time could be used to depict France as weak. This would provide valuable material for propaganda purpose ‘so I know that no offer can be made. One knows only too well the advantages that the enemies would draw from propositions made to them generally, regarding it as an offer made from a need from peace’; significantly however he was ‘much persuaded that we are in a better state than them to maintain a war for a long time.’⁷⁷ Then, working from what Hooke had said regarding differences between Marlborough and the States General, he set out his revised instructions for the rest of his mission in light of changing circumstances

It seems from this difference of opinion that understanding is not great between the English general and that of the States; I do not doubt but that the situation will only worsen during the rest of the campaign. It would be a pleasure if you could tell me all the circumstances that you are able to learn. Try to find out as well, if it is possible, what the proposition that M. Stanhope had been ordered to make to the Emperor is, and what is the true subject of the voyage of Admiral Mitchel. Also continue to let me know what you learn of the news from England.⁷⁸

On 13 August Hooke wrote with updated information concerning these matters he had been charged with by de Torcy. The evening before Stanhope had called to bring Hooke for a walk. Hooke described him as appearing ‘distracted and he would not talk except about having met the Pensionary’.⁷⁹ The ambassador was evidently in an agitated mood and severely preoccupied by what had occurred in the course of his meeting with Heinsius. Hooke remained patient and

did not dare ask him what this was but, having fallen into discussion some time a little after on the topic of Prince Eugene and on the state of affairs in Italy, I blamed the court at Vienna for not having supported the Prince. Mr Stanhope told me that he was not surprised, that the council is composed of fools and traitors, that the Emperor had given power to the elector Palatine to receive from the English and the Dutch in the name of the Emperor all

⁷⁶ De Torcy to Hooke, 17 Aug. 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 86r).

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Hooke to de Torcy, 13 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 98r).

the places that they take in the Low Countries, that the minister of the elector Palatine [...] informed the Pensionary of this 'power' and that this was the affair that had so burdened him. And that he told him on the part of the princess of Denmark that she disapproved of it in these circumstances.⁸⁰

Thus was Hooke able to enlighten de Torcy in regard to what Stanhope's memorial to the Imperial Court had contained. Not surprisingly the English and the Dutch were averse to seeing their men and money employed to remove the French just to hand their gains over without recompense to the Emperor. Relations between the Maritime Powers and the Emperor were strained. The English and Dutch grew more impatient at the lack of effective Imperial action. Indeed there appeared to be a concerted effort to undermine their one successful general, Prince Eugene in Italy. This, in Stanhope's view, endangered the whole war effort. Hooke reported him as saying that 'if the Imperials are chased from Italy this year, he could not see how the allies could continue the war.'⁸¹ Hooke was quick to take the opportunity presented to attempt to ratchet up the tension and further French hopes of isolating the Emperor from his allies. He questioned, in a roundabout fashion, why they should expend their resources for the Emperor's advantage. 'I took the opportunity to remark on the sad state of those who had allied with the Emperor who took such little care with his own affairs: He agreed.'⁸²

A captured letter from General Obdam to the States' envoy in Vienna corroborated, from the Dutch perspective, what Hooke had reported of the English and de Torcy's own contention that the Dutch resources might be drained by their Imperial ally.

I can not agree [...] with the conduct of the Imperial court as much by abandoning or ignoring poor prince Eugene, as the affair of Rhinfalls as well as the delayed action of the envoys at Ratisbon to pass the declaration [of war] of the Empire. All these affairs in my

⁸⁰ Ibid., f. 98v.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., f. 99r.

opinion are of the greatest importance; however they are treated with so much laxity that there is no answer before God or man, from those who have put us in such an inexpressibly awkward position; because in this way everything to be done falls on us, which we cannot sustain long as the sums keep mounting.⁸³

These sentiments appeared to reinforce the possibility of sundering the Dutch from the alliance.⁸⁴

De Torcy, however, as an experienced diplomat was eager to maintain other policy options. He encouraged Hooke to gather as much intelligence as possible, particularly in relation to England where

I would like you to find out what M. Stanhope thinks, and enquire also on the journey to be made by the duchess of Hanover to England. I doubt very much whether the presence of a successor would be acceptable to the princess of Denmark. It is also said that if she does pass into England, that this will be regarded as a mark of a favour to the Whigs, who want to have safeguards against the power of the Tories and against arrangements little favourable to the court in their view.⁸⁵

Due to the time lag in communication de Torcy's letter did not reach Hooke until early September. Hooke's letter of 20 August therefore did not address these considerations directly. However he did have some interesting information relevant to the issues in hand. Hooke had again been talking to Stanhope. He had cultivated Stanhope to such an extent that he was now accompanying him on business trips to Rotterdam and Amsterdam.⁸⁶ Hooke first had to report to de Torcy that he had just managed to avoid leaving The Hague to go to the siege of Venlo, where Cutts commanded the English forces. Hooke was unsure whether Marlborough had conveyed orders to Stanhope, but the minister had endeavoured to persuade him to take up the offer. This was unwelcome to Hooke as it would

⁸³ Obdam to Bruyninx, [n. d.], The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 79r).

⁸⁴ See J. G. Stork-Penning, 'The ordeal of the states – some remarks on Dutch politics during the War of Spanish Succession' in *Acta Historiae Neerlandica/Historical Studies in the Netherlands*, ii (1967), pp 107-131; John C. Rule, 'King and minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy' in Hatton and Bromley (eds), *William III and Louis XIV*, pp 213-236; Van den Haute, *Les relations Anglo-Hollandaise*, p. 6.

⁸⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 13 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 104v).

⁸⁶ Hooke to de Torcy, 8 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 88r); Hooke to de Torcy. 31 Aug. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 118r).

take him away from his principal sources of information in The Hague, the prime centre of events and intelligence. Hooke was unsure of the reasoning behind the suggestion and whether it implied some change in attitudes towards him. In the end however he was excused 'because of the state of my health which is still very delicate.'⁸⁷

As Stanhope was clearly not gullible, Hooke kept his guard up despite the level of friendship and trust that he believed existed between them. He reported one of Stanhope's comments regarding the elector of Bavaria. The English minister had said that while he had been worried at the elector's actions he had been reassured by the Pensionary that the elector was still on the Allies side. Hooke, inherently cautious and unsure of the true situation, was wary of a trap being laid and requested clarification from de Torcy. 'You will know, Monseigneur, if this is true. But if it is a tale, it would be expedient to give me a warning, as it can augur nothing good for me.'⁸⁸

Hooke, following de Torcy's instructions was soon able to relay the latest news from England. Stanhope himself was 'very discontented to see that the Tories have been elected almost everywhere for the next parliament.'⁸⁹ The earl of Marlborough had also received the strong support of Queen Anne in his contretemps with the other generals 'who were not willing to follow his views.'⁹⁰ Hooke's connections past and present now came together in an unexpected way. Having endeavoured to use the Jacobite court to alleviate suspicion about his activities in the Netherlands he now found it had unforeseen repercussions. Hooke

⁸⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 20 Aug. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 109r).

⁸⁸ Ibid., f. 109v.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

may have officially left the Jacobite court for French service but some at St Germain had not given up on hopes of profiting from his position and mission.

Lady Elizabeth Hatcher, a member of the St Germain's household whom Hooke knew, and who had been intriguing for some time at Rotterdam, arrived in The Hague to speak to him. A quite extraordinary offer resulted. Hooke reported to de Torcy that

From the manner in which she spoke to me over the course of two days I am persuaded that she had an order from the Court of St Germain, from where she came, to attempt to discover what I do here. After having approached me from all directions she told me that she knew I was very well in with milords Marlborough, Cutts and Stanhope, and that she believed it would be very easy to render service to the Queen of England [Mary of Modena]. If I wanted to employ my credit to carry M. Marlborough to obtain the dowry of the Queen of England, she would give me the power to offer him 10,000 pounds sterling per year, and 2,000 per year for me. I was surprised by the proposition and tried to make her see the difficulty of getting parliament to agree; she answered that this was not her plan, that the Princess of Denmark is of a good nature, and she would profit by paying this sum to the widow of her father, secretly from her revenues, and that there would only be her, who talked of it to me, milord Marlborough and me who would know the secret, adding that if I did not wish to undertake it she would address herself elsewhere. As I knew the Lady I did not want to put her off, therefore I asked for time to think on it, to which she agreed. I will give her whatever response that you will be pleased to order me to.⁹¹

Although Hooke left the final decision on the matter to de Torcy, he added his own thoughts on what he considered to be the chances of success for this Jacobite overture. Seeing things from a French perspective, he viewed the scheme as unrealistic in conception and as inimical to current French policy. The weakness of the scheme lay not in the design itself, since Marlborough 'loves money as much as any man in the world up to immoderate greed.'⁹² Instead the problem lay with the source of the offer as 'it seems to me that this proposition would alarm milord Marlborough who is very distrustful of, and does not want to have dealings

⁹¹ Ibid. The issue of the exiled Queen's dowry had been ongoing since discussions between the French and William III had agreed to payment following treaty of Rijswijk in 1697; see a report detailing arrangements made under the auspices of the Swedish mediator, Lillieroot in September 1697, sent to Hooke in 1710 by Mr Diccon, (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre suppl., vol. 3, ff 4r, 4v). Nothing had come of the agreement and the money that had been set aside was diverted to other purposes. See also Callow, *King in exile*, pp 296-97; Edward Corp (ed.), *A court in exile: the Stuart court in France, 1689-1718* (Cambridge, 2004), pp 53, 54, 71-72, 317-18.

⁹² Hooke to de Torcy, 20 Aug. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 111v).

with, that court.⁹³ Hooke's worry was that any precipitate action launched by St Germain might 'close the door to things of greater importance that one might perhaps be able to carry out.'⁹⁴

He was careful to reassure de Torcy of his undivided loyalty, vowing to 'execute all your orders punctually, having no other design but to let you see by blind obedience that the service of the king, and yours, Monseigneur, is more dear than even my life.'⁹⁵ Even if he had not been in the service of France, he would hold out little hope for the success of the scheme. He explained that

it will be very difficult to make him [Marlborough] listen to even the most reasonable proposition. If he succeeds in this campaign, he will be in a position where he will be lauded by parliament, which is almost wholly Tory, and to become through that the favourite of the people as well as the princess of Denmark; rendering himself also so necessary in Holland that the States will be obliged to continue his commander-in-chiefship and open the way to even greater things.⁹⁶

On 7 September de Torcy again advised Hooke to remain at The Hague.⁹⁷

Returning to the theme of the Emperor's baleful influence on the affairs of England and the United Provinces he

liked a lot what your friend [Stanhope] said. That nation must hope only for sadness if they do not wish to seek means to dissipate the fear inspired in England by the late King William that caused the nation to support the pretensions of the house of Austria.⁹⁸

Warming to his theme, de Torcy continued by pointing how this could be dangerous to England. This was the issue Hooke should raise in conversation with the English ministers. 'They will engage themselves little by little in all their [Habsburg] wars and if the king of Sweden enters into Silesia as has been said, it

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., f. 112r.

⁹⁶ Ibid., ff 111v, 112r.

⁹⁷ De Torcy to Hooke, 7 Sept. 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 113r).

⁹⁸ Ibid., ff 113r, 113v; for Hooke's conversation with Stanhope see, Hooke to de Torcy, 13 Aug. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 99r).

may be necessary that England declare war against Sweden.’⁹⁹ He responded guardedly to Hooke’s concerns in regard to the proclivities of the elector of Bavaria by saying that there had been ‘much talk of the elector of Bavaria’. Without writing anything which might prove compromising should the letter be intercepted he added that ‘I would be worried for you to be surprised in Holland.’¹⁰⁰ This warning, ambiguous as it was, became in the end academic as Hooke did not receive the letter until 4 October 1702. By that stage conditions would be much changed.

From 20 August there was a hiatus in Hooke’s correspondence with de Torcy because Mollo, the Polish resident and merchant, who was effectively acting as Hooke’s courier via his network of trade connections, was absent for fifteen days. Because of this, Hooke’s letter of 20 August was not received in Paris until 3 September and de Torcy’s of 17 August, replying to Hooke’s of 8 August, did not reach Hooke in The Hague until 30 August. The precariousness of Hooke’s position was becoming more evident and the fragility of the all important lines of communications obvious.

⁹⁹ De Torcy to Hooke, 7 Sept. 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 113r). De Torcy’s acuity was impressive. Only the skilled diplomacy of Marlborough prevented this scenario from becoming reality. Charles XII of Sweden dethroned Augustus II as king of Poland in 1704. More ominously he invaded and conquered Augustus’s electorate of Saxony in 1706. From this strategically advantageous situation he appeared well placed to wage a broader war to reclaim Swedish interests within the empire, in alliance with France against the Emperor. The seriousness with which the situation was viewed by the grand alliance can be deduced from the fact that Marlborough himself undertook a personal journey to Altranstadt in Saxony in April 1707 to negotiate directly with the Swedish monarch. *The Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence*, ed. Henry L. Snyder (3 vols, Oxford, 1975), ii, 757-62; *The correspondence 1701-11 of John Churchill, first duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius, grand pensionary of Holland* ed. B. van ‘t Hoff (The Hague, 1951), p. 300; A. E. Stamp, ‘The meeting of the duke of Marlborough and Charles XII at Altranstadt, April, 1707’ in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, new series, xii (1896), 113-14; Andrew Rothstein, *Peter the great and Marlborough: politics and diplomacy in converging wars* (London, 1986), pp 71-77.

¹⁰⁰ De Torcy to Hooke, 7 Sept. 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 114r).

In his letter of 31 August Hooke informed de Torcy that he had had informal discussions with a number of (unnamed) Dutch politicians. In the absence of clarification on what line of argument he should take in these interviews

I anticipated your order [...] His Majesty did not want to oppress either England or Holland. I attempted to persuade others of this without revealing myself but I found their caution more invincible than their arms. They ended by asking what sureties could be expected; I answered by asking what guarantees they wished. For fear of giving umbrage to their allies they would not explain further.¹⁰¹

Hooke held out some hope for progress after the campaign. It was unclear however when operations would cease. By late August the Anglo-Dutch army was engaged in besieging Venlo. As yet, neither side had made much headway in the war. Normally the active campaigning season should shortly be drawing to a close. Marlborough himself wrote of the season being 'far advanced' on 26 August.¹⁰² Nevertheless he was still hoping to take the fortress of Roermonde.

Hooke thought Marlborough might be amenable to consider peace feelers

if he receives some setbacks, because in that case it is certain he would no longer have control of the army and it would be more conducive to maintain his credit in England by a good peace; otherwise he would not suffer to listen to any general proposition that may be long drawn out, for fear of it being discovered and he denounced in parliament as a friend of France. I believe that instead, he would sacrifice the offer, and the one who made, to ingratiate himself with the House of Commons. [...] ¹⁰³

Whether Hooke would be able to remain in situ to make any offers now became a live issue. He reported a worrying development to de Torcy. After returning from a trip to Rotterdam with Stanhope to see Madame Tyrconnel

he had asked me to dinner Sunday last with the comte de Goes and several other ministers who were there to mark the claimed victory of Prince Eugene [at Luzzara]; but he came to see me the morning of that day to tell me not to come, because the comte de Goes had made a difficulty being there with me because he believed that I was in the interest of France. In a short while I will discover if these suspicions have made any impression on M. Stanhope, but I am alarmed that Baron de Walef came shortly after to live in the same house as me; he

¹⁰¹ Hooke to de Torcy, 31 Aug. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 118r, 118v).

¹⁰² Marlborough to Heinsius, 26 August 1702, Helchteren. Cited in van 't Hoff, *Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius*, p. 24.

¹⁰³ Hooke to de Torcy, 31 Aug. 1702, Amsterdam (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 118v, 119r).

says it is because of his liking for me, but as he is a great friend of Pensionary Heinsius, who has been informed several times of the life that I lead, it gives me reason to think.¹⁰⁴

However the situation, and the future of Hooke's mission, remained unclear. Hooke was able to report having had dinner with the Prince of Hesse at Rijswick some days later.¹⁰⁵

Over the course of the last weeks of August and early September the situation in the Netherlands grew less conducive to the presence of an unaffiliated gentleman with a gathering cloud of suspicion over his head. Events at last appeared to be gathering speed, but in a positive sense for Hooke or France. On 15 September the fortress of Landau on the Rhine was reported to have fallen to Imperial forces, occasioning 'great celebrations.'¹⁰⁶ Confirmation of the news 'spread universal joy.'¹⁰⁷ French forces were 'confining themselves to Tongueren [...] with their cavalry dilapidated and their infantry in bad condition.'¹⁰⁸ In good news from further a field on 19 September the king of Sweden was reported to be 'well disposed to peace in Poland, a goal that can easily be achieved if the negotiations are handled delicately.'¹⁰⁹ From London also, came news of many French prizes taken, including one 500 ton French merchantmen captured by two Dutch privateers on its way back from St Domingo.¹¹⁰ The 22 September saw Fort St Michel, a strongpoint protecting the fortress of Venlo, taken by storm, 'sword

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., ff 120r, 120v. Major-General Henri de Cort (1652-1734), Baron de Walef. Born in Liege, became a soldier, rising to colonel of a regiment of Liege dragoons in Dutch service. At the same time created brigadier by Marlborough in 1709 and major-general in 1710 in the English service lists. Also active, less successfully, as a diplomat, he acquired a reputation for devotion to women and gambling. Most renowned though, in his own lifetime and today, as a poet of some accomplishment in the French language, combining imagination with wit. His ability won the praise of one of France's most famous contemporary men of letters, Nicolas Boileau (1636-1711), who described de Walef's poetry as elegant and powerful.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ [Anon.] to Paris, The Hague, 15 Sept. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 130r).

¹⁰⁷ [Anon.] to Paris, The Hague, 19 Sept. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 131r).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., f. 132v.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., f. 133r.

in hand.’ The gazettes ‘attributed all the glory of this assault to milord Cutts who conducted it and himself with wisdom, bravery and intrepitude’.¹¹¹ Soon after Venlo itself fell.

Hooke must have been doubly relieved that he had managed to wriggle out of venturing to join his old friend at the siege. Cutts acquired his nickname of ‘The Salamander’ from surviving unscathed so much heavy fire during operations. As well as being far from the centre of events in The Hague, it might have been difficult for Hooke, as an experienced soldier, to have avoided being drawn in and caught up in the attack if he had been present. De Torcy himself had confessed that he ‘would have been very worried if [Hooke] had accepted the proposition to go to the siege’ and his caution was justified by the bloody action that followed.¹¹² To have a valuable French intelligence operative killed or maimed by French soldiers while taking part in an English assault would have been a great loss.¹¹³

This tide of morale boosting news for the allied side created an increasingly bullish atmosphere in England and Holland affecting politicians, the military and the general populace. The cavalcade of glad tidings was rudely checked by one piece of bad news. The elector of Bavaria, after entering the Imperial city of Ulm under the pretence of serving the Emperor, at long last shed his cloak of neutrality and declared for France. This deception, more than his declaration, caused outrage both in Germany and among the allies. The States General responded to the news by meeting in special session and

¹¹¹ [Anon.] to Paris, The Hague, 22 Sept. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 137r).

¹¹² De Torcy to Hooke, 7 Sept. 1702, Versailles (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 113r).

¹¹³ It is interesting, if perhaps overly Machiavellian, to wonder if the suggestion that Hooke be present at the siege was made precisely because it would remove Hooke as a potential nuisance one way or the other. Cutts was well known for his bravery and audacity in conducting frontal assaults to the extent that even some military experts questioned whether his actions veered too dangerously in the direction of vainglorious foolhardiness. Sending Hooke into that situation entailed a grave risk.

resolved and concluded to make the utmost effort during the winter to have sufficient forces not only to oppose those of France and Spain but also those two electors “in reason of them being traitors to their country”. Here is the epithet which was given to these two electors.¹¹⁴

The Emperor himself ‘dispatched emissaries to all the German princely courts who have not yet declared themselves ready to be led, and promised to take up arms against this elector and his brother.’¹¹⁵ On 22 September it was reported that the Diet at Ratisbon had finally resolved ‘the rest of Germany’¹¹⁶ to declare the Empire as a whole at war.¹¹⁷

This powerful combination of bullish confidence and aggravated outrage soon produced a new and aggressive mood in The Hague. The full implications of the drastically changed situation were brought home to Hooke. On 23 September he wrote to de Torcy describing how

the joy for the success of the Allies has changed the tone of almost everybody. M. Stanhope has abandoned his moderation to talk more heatedly. He came to see me the other day. He asked first what I intended to do, adding that he did not believe that I wanted to take the oaths, that in that case I could not hope to go to England; that there had been several disputes about me (I suspect that all of these originated from milord Athlone).¹¹⁸

Stanhope went on to present Hooke with a stark choice

Milord Marlborough will be here in fifteen days. He counselled me to take my decision before his arrival, because, though he liked me a lot, he did not have enough credit to protect me here during the winter. If I was not open on the oaths he would suspect I was sidestepping the issue. It was necessary to make a choice: if I wished to take [the oaths] my affairs would soon be settled, if not it would be necessary for me to leave Holland; he believed that the continuing presence of an English Catholic, who did not want to recognise the Princess of Denmark, was dangerous here.¹¹⁹

It was absolutely clear that Hooke’s presence was untenable in the eyes of many in The Hague. His contacts and his friends would be of little use: there had been a decisive shift in attitudes. Stanhope reiterated to Hooke that

¹¹⁴ [Anon.] to Paris, 21 Sept. 1702, [n. p.] (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 134v).

¹¹⁵ Ibid., f. 134r.

¹¹⁶ [Anon] to Paris, 29 Sept. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 145r), uses this extremely interesting phraseology.

¹¹⁷ [Anon.] to Paris, 22 Sept. 1702 The Hague, (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 137v).

¹¹⁸ Hooke to de Torcy, 23 Sept. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, ff 138r, 138v).

¹¹⁹ Ibid., f. 138v.

affairs have changed very much. Those who were delighted to see you in The Hague until recently now torment me to make you withdraw. Think it over well. You will find me ready to do for you all types of favours.¹²⁰

The tables had been turned. From hinting obliquely at how accommodating a grateful French government could be to those who facilitated peace, Hooke now found himself put on the spot. In one final, and forlorn, gambit he made an effort to spin de Torcy's anti-Austrian arguments. He found it impossible to make any headway in the face of the English minister's now uncompromising approach

I responded only by complaining of my misfortune and wishes for a good peace which would relieve England from her great expenses and let her keep them for herself; [Stanhope] answered that is how all those who come from France talk: England assists the Emperor but she acts for herself. It is necessary to bring down France, the occasion is favourable; it would be to our downfall if we failed to take the opportunity. And I am persuaded that the nation will give to its last penny to profit from it.¹²¹

This was a forthright statement of the English position, shorn of any trace of diplomatic nicety. Hooke queried Stanhope's analysis.

Though astonished by a discourse so little expected, I asked him did he believe that England was in a state to supply all the commitments where the interests of the Emperor will embark them upon; He said yes, that was assured.¹²²

Despite dutifully contesting Stanhope's contention, Hooke's own analysis of the political situation caused to admit that he feared that

[Stanhope] spoke the truth. The natural enmity of the people against France, their insolent attitude on the least success, which they always exaggerate, the universal fear that has taken hold of their minds, the designs of milord Marlborough, either for himself or king James, and the opinion that all the Jacobites have that only the misfortune of France will cause the return of the king, will gather all minds together in the same design.¹²³

Further indications that Hooke's position was under threat came from interaction with representatives of the court of St Germain and Mr Mollo. While telling de Torcy that he was 'not in anyway worried by the suspicions of the court of St Germain,' he was put very much on his guard because

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., f. 139r.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., f. 139v.

a letter that Mr Floyd, a gentleman of the bedchamber of King James, showed me today alarmed me a lot. It was from M. MacDonnell, who is in the same post. He asked him to give me his compliments on being employed by your grace.¹²⁴

Hooke reiterated his worry to de Torcy that too much information was being relayed to the Jacobite court. Hooke would retain his reservations throughout the rest of his career.

To add to Hooke's increasing unease he wrote to John Cutts 'to make him aware of my predicament' but there was no response.¹²⁵ Mollo then revealed that 'a letter he had received for me had gotten lost between Amsterdam and the Hague.'¹²⁶ Friends, contacts and correspondence seemed to be vanishing. Plaintively he wrote to de Torcy that 'you can see, Monseigneur, that my confusion is great. I beseech you to give me your orders, if possible before the return of Milord Marlborough.'¹²⁷

Hooke wrote again on the 3 October. He had just received a letter of de Torcy's dated 21 September, which while not a direct response to his urgent plea of the 23 September, nevertheless served to clarify his situation. De Torcy told Hooke that

¹²⁴ Ibid., ff 139v, 140r. This Mr Floyd was most likely David Lloyd (1642/3-1723), naval officer and Jacobite agent. Born in Ffosybleiddiaid (*sic*), Cardiganshire, he joined the Royal Navy in 1671 and become captain in 1677 of the *Mermaid*. Subsequently he was captain of the *Reserve*, the *Dover*, and the *Crown*. Lloyd was appointed groom of the bedchamber to James II in 1685. Stationed in the Mediterranean when William of Orange landed in November 1688, he followed James II into exile in 1689 and subsequently carried out a number of missions to England to sound out Admiral Edward Russell, Marlborough, and others. He acted as a naval advisor to the French Marine ministry and was considered as a possible commander in chief of any invasion fleet. He left St Germain after James's death.

¹²⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 23 Sept. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 139v).

¹²⁶ Ibid., f. 140r. Mollo wrote his own letter to de Callières on 25 September which he relayed with Hooke's letter. He made no mention of the missing correspondence, but strenuously pleaded his loyalty to Louis XIV and his readiness to demonstrate this by serving Hooke in any way he could. He informed de Callières that through his trading network he had the means through which people could leave from time to time. Clearly he saw no future for Hooke's mission in Holland, '[...] the good success of their arms on the Meuse, and the debarquement on the Andalusian coast [has] closed the door to peace and made bolder those who are for war', Mollo to de Callières, 25 Sept. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 141r).

¹²⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 23 Sept. 1702, The Hague (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 140r).

it appears now that we will not overcome the unfortunate caution of the Dutch by words. It will be necessary that they grow weary of the strains and expenses of the war and until then it seems that all propositions of peace would have an effect contrary to the goal that one would propose. Thus there is no question at present of a project which would reach the earl of Marlborough but it is good to make him consider what he would have to fear if the house of Hanover passed over to England [...] I do not doubt that you were informed of the surprise of the elector of Bavaria. I believe the affair will cause a lot of rumour in Germany and will not be pleasant in Holland [...] Despite the pleasure of receiving your news I beg you to take great care in a country where the littlest things are suspected and believed.¹²⁸

With the whole endeavour now very much in the endgame de Torcy wrote, conceding that

it is difficult for you to stay much longer where you are and it is not necessary that you expose yourself to the bad offices of your enemies. Consequently I can only advise you not to stay in a place where you may not be safe and I know it will not be found adverse that you come back here if you judge it appropriate [...] I would like you to understand from this order that I assure you that one could not be more true than I am entirely to you.¹²⁹

He requested Hooke to secure what he could before he left in the way of keeping alive communication by letter with Marlborough, Cutts, Stanhope or Barnard and if possible, conserving a pretext to return when suspicions abated.¹³⁰ Hooke did not receive this communication until 30 October. He wrote no more letters to de Torcy from the Netherlands and his final written report took the form of a memoir drawn up on 12 December 1702 reflecting on his mission after his return to France. Hooke described his endeavours to carry out de Torcy's instructions in regard to establishing channels of communication. He emphasised that he did this while taking all possible care 'to trump the vigilance of Baron Walef, and of others who, as I have often said, watch me very closely by order of the Pensionary [...] I was very apprehensive that the loss of a letter or the least indication that I was writing to France would render the execution of your orders impossible.'¹³¹ To that end Hooke conveyed all his papers, including 'my codes and cyphers' to a friend in Rotterdam for safekeeping and set out to 'talk more openly to the Lords

¹²⁸ De Torcy to Hooke, 21 Sept. 1702, Fontainebleau (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 126r).

¹²⁹ De Torcy to Hooke, 12 Oct. 1702, Fontainebleau (A.A.E., CP, Hollande vol. 199, f. 147r).

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 168r).

Marlborough and Cutts than I had before the campaign, being well assured that they would not betray me even if they disapproved of my taking liberties.’¹³² His precautions were not in vain, a fact reinforced by news he received from another acquaintance, Lord John Hay who had recently arrived in The Hague.¹³³ He informed Hooke that ‘a certain Mr Barnwell (the same that was chased from France nine months ago)’ had arrived at the army under the protection of the earl of Athlone. This had stirred up a great degree of pique and discontent among the German officers and in turn had occasioned the specific naming of Hooke as someone whose background and long stay in The Hague was giving cause for concern. ‘The Prince of Holstein-Beck and several other German generals’ when complaining to Marlborough on the foisting of favourites of doubtful loyalty on the army, had been joined by several English officers who had taken the opportunity to make remonstrations on the

great number of people coming from St Germain during the summer, some of whom had gone to England and others who were still in Holland. They stressed very much my long stay in The Hague and the friendship that there was between Mr Stanhope and me.¹³⁴

As a result of this Barnwell had been ordered to withdraw from the army. Hay explained to Hooke that he had been charged by Cutts to apologise for his failure to reply to his letters but he had not ‘dared to do so because of the complaints of these men.’¹³⁵ Stanhope had had the same news but had said nothing to Hooke. What neither Stanhope nor Hooke knew was that Marlborough had been

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid. Hay (d. 1706) was the second son of John Hay, second marquess of Tweeddale, prominent in Scottish politics, especially in the passing of the act of Union, and Lady Mary Maitland, daughter of John Maitland, the first duke of Lauderdale. A cavalry officer, he became lieutenant colonel of the Royal Scots dragoons in 1694, and went on to command the regiment during Marlborough’s campaigns of 1702-03. Brigadier-general in 1704, noted for the conduct of his regiment at Ramilles in 1706. He died of fever shortly afterwards.

¹³⁴ Ibid., f. 168v.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

dissatisfied with Stanhope for quite some time and was striving to bring about his recall 'for his being apt to believe malicious things that are writ from England, and his easy temper of receiving and countenancing every disaffected Englishman does a great deal of hurt here [...] to the Queen and the present ministry.'¹³⁶ Evidently he was now a man not to be too closely associated with in public. Hooke was worried that Marlborough might now be of the same opinion, 'since I knew [him] as a man of great precaution, I was apprehensive that these rumours, joined to the insinuations of the Pensionary, could only cool his attitude toward me.'¹³⁷ This seemed to be confirmed when Hooke 'went to compliment him in M. Odyck's house on the fortune with which he escaped from the hands of the partisans it seemed to me that he did not receive me with the same friendliness as other times.'¹³⁸

Hooke, determined to ascertain the reality of the situation, approached an intimate of Marlborough's, William Cadogan,¹³⁹ who, like Hooke, had been born

¹³⁶ Marlborough to Godolphin, 19/30 June 1702, The Hague, in *The Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence*, ed. H. L. Snyder, (3 vols, Oxford, 1975), i, 73-74.

¹³⁷ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 168r).

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 168v. Marlborough had narrowly escaped being captured while making a journey by river from Venlo to the Hague. An Irish lieutenant in French service had allowed the English general to continue his journey. See Churchill, *Marlborough*, i, pp 605-08.

¹³⁹ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 168v). William Cadogan (1671/2-1726), first earl Cadogan. Born at Liscarton in Co. Meath, Cadogan's background was similar to Hooke's. His grandfather, also William (1601-1661), born in Wales but settled in Ireland, swung from royalist to parliamentarian, serving as governor of Trim, and then like Thomas Hooke, worked with the surveyors of confiscated lands. The family's fortunes were built on land acquired in the 1650s. Cadogan himself had left Trinity without a degree in 1687 and enlisted in the army of William of Orange in 1689, fighting at the Boyne and Aughrim. He encountered John Churchill, earl of Marlborough at the taking of Cork and served under him during the remainder of Nine Years War. Sent to the Netherlands with English troops in 1701 he was officially appointed Marlborough's quartermaster general in April 1702. Unofficially he acted as his chief of staff and director of military intelligence. Hooke's choice of intermediary may not have been the wisest given this fact. Cadogan went on to have a successful career as a soldier and diplomat during the reigns of Anne and George I. His career was however blighted by accusations of bribery and peculation which, given the evidence of Hooke's interaction with him, may very well have had legitimate

in Ireland of English descent. Hooke was determined to use any means necessary to get the information, including bribery

It might have seemed to be nothing but having revealed my suspicions to M. Cadogan, adjutant general of the English infantry, and favourite of the earl of Marlborough and having found the means to make him a present of 60 Louis d'Ors, under the pretext of lending him the money of which he had need of, until the campaign got underway; he promised to talk to him, which he did that evening with so much sincerity that Milord told me shortly afterwards that I was wrong; that in the present state of affairs it was not possible for me to go to England without causing a lot of harm, but I only had to tell him if I wished for something else; [and] that the Pensionary had spoken to him of me as a dangerous man but (he said) I know these people, they are the most suspicious in the world, thus I assure you that all he has said to me has made no impression on me: but I counsel you not to stay much longer here, because you will not be safe.¹⁴⁰

Knowing his access to Marlborough was narrowing, Hooke decided

to better prepare my way [by asking] permission to bring to him Mr Floyd, Undergentleman of the Bed Chamber to the King of England; By means of this gentleman who is a zealous Protestant and very strongly liked by milord Marlborough, I hoped to remove all the bitterness that the earl could have against me, because of my conversion to the Catholic Religion, of which he had reproached me two or three times.¹⁴¹

Once Marlborough agreed to his proposal Hooke instructed Floyd, who he had lodged in his house, on 'what he must say'.¹⁴² The tactic had the desired affect as Floyd 'was a very honest man and acquitted himself loyally of his promises.'¹⁴³

On next encountering Hooke, Marlborough said he was comforted to know that

notwithstanding my change of religion, I did not hate Protestants; that he would not condemn me for having followed the movement of my Conscience since I maintained my charity. If all Catholics were like me England would be much more tranquil, that a Catholic who had that moderation there could contribute much; the fanatical zeal of several at St Germain had caused great pain; he named several and as this gave me the opportunity to speak of the king of England, and I was just about to do so when the arrival of Monsieur

foundations. See J. P. N. Watson, *Marlborough's shadow: the life of the first earl Cadogan* (London, 2003).

¹⁴⁰ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 169r).

¹⁴¹ Ibid. This was the same David Floyd/Lloyd mentioned earlier. His entry in the *Oxford DNB* suggests he might have retired and lived in France once James II died, returning to England at some point prior to 1708 when the next reference to him was noted. Hooke's memoir makes it quite likely that he returned to England as a consequence of this introduction to Marlborough. Very little is known of his activities after he returned to England. See *Oxford DNB*, vol. 34, pp 110-11.

¹⁴² Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 169r).

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Coehoorn obliged me to retire, after milord had said to me that he would talk to me at leisure the next day.¹⁴⁴

Hooke's opportunity had arrived. Over the course of the several days Hooke had a series of interviews with Marlborough. On the first day Marlborough told Hooke that Mr Floyd had proposed giving him a passport for France since travel to England was impossible. Marlborough said he was willing to do this but it would be easier if the support for the proposal came from a Whig such as Stanhope. His frank and revealing comments to Hooke give a good insight into Marlborough's wily method of political manoeuvring. To circumvent any possible criticism from the Whigs

he would bring [Floyd] with him to pray with the earl of Rivers, who would bear the blame if the Whigs found fault with something. That as for himself he only wished to do the best by everyone but that he had great actions to protect and he would wish that everything that was done of this nature was at the behest of a Whig.¹⁴⁵

Marlborough's correspondence confirms that he engineered the situation exactly as he told Hooke that he would. Writing to Sidney Godolphin concerning Floyd's return, Marlborough makes it appear that the matter has arisen at the instigation of Lord Rivers and that Rivers will assure Floyd's behaviour.¹⁴⁶ Nowhere in the

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. The 'Monsieur Coehoorn' referred to is Menno, baron van Coehoorn (1641-1704), Dutch general, military engineer and noted expert on fortifications, artillery and siege warfare. Experienced in military affairs since 1657, especially in warfare against France, Coehoorn was the only engineer and theoretician to rival to the talents of maréchal de Vauban. He became a senior commander of the Dutch army, working frequently with Marlborough from 1702, but retaining independent command. See van 't Hoff, *The correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius*, p. 86.

¹⁴⁵ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 169v). The fourth earl Rivers, Richard Savage (c. 1654-1712), army officer and politician. Principal leader of the Whig Treason Club at the end of James II's reign, Rivers was the first English nobleman to desert to William III and was specifically excluded from James II's general pardon in 1692. Fought in Ireland, winning distinction at Cork. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1697, this was renewed in March 1702. Promoted to general he held a number of independent commands. Rivers sought the post of constable of the Tower in 1709, which he was granted by the Queen despite Marlborough's opposition, and moved increasingly away from the Whigs toward Robert Harley. He replaced Marlborough as master-general of ordnance in 1712 and was appointed commander in chief of the army of Great Britain in the absence of the duke of Ormond. He died shortly after these appointments. See *Oxford DNB*, vol. 49, pp 78-81.

¹⁴⁶ H. L. Snyder (ed.), *The Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence* (3 vols, Oxford, 1971), i, 96: 'My Lord Rivers having write a letter to me concerning David Floyd, I have sent it to the Secretary [Hedges]. I desire you will read it, and if you think it will not make a great noise, I should be glad

correspondence is Hooke mentioned. It appears that even the most private of Marlborough's letters tell less than the full story. Interestingly it appears that Marlborough was most open, at least on some matters, when in conversation with Hooke.

Marlborough however was not the only one who was attempting to distort reality. Interrupted in this meeting by the entry of the Dutch Treasurer, Dop, Hooke was in no way annoyed. Rather he hoped that the appearance of 'frequent conferences, though short, with milord Marlborough would create the worrying impression that I was brewing something with him.'¹⁴⁷ Later that evening Hooke saw Marlborough in company with Stanhope and asked for a passport to France, to which Marlborough replied he would ask the Pensionary. The following day Hooke went to Marlborough's house early in the morning, 'as I did everyday on his rising, and after the company had gone I talked to him without interruption.'¹⁴⁸ He had instructions from de Torcy to sound him out on the 'the king of England, the succession of Hanover, and [to seek] permission to write to him.'¹⁴⁹

Marlborough himself gave an opening to Hooke by asking several questions concerning James III. Hooke replied with some reserve, prompting Marlborough to ask him to 'speak more frankly, assuring me that he would take everything I said in good part and everything would be secret.'¹⁵⁰ Hooke proceeded to give 'him a portrait of this prince, with which he seemed very

he might end his days in his own country, my Lord Rivers assuring me that he will give his word of living quietly.'

¹⁴⁷ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 169v).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

content.’¹⁵¹ Hooke pressed his argument in favour of James by ‘expanding on the danger of civil war’ if he continued to be excluded, combined with the grave danger to the Anglican Church if Anne was succeeded by the Hanoverians. No sooner would that house

be on the throne than the Whigs (which had called the house of Hanover there) would be masters of government; that he well knew the mind of these people and their hatred against the Anglican Church, which one clearly saw by their conduct under King William. They were enemies of absolute authority but only so long as they had not got it between their own hands. I had heard it said to His Excellency that during their ministry it [had been] easier to do arbitrary things [...] that the prince of Hanover, being absolute in his own [territory] wishes also to be in England and that the ministers of this [Whig] calibre will assist him as he wishes.¹⁵²

In addition England would inevitably become embroiled in the interests and the wars of Hanover, despite the provisions of the Act of Settlement, as had happened before when English kings had fought to retain their patrimony in France. ‘You will soon see that they [the English] will come to believe that what belongs to their king belongs to them and they are obliged by honour to conserve it.’¹⁵³ This was a far greater danger to England than a Catholic king, ‘those of that communion being of small number.’¹⁵⁴ Engaging in an innovative line of reasoning Hooke argued that a Catholic king would now indeed be a guarantor of the liberties of England rather than a threat, since

having consolidated [their liberties] under the present reign, if they were to call the young king to succeed his sister, he would be constrained to follow the same design. This would reunite all interests and remove from France the pretext for troubling England; and parliament having obtained such a part in government, it will be impossible for the king to encroach on their rights.¹⁵⁵

The heart of these matters lay in the on going constitutional crises that had dogged and divided England since the 1670s, concerning liberty, religion, French

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid., f. 170r.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

influence and arbitrary government. Both Marlborough and Hooke had been involved in the controversies and their lives had been shaped by them. The question remained of how best to resolve these issues that had been divisive for a generation. Hooke's argument, in essence, was that any tendencies towards the old shibboleths of 'popery and arbitrary' government were now securely trammelled by the power of parliament, and beyond the reach of any monarch. The return of James III would remove divisions and strengthen England much more than the installation of the Hanoverians. The stumbling block for Marlborough, however, remained the third of the trinity of problems. Religion and arbitrary government might be concerns that were now largely settled, perhaps not to everyone's satisfaction, but as Hooke acknowledged there were now guarantees secure enough to mandate compliance; the problem of French influence, though, remained contentious. 'What surety do we have that France would not have the same credit at court that it had under the last reigns' was Marlborough's question to Hooke.¹⁵⁶ It was a question which Hooke could not answer, but he attempted to turn the difficulty to opportunity by telling Marlborough that he was not 'in a state to give this to him but if he would give me permission, I would talk to those persons who could do so, and I would tell him their sentiments.'¹⁵⁷ However, after musing on the offer Marlborough said

we are in unfortunate circumstances. One cannot dare do what one wants though that might very well be for the public good. We have a new parliament and we do not know which party will control it; moreover, he added, it would serve for nothing since the succession has already been decided.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., f. 170v.

Hooke tried to argue this point by recalling that in regard to the succession he had been strongly ‘assured that the most weighty and sensible did not approve of it; and that there was every appearance that Scotland would never consent to it, that being a greater disadvantage than all the rest.’¹⁵⁹ Marlborough admitted that Scotland could ‘do much’ and that France had already offered ‘the Scots their old trading privileges’ to ingratiate themselves there, ‘but that will all be dealt with by the union of that kingdom with England’.¹⁶⁰ Hooke replied by stating that it appeared to be little more than an empty gesture to ‘demonstrate that all the projects of King William were being followed, than by any hope of succeeding there. Marlborough smiled and answered no more’.¹⁶¹ Ironically Hooke’s later career, as detailed in chapter seven, would see him attempting to further the diplomatic and military interests of France by undoing the union of Scotland and England.

Marlborough changed the subject by returning to talk of James III. He asked Hooke a very apposite question: ‘how [could] a man who knew England think that the nation will consider him while it believed that he had been imposed by France?’¹⁶² Hooke replied by saying that ‘it was necessary to remove that mode of thought.’¹⁶³ Marlborough agreed that Hooke was right but wondered how ‘that was to be done, because we do not in any way want a French government.’¹⁶⁴ Hooke, again sensing an opportunity to execute his orders and open a correspondence with the allied commander, said that he would be better able to

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

speaking on that when he was in France. However Marlborough made no direct reply but changed the subject again to discuss the recent conversion of the earl of Middleton to Catholicism. Both Hooke and Marlborough agreed that it was sincere. Marlborough in a candid moment added that ‘I don’t know if he has rendered service to his master by doing so but he renders us much.’¹⁶⁵ Hooke took this as an opening to enquire whether Middleton’s service (indirectly) to Queen Anne should automatically be seen as harming his master? Hooke spoke frankly, ‘I flatter myself that Her Majesty was not such an enemy of her brother as she seemed to be’.¹⁶⁶ Marlborough, however, sidestepped the question by saying that perhaps it was better to leave all that, that

when God wanted to do something he finds the means, even when there seems not even the least likelihood; which he repeated two or three times with emphasis, by putting his hand on my shoulder. I responded that he was right but that God works through the ministry of men, and that I would hope that His Excellency had not been raised so high for nothing.¹⁶⁷

Marlborough replied to Hooke that

you have the Prince of Wales well in your heart but if he wished for anything it would be necessary for him to have a different type of person close to him and that would remove our fear of France. Then he spoke with some vehemence against the duke of Perth; he much likes Lords Sheldon and Dickeson, under governors of the king of England. He spoke very favourably of the duke of Berwick [...]; he asked me to give his compliments to milord Middleton.¹⁶⁸

Ending the interview Marlborough promised again to ask the Pensionary for a passport for Hooke, after which Hooke took his leave. Later that same afternoon he encountered Marlborough again. The earl had considered Hooke’s affairs, and believing that the Pensionary would make a great difficulty in granting a passport, ‘he would give me his, to go to Brussels and from there I could go where I

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. Charles Middleton (1649/50-1719), second earl of Middleton and first (Jacobite) earl of Monmouth. See *Oxford DND*, vol 38, pp 42-46; and George Hilton Jones, *Charles Middleton: the life and times of a Restoration politician* (Chicago, 1967).

¹⁶⁶ Hooke, ‘Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy’, 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 170v).

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., f. 171r.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

wanted.’¹⁶⁹ While he was still in the Netherlands ‘no-one would dare to refuse his passport, but that would not perhaps remain the same following his departure and for this reason he would counsel me to leave before him.’¹⁷⁰ Hooke ‘accepted the proposition with joy’ but not yet having given up hope of achieving something, he asked for another audience, which Marlborough accorded.¹⁷¹

Unsure as to what Heinsius’s reaction to the news of his securing a passport from Marlborough would be, and wary lest he use it as a pretext to ‘have me searched on leaving Holland’, Hooke acted with cautious forethought; ‘I sent all my papers by post to Brussels.’¹⁷² Then having arranged his affairs he visited Marlborough for the last time. Safe in the knowledge of his passport and his imminent departure Hooke was bolder than on previous occasions. As Hooke portrayed it, his return to France was forced on him and entry into French service was the only option left. This was not to be taken as evidence of a desire to desert his homeland but he had been left with no choice since he had not been allowed to travel to England.

I had only come to Holland to pass to England, motivated by the love which I felt for my country. That being constrained to return to France, I would take service there. That as I made it my watchword, as he knew, to serve loyally, that while he could not expect me to betray my duty, I would dare say that I was not unknown at court; and I would dare say it seemed promising that I could have opportunities to render some service to England. The war would not be eternal and if he would give me permission to write to him I might be able to contribute to advancing a good peace. He had had some difficulty the other day in according me this permission, but that I would flatter myself that after all that had been done, that he did not distrust me.¹⁷³

Marlborough replied that that was all very well but ‘he feared that if it came to be known, the States and the Whigs would be jealous.’¹⁷⁴ Instead he could write to

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid., f. 171v.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

‘milord Cutts, who is my [Hooke’s] relation and was better in with the States than him, and that he had more interest among the Whigs.’¹⁷⁵ If he set up a correspondence with Cutts he could simply insert a letter under that cover for Marlborough, ‘but he beseeched me never to write except for something of consequence.’¹⁷⁶ Marlborough then commented that from the manner in which Hooke had spoken to him before the campaign ‘he doubted that I spoke to him by order, and he asked if he was not right?’¹⁷⁷ This was a most awkward question since he could not know how much Marlborough knew or suspected. He avoided the question by saying that Cutts had already refused to engage in a correspondence. Marlborough told Hooke to propose it again. Hooke’s reluctance in answering his question and his failed attempt to arrange an exchange with Cutts probably indicated to Marlborough as much as any answer would have.

Hooke couldn’t be sure if Marlborough had spoken to him but the following day Cutts told Hooke that he had reconsidered his proposal to establish a correspondence, since ‘it would be necessary to make peace one day [...] we could see if we could not contribute to it.’¹⁷⁸ Cutts also confided in him that ‘he had declared to milord Marlborough at the start of the campaign that he was very discontented that the Queen had not made him lieutenant general. If he was not promoted that winter ‘he would no longer serve the crown of England and he would seek employment elsewhere’, though Hooke considered that the honours shown him by Marlborough would be enough to mollify him.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., f. 172r.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., f. 173v. Cutts was promoted to lieutenant general at the turn of 1702 and remained in the service of Queen Anne. Hooke was unsure whether such confessions of disaffection were heartfelt

Soon after Hooke had his passport, signed in Marlborough's name for Brigadier Wood to apply at Breda. Hooke could not resist one further attempt at 'launching some seeds of distrust.'¹⁸⁰ Rather disingenuously he asked Marlborough to if he could 'confess to everybody that I had his passport, since my departure could not be secret.'¹⁸¹ Not surprisingly, he was told to keep it quiet. Hooke then took his leave of Marlborough, who asked Hooke to give his compliments once more to the earl of Middleton. The juxtaposition of Middleton's loyalty to James II with Marlborough's own actions may have stirred his conscience. In self justification it seems, Marlborough said that

it was well known that he [...] had always been of the opinion that the late King James, had done more harm, in conducting himself badly, than all his enemies had been able to do [...] he repeated this twice.¹⁸²

Marlborough advised Hooke 'if he wished to be useful not to take [himself] on board with the court of St Germain', to which Hooke replied that as entry to England had been refused he would naturalise himself in France. Marlborough answered that he would not be doing badly and then

taking me by the arms, if we see each other again (he said smiling) it will be by order, he used another expression in English which amounts to that, and after having emphasised to me two or three times to leave Holland before him, he said goodbye.¹⁸³

Hooke left with Marlborough's passport but encountered some difficulty at Breda where the governor, Monsieur de Salis maintained that all passports had to be in the name of the Estates General and fixed with their seal. Brigadier Wood, the English officer charged with enforcing the passport 'spoke so strongly that in the

or an effort to seek the renewal of offers Hooke had alluded to earlier on his arrival in the Netherlands.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., f. 172r.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid. James Stanier Clarke's *The life of James the second* (London, 1816), based mainly on original papers, also referred to Marlborough's 'remorse for his role in the revolution'. See W. A. Speck, *James II* (Harlow, 2002), p. 157.

¹⁸³ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 172r).

end [de Salis] let me pass saying that he would inform the States, to which Brigadier Wood answered that he would take responsibility for the affair. Hooke was quite pleased by the whole business, saying ‘that it gave me much pleasure in the hope that the Pensionary would imagine that there was some mystery in all of this.’¹⁸⁴

The final section of Hooke’s report on his activities in the Netherlands reflected on what was accomplished and what might flow from it in the future. He wrote that it was, of course, for de Torcy ‘to judge the disposition of milord Marlborough from the detail he had given and what advantage might perhaps be drawn from the correspondence that I have established with him.’¹⁸⁵ Hooke’s own assessment of Marlborough was that he was well intentioned ‘for the king of England’, as, in his opinion, were all of the Tories.¹⁸⁶ However, the situation in regard to France was very different. Hooke’s considered analysis was depressing in relation to any hopes French strategy might have of utilising support in England.

I find that not only [Marlborough] but all the Jacobites, and the greatest part of the English Catholics even, would not be dismayed to see [France] suffer some great failure, as I have already had the honour of telling you more than once, because they imagine that the nation will recall its king, as soon as it ceases to fear the power of France.¹⁸⁷

Marlborough was also evidently afraid of the Whigs. He might be more secure if the ‘Tories were to find themselves the strongest in the parliament’ but it was impossible to know yet if that was the case.¹⁸⁸ In regard to the correspondence he had established Hooke was realistic.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., f. 172v.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

I do not flatter myself too much. I know that I will be believed in what I write to them, but I do not know if I can have the same faith in what milord Cutts will tell me. I know him to be a man full of vanity, who loves mystery and refinement in even the littlest things: therefore I do not trust him.¹⁸⁹

Cutts insisted on writing to Hooke in cipher. Hooke thought this completely unnecessary since his letters from France would be safe from inspection and equally Cutts's credit with the States General was such that nothing would befall any letters addressed to him. Nevertheless Hooke indulged Cutts's love of intrigue since 'according to circumstance one could ask him things at the right time to profit from it, and to draw some enlightenment from his responses' and 'I can talk to both of them, each for their own particular view or what concerns the public, with more freedom than when I was in Holland.'¹⁹⁰ To balance these views Hooke had also managed to set up correspondence with Alexander Stanhope 'to use according to the occasion.'¹⁹¹

He created other lines of communication that did genuinely require the protection of a special cipher. The first was with an unnamed person in England, apparently female, of the 'first quality, who is allied to all that are 'Grand' in England. She promises much but she wishes that I only reveal her name when she has done something which will merit the good graces of the king'; Hooke's mysterious contact held out the prospect of some very fruitful connections, not the least of which might be a spy in the English post office.

She promised me to win over an official in the Post Office in London, who will safely be able to pass letters, and as she has many relatives and friends in parliament, I flatter myself that this commerce will not be useless and it was to this person that I sent the second cipher on which I worked during my stay in Brussels.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., f. 173r.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

This would be crucial if the threatened ban on postal communications between France and the Allies was enacted. Although unnamed it could plausibly be surmised that the person involved in this sensitive undertaking might have been Frances Talbot, duchess of Tyrconnel, whom Hooke had visited with Stanhope in Rotterdam in August. Her connections through her sister Sarah, the wife of Marlborough and confidant of Queen Anne, certainly put her in a position to have access to information and influence on her return to England in 1702. Her two successive marriages to Catholic Irish soldiers, firstly to George Hamilton and then to Richard Talbot, the *bête noir* of Protestantism in the 1680s, created duke of Tyrconnel and lord deputy of Ireland by James II, her conversion to Catholicism and her time spent in exile at St Germain testify to an ongoing sympathy and support for the Jacobite cause. The uproar caused in England by her return from exile (stoked in part by the restitution of her husband's estates in Ireland through the influence of the Marlboroughs) demonstrated the mistrust with which she was viewed. She returned to live in exile in Delft in 1704 and remained close to St Germain until 1708.¹⁹³

Hooke's third correspondent was the Danish ambassador von Stöcken, with whom he had made a 'strong and close friendship.'¹⁹⁴

I have had several proofs of his sincerity by the warnings he gives me very often; I recognised him as an enemy of the Hanoverian succession because of the consequences for the king his master. He seemed a friend of France, and as he knows England very well, I gladly accepted his offer to enter into correspondence with me and it was to him that I sent a third cipher.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ See Philip W. Sergeant, *Little Jennings and fighting Dick Talbot: a life of the duke and duchess of Tyrconnel* (London, 1913), pp 567-84.

¹⁹⁴ Hooke, 'Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy', 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 174r).

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

Von Stöcken also contributed to the evolution of Hooke's ideas of a military descent and designs in Scotland.

He is of the opinion that the shortest way to finish the war is to make a descent in England, which he believes infallible, provided that one chooses well the time and place. He assured me that he found, during his stay in London during this summer, that the memory of King William is held in abhorrence among the Tories, and that it would be easy in spreading a little money among the Scots to break the project of the union, and to make them reject the Hanoverian Succession.¹⁹⁶

In relation to the broader international perspective von Stöcken was convinced that 'the creatures of King William have imparted the fear of the power of the King [Louis XIV], so advanced in the mind of the Dutch, that the only way to make them see reason [...] is to show them this power first hand'.¹⁹⁷ This analysis was contested, at least in the case of the Netherlands, by M. Mollo whom Hooke said had a different opinion on the best way to proceed. Mollo's understanding of the situation was that there were three factions in the Republic: one headed by the Pensionary which was the enemy of France, one neutral faction which it was necessary to win over, and a third group who were friends of France and peace.¹⁹⁸ Mollo said that as soon as some overtures were made the peace group would be 'able to win the neutrals and force the Pensionary and his group to make peace.' Hooke himself at this stage saw merit in both military and political approaches, though leaning more in favour of a military strike on England itself as the fastest and most direct method of bringing France's enemies to see reason. The alternative was a slow campaign of political subversion, suborning powerful figures in England to support and further a peace settlement favourable to France. This was the more difficult task, as Hooke was aware, given that the prevailing English mindset rested on a resolutely negative perception of France. The contacts

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

with leading English figures that Hooke had developed in the Netherlands could serve to initiate measures in this regard. Important to both strategies was the undoing of the Hanoverian Succession and the restoration of James III.

Overall his mission led to the acquisition of valuable intelligence for the French. For little outlay in terms of expenditure or risk de Torcy had placed his own agent at the heart of the allied command for a period of over five months. During that time the tone and temper of events and decisions unfolding there were accessible to him via Hooke's dispatches and analysis. Hooke acted as de Torcy's eyes and ears in the Netherlands, clarifying, more reliably than anonymous agents, what was possible and, perhaps even more importantly, what was not. Expectations that a peace could be negotiated were shown to be unrealistic. Manoeuvres to split the Dutch from their English alliance were equally shown to be ill-founded. While these may not have been the answers that de Torcy wanted to hear, they did give him the accurate information he needed to formulate French foreign policy. Hooke proved himself a useful agent and perceptive analyst, setting the course for his future career.

When contextualised in the broader perspective of European diplomacy and international relations, Hooke's activity as a French agent casts valuable light on the objectives and mechanics of secret diplomacy and intelligence in the opening phase of the War of Spanish Succession. It shows clearly what could and equally importantly what could not be achieved. As his reports show political and religious identities were by no means set hard and fast, or understood to be so by contemporaries. If they had been non-negotiable there would have been far less fear and far less worry in England and much less uncertainty for Hooke to exploit.

In the months after William's death questions inevitably arose in relation to the English succession as well as the Spanish. With a Stuart, Queen Anne, on the throne and a Stuart, James III, as counterclaimant, the unfolding conflict would also be a form of civil war. As with all such conflicts friends and family could be divided by diverging loyalties. In such a situation, without the benefit of hindsight, it was difficult to tell friend from foe, or when the vanquished might become the victor. For a generation with the last restoration fresh in their memories another 'revolution' in political realities was all too possible. Hooke had utilised these conditions to work for the interests of France in the Netherlands. The next phase of his career in French service was to involve removing an enemy of France by bringing about another restoration by altering the English succession and unravelling the union of England and Scotland.

CHAPTER 7: SCOTLAND: 'A VERY FATAL DIVERSION'¹

In 1703 Hooke wrote another sequence of briefing papers for de Torcy analysing prevailing international relations and setting out recommendations to strengthen the French position against England, the United Provinces and the Emperor. From these recommendations emerged plans for an invasion of Scotland. This project would evolve largely through the efforts of Hooke himself, and would be a significant chapter of his career. His ideas on Scotland came to the fore once it became clear from his Dutch mission that securing French policy goals in England or Holland was unlikely. Very few in The Netherlands seemed interested enough in peace to abandon their English allies. Despite Hooke's best efforts, subtle approaches to Marlborough, Cutts, Stanhope and Barnard promised little in the short term. As the fortunes of war turned against France, Hooke's plans to use more direct methods against England gained support. With trouble brewing in Scotland even without French involvement, he was able to persuade a coterie of powerful and influential military and political figures in Paris that a French invasion of Scotland would coerce the English into negotiating peace. And a peace on French terms in 1705 or 1708 could have led to a very different balance of power than that of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1712. Hooke was fully cognisant of the important commercial benefits that could accrue to France in such a situation. His practical plans were devised with geopolitical strategy very much in mind. In his view, France's main competitor was England and colonial rivalry would determine the winner. He believed the best policy to challenge Britain and

¹ *Letters of Daniel Defoe*, ed. G. H. Healey, pp 243-44; quoted in Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, p. 98.

underpin French security and trade worldwide was a successful invasion of Scotland. He very nearly succeeded in bring this about.

Hooke developed this thesis over time. In February 1703 he presented a report to de Torcy addressing the strategic situation of France *vis-à-vis* its enemies. His objective was to suggest ways in which France could exploit its opponent's weak points. Hooke emphasised the economic dimension of the war as an opportunity for the French, arguing that the commercial interests of the combatants would be of crucial significance. Financial, commercial and demographic considerations had encouraged England to enter the new war while still recovering from the exertions of 1688-97: the positive state of its revenue, the much lower cost of its government, the rapidity of its commercial recovery and the increase in its population augured much more favourably for England's ability to wage war compared with France's.² As such

the Privy Council of England was convinced that now was the time to assure their commerce and their liberty, before France had time to recover fully (however erroneous the suppositions may be). As the increase of their strength follows that of their commerce they believe that their liberties will be protected in establishing the latter.³

Hooke is especially sensitive to the connection between the expansion of commerce and the might of a state, a symbiotic relationship between profit and power. Because of this he suggested that the main focus of the English in seeking economic advantage in the war would be in the Americas because

the commerce of Spain and America is the most lucrative of all (according to a statement I have, the latter amounts to almost one half of their profits), and they believe that never again will they have such an advantageous occasion to increase it further.⁴

² Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 178r). The memoir was read by de Torcy before the Conseil d'en Haut.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., f. 178v. Hooke estimated current English profits from their American colonies at about 1,000,000 sterling a year. His figures are similar to those given by Edward Chamberlaine, *Anglicae notitia, or the present state of England, with diverse remarks upon the present state thereof* (London, 1700), p. 62

The Emperor's pretensions regarding the Spanish Monarchy gave the English an excuse to intervene in Spanish territories from which they had long been excluded and the sixth article of the treaty of the Grand Alliance stipulated that the English could retain whatever they could manage to seize in the Americas.⁵ Hooke argued that any English expansion in the Caribbean or the mainland of Spanish America was expected to bring immense profits, both in terms of tangible revenue and the political rewards for whoever gained the upper hand. Hooke stated that William III had been advised that if he could 'obtain for the English, the freedom to traffic in the Spanish Indies, His Majesty would win the hearts of all the nation'.⁶

In earlier memoirs Hooke had argued against the practicalities of military enterprises in the West Indies and Spanish America. However he reconsidered his analysis of grand strategy in the light of new information 'since my conversations in Holland with merchants and others, and after what I have been told from England'.⁷ The eighth article of the Treaty of the Grand Alliance barred the French from trading in Spanish America. Hooke's contacts had revealed that 'the opposition of the minister of the Emperor in London came to form to this design rendered them more ardent to execute it, so as not to fail to take advantage of the present situation'.⁸

Coupled with this opportunity for the English was a fear of French colonial ventures exploiting the new relationship with Spain to threaten England's trade in the West Indies. There were already

⁵ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703, (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 178v).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

grave rumours that the French might seize the Canary Islands. The establishment of a presence at the mouth of the Mississippi aroused fears that the French might have a scheme to gain control of the mines of New Mexico or that they would ruin the commerce of the English colonies in North America, which would ruin at the same time their islands in the Indies which subsist only through these colonies.⁹

Therefore England had a strong motivation to attack French and Spanish interests in the Americas. Hooke suggested that if the English decided to act offensively ‘in the New World they will start perhaps [...] with an attempt to destroy the French colonies, as the surest means of ruining the navy of the king, these colonies being the nursery for sailors of France.’¹⁰ It was Hooke’s belief that English ambitions in this regard went back much further than the present or even previous war. Hooke traced English antagonism against the French and covetousness of the Spanish into the 1680s, when disaffected English Protestant groups planned to establish settlements in the Americas. As a participant in these schemes Hooke could claim first hand knowledge of the leading figures involved, the earl of Peterborough and William Penn, and their plans, ‘giving me the ability to talk of their designs with great clarity’.¹¹ He could even boast documentary evidence, ‘although I have not yet received the originals of their plans, which I left in England.’¹² This knowledge was important and relevant because he suggested that the essence of those plans was now being reactivated and English military activity was likely to be directed against the commercial and territorial interests of Spain and France in the West Indies, Central and South America. Hooke was at pains to

⁹ Ibid., f. 179r.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. Hooke was referring to the enterprises discussed in chapter two. Mordaunt had visited Hooke in the Tower during his imprisonment in 1690. See the warrant of the governor of the Tower to Charles Mordaunt, earl of Monmouth, 15 July 1690 (T.N.A., [formerly P.R.O.] SP 44/338 f. 407).

¹² Hooke, ‘Memoir on England’s reasons for embarking upon war’, 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 179r). The papers Hooke refers to may have been left in the care of his brother, John Hooke, in London.

stress that this was a conscious and wholly premeditated attempt by the English to dominate their trade rivals, and this included their nominal allies the Dutch.

If the English, operating from their base in Jamaica, could establish themselves in a sufficiently dominant strategic position in the Caribbean they could hold the shipping of other countries to ransom. Displaying an informed knowledge of the geographic and political situation of the Latin American region,¹³ Hooke suggested that there were a number of approaches they could take to achieve their object: firstly they could re-establish the Darien colony in Panama, this time supported with the full resources of the English government.¹⁴ Sieur Maclaine, one of the Scottish leaders at Darien, had told Hooke whilst in the Netherlands that the lack of provisions, and not the 'bad air of the country or Spanish forces' had been the main cause of the colony's failure.¹⁵ However

if they were able to establish themselves on this isthmus they would be able to hold in check Panama and Carthagea [...] they would oblige the Spanish to make them carriers of their silver: they could even attract to themselves, in time, the commerce of the East Indies in shortening the way by some thousands of leagues. [...] By this they would diminish the grandeur of the Dutch and be able to extend their own capabilities.¹⁶

¹³ As well as being personally acquainted with men like Penn and Maclaine, who were involved in colonial enterprises in the Americas, Hooke also appears to have made use of a number of written works such as A. O Exquemelin and Basil Ringrose, *The history of the bucaniers of America, or, A true account of the most remarkable assaults committed (of late years) upon the coasts of the West Indies by the bucaniers of Jamaica and Tortuga, English, Dutch, Portuguese &c* (London, 1695); Philip Ayres, *The voyages and adventures of Capt. Barth. Sharp and others in the South Sea being a journal of the same : also Capt. Van Horn with his buccanieres surprizing of la Veracruz : to which is added the true relation of Sir Henry Morgan his expedition against the Spaniards in the West-Indies and his taking Panama : together with the president of Panama's [i.e. Juan Perez de Guzman] account of the same expedition, translated out of Spanish : and Col. Beeston's adjustment of the peace between the Spaniards and English in the West Indies* (London, 1684) and Basil Ringrose, *Bucaniers of America the second volume : containing the dangerous voyage and bold attempts of Captain Bartholomew Sharp, and others, performed upon the coasts of the South Sea, for the space of two years, &c. : from the original journal of the said voyage* (London, 1685).

¹⁴ Darien was a failed attempt in the late 1690s to bring prosperity to Scotland by establishing a trading colony in South America. Much of the country's already limited capital was lost when the venture failed. The project and its impact on Anglo-Scottish relations is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

¹⁵ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 179r).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 179v. This would also explain William III's lack of cooperation with the initial Scottish Darien scheme, as it would have led to tensions within his multiple kingdoms.

Obviously the Dutch would have problems with such a project. A less confrontational approach might see the English and Dutch unite to ‘act in concert to ruin the French colonies, and then each [would] establish themselves separately, the Dutch on the south coast and the English more towards the north.’¹⁷ Hooke however was sceptical about such an arrangement as giving anything more than ‘the appearance that they had agreed not to do harm to one another.’¹⁸ In this scenario the English would

follow the plan of Mr Penn who proposed before to enter into the Alvarado river and to make themselves the masters of Guaxaca province, which is very open and rich, or to settle in that of Chiapas which produces an abundance of the best [scarlet dye] *cochenille* in America, and where are found large numbers of good horses.

A landing in this area along the Tabasco River would also have the advantage of attracting local allies, opening up the prospect of an advance into the interior where

one is sure to be assisted by an Indian nation [...] who have never been subdued by the Spanish, hence one could easily seize Guatemala, where the slaves are numerous and ready to revolt; in settling on the Golfo Dolce in this province one will assure oneself of a port capable of receiving thousands of ships and which can be defended with ease. One will find there also a nation of black rebels who revolted a long time ago, who would be happy to join with the English against the Spaniards, as well as the Indians of the Yucatan and Vera Paz who are always at war with them. The Spaniards of these provinces have less than 5000 men capable of carrying arms, their own Indians will rebel against them, and the old inhabitants descended from the first Spanish, which are called Criolios, are also of the same hostile sentiment.¹⁹

If the English could achieve this then the outlook for the Spanish in America was poor: ‘the advantage of the situation’ from an English viewpoint was

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid. ‘Captain’ Bartholomew Sharp, an English buccaneer, had received help from local tribes when mounting a daring overland raid on the Spanish city of Panama. Sharp and his 250 men operated from Darien to the Pacific coast for two years unimpeded before returning to London in 1682. The activities of these and other pirate groups had the viceroy of Peru bemoaning the defenceless state of the Spanish Indies. See Henry Kamen, *Spain’s road to empire: the making of a world power, 1492-1763* (London, 2003), pp 424-429.

the fact that they ‘would hold all of America in check’.²⁰ Such a situation would also threaten the vital interests of the Netherlands, as the English would displace the Dutch as the ‘carriers of the world’ since the greatest profit in trading with Spain ‘comes entirely from this principle’, and the French whose possession of the right to supply slaves to the Spanish Indies, (the *asiento*) would aggravate the English if they ‘believed that the French have the same objective’ to dominate the Atlantic trade.²¹ Hooke advocated seizing Jamaica as an effective countermeasure against any English operations in the Caribbean. Again Hooke was convinced that military action in the form of a descent would be a rewarding strategy: ‘this blow alone [would] ruin from top to bottom their power and their commerce in the West Indies’.²² This was an important policy in Hooke’s understanding of geopolitical trends because to his mind the English ‘*were searching for the future*’ [my italics], and that future would be underpinned by the expansion of trade and empire at others expense.²³

Though Hooke’s scenario appeared discouraging and rather disconnected from the immediate challenges in hand in Europe, he linked his analysis of the situation in the Americas to the European theatre of operations. He demonstrated that an assessment from such a broad geopolitical perspective revealed an opportunity for France to divide the Allied opposition, England, The Netherlands and the Empire and end the war quickly. France had sufficient economic and military capability to subdue two of these powers, but not the three together. Hooke’s ideas in this respect, running through his analysis from 1702 onwards,

²⁰ Hooke, ‘Memoir on England’s reasons for embarking upon war’, 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 179v).

²¹ Ibid., f. 180r.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

were to contribute to an important component of French strategic thinking: the separation of the Dutch from England and the Emperor. Hooke's own experience in the Netherlands and other reports suggested that the Dutch might agree to negotiate peace terms given the right conditions.

Hooke's observations centred on how this might be done. He focused on the obvious commercial conflict of interest between England and the Netherlands.²⁴ He believed that discordance between the two countries was so serious that

despite those conventions that the two nations of England and Holland were able to make, it is still certain that if the fear of France did not hold them together it would be impossible to avoid a rupture, as M Stanhope, Envoy Extraordinary of England and Plenipotentiary at the Hague, and M. Cresset, Envoy of the same crown to Hanover, confessed to me last year in the Hague.²⁵

Hooke described the English as being jealous of the Dutch. One of the main reasons was that they were 'persuaded that they had lost about 80 million by the last war, and that the Dutch gained more than 8 millions.'²⁶ This was not just a popular prejudice; the animosity extended into the highest levels of government. Hooke's copy of a memoir presented to the English Council of Commerce contained a lengthy condemnation of the Dutch. This centred on their alleged usurping of English fishing rights, 'viewing with a jaundiced eye that the Dutch are fishing even on the coasts of England itself, and they make a profit from this of 7 million sterling at least.'²⁷ Bitterness had increased after the Peace of Ryswick, 'with complaints in the Lower House that the Dutch did not want to

²⁴ See Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp 969-70.

²⁵ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 180v).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

suffer the English to fish on their own coast'.²⁸ It appeared that the long standing and deep seated anti-Dutch feeling that had led to three wars (1652-54, 1665-67 and 1672-74) between the two countries was now being reanimated after the death of William III. The fishing issue became a major grievance giving rise to much public debate and a demand within the political nation that something be done.²⁹ The fishing dispute broadened and linked into wider issues. A number of books and pamphlets were written highlighting the damage being done to England's trade and prosperity.³⁰ The revenue lost to the Dutch through fishing was presented as a panacea for England by one writer who asked

how much likewise we should enrich the land by so much treasure got out of our own seas, which afford ten millions of gains to our neighbours yearly, if we reckon others with the Dutch; how many poor people it would set at work; how plentiful and cheap such an increase in edibles would make all sorts of provisions; how it would increase shipping, be a nursery of mariners, so that we should never want to set our fleet, if our Fishery were encouraged, as it might easily be.³¹

It was evident that the issue had aroused a high level of agitation and some depth of resentment. The English parliament had established a 'Council of Commerce [in order] [...] to examine by what means neighbouring peoples seized the commerce of England, and to seek means to win it back'.³²

French foreign policy could benefit from this situation because Hooke believed that English strategy for winning back commerce was targeted principally at the Dutch. He highlighted a report produced by the Council, shortly

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch*, pp 9-11.

³⁰ Edward Chamberlaine's *Angliae notitia, or the present state of England with diverse remarks on the ancient state thereof* (London, 1700) traced complaints against the Dutch in regard to fishing back to comments of Walter Raleigh to James I that the Dutch were 'yearly selling herrings caught on our coast to the value of £1,372,000'; he claimed that 12,000 Dutch ships and 200,000 men were currently employed 'putting the Dutch total at £5,000,000', p. 64.

³¹ Chamberlaine, *Angliae notitia*, p. 66.

³² Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 181r).

before the war began, portraying the Dutch as culprits in obstructing England commerce. It recommended

1. That [the Dutch] be obliged not to prevent the English from dealing with China and Japan.
2. That they would no longer trouble [the English] in their commerce with the East Indies, and they would not prevent them in any way from expanding there.
3. That they would let the English enjoy, in full freedom, that which remained to them of the pepper trade.³³

In Hooke's view this testified to England's longstanding commercial competition with the Dutch, particularly in Asia.³⁴ The ascendancy of the Dutch in the East Indies trade at England's expense was a particularly inflammatory memory. Hooke wrote that this 'caused much jealousy in England: their usurpation of the English on Bantam and elsewhere was not forgotten.'³⁵ To men of Hooke's generation Anglo-Dutch rivalry was an important and traditional dynamic. Another aspect in Anglo-Dutch relations that Hooke noted was the link between the English Whigs and the Estates General. This was based on shared espousal of the Hanoverian Succession in England. The Whigs believed that support and facilitation of the new regime would assure them of power in England; the Estates General hoped the accession of the house of Hanover would allow them continued influence in English affairs and enhance their security.³⁶ This was another situation of which French diplomacy (and espionage) could take advantage. Hooke suggested that these factors could also 'furnish an occasion to detach one

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See P. J. Marshall, 'The English in Asia to 1700' in Canny, Nicholas (ed.), *The origins of empire*, volume 2 of *The Oxford history of the British Empire*, W. R. Louis (ed.), (5vols, Oxford, 1988), pp 264-86.

³⁵ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 181r).

³⁶ Ibid., f. 181v.

or the other nation from the league' against France.³⁷ He emphasised that in the Alliance facing France the interaction between England and the Netherlands was the important dynamic, whereas nobody 'worried for the interests of the Emperor.'³⁸

To woo either England or 'Holland' away from the Grand Alliance required that the French recognise the different priorities of the two countries. Both countries' essential war aims involved achieving French concessions on trade and security. Trade was a common denominator for both countries. However the security concerns of both countries were different. With this in mind Hooke summarized the essentials necessary for France to negotiate an understanding with England or Holland, saying it

would be necessary to guarantee Holland's frontier or England's political freedom [in any negotiations], things which are not very difficult. The first of these two nations to which one wishes to give these sureties and the benefits of commerce will be delighted to profit to the exclusion of the other.³⁹

To Hooke's mind 'it would be easier, and more advantageous to France, to detach Holland and support it against England.'⁴⁰ His reasoning in this regard was that 'as all factions of this Republic have until now agreed on what is in their interest, and they are only divided on the means of how to obtain it, it seems less difficult to satisfy them.'⁴¹ Dealing with the Dutch would have to commence quickly, Hooke emphasised, because if one 'waits too long [...] affairs will produce such a close liaison between the Whigs and the Dutch, that one will be

³⁷ Ibid., f. 181r.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., f. 181v.

⁴¹ Ibid.

obliged to wait for some new revolution in England before being heard by the English or the Dutch.’⁴²

‘To win over the English’ would be more difficult in Hooke’s assessment because ‘each party has different interests, and both of them are almost equal in power, so that no one is the master.’⁴³ To accommodate the desires of the Tories would be to enrage the Whigs and *vice versa*. Such division placed grave obstacles in the way of achieving anything in England. Disunity was a strength rather than weakness, even if the English themselves did not recognise the fact.

Hooke had his doubts, therefore, of the likelihood of success in political projects in England. However as an analyst it was still his job to assess and present possibilities. He suggested playing one party off against the other to further French interests. In Hooke’s view the Tories wanted ‘to diminish the power of France and to safeguard England’. While the Whigs ‘pretend the same thing [...] their true motive is to do with their own affairs, so much so that they would prefer peace to a war that is not conducted by them’. Hooke had little sympathy for his former comrades in the Whig ranks. He presented them as a self-interested group who would do anything for power.

Hooke suggested that the political situation in England could be exploited in a number of ways. One scenario was to allow the Tories greater latitude to end the Hanoverian Succession and distance England from the Dutch by subverting a number of the Whig leaders. It would be impossible, Hooke conceded, to win over all the Whig leaders, ‘but the division that will be born between them, and the jealousy that will be aroused by this means will in any event have a better affect.’

⁴² Ibid. That successful peace negotiations only followed the Tory election victory of 1710 suggests Hooke’s analysis was sound.

⁴³ Ibid.

If the Tories were in a stronger position they might feel sufficiently emboldened to 'reject the Hanoverian Succession and recall the king of England after his sister's death'.⁴⁴ Even though it was true the Anglican Tories 'feared a Catholic king' they feared a Whig-supported Hanoverian king more.⁴⁵ Hooke believed that James III would be seen as 'their only means of maintaining themselves against the Whigs.'⁴⁶ The Whigs in turn, Hooke proposed, suspected that this was the Tories' intention. The prosecution of Whig grandees in parliament was proof of the mortal hatred between both factions. However, Hooke believed the Whigs were capable of forestalling the Tories. Comparing the Restoration and the prevailing situation, Hooke depicted the Whigs as potentially 'playing the same role as their predecessors, who, seeing their enemies working to recall Charles II, they anticipated them and had all the merit.'⁴⁷

This would have been a tenuous analysis if Hooke had not obtained a significant piece of supporting evidence. John Somers (1651-1716), one of the most important Whig leaders, (the 'personification of Whiggery' according to his biographer),⁴⁸ had written from England, via Hooke's contacts, offering his services.⁴⁹ This was unexpected, as Somers had been close to William III, who had appointed him Lord Chancellor of England, and one of the Commissioners to

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., f. 182r.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ W. L. Sachse, *Lord Somers: a political portrait* (Manchester, 1975), p. 166.

⁴⁹ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 182v). Somers had made his initial offer of service to an anonymous correspondent of Hooke's in London. It appears that Hooke had commissioned this contact to ameliorate awkward news from France, in this particular instance the negative impact of the conversion of Lord Middleton. It was during this conversation that Somers had made his offer. See [Anon] to Hooke (extract), 22 Jan. 1703 (A. A. E., CP, Angleterre vol. 215, f. 8v).

act as regents when he was abroad.⁵⁰ However, Somers had been dismissed for political reasons by William III in 1700 and his involvement in the secret partition treaties led to his (unsuccessful) impeachment in April 1701.⁵¹ The accession of Queen Anne ensured Somers's banishment to the political wilderness, as the new monarch detested him for taking William III's side in disputes. Though out of office he remained, in 1703, 'the life, the soul, and the spirit of his party.'⁵²

Hooke adjudged him to be 'upright, sincere, moderate [and] the best mind in England; one can hope for much from his standing and credit with the [Whig] faction'⁵³ Through Somers, Hooke hoped it would be possible to manipulate English politics to the advantage of France. Ideally he would persuade the Whigs of the benefits, not least to themselves, of accepting the return of James III and peace with France. If Somers 'did not succeed, even if he were to lose all his credit' Hooke believed his actions would 'disconcert all the measures of the Whigs.'⁵⁴ In a piece of sharp Machiavellian thinking, Hooke posited that if Somers 'failed in the end, it will still be possible to use his *demarches* to alarm the Tories and make them proceed faster and cause confusion on both sides, which can only prove to be of very great advantage to France.'⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Even the correspondent who wrote of Somers offer began his account to Hooke with the words 'However strange this will seem to you I have been commissioned by him to offer his services.' See [Anon] to Hooke (extract), 22 Jan. 1703 (A. A. E., CP, Angleterre vol. 215, f. 8v).

⁵¹ Sachse, *Lord Somers*, p. 179.

⁵² *ibid.*, p. 213.

⁵³ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 182v).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* For the Restoration comparison see Barry Coward, *The Stuart age: England 1603-1714* (3rd edition, London, 2003), p. 328.

In Hooke's view trying to influence the Tories directly was problematic. 'All the difficulty in handling these men consists in their different characters.'⁵⁶ Hooke's time in Holland made him confident that he comprehended the personalities involved. Marlborough, the most powerful Tory, was a man whose public presentation differed very much from his real depths, but according to Hooke 'with a little study and familiarity it is not difficult to penetrate his inclinations and his goals.'⁵⁷ However Marlborough rarely made any decisions without recourse to Sidney Godolphin, a man who was 'very subtle, sombre, wary, deceitful and dissimulating.'⁵⁸ This made negotiating with Marlborough very difficult as Godolphin's views usually prevailed in the end; as Hooke put it 'the first doing nothing without the approbation of the second.'⁵⁹

However Hooke considered that making some 'reasonable' propositions to Marlborough when he was in Flanders, away from direct contact with Godolphin, might be useful on a number of levels. He was known to 'love money passionately' and he was eager to 'establish the fortune of his house'. However he 'knows that the favourite of the Prince is never popular for long with the people of England': already a proposal to award a pension to him and his descendants had failed in the House of Commons.'⁶⁰ Hooke suggested that this might 'dispose him to embrace the first overture to establish his fortune, consolidate the Anglican Church, and to ruin the party of the Whigs, in recalling the king of England as the

⁵⁶ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 182v).

⁵⁷ Ibid. Winston Churchill believed that in dealings between Marlborough and Hooke, the English general had succeeded in masking his true thoughts and intentions, and gleaned more information from Hooke than *vice versa*. See W. Churchill, *Marlborough: his life and times* (2 vols, University of Chicago Press edition, Chicago, 2001), i, 329, 626.

⁵⁸ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 183r).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

most sure means of succeeding in his wishes.⁶¹ Nothing could be lost by this in Hooke's opinion, even if the offer was refused, as 'neither [Marlborough] nor the Allies can draw the least advantage from this demarche.'⁶²

Hooke proposed military action in tandem with the political strategy as the most persuasive. 'Making [the English] feel the force of the king's arms at the same time will prevent them imaging that it comes from a lack of means to continue the war.'⁶³ Hooke considered that even the complete failure of all the political overtures he had suggested in England, especially an offer of a reasonable peace to Marlborough, would be useful to France. Aware of the value of propaganda, Hooke argued that propositions would serve to justify French military actions 'demonstrating to all the world [Louis XIV's] love for peace and for the tranquillity of Europe.'

In this context Hooke made his first direct reference to a plan that would dominate his activities over the course of the next several years: a French invasion of Scotland. Hooke argued that such an enterprise would see substantial benefits accruing to France. 'The present state of Scotland furnishes an almost infallible means of placing England in a position where she will be forced to make peace, or to become almost useless, or even a burden, to the Allies.'⁶⁴ Conditions in Scotland were favourable for the French involvement as 'the Scots, besides their discomfort at the English for the Darien affair, appear to be very little disposed to

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid. The desire to demonstrate French strength to the Allies was the opposite of what occurred proceeding peace talks in the previous war from 1688-97. Then the English and Dutch had sought to convince the French that, despite making secret peace overtures, their military ability was unimpaired. See Baxter, *William III*, p. 322. The reversal of roles underlined a change in the relative balance of power.

⁶⁴ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 183v).

accept the Hanoverian succession and according to the establishment since the Revolution they have the right to reject it.⁶⁵

A union between England and Scotland had been a goal of William III.⁶⁶ Disaffection in Scotland had increased throughout the 1690s. The principal cause of the worsening relations between the neighbouring kingdoms was the disparity in economic conditions between the two jurisdictions. England's commercial development compared to Scotland's stagnation rankled with many Scots. England's achievement was understood to be derived from the commercial success of its American and Caribbean settlements. Understandably, an element of envy fuelled growing animosity to England. Despite sharing a monarch, Scottish access to these markets remained severely restricted. The obvious palliative for Scotland's woes was seen to be the creation of its own colonial network. A mix of resentment, envy and a desire to emulate England underpinned the launch of the 'Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies' in 1695.⁶⁷ The name itself indicated the 'national' aspect of investment in the company. When the English authorities in the West Indies stood by as the Scottish colony suffered from Spanish attacks, epidemics and eventually starvation, opinion in Scotland grew increasingly angry. Particular bitterness was reserved for the behaviour of their own sovereign, William III. He had made his lack of interest in the welfare of his Scottish subjects overwhelmingly clear. Since the scheme had attracted a significant amount of the available capital in Scotland through public subscription, the failure of the colony approximated to a national disaster. Such

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ William III, *A letter ...to the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland, at their meeting at Edinburgh* (Edinburgh, 1689).

⁶⁷ On Darien see John Prebble, *The Darien disaster* (reprint London, 2002). I would like to thank Dr David Worthington for his guidance in relation to sources for Scottish history in this period.

was the depth of acrimony that the likelihood of rebellion caused William to postpone his customary early summer return to the Netherlands until July 1700.⁶⁸

Therefore Hooke's assessment of strategic potential in Scotland was well grounded in reality. It was also supported by political developments in Scotland. By 1703 the political and economic *status quo* was untenable: the Scottish political nation was faced with diametrically opposed choices: formal separation from England or a closer union. Given the level of hostility to England, even those who were pro-union thought it inconceivable. John Clerk, one of the Scottish negotiators selected to go to London in 1706 who was personally in favour of the Union, was still convinced his journey south would bring nothing but expense and failure because of the level of anti-union feeling in the Scottish Parliament.⁶⁹ Separation seemed the most likely option, though one that would not be easy to achieve. Conflict with England would undoubtedly result. Ending the 1603 union of crowns between the kingdoms would radically affect English foreign and security policy. English concerns would be dominated by the danger of the rebirth of the traditional 'Auld Alliance' between France and Scotland. With England at war with France, such an occurrence was a strategic nightmare. An independent Scotland was a vulnerable flank exposing England itself to invasion. Strategic necessity would see England resort to war and invasion before accepting such an outcome, whatever the Scottish Parliament might decide. The Scots therefore would need French help to ward off the English. It was this situation that Hooke was hoping to exploit.

⁶⁸ Baxter, *William III*, p. 377.

⁶⁹ John Clerk, *Memoirs of the life of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik* (Edinburgh, 1892), p. 58. Quoted in Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 68.

According to Hooke's analysis the English government were attempting to solve this serious problem of escalating resentment and the prospect of an independent Scottish foreign policy by 'pretending' to offer a formal union of the two countries.⁷⁰ In Hooke's view what the English really intended was to let the discussions 'drag on, all with the intention of giving them more liberty to consider outside affairs.'⁷¹ If the European situation stabilised, the English would have far less reason to worry about Scotland and far more freedom to deal with it without the complications of outside intervention. The Scots too were happy to acquiesce in the slow moving talks, as they were 'happy to have gained time to better prepare their position on the terms they will accept.'⁷²

The outcome of events would depend on external factors. Scotland was being brought into play in the European context of the English Succession. Hooke reported that the Dutch and Hanoverians were already engaged in winning influence and votes in Scotland. 'The dowager duchess of Hanover [had] sent about 10,000 pounds sterling into Scotland to make friends there' via John Campbell (1680-1743), the son of the Whig-inclined Archibald Campbell (*d.* 1703), duke of Argyll; and when that money 'was exhausted' Hooke suspected that 'the Dutch will not leave him short of money.'⁷³ Money would be the crucial factor in Scotland, Hooke believed. 'The dukes of Hamilton and Argyll are in the

⁷⁰ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 183v).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.* 'The proposals for union that were put forth [...] in 1702/03 came to nothing, essentially because England, at this time, was not interested in pursuing them.' See Tim Harris, *Revolution: the great crisis of the British monarchy, 168-1720* (London, 2006), p. 497.

⁷³ Hooke, 'Memoir on England's reasons for embarking upon war', 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 183v). John Campbell was the grandson of Archibald Campbell (1629-85), ninth earl of Argyll, who had attempted to raise rebellion in Scotland in conjunction with Monmouth rebellion, as detailed in chapter three. His family had staged a remarkable resurgence since his grandfather's execution in 1685.

best position to alter the balance in favour of the party they will espouse.⁷⁴ Argyll's supporters were mainly Presbyterians, who, according to Hooke, being 'Church Whigs', would follow him no more if 'even once he is seen to abandon their cause. Thus one can only hope from him to break secretly the Whig's measures, while seeming to pursue their interests with zeal.'⁷⁵ Hamilton's Episcopalian and Jacobite supporters were against the Hanoverian Succession and Presbyterianism. However Hooke made clear this faction was less cohesive, with only 'some [being attached] by principle of conscience and honour, but the majority have their votes bought.'⁷⁶ Generally Hooke believed Hamilton's party were 'inclined for the king of England'; however 'if they do not find it profitable to follow their inclinations, they will soon change their sentiment and put themselves on the side of those who reach out to them with money.'⁷⁷ Time was of the essence if their votes were to be assured as 'the Whigs have already commenced to distribute some money.'⁷⁸ It is worth noting that here that it was common political practice to give and receive bribes in political affairs.⁷⁹ The malleability of the great majority of individuals was accepted as political reality. Applying these principles Hooke attempted to persuade, openly or obliquely, John Cutts, Alexander Stanhope, Christopher Vane, John Somers, and the duke of Marlborough, to aid projects which were ultimately beneficial to French interests.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ See C. H. Whatley, *Bought and sold for English gold: explaining the Union of 1707* (2nd edition, East Linton, 2001), pp 35-50, on historiographical views on the issue of bribery in Scotland.

Such methods might be profitably employed in Scotland. Hooke suggested that there were ‘two ways of helping ourselves usefully’ there.⁸⁰ The first was to remit enough money to ‘cause the rejection of the Hanoverian Succession in the Parliament which will be assembled next month.’⁸¹ The French would need to be sure of not only the Lords but also the free towns ‘who are great in number, but their deputies are so poor that 100,000 francs distributed with prudence there would be enough.’⁸² The duke of Hamilton, in Hooke’s view, was the only one with the ability to orchestrate the affair.

Hooke admitted Hamilton’s own integrity was ‘in doubt because he had had his own share of Hanoverian money.’⁸³ However Hooke had known Hamilton ‘particularly well in the past’ when both had been prisoners in the Tower of London in 1689.⁸⁴ He ‘believed he may well have taken this money without engaging in anything.’ A greater difficulty in attracting Hamilton to act in the French interest, in Hooke’s view, might be his chariness of any suggestion of involvement with the Court of St Germain as ‘he is naturally circumspect and having been [placed] two or three times in danger by the carelessness of the Court of St Germain, he will perhaps have become even more so.’⁸⁵ Hooke made it clear that he viewed the Jacobite court as an obstacle to the formulation and execution of plans for Scotland because

⁸⁰ Hooke, ‘Memoir on England’s reasons for embarking upon war’, 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 184r).

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid. The allegations against Hamilton are contained in a letter to Hooke from an anonymous correspondent in London. See [Anon.] to Hooke (extracts), 15 Jan. 1703 (A. A. E., CP, Angleterre vol. 215, f. 8r).

⁸⁴ Hooke, ‘Memoir on England’s reasons for embarking upon war’, 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 184r).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

I recognised more than ever from a journey that I had made to St Germain that the two factions of that Court destroy the efforts of one another and condemn everything that is not carried out by their party, giving a false colour to everything according to their inclination.⁸⁶

Hamilton was not a lost cause however, ‘if things were gone about the right way from the start, it will be easy to engage him and his word can be counted on, if one is exact in holding to the promises made to him.’⁸⁷

However beyond political stratagems, Hooke recommended a ‘better and more efficacious means through which Scotland [could] be rendered useful to France.’⁸⁸

This means is to land a small body of troops there with the consent of the principals of the nation who would favour their descent. I have investigated the means needed to succeed in this design and what can be expected from the Scots.⁸⁹

However although Hooke was ‘persuaded that this would be an infallible means of rendering England untroublesome to France for a long time’ he did ‘not believe that things were sufficiently finalised as yet to expand’ on his plan.⁹⁰

Before Hooke had the opportunity to expand on his Scottish proposals his circumstances changed radically. As a serving army officer Hooke exchanged the pen for the sword during the 1703 campaigning season in Flanders. Even before being interrupted by the necessity of rejoining the army Hooke’s political projects in England had been making little headway. Negotiations regarding the surprising offer of John Somers were slow and delayed by the English politician’s frequent

⁸⁶ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the means of rendering England useless to the League in present circumstances’, 25 Mar. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f.187r).

⁸⁷ Hooke, ‘Memoir on England’s reasons for embarking upon war’, 18 Feb. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 184r).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., f. 184v.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

indispositions and extreme cautiousness.⁹¹ Correspondence from Hooke's contacts in England suggested that another approach to the duke of Marlborough might now produce useful results. To this end Hooke was ordered by de Torcy to travel to Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen). Marshall Villeroy, Hooke's commanding office in Flanders and an influential courtier, was briefed on the mission and provided a passport in September 1703.

Aix-la-Chapelle was renowned for its recuperative spa waters. Located in neutral territory but close to the conflict in Flanders, it attracted some of the most influential political and diplomatic personnel from both sides once the campaign was halted for the winter. Opponents now mingled politely at social *soirées*, balls and gambling tables. To elicit as much information as possible Hooke sought to give the impression that he 'was only a man who was in France by force of circumstance and who much loved England.'⁹² Hooke makes clear the level of performance and conscious self-presentation that he engaged in to allay suspicions, referring to the 'character which I presented in The Hague' as the model for his current role.⁹³ It leads one to wonder if there were any occasions when Hooke was not consciously fashioning the image which he wanted perceived.

Hooke told de Torcy that the Comtesse de Tilly, a Dutch general's wife whom he had saved from harm at the battle of Eckeren earlier in 1703, had

⁹¹ Hooke, 'Memoir on the means of rendering England useless to the League in present circumstances', 25 Mar. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 187r); Hooke, 'Memoir to M de Torcy', 2 Apr. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 187v).

⁹² Hooke to de Torcy, 25 Oct. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 201v).

⁹³ *Ibid.*, f. 201r.

confirmed his cover story of being in France purely by necessity.⁹⁴ This declaration ‘was part of the reason why I was spoken to with frankness in Aix.’⁹⁵ Hooke conversed with many people during the course of his stay, including George Hamilton (1666-1737), earl of Orkney, brother of the duke of Hamilton, Major General Coenraad Willem van Dedem (d. 1714) of the Dutch army, Richard Hill (1655-1727), English ambassador to Savoy, and General Sommerdal, commander of the Hanoverian army. One of the most valuable friendships Hooke struck up was with John Dalrymple (1673-1747), son of the Earl of Stair.⁹⁶ Such was the closeness of the friendship that Dalrymple was at pains to persuade Hooke to return to England.⁹⁷

Hooke learned something of great import in the course of one conversation where Dalrymple ‘pressed me strongly to leave the party of the young king, assuring me that he knew two or three lords who had been ordered to offer their services to this prince, and to distract him with these specious offers.’⁹⁸ The reason for John Somers’s unexpected offer was now explained. While Hooke had been busy conceiving and, as he thought, implementing subversive political plots in England, he had been the victim of such a scheme himself. Hooke must have also questioned again how much credence he could give to his communications

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 201v. The general in question was Claude-Frédéric ‘t Serclaes (1648-1723), Comte de Tilly, born in Brabant but in Dutch service. Illustrating the fluidity of history and the flexible nature of service, he was a relative of Johann ‘t Serclaes (1559-1632), Graf von Tilly, commander of the Catholic Imperial forces which had brutally sacked Magdeburg in 1631. His brother, Albert-Octave ‘t Serclaes (1646-1715), joined the Spanish armies of Philip V in 1703 as commander of the royal guards, rising to deputy commander of Spanish forces in 1709.

⁹⁵ Hooke to de Torcy, 25 Oct. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 201v).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 202v. Dalrymple’s grandfather James Dalrymple (1619-1695), viscount Stair, had been in exile in the Netherlands in the 1680s. Under William III the family rose to prominence in Scotland. John Dalrymple began his career as a soldier in the 1690s and by 1703 he was an aide-de-camp to Marlborough. He rose to the rank of lieutenant-general in 1710 and undertook a diplomatic mission to Saxony-Poland. In 1715 he was appointed British ambassador to France, where he renewed his acquaintance with Hooke.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

with Cutts, Stanhope and Marlborough. Were sentiments they expressed regarding peace genuine, or part of a disinformation campaign? To make matters worse Dalrymple confirmed something that Hooke had commented on previously: that the court of St Germain, and France, could not depend on English Jacobites and Tories. They did not accept James III could be re-established by force of French arms, nor did they believe he would ever be recalled voluntarily while France remained a powerful threat to England. Logic led the exiled Stuarts' supporters in England into a peculiar situation. The power of France, though James III's strongest ally, prevented a restoration, therefore

the Jacobites and the Tories would concentrate all their efforts to pull it down. But the health of Queen [Anne] was diminishing and circumstances were so pressing that these gentlemen themselves will be obliged to take other measures for the succession or to submit to those that have already been taken, because their project to bring down France requires too much time and its success is very uncertain, that therefore there is hardly any appearance that the young king will return to England, since even his friends only wish it in conditions that are nearly impossible.⁹⁹

George Hamilton and Colonel Emanuel Howe (c.1663-1709), brother of influential English MP John Howe (1657-1722), summed up English political sentiment succinctly by commenting that 'if the king of England [James III] was an angel, from the manner in which he was raised he would not be wanted in England [...] because we absolutely never want France to give us a king.'¹⁰⁰ They were adamant that 'if your prince of Wales wants to return to England, he must qualify himself for that.'¹⁰¹ Given the discouraging information that Hooke had uncovered in his discussions, it appeared that his plans for political schemes among the parties in England were dead.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., f. 203r.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Force however was a more straightforward option than the vagaries of political subversion. Meetings with Scots notables in Aix-la-Chapelle suggested that Hooke's idea for military intervention in Scotland could be successful. The Scots, whom Hooke met, unnamed but of 'the first quality', offered to 'take measures with me to be supported by France if Scotland came to break from England.'¹⁰² Hooke was wary of saying 'something inappropriate' but he was able to report that 'my friends assured me that if the Scots could not obtain a union with England, such as they asked for, they would throw themselves into the arms of France, the king of England [James III] or whoever, rather than remain slaves of the English.'¹⁰³ According to Hooke feeling in Scotland on the likely outcome of negotiations was divided. Some believed that England would agree union rather than risk separation. Others were persuaded that peace with France would be preferred, 'rather than consent to a union contrary to English interests.'¹⁰⁴ England would then be in 'a better state to subjugate Scotland.'¹⁰⁵ Hooke stated that the Scots were 'determined to risk everything' if they did not get a favourable deal. However he emphasised that 'all [the Scots] agreed that nothing could be done without the protection of France and they very much wish to be reassured.'¹⁰⁶

To emphasise the importance of liaising with the Scots, Hooke reiterated that he was now convinced of the lack of political options in England. The Whigs were amusing themselves with insincere propositions designed to 'take up time [...] distracting the king [Louis XIV] from attempting anything in England or profiting from the disposition of Scotland.' The Tories, bar a small minority,

¹⁰² Ibid., f. 206r.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., f. 206v.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

‘played the same role [...] because [they] would be happy to exclude [James III] eternally’ provided their own interests were protected. Hooke believed that at the right time ‘the greatest part of these gentlemen will lift the mask and they will think no more of their legitimate king.’¹⁰⁷ Hooke criticised the court of St Germain for having been influenced by these machinations and hollow claims. In fact Hooke claimed several, unnamed, leading members of the exiled Jacobite court now viewed France as being an obstacle to a restoration. Broaching the subject of landing arms in Scotland, Hooke said that the proposal had been received coldly ‘by the principals among them’, who replied that ‘it was good for France and not for us.’¹⁰⁸ While not contesting the practicality of such an undertaking, Hooke reported that it was believed that the use of French arms to re-establish James III would alienate the English. In Hooke’s view those at St Germain were wholly taken in by the chimerical promises (as Hooke had been until his visit to Aix-la-Chapelle) of a peaceful restoration engineered by one of the English factions.

These attitudes at St Germain hindered the development of Hooke’s plans for Scotland. Military and political developments also changed the context in which Hooke was operating. The French military campaign of 1703 had been very successful. A French army under Marshal Villars, combining with France’s Bavarian allies under the Elector Max Emmanuel (1662-1726), had come close to threatening Vienna.¹⁰⁹ As a result the French strategic situation had improved and

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., f. 207r.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Bély, *Les relations internationales en Europe*, pp 391-92; Sturdy, *Fractured Europe*, p. 361.

the goal of neutralising one of its enemies, the Emperor now, rather than the English, seemed within sight.¹¹⁰ Interest in plans for Scotland receded.

However Hooke continued to work on a plan for a potential Scottish operation. He argued that prevailing sentiment in Scotland regarded the English as ‘their enemies and their oppressors.’¹¹¹ The Darien misadventure, fears of an imposed union and the envisaged Hanoverian succession had aroused anger in the country. Importantly, as Hooke was at pains to emphasise, this discontent was shared by ‘all the factions in Scotland’, Highlander and Lowlander, Jacobites, Episcopalians and Presbyterians.¹¹² Rarely had the country been so united in a determination to take action. According to Hooke the Scots only ‘sought a pretext to take up arms and never had a nation given more indication of a universal resolution to throw off the yoke.’¹¹³ In addition there were few government troops in Scotland, the treasury was almost empty, and in England most of the army was in Flanders and the navy occupied elsewhere. An expedition to Scotland could have far-reaching effects. Hooke stated that the undertaking would be a minimal drain on French resources. The Scots had men, horses and food. All they required were arms, money, a number of experienced officers and a small force of around 5,000 men to provide security while a Scottish army, 30,000 strong, formed up.¹¹⁴

Politically Hooke emphasised that the French should not give hostages to fortune. While all the factions were ‘in accord to bring down the present

¹¹⁰ Black, *European international relations 1648-1815* (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 130; idem, *From Louis XIV to Napoleon: the fate of a great power* (London, 1999), p. 62.

¹¹¹ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 210r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 32

¹¹² Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 209r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 30-31.

¹¹³ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 210r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 32.

¹¹⁴ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 211v); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 36.

government, they had not agreed on what should be established in its place.¹¹⁵ Discussing the nature of the new Scottish regime too soon, Hooke warned, ‘would give rise to divisions and could cause the failure of the whole design’.¹¹⁶ Therefore a declaration explaining the French motivation in helping Scotland should be drawn up to put the minds of all the factions at ease. Hooke drew up a brief draft. He emphasised that any document should state clearly that French forces were only on hand to support Scottish liberties and independence. These were threatened, not by Queen Anne, but by a coterie of her Ministers: through their influence the Scots had already been forced into war but excluded from trade. With these oppressions growing the Scots had had no alternative but to seek the protection of Louis XIV, who ‘sought only peace and to protect the unfortunate.’¹¹⁷ If the French held to these principles, what seemed an unlikely alliance of interests could be maintained and reinforced for the common cause until victory ensued. Hooke’s reasoning had a Machiavellian strain. In his view only this piece of propaganda would allow the reestablishment of James VIII because if ‘one spoke too much too soon of this Prince at the start, all the Presbyterians would oppose him and join with the English; it would be soon enough to talk of him when the Scots had no where else to turn.’¹¹⁸

In the early months of 1704 Hooke continued to press the case for an expedition to Scotland. He pointed out that traditional ‘animosities among the Scots had given way, at least for a time, to their dominant passion for

¹¹⁵ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 209r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, i, 30.

¹¹⁶ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 209r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, i, 30-31.

¹¹⁷ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 212r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, i, 37.

¹¹⁸ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 10 Dec. 1703 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 214r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, i, 38.

independence and for commerce.¹¹⁹ However hopes for continued success against the Empire in the coming campaign scuttled any chances of support for the scheme. In addition plans for Scotland were called into doubt by the behaviour of prominent Jacobites. Simon Fraser (1667-1747), outlawed claimant to Scottish title of Lord Lovat, had aroused much sympathy and support at St Germain when he had arrived in France in late 1702. Fraser even managed to convince Queen Mary of Modena to arrange an unprecedented private audience with Louis XIV, where he claimed all Scotland was ready to rise against England with French help.¹²⁰ Hooke, as we have seen, had already recognised the strategic potential of Scotland as early as March 1702, before Fraser had arrived in France.¹²¹ He denied ‘any familiarity’ with Lovat in February 1704, ‘knowing him only by having seen him two or three times by accident,’ although there was correspondence between the two men later in February and March 1704.¹²²

This denial was necessary as Fraser was soon revealed as a devious political double dealer. It was learned that on a voyage to Scotland to sound out Jacobites leaders in 1703 Fraser had revealed sensitive information to the Queen’s

¹¹⁹ De Callières to Hooke, 28 Aug. 1704, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 156. This letter was part of Hooke’s private correspondence and is not found in the archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Several subsequent documents are found also only in the printed volumes of the papers which were sent after Hooke’s death to his nephew in England.

¹²⁰ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 21. John Gibson’s book is an excellent and very detailed overall account of the invasion attempt of 1708; I have concentrated on examining Hooke’s role in the enterprise.

¹²¹ See Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of England in relation to the death of King William’, 25 Mar. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 163r); Hooke, ‘Memoir given to Monseigneur le marquis de Torcy’, 12 Dec. 1702 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 174r).

¹²² Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 2 Feb. 1704 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 216r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 51; For the correspondence between Hooke and Fraser see *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, 105, 108, 112, 126, 127, 129. The originals of some of Hooke’s answers to Fraser (corresponding to pages 93, 94, 101 and 108 above), including envelopes and seals, are now held amongst the Fraser/Lovat papers in the British Library. See Hooke to Fraser (*alias* Lovat), Paris, and 11 Feb. 1704 (B.L., Add. Ms. 31251, f. 169); Hooke to Fraser (*alias* Lovat), Versailles, 12 Feb 1704 (B. L., Add. Ms. 31251, f. 170); Hooke to Fraser (*alias* Lovat), Paris, 25 Feb. 1704 (B.L., Add. Ms. 31251, f. 179); and Hooke to Fraser (*alias* Lovat), Versailles, 5 Mar. 1704 (B.L., Add. Ms. 31251, f. 199).

Commissioner for Scotland, James Douglas (1662-1711), duke of Queensberry. Fraser had insinuated that the duke of Athol, John Murray (1660-1724), had been a leading conspirator in plotting a Jacobite rebellion. In fact Athol was a Presbyterian and a Williamite, but as his family had a rival claim on the Lovat estates, Fraser was determined to blacken his name with the Scottish authorities.¹²³ Ironically as a result of Fraser's activities Athol became an active Jacobite. Rumours of Fraser's double-cross reached Paris in January 1704. His eventual imprisonment in the Château d'Angoulême cast doubt on the reality of anti-English sentiment in Scotland and the reliability of Scots nobles.¹²⁴

The credibility of arguments for French intervention in Scotland was further undermined by the capture of another agent sent from St Germain, Sir John MacLean. MacLean had also been sent by the Jacobite court to sound out opinions in England and Scotland. However when captured and sent to the Tower of London he disclosed everything he knew of incipient plans for a Jacobite rebellion aided by France.¹²⁵ Hooke continued to advance his design over the summer of 1704 for French intervention in Scotland but these setbacks weakened his argument. However he did manage to win over an important ally in Marshal Villeroy, who had previously opposed the plan.¹²⁶

On the 13 August 1704 French and Bavarian forces were badly defeated at Blenheim (also called the second battle of Höchstädt) with 20,000 dead, and 14,000 captured from a total of 60,000; Bavaria, France's last major ally, was

¹²³ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, pp 24-33.

¹²⁴ De Callières to Hooke, 28 Aug. 1704, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 156.

¹²⁵ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 26.

¹²⁶ Hooke to the duke of Perth, 27 July 1704, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 154.

overrun and the course of the war changed.¹²⁷ From being poised to strike at the heart of the Empire, Louis XIV's France was now on the defensive. In this changed situation, interest was reawakened in Hooke's Scottish proposal as a strategic option over the winter and spring of 1704/05. On 6 August 1704 the Scottish parliament had again passed the Act of Security (unsuccessful in 1703 in the absence of royal assent) separating the Scottish succession from that of England unless

there be such conditions of government settled and enacted as may secure the honour and sovereignty of this Crown and Kingdom, the freedom, frequency and power of Parliaments, the religion, liberty and trade of the nation from the English, or any foreign influence.¹²⁸

Significantly the act backed up this political threat by stipulating that all 'protestant heritors and all the burghs within the kingdom shall forthwith provide themselves with firearms for all [...] fencible men [and] are hereby empowered and ordained to discipline and exercise their said fencible men once in the month at least.'¹²⁹ Discontent and resentment were at such dangerous levels in Scotland that Queen Anne, on the advice of her ministers, gave the royal assent to the Act to prevent a complete breakdown in the administration of the kingdom. The depth of hostility to England and the English was publicly and brutally evidenced in the Worcester affair. In February 1704, a Scottish ship, and its cargo, was impounded for breaching the East India Company's monopoly. Six months later an English ship was seized in retaliation. Its crew were later charged with the piracy of a missing Scottish ship. Despite seriously flawed evidence, and an appeal for clemency from Queen Anne, Scottish public opinion intimidated the lord

¹²⁷ Lynn, *The wars of Louis XIV*, pp 286-94; Lucy Norton (ed.), *Memoirs of the duke de Saint-Simon* (3 vols, London, 1967), i, 252-253; Bély, *Les relations internationales en Europe*, pp 396-98.

¹²⁸ B. P. Lenman and J. S. Gibson (eds), *The Jacobite threat - England, Ireland, Scotland and France: a source book* (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 85.

¹²⁹ Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, p. 85.

chancellor, Lord Seafield, into ordering the execution of the captain and two crew members on 22 April 1705. The hangings galvanised anti-English and anti-union sentiment in Scotland and stoked anti-Scottish feeling in England. Within weeks a vicious pamphlet war was in full swing between the presses of Edinburgh and London, resulting ‘in a barrage of obloquy, in prose and verse from both sides.’¹³⁰ One English pamphlet, *The reducing of Scotland by arms and annexing it to England as a province considered* (1705), urged the conquest of Scotland as the ultimate solution, and in political circles invasion was seriously contemplated.¹³¹

Such public actions were manifest testimony to continuing turmoil in the relationship between Scotland and England. Could this be turned to France’s advantage? Hooke urged that it could and should be exploited. He had already made it clear that force was the only reliable method of bringing the English to the peace table and that Scotland was the best place to apply it.¹³² Hooke argued that

the revolt of the Scots would be a major diversion; it would oblige England to recall its troops, or at least a major part, from Flanders and diminish their morale. It would weaken England and in consequence Holland and the Empire as these allies of England looked to their own security as they saw this great power divided against itself. The friends of the king of England would be reanimated and those who were wavering given heart, with all the appearance that the king would be re-established. It would add force to propositions that might be made to the duke of Marlborough, or to others, either for peace or the interests of the king of England.¹³³

With this argument Hooke convinced Francois de Callières, James Drummond, duke of Perth, the Papal nuncio, cardinal Filippo Antonio Gualtierio (1660-1728),

¹³⁰ James Kelly, ‘The Worcester affair’, in *The Review of English Studies*, new series, li, no. 201 (Feb., 2000), p. 9. Typical of the abuse flowing back and forth across the border was one English satirist’s prayer that ‘God would keep the Scots at their proper distance, that they may never infect us with their itch or their principles, neither bastardise our breed with poisoned pates and freckly faces, but always live within the starving limits of their own barren country’.

¹³¹ Mark Goldie, ‘Divergence and union: Scotland and England, 1660-1707’ in B. Bradshaw and J. Morrill (eds), *The British problem c. 1534-1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago* (Basingstoke, 1996), pp 244-245.

¹³² Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 2 Feb. 1704 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 216v); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 56-57.

¹³³ Hooke, ‘Memoir on the affairs of Scotland’, to de Torcy, 2 Feb. 1704 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 216v); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 56-57.

and crucially Charles Honoré d'Albret (1646-1712) duc de Chrevelse, (an unofficial but influential member of Louis XIV's inner circle),¹³⁴ of the merits of a Scottish expedition. With their support Hooke then petitioned de Torcy, who could raise the matter in King Louis XIV's *Conseil d'en haut* where the 'foreign minister always served as the *rapporteur*' who set the agenda.¹³⁵ Despite Hooke's assiduous courting of influential supporters for his scheme he remarked that 'it had been very difficult to carry the Ministers [of the king] to think seriously of doing something in Scotland.'¹³⁶

Eventually though, in June 1705, it was decided to send Hooke to Scotland to negotiate directly with the Scottish nobility and report on the situation.¹³⁷ In a successful audience at St Germain Hooke had gained the support of Queen Mary of Modena for his voyage to Scotland. Hooke wrote to de Torcy expressing his resolution to do his best on the mission. In an interesting insight on the perception of the Jacobite court in official French circles, Hooke said that he would be very happy if the mission went well, because he could 'save [de Torcy] from the pain of being continually tormented by these eternal factions and divisions of the Court of St Germain.'¹³⁸

Hooke initially set out for Scotland in July but contrary winds delayed the voyage until early August. Hooke's orders for his mission were based on a

¹³⁴ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Saint-Simon and the court of Louis XIV* (translation, Chicago, 2001), p. 146; Norton, *Memoirs of the duke de Saint-Simon*, i, 344-45.

¹³⁵ On the *Conseil d'en haut* and the role of Torcy as *rapporteur* see J. C. Rule, 'The king and his council: Louis XIV and the Conseil d'en haut', in Robert Oresko, G. C Gibbs, and H. M. Scott (eds), *Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe: essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997), pp 216-41.

¹³⁶ Hooke to de Callières, 26 Apr. 1705, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ed. Macray, i, 172.

¹³⁷ Hooke to de Torcy, 10 June 1705, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 194.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

document he had drawn up himself on 15 June at the request of de Torcy.¹³⁹ This was then formalised on 17 June as an official set of instructions from Louis XIV.¹⁴⁰ Hooke also carried a letter setting out his power to treat as an emissary of the court of France.¹⁴¹ This authorised him to

decide on, conclude and sign in the name of his Majesty, with those who have the necessary power, all treaties, articles and conventions which they consider necessary to renew the ancient alliance between his Majesty and the kingdom of Scotland, or all other things which will be adjudged appropriate for the wellbeing and advantage of His Majesty and the said kingdom.¹⁴²

Hooke arrived in Scotland on 8 August at Slains, the castle of Anne Hay (*née* Drummond, sister of the duke of Perth) dowager countess of Erroll, bearing letters from the French court to James Hamilton (1658-1712), duke of Hamilton, George Gordon (c.1649-1716), duke of Gordon, Charles Hay (d. 1717), earl of Errol, William Keith (d. 1712), the earl Marischal and Charles Home (d. 1706), earl of Hume. Hooke had a series of meetings with these men, or their agents, who were hostile to union with England and the Hanoverian succession. Hooke was careful to stress that he was in Scotland only to listen to proposals from the Scots, not to make them on behalf of the king of France. He found opinion almost entirely in favour of armed resistance, if supported by France.

¹³⁹ Hooke, 'Memoire des Expéditions nécessaires', to de Torcy, 15 June 1705, *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 201-03.

¹⁴⁰ 'Memoir du Roy pour le Colonel Hoocke (*sic*)', 17 June 1705 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, ff 240r-244v; A.A.E., CP, Angleterre vol. 219, ff 140r-45r); *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 203-08. In addition, in case his ship was intercepted *en route*, Hooke had suggested he carry papers naming him as an envoy to Poland and a passport for safe passage there. See *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 202, 215-16, 241, 265. Although these papers were never intended to be authentic, they have led to confusion. Hooke is listed incorrectly as French envoy to Saxony-Poland in 1705 in Bittner and Groß (eds), *Repertory of the diplomatic representatives*, i, 232.

¹⁴¹ 'Pouvoir du Roy au Sieur Hoocke (*sic*)', 17 June 1705. The original patent of this document is located at A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, ff 238r, 238v, and a copy at A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 246r, and another at A.A.E., CP, Angleterre vol. 219, ff 146r-46v; also contained in *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 213-14.

¹⁴² 'Pouvoir du Roy au Sieur Hoocke (*sic*)', 17 June 1705, in *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 213-14.

However Hooke also realised that this group of dissident nobles were divided and lacking direction. The duke of Hamilton, ‘supposedly the leader of the Scottish patriots’, was no longer trusted by all, and his behaviour in regard to the union was now erratic.¹⁴³ Hooke had already noted before he left France that Hamilton was rumoured to have received Hanoverian money. In Scotland he was also told that Hamilton, a Protestant in the Stuart line, now had aspirations on the Scottish crown itself. His attitude was now an obstacle to concerting concrete plans.

Determined to investigate the situation, Hooke travelled to Edinburgh to meet Hamilton. This was a dangerous undertaking for the French agent as Edinburgh was a small city where strangers were readily noticed. To heighten tension, Hamilton was staying in Holyroodhouse Palace for the duration of the parliamentary session. Lodged near Hamilton’s rooms was John Campbell (1678-1743), duke of Argyll, Queen’s Commissioner for Scotland and William Johnstone (d. 1721), marquis of Annandale, Secretary of State, the leading members of the government that Hooke was endeavouring to overthrow.

Sixteen years after their last encounter in the Tower of London, Hooke met Hamilton in a darkened room. By means of this stratagem the devious duke could claim never to have actually seen the French agent. Over the course of their meetings Hooke concluded that this reflected the slippery nature of the man. Hamilton claimed that he wanted action to secure Scottish independence but was frustrated by the lack of unity. He would take up arms but only when the time was

¹⁴³ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 41; Victor Stater, *High life, low morals: the duel that shook Stuart society* (London, 2000), pp 126-27. Stater gives a revealing insight into Hamilton’s deteriorating financial position and escalating legal problems in the 1700s. The situation eventually led to a duel with Charles Mohun (1677-1712) in which both men died.

right. When Hooke tried to pin him down on when that time might be, the duke continually avoided the subject. He did confirm that the Scots could raise at least 30,000 men and needed only arms, money and munitions.

However when Hamilton said that he ‘recognised that this [was] the moment to shake off the English yoke, but I doubt if we could undertake to restore King James’, Hooke was convinced that the duke’s true intention was indeed to make use of French aid to further his own royal ambitions.¹⁴⁴ Hamilton appeared content to wait until Queen Anne died ‘when, with the question of a Hanoverian succession not settled, it will be easy for us to break with England, or make her accept whatever conditions we stipulate’.¹⁴⁵ Hooke was prepared to indulge Hamilton’s ambitions in Scotland if it would contribute to the overall French objective of forcing England to the negotiating table. However it was evident from Hooke’s other contacts that Hamilton was an increasingly isolated figure in the opposition movement in the country ‘which brought me to conclude that there was nothing to be done with him.’¹⁴⁶ Hamilton too saw which way the wind was blowing. Wary of falling between two stools, on 1 September 1705, the day after his last meeting with Hooke, Hamilton caused consternation in Scottish politics by moving that the choice of Scottish representatives to negotiate the proposed union with England rest with the Queen rather than the Scottish Parliament. The measure, wholly unexpected by the opposition, passed in a snap vote late in the day. Queen Anne and her ministers now had the power to select both the English and the Scottish negotiators. This transformed the situation from one where the prospect of Anglo-Scottish union was virtually unthinkable given the demanding

¹⁴⁴ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, pp 50-51, 55, 58.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

conditions the Scots had set, to one where it was now almost certain. Hamilton, still trying to keep a foot in both camps, attempted to explain his actions as an elaborate ploy to undermine the whole process.¹⁴⁷

Despite his protests most of the anti-union alliance now regarded Hamilton as a traitor. As he had been seen as the lynchpin of planning for an armed uprising, Hooke's mission was now stymied. Leading nobles, including the duke of Gordon, the earl of Home, the earl Marischal, the earl of Erroll, the earl of Panmure, and viscount Stormont, told Hooke that they required time to consult, coordinate and update their plans. They agreed to send a delegation to France to negotiate in person as soon as possible. After this arrangement was reached, Hooke returned to France on the 18 September 1705 to brief the French court.

His report was read before Louis XIV and his council by de Torcy on the 19 October 1705.¹⁴⁸ Hooke summed up the situation in Scotland by saying that the Scots in general were embittered against England. Publicly, in Parliament and in print, they had threatened to seek the protection of France. He stated that 'the greatest part of the nation was entirely for the king of England (James III).'¹⁴⁹ Only the Presbyterians were opposed and they were only strong in the western provinces. The lords whom Hooke had spoken with in Scotland had named twenty six peers of the realm, along with several gentlemen, parliamentary deputies and others, definitely committed to taking up arms in conjunction with French support. 'They are positive that not only the nobles but almost all the inhabitants of the provinces of Perth, Sterling, Athol, Angus, Mearnes, Aberdeen, Banff are

¹⁴⁷ Stater, *High life, low morals*, pp 134-138.

¹⁴⁸ Hooke, 'Mémoire donne a Messieurs de Torcy et de Chamillart', 17 Oct. 1705 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, ff 250r-265v).

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 263r.

entirely with them.’¹⁵⁰ Hooke could testify personally to this support in five provinces. The Scots lords estimated an army of 12,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and 8,000 Highlanders could be raised so that only 4,000 to 6,000 French regular troops would be needed. However ‘the presence of the king of England, a general for commander-in-chief, some money, and a good quantity of arms and munitions was absolutely necessary.’¹⁵¹ A French force could disembark either at Edinburgh or Glasgow. According to Hooke, once the Scots army had formed up their intention was to march into England, and they believed that they could advance as far as Newcastle without encountering resistance.

Hooke’s efforts were well received but as October wore on, and then November, no emissaries arrived from Scotland. In December Hooke learned that two messengers from Scotland had been forced to throw their letters overboard when boarded by an English vessel.¹⁵² On 31 December he was informed that a ship bearing a Scottish negotiator, Charles Fleming, had been taken by a privateer.¹⁵³ Momentum on the Scottish enterprise stalled and its prospects for inclusion in campaign plans for 1706 faded. Hooke maintained his contact with Scotland but soon his military duties intervened again. He spent much of the summer of 1706 besieged with his regiment in the key fortress town of Menin in the Spanish Netherlands as Marlborough swept south toward the French border.¹⁵⁴ Ironically Hooke, as one of the garrison commanders, encountered the duke of Marlborough once more when negotiating surrender terms for the town. Hooke

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., f. 264v.

¹⁵² *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 466.

¹⁵³ Ibid., i, 477.

¹⁵⁴ Richard Holmes, *Fatal avenue: a traveller’s history of the battlefields of northern France and Flanders, 1346-1945* (London, 1992), pp 26-29.

reported to de Torcy that Marlborough had been very friendly with him, saving two of Hooke's officers from arrest as deserters and prevailing on the Dutch to soften their terms of surrender.¹⁵⁵ The French contingent was eventually allowed to march away with their weapons and standards.

Marlborough and the allies were less generous in broader strategy. On 23 May 1706 French, Bavarian and Spanish forces lost 13,000 men when badly defeated at the battle of Ramillies in Flanders. The Allied army followed up the victory by taking ten towns in the Spanish Netherlands, including Brussels, Louvain, Bruges, Ghent and Antwerp, and Menin, where Hooke was garrisoned. On 7 September at the battle of Turin French forces lost 3,800 dead and 6,000 captured. Soon after all of northern Italy was given up to the Allies. In Spain, Valencia and Catalonia were in rebellion against Philip V. By the end of 1706 the French strategic position was grave and Louis XIV made overtures for peace. The Allies, sensing outright victory, rejected them.¹⁵⁶

Amidst these circumstances the Scottish option was re-examined as a way to relieve pressure on the hard-pressed French armies. A landing in Scotland, as Hooke had argued, would divert England from deploying her military resources to the full on the Continent. He had been promoting this enterprise and had again interested powerful supporters in the form of Francois de Callières, the duke of Perth, the duc de Chevreuse, duc de Beauvillier and importantly the war and finance minister, Michel de Chamillart (1657-1721), as well as de Torcy. On this

¹⁵⁵ *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, 69-79.

¹⁵⁶ Lynn, *The wars of Louis XIV*, pp 306-11.

occasion Hooke's petition was readily accepted. In January 1707 he was ordered to repeat his previous mission to Scotland and report back on the situation.¹⁵⁷

It seemed an opportune time to intervene. By dint of a divided and dithering opposition and well directed bribery a treaty of union had been approved in the Scottish parliament on the 27 January 1707, by 110 votes to 67. The duke of Hamilton again wavered and vacillated as leader of the opposition.¹⁵⁸ However outside parliament anti-union sentiment remained widespread. Rioting in Edinburgh made a protective cordon of troops necessary around the parliament building. A planned joint insurrection by the militant Presbyterians of the south-west (the Cameronians), and Jacobite inclined magnates of the north had been countermanded, inexplicably, by Hamilton.¹⁵⁹ In anticipation of serious trouble, a number of English regiments were marshalled on the Anglo-Scottish border.¹⁶⁰ Several agents of the intelligence network of Robert Harley (1661-1724),¹⁶¹ English secretary of state, were active in Scotland.¹⁶² One of the agents dispatched to observe, and if possible influence events was Hooke's old comrade from

¹⁵⁷ *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, ii, 96-99.

¹⁵⁸ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, pp 77-80.

¹⁵⁹ Hamilton was playing a dangerous game of trying to retain his status and following as the main leader of resistance to union while simultaneously underhandedly engaging with the government to sabotage effective opposition. See Daniel Szechi, *George Lockhart of Carnwart 1689-1727: a study in Jacobitism* (East Linton, 2002), pp 65-68.

¹⁶⁰ K. M. Brown, *Kingdom or province: Scotland and the regal union, 1603-1715* (Basingstoke, 1992, reprinted with corrections 1993), pp 184-88.

¹⁶¹ Harley, from a puritan background, was initially a Whig. From 1700 he moved toward a more Tory outlook, eventually becoming leader of the party. Between 1704 and 1708 he was secretary of state in Godolphin's administration. Dismissed for attempting to displace Godolphin, Harley, as chancellor of the exchequer, led the Tory party into government in 1710. He was created earl of Oxford in 1711. After the accession of George I he was impeached and held in the Tower from 1715 to 1717. He played little further part in politics but remained influential. Hooke's nephew Nathaniel benefited from the patronage of Harley, a noted bibliophile, and dedicated his translation of the *Life of Fénelon* to the earl in 1723.

¹⁶² Angus McInnes, *Robert Harley: puritan politician* (London, 1970), pp 77-84.

Monmouth's Rebellion, Daniel Defoe.¹⁶³ Defoe's role in Scotland was the mirror image of Hooke's: he was charged with promoting the union and preventing conditions in Scotland impinging on England's war effort.¹⁶⁴ Despite his best efforts, he was pessimistic regarding the state of affairs in Scotland, writing to Harley that

I must confess I never saw a nation so universally wild and so readily embracing everything that may exasperate them. They are ripe for every mischief [...] they will certainly precipitate themselves into some violent thing or other on the first occasion that offers. [...] Different interests, differing parties, all join in a universal clamour – and the very Whigs declare openly they will join with France or King James or anybody rather than be insulted as they call it by the English.¹⁶⁵

Circumstances seemed promising for Hooke's mission. After a delay of almost two months due to contrary winds he arrived in Scotland at the end of April 1707. By this stage it was too late to concert action to prevent the Act of Union coming into force on the 11 May. However Hooke again consulted widely with those opposed to the Bill and found widespread support for French intervention. Rather than risk the same breakdown in communications as had happened on the previous voyage he returned to France with a signed collective memorial and individual letters from Scottish lords.

The memorial set out the proposal of the Scots lords to raise, clothe and feed 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry and to assemble them wherever James VIII should land. From France they requested a general to take command, experienced officers, 5,000 men, money and munitions, including a siege train and artillery. This was signed by the earls of Erroll and Panmure, viscount Stormont, baron

¹⁶³ J. A. Downie, 'Daniel Defoe and the general election of 1708 in Scotland', in *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, viii, no. 3 (Spring, 1975), pp 315-16.

¹⁶⁴ David Macree, 'Daniel Defoe, the Church of Scotland and the Union of 1707' in *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, vii, no. 1 (Autumn, 1973), p. 62. See Daniel Defoe, *The history of the Union*, ed. David Hayton, (2 vols, London, 2002).

¹⁶⁵ *Letters of Daniel Defoe*, ed. G. H. Healey (Oxford, 1955), pp 236-38; quoted in Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, pp 97-98.

Kinnaird, James Ogilvie, Nicholas Moray, Nicholas Keith, the marquis of Drummond, Thomas Fotheringham and Alexander Innes.¹⁶⁶ Hooke was at pains to point out that this mixture of nobility and gentry had signed the petition as the representatives of many other lords and lairds. He even had indications of Presbyterian support.¹⁶⁷

The lords who had signed the memorial had put their lives and their estates in grave risk. It provided strong evidence that a French landing in Scotland would find substantial assistance. On the other side of the divide Defoe was of the same opinion. He reported to Harley in September 1707 that

should the king of France but support [the disaffected], not with men because they need them not, but should he send about 200 officers, arms and ammunition, artillery etc to furnish them, and about 100,000 crowns in money, he might soon get together 12 or 15,000 stout fellows and do a great deal of mischief.¹⁶⁸

The fact that Defoe, a government agent with nothing to gain from overstatement or exaggeration, was echoing Hooke's views on Scotland points to the accuracy of Hooke's contention.

Defoe was fully cognisant of the grave strategic implications for England, and by extension Europe, of an invasion of Scotland. He emphasised the point in his report to Harley in September 1707, stating that

I confess that this [the consequences of a successful French landing] would be a very fatal diversion as things stand here now [...] tis a juncture in which it would be of worse consequence than ever with respect to other parts of the world.¹⁶⁹

In France preparations began in earnest to prepare the ships, men and equipment necessary for the expedition. Intended to depart in the autumn of 1707, after

¹⁶⁶ Hooke, *The secret history of Colonel Hooke's negotiations in Scotland in favour of the Pretender* (London, 1760), pp 83-91.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp 113-14.

¹⁶⁸ *Letters of Daniel Defoe*, ed. G. H. Healey (Oxford, 1955), pp 243-44; quoted in Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, p. 98.

¹⁶⁹ *Letters of Daniel Defoe*, ed. G. H. Healey, pp 243-44; quoted in Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, p. 98.

inevitable delays a small fleet of 28 ships, 5 men of war and 23 fast frigates was ready to leave for Scotland in spring 1708. The idea of using frigates instead of slower transports came from Hooke,¹⁷⁰ the only man in the fleet who had already been part of a landing in Britain. Twenty three years before, Monmouth's small force had used three similar ships to evade the English navy.

On board the frigates in 1708 were 6,000 French soldiers from the regiments of Agenois, Auxerrois, Bearn, Beaufermé, Boullonois, and Luxembourg. The use of French regulars indicated how serious the operation was regarded in France. Hazarding such regiments was not undertaken lightly when veteran soldiers, a precious commodity after six years of war, were in short supply. Equally, should the landing prove a success the presence of such French regulars would be a better guarantee of French influence. Hooke, in his invasion plan, had called for the deployment of Irish regiments. He believed that they had the advantage of being closer, in terms of culture and language, to the Scots, and would thereby gell more easily into a cohesive army. Interestingly, his alternative suggestion was the use of German troops, as these were almost as used to privation and hard living as the Irish and Scots.¹⁷¹

Politics however became more of a determining factor than practicality. A restored James VIII, with a well trained army in Scotland centred on seasoned Irish regiments who acknowledged him as their monarch, might very well prove hard to control from France. The situation that ensued in Ireland in the 1690s, when James II had largely ignored French advice and concerns, had to be avoided.

¹⁷⁰ The commanding admiral of the fleet later claimed it as his own. For Hooke's plan see *The secret history of Colonel Hooke's negotiations*, p. 76.

¹⁷¹ Hooke's experience of German troops came from his role as the colonel commandant of the Regiment de Sparre; originally Swedish, the unit was later classified as German.

In the same vein the general appointed to command the army, was not James III's half-brother, the duke of Berwick, whom the Scots had requested, but Charles-Auguste de Goyon-Matignon (1647-1729), comte de Gacé, a close confidante of Chamillart, the minister of war. De Gacé, was also to act as ambassador to James. Before the fleet sailed Hooke had been promoted to Brigadier-General by Chamillart and created Baron Hooke in the Irish peerage by James III. He had also been singled out as thoroughly versed in Scottish affairs and named as advisor to de Gacé, in the latter's instructions.¹⁷² It was intended that Hooke would act as de Gacé's representative in any negotiations with the English government reflecting trust and confidence in his abilities and loyalty.¹⁷³ Equally his earlier warnings to de Torcy that many at St Germain would happily dispense with France once the opportunity arose ensured that care had been taken to protect French interests should the invasion be successful. Control of political, military and diplomatic matters would be in reliable hands.

In early March 1708 English ships under Admiral George Byng (1663-1733) patrolled outside Dunkirk harbour.¹⁷⁴ Claude de Forbin (1656-1733), naval commander of the French fleet, advocated cancelling the enterprise. Forbin, an accomplished and experienced admiral, blemished by a peevish, belligerent temperament, demonstrated no enthusiasm for the enterprise. He was still

¹⁷² 'Memoir du Roy pour servir d'instruction au Sieur Comte de Gacé commandant les troupes de sa Majesté en Ecosse et son ambassadeur extraordinaire auprès du Roy d'Angleterre', 5 Mar. 1708 (A.A.E., MD, Angleterre vol. 24, ff 96v, 103r, 103v). De Torcy had requested Hooke on the 28 Feb. 1708 to draft the main tenets of these instructions, which he submitted in a memorial of 2 Mar. See A.A.E., CP Angleterre supp. vol. 4, ff 10r-11r.

¹⁷³ Hooke was by now viewed as reliably loyal to de Torcy and France, assuaging the worry he had expressed to de Callières in 1702 concerning whether he would always be viewed as in some way 'English' in sentiment. See chapter four.

¹⁷⁴ James Ogilvy, employed by the earl of Middleton to carry news of invasion preparations to Scotland, was in reality an English agent. Full details of the planned expedition, including references to Hooke's role, had reached Robert Harley in autumn 1707. See Jean Gassion [alias Ogilvy] to Robert Harley, 17 Nov., 1707 (O.S), H.M.C *Portland*, iv, pp 460-461, 464-68.

smarting from a damaging clash with his colleague, René Trouin, sieur du Guay (1673-1736), in October 1707. The Naval Minister, Pontchartrain, had supported Duguay-Trouin. Forbin came out of the dispute embittered and bruised.¹⁷⁵ This must be borne in mind when considering his attitude and behaviour in 1708. Still smouldering over the events of six months before, and displaying undisguised intransigence and conceit, he failed to see the expedition as an opportunity to rehabilitate his career and reputation. Rather, he made it clear that he regarded the Scottish plan as ill judged, much preferring a scheme of his own to launch an amphibious assault on Amsterdam. Piqued by the rejection of his idea, even as he was departing to take command at Dunkirk he had tried to remonstrate with Louis XIV. Sternly reproached to obey his orders and do his duty, Forbin embarked on the mission very grudgingly. Through lack of appreciation of, or disinterest in, the strategic implications of the undertaking and indignant resentment at having his own operation sidelined, Forbin never engaged wholeheartedly with the Scottish descent. His attitude throughout was marked by antagonism and antipathy which greatly impacted on the outcome of the voyage.¹⁷⁶

Admonished to continue with the expedition despite the presence of the English ships, Forbin grasped an opportunity to sail on the 17 March 1708 when high winds forced the English away from their station. Having escaped the English squadron, storm damage drove four French ships back to port. These later set out again to follow the main body. Forbin called a council of war when faced

¹⁷⁵ François Bluche (ed.), *Dictionnaire du grand siècle* (Paris, 1990), p. 608.

¹⁷⁶ The *Mémoires de Claude, comte de Forbin* (Paris, 1731), written by the admiral many years after the events they describe, still resonated with indignation at his treatment. The memoirs have been recognized as not entirely accurate or trustworthy and at times purely self-serving, yet Forbin's account of the 1708 expedition has been influential in casting the endeavour (excepting his own actions) in a negative light. See Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 159.

by contrary winds, again seeking to abort the mission. However he was overruled by James III and his retinue.

Slowed by the winds the expedition took longer to reach Scotland than was expected. When the Scottish coast was sighted it was discovered that the fleet was almost 100 miles north of the entrance to the Firth of Forth and the landing site close to Edinburgh. The expedition eventually arrived safely at the mouth of the River Forth on the evening of 23 March 1708. Rather than continue to Leith and begin the landing of troops and material immediately, Forbin ordered the ships to hold station for the night. On the following morning the strong English naval force under Admiral Byng was sighted and Forbin decided to evade the opposition squadron rather than sacrifice his ships to allow a landing to proceed at Leith. What might have happened if the French ships had reached Edinburgh would be usually a matter of speculation; however in this rare instance the historical record provides a revealing insight. Unknown to Forbin, one of the four ships which had returned to port due to storm damage had resumed the voyage. Inexplicably, despite setting out two days later, the *Proteus* managed to arrive in the Firth of Forth on the morning of 23 March, some 6 hours ahead of the main fleet. Sailing into Leith harbour the French ship met a warm welcome; as had been prearranged, pilots were ferried out to guide the ship, and an small armada of boats arrived to greet what they thought was the arrival of the expedition and King James VIII.¹⁷⁷ No opposition was forthcoming from government forces in the city

¹⁷⁷ Hooke, *The secret history of Colonel Hooke's negotiations*, pp 140-141. The reception afforded the *Proteus* has been overlooked in most references to the 1708 expedition which claim there was no reply from the Scots. See for example Frank Welsh, *The four nations: a history of the united kingdom* (London, 2003), p. 203 and Lord, *The Stuarts secret army*, p. 43. Unfortunately assessments of the unfolding and potential of the 1708 French expedition in general works are quiet often badly informed and inaccurate in detail.

of Edinburgh; the governor was engaged in drawing up evacuation plans.¹⁷⁸ If Forbin had moved more quickly a successful landing was eminently possible. Daniel Defoe believed that if a landing was effected ‘the forces here are so contemptible [...] that they can do nothing.’¹⁷⁹ Shortly before the expedition got underway he emphasised to Harley that ‘most of the subaltern officers of the army in Scotland is (*sic*) debauched and the whole generality of the soldiers’ and gave a stark warning that ‘if the Prince of Wales comes they’ll join him.’¹⁸⁰

However the expedition that had been mere hours away from success ended in failure. After escaping from the Firth of Forth the French expedition sailed north along the coast, while the English squadron soon broke off to guard the entrance to Edinburgh and await reinforcements. Forbin repeatedly refused to land James VIII and a small party on the Aberdeenshire coast; he misinterpreted such requests as being motivated by fear rather than resolution. His memoirs make it clear that he had little regard for ‘the English’, who continuously suffered from sea sickness, disputed his decisions and then revealed themselves to be cowards at heart.¹⁸¹ Instead it was decided to continue north and possibly land at Inverness. However strong seas and difficult winds delayed progress, and the English squadron was again sighted. Time was a crucial factor: the disadvantage of Hooke’s plan to use fast frigates to transport troops was the major reduction in cargo space available. Only three weeks provisions for the complement of sailors and soldiers could be carried on board.¹⁸² Many of the troops were also carried on deck, exposed to the elements. With food stores low, the soldiers health

¹⁷⁸ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, p. 138.

¹⁷⁹ Defoe to Harley, Edinburgh, 8 July 1707 (O.S), H.M.C *Portland*, iv, 425.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 25 Dec. 1707 (O.S), H.M.C *Portland*, iv, 433.

¹⁸¹ See Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, pp 104-106.

¹⁸² Hooke, *The secret history of Colonel Hooke’s negotiations*, pp 133-134.

deteriorating and weather conditions worsening the expedition was forced to return to France. The first of the expedition's ships arrived back in early April with the bad news.

In contrast to his other missions in French service, both earlier and later, no written account by Hooke on the conduct of the expedition is known to survive. Any such documents that may have existed were most likely among those papers seized in 1740: indeed the order may have originated with this express purpose in mind.¹⁸³ Furthermore no other detailed 'afteraction' reports or analysis of what went wrong seem to exist in the archives. A concerted effort to draw a veil over the affair appears to have been successful. The failure of a mission which had carried such high hopes and had come so close to success was too painful to contemplate and divisive recriminations emerging from a detailed official examination might be dangerous for all concerned.¹⁸⁴

The possibility of making another attempt was actively considered in 1709 and 1710. The 1708 attempt had demonstrated that a diversion in Scotland was feasible and would draw off English troops from the continent: some 3,000 English soldiers had actually been transported from Flanders to the north of England when news of the French attempt had reached London.¹⁸⁵ These troops too suffered from exposure to the elements, rendering them unfit for duty: negotiations made good the loss with Prussian troops failed.¹⁸⁶ This depletion of

¹⁸³ De Torcy issued similar orders for the seizure of the papers of one of the central figures in the assassination plot of 1696, George Barclay, after his death in France in 1710. See A.A.E., CP Ang., vol. 230, ff 373-390.

¹⁸⁴ Forbin's career ended in 1708. He never received another command during the course of the war.

¹⁸⁵ Thomas Wentworth (1672-1739), Baron Raby, English ambassador in Prussia to secretary of state Henry Boyle (1669-1725), Berlin, 31 Mar. 1708 (PRO [now TNA], SP 90/4, f. 673).

¹⁸⁶ Raby to Boyle, Berlin, 7 Apr. 1708 (PRO [now TNA], SP 90/4, f. 676).

the Allied forces may have contributed to the success of the French spring offensive in Flanders in 1708.

This operation had originally been planned to take place in coordination with a successful Scottish landing: it was envisaged that French forces would strike a major blow at the weakened Allied (mainly Dutch) forces in the southern Netherlands while the Franco-Scottish army paralysed England militarily, politically and economically. Overall Hooke's plan to knock England out of the war by opening a new front in Scotland had great potential. Despite the English government being aware of many of the details of the operation months in advance and the presence of a strong English naval squadron outside Dunkirk, the expedition had still made its way to Scotland. Jacobite support in Edinburgh had proven real rather than illusive. Luck rather than skill or preparation had prevented a major crisis in England.¹⁸⁷ In an attempt to shore up its credibility the English government downplayed the fact that any real danger had existed, and these protestations have strongly coloured historical assessments of the episode.¹⁸⁸

However, as Hooke had forecast, stock prices in London went into freefall at the rumour of invasion and still remained in steep decline even when it was clear the expedition had failed.¹⁸⁹ By 1 April 1708 the financial situation was so serious 'the Commons resolved to charge anyone who reduces public credit of a high crime and misdemeanour, "especially when the Kingdom is threatened by

¹⁸⁷ On 30 August 1708 Queen Anne and her ministers attended a service in St Paul's Cathedral to give thanks to God for English success in Scotland and at the battle of Oudenaarde. See [anon] to Paris, 4 Sept. 1708 (n.s), London (A.A.E., CP Ang., vol 225, f. 120).

¹⁸⁸ Gibson, *Playing the Scottish card*, pp 137-139. In reality a bitter internal battle for power within the English ministry had distracted attention and paralysed decision making over the winter and spring of 1708. See Henry Horwitz, *Revolution politics: the career of Daniel Finch, second earl of Nottingham 1647-1730* (Cambridge, 1968), pp 210-218.

¹⁸⁹ A similar run on the Bank of England occurred after the abortive French landing in Ireland in 1796. See William Doyle, *The Oxford history of the French revolution* (Oxford, 2002), p. 216.

invasion.”¹⁹⁰ If a Franco-Scottish army, after consolidating its position in Scotland, had adhered to the rest of Hooke’s blueprint for undoing the Union by moving southwards and cutting the crucial supply of coal from Newcastle to London, an even more calamitous financial emergency, ‘an effective trading stop on the Bank of England, would have deprive[ed] the Whig ministry of their power to supply their allies with money and muster sufficient reinforcements to counter a Jacobite rising backed by [France]’.¹⁹¹

The failure of the descent had no detrimental impact on Hooke’s career. Indeed the merits of his analysis and recommendations appear to have been validated by the events surrounding the expedition. Active planning began for another attempt. By this stage though, Hooke had had enough of perilous and demanding journeys to Scotland. His voyage in 1707 had required him to leave his pregnant wife without telling her where he was going or when he would be back. Consequently Hooke refused all entreaties to become involved in proposed expeditions to Scotland in 1709 and 1710, beyond offering his advice and analytical insight.¹⁹²

Overall, the abortive rebellion of 1708 had far more French support, was far better equipped and faced far less opposition than later attempts in 1715 and

¹⁹⁰ John Wells and Douglas Wills, ‘Revolution, restoration and debt repudiation: the Jacobite threat to England’s institutions and economic growth’ in *The Journal of Economic History*, lx, no. 2 (2000), pp 418-41.

¹⁹¹ A. I. MacInnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788* (East Linton, 2000), p. 200. MacInnes considers Hooke to have drawn up ‘the groundrules for retaking the three kingdoms from Scotland’.

¹⁹² Hooke, ‘Réponses aux questions proposées sur l’Ecosse’, 23 Jan., 1710 (A.A.E., MD Angleterre, vol. 24, ff 115r-122v). Georges Lizerand, *Le duc de Beauvillier 1648-1714* (Paris, 1933), pp 256-259.

1745.¹⁹³ Comparison with 1745 is particularly instructive.¹⁹⁴ With minimal French support, no regular troops, far less planning and a more stable political and financial situation, Charles Edward Stuart, ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’ recruited an army, secured Scotland, invaded England and came within 200 miles of London.¹⁹⁵ The ‘conclusion can hardly be avoided that’ if the 5000 French regulars, the Irish and Scottish officers, the engineers, and the arms, artillery and money had been successfully landed that ‘the whole Scottish nation would in a very short time have embraced that cause of the Pretender.’¹⁹⁶ Without delving too deeply into counterfactuals it appears reasonably to say that Hooke had conceived, promoted and got underway an expedition that might well have altered the political development of Great Britain and changed the nature of European international relations.¹⁹⁷ The idea of invading Britain was not new. However previous proposals had presumed the need for naval supremacy to allow passage to a large lumbering transport fleet. Part of Hooke’s contribution was to conceive an innovative new strategy based on a smaller faster fleet that could evade the English navy. When tied in with active support in Scotland, confirmed and organised by Hooke himself, such an enterprise was a serious threat to military security. Even more important, as Hooke understood, was the potential to ruin the

¹⁹³ A combined French and Dutch invasion of Scotland was considered in August 1797. See C. J. Woods, ‘A plan for a Dutch invasion of Scotland, 1797’ in *The Scottish Historical Review*, liii, no. 155 (April, 1974).

¹⁹⁴ The 1745 rebellion got underway despite a lack of money, arms and experienced officers. As in 1708, these had been identified by would-be rebels in Scotland as their main requirements should French aid be forthcoming. See Leopold von Ranke, *Memoirs of the house of Brandenburg and history of Prussia, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (3 vols, translation, London, 1849), iii, 256-57. I would like to thank Dr Andreas Boldt for this reference.

¹⁹⁵ Neil Davidson has described 1708 as ‘certainly the most serious attempt by the French state to mount an invasion of Britain’. See Neil Davidson, *Discovering the Scottish revolution 1692-1746* (London, 2003), p. 192.

¹⁹⁶ F. W. Wyon, *The history of Great Britain during the reign of Queen Anne* (2 vols, London, 1876), ii, 28-29.

¹⁹⁷ Lenman and Gibson, *The Jacobite threat*, p. 109.

financial strength of England by undermining its credit facilities. This could radically alter the geopolitical balance in France's favour. Without English troops and, more crucially, deprived of English money to pay hundreds of thousands of hired troops the whole Grand Alliance facing France would grind to a halt. The acceptance of the effectiveness and value of Hooke's grand strategic concept to France and French foreign relations was testified to by the repeated attempts to relaunch such plans in 1709 and 1710.

Hooke was adamant in refusing to travel to Scotland. He did not leave the world of intelligence and diplomacy: he merely changed theatre. His attempts to replicate his success in Britain by organising distraction and diversion in Eastern Europe are explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 8: EMBASSY TO SAXONY

After Hooke refused to undertake further voyages to Scotland, judging the risks too dangerous, in July 1708 Hooke was appointed as French liaison officer with the entourage of James III (operating incognito as the Chevalier de St George) when the English prince joined the French army in Flanders.¹ Reporting directly to the army's commanding general, the duc de Bourgogne (Louis XIV's grandson), Hooke was specifically ordered to remain close to and ensure the safety of the Prince in any action during the campaign.² Hooke remained in this role for a number of years, while maintaining his close links with de Torcy.³ Hooke evidently impressed James III with his ability. He was selected to represent the interests of the Prince and his mother, Queen Mary, as part of the French delegation at peace talks in The Hague in 1709.⁴ However these peace talks proved abortive, as did renewed attempts in 1710.⁵ Hooke became involved once more in international diplomacy and intelligence in 1711, a year that was to prove crucial in bringing the war of Spanish Succession to a close. All parties to the conflict were war weary. In 1706 civic unrest had broken out in Vienna when, prefiguring the events of 1848, students went on the rampage in

¹ Chamillart to Hooke, 2 July 1708, Fontainebleu (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 4, f. 38r).

² *Ibid.*, f. 38v.

³ As well as being involved in providing his analysis in relation to events in England and Scotland, Hooke acted as a translator of important documents for de Torcy. See A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 4, ff 56r-59r. Adding a further string to his bow he wrote memoirs to de Chamillart suggesting improvements in French military organisation and supply. See A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 4, ff 59v-66v.

⁴ Memoire from James III sent by the earl of Middleton to the marquis de Torcy setting out the main items of interest to St Germain in any negotiation, 20 Apr. 1709 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 4, ff 48r-49r). Hooke was to seek a secure residence for James III outside of France, preferably the Spanish Netherlands, an amnesty for Jacobite activists and a payment of Queen Mary's dowry.

⁵ See Bély, *Les relations internationales*, pp 407-414.

protest at the continuing war.⁶ The ‘common people’ of The Netherlands, subject to high taxes, also grew less supportive of their country’s involvement and a political revolution seemed possible.⁷ In England, tensions were rising to such an extent over finance, foreign policy and political control that dark rumours of *coups* and civil war were circulating.⁸

However, developments in 1711 augured well for renewed efforts at peacemaking. As Hooke had forecast in 1702, this newly favourable situation only followed a decisive change in the political situation in Britain, the paymaster of the Grand Alliance.⁹ The Tories under Robert Harley (1661-1724) had replaced the pro-war Whigs after the election of 1710. Reflecting the preoccupations of a war weary country, the new administration was eager to end hostilities.¹⁰ Added to this, on 17 April 1711 the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I (1678-1711) died suddenly. His successor, his brother Archduke Charles of Austria (1685-1740), the Habsburg pretender to the Spanish throne, would now reign over the reunited Habsburg empire of Charles V (1500-58) if his claim to the Spanish succession was made good. This presented at least as great a threat to the balance of power in Europe, and to British

⁶ Anonymous informant to Jean Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, 9 Feb. 1706 (A.A.E., CP Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, ff 212r, 212v).

⁷ Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 16 Dec. 1704 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 106r); Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 13 Jan. 1705 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 124v).

⁸ N. Hooke, ‘Relation de l’execution des Ordres du Roy, confiez au Baron de Hooke, après du Roy Auguste, en 1711, et en 1712’, 24 May 1712 [with later annotations and marginalia] (Bodl., MS D 26 ff 483-84).

⁹ Ibid., f. 476.

¹⁰ For the background to this shift in power in British party politics see W.T. Morgan, ‘The ministerial revolution of 1710 in England’ in *Political Science Quarterly*, xxxvi, no. 2 (1921), pp 184-210.

and Dutch commercial interests world-wide, as a Bourbon king on the throne of Spain.¹¹ Cohesion in the Grand Alliance withered rapidly.

For France, this rupture in the coalition of its enemies was especially timely. As Hooke had argued as early as 1702, divisions between the Allies opened a much more favourable vista for a nearly exhausted France, providing promising diplomatic possibilities on two fronts and raising morale considerably. In the western sphere, a British administration apparently amenable to peace and increasingly diverging from the Dutch alliance augured well for a successful outcome to renewed peace initiatives. Diplomatic possibilities also appeared in Eastern Europe where the death of the emperor and the election of a successor offered the opportunity for concurrent French overtures in the Empire. Pursuing a number of diplomatic avenues simultaneously was prudent strategy. Nathaniel Hooke was centrally involved in implementing this French policy through conducting secret negotiations with Augustus II, elector of Saxony and king of Poland. As in Scotland, his mission was to investigate the possibility of engineering a diversionary campaign, political or military that would distract and weaken the Habsburgs. Would Augustus II be prepared to seek the Imperial title if he had the promise of French support? Or perhaps he could be induced to move to add the crown of Hungary to that of Poland? France had influential ties with Ferenc II Rákóczi (1676-1735) and his *kuruc* rebels that could be useful. Hooke's assigned task in Saxony, as in Holland and Scotland,

¹¹ Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 6 Oct. 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 278v). For a discussion of the issue of trade as a factor in the Spanish Succession War, see C. Nettels, 'England and the Spanish-American trade, 1680-1715' in *The Journal of Modern History*, iii, no. 1 (1931), pp 17-32.

was again complex and changed over the course of his endeavours. His conduct of his mission to Saxony during this crucial period in European international relations added further credit to his reputation at Versailles.

Hooke had fought at Malplaquet in 1709, the greatest battle of the War of Spanish Succession.¹² This combat led to major changes in the military and political situation. The invading armies facing France stalled, and the stalemate led to peace talks. However, the harsh conditions demanded by the Allies had made peace impossible. The breakdown in negotiations meant the resumption of war but shortly afterwards, the new Tory government in Britain initiated direct and unofficial peace talks with France.¹³ By the spring of 1711 these talks were well advanced when the English chief minister, Robert Harley was seriously injured in an assassination attempt.¹⁴ The sudden death of the emperor only added to the fluid state of international relations throughout Europe. Old certainties and old alliances were under pressure.

¹² J.A. Lynn, 'The trace italienne and the growth of armies: the French case' in *Journal of military history*, lv, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 314; William Doyle, *Old regime France* (Oxford, 2001), p. 190, cites 35,000 dead; David Parrott, 'War and international relations' in Bergin (ed.), *The seventeenth century*, p. 125, calculates a casualty rate of 25% for the six hours of the battle. Parrot also discusses the significance of the battle as a crucial defining moment in European military and political history, see Parrot, 'War and international relations', pp 125-27. Intriguingly such was the notoriety and resonance of the battle in wider society that it become the subject of an opera called *Last years campagne* performed by puppets in London's Punch theatre in 1710. Amidst the scenes of the slaughter it also apparently featured 'several comical entertainments of Punch in the camp', see Eric Hinderaker, 'The "four Indian kings" and the imaginative construction of the first British empire' in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., liii, no. 3 (July 1996), p. 498.

¹³ Anonymous agent to de Torcy, 13 Oct. 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 276v; 'Réflexions générales sur l'état de la negotiations d'Angleterre', July 1711 (PRO [now TNA], PRO 31/3/197, f. 358) gives an overview of the peace negotiations underway in early 1711. A major point of discussion was the future of James III and his continued residence in France, see de Torcy to Oxford, 8 Apr. 1712 (PRO [now TNA], SP 31/3/198, f. 45).

¹⁴ B.W. Hill, *Robert Harley: Speaker, secretary of state and premier minister* (London, 1988), p. 150.

In this unpredictable situation Hooke was selected by the marquis de Torcy as the most suitable candidate for a covert mission to Augustus II of Saxony-Poland.¹⁵ In addition to Hooke's credit with de Torcy, he had proven his ability in the conduct of covert operations in the Netherlands and Scotland.¹⁶ Another more specific factor in Hooke's selection for this mission to Saxony-Poland was his status as a Catholic convert, something he shared with Augustus. Hooke's religious background in many instances was a significant advantage. As a former Protestant minister, he was a rarity and thus valuable in the French diplomatic system. His informed insight into, and extensive knowledge of, protestant religion and culture, and his innate personal understanding of protestant mentality gave him an unmatched ability to operate effectively in protestant countries such as The Netherlands, Scotland and Saxony.

The majority of Saxons were conspicuously proud of Martin Luther's Saxon roots and their country's role in the origin and defence of the Reformation. Lutheranism was regarded as an essential element of Saxon identity, so much so that the conversion of their pragmatic king had greatly unsettled the majority of Saxons (Augustus's wife left him upon hearing of his decision), who feared the future imposition of catholicism, by stealth or by edict, along with a catholic dynasty. Consequently, great interest and concern surrounded the religious education and

¹⁵ Frederick Augustus became elector of Saxony in 1694 as Frederick Augustus I. Following his election as king of Poland-Lithuania in 1697 he assumed the name Augustus II in that kingdom. Poland and Saxony remained distinctly separate entities despite sharing a ruler. However his Polish title is most often used as historical shorthand when referring to his involvement in European history.

¹⁶ Hooke's analysis regarding the geo-strategy situation in Europe as outlined in a *mémoire* to de Torcy again demonstrates a keen awareness and understanding of politics and diplomacy not only on a European scale but from a wider international perspective. For instance, he refers to events and conditions in North America and Asia, evidencing an early version of an imperial world-view; see *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, 1-11.

principles of the heir to the electorate, Prince Frederick Augustus. In the weeks immediately prior to Hooke's arrival at the court of Augustus II in Dresden (June 1711), the city was fraught with rumours that the prince of Saxony had converted (spontaneously or forcibly) to catholicism in Prague. As a result, the city was said to have been 'plunged into a general silence and all conversations are constrained'.¹⁷ To Hooke, who had witnessed and participated in the turmoil and heightened political tensions engendered by the issue of catholicism and succession in England during the exclusion crisis in England (1679-81), the political-religious situation in Saxony presented many familiar parallels.

Even if the Saxon court had not been exercised by intermingled politico-religious matters, Hooke's mission was already far from straightforward. Relations between France and Saxony were poor. For France close relations with Poland were important for French foreign policy in Eastern Europe as political and military alliance with Poland offered the possibility of opening a second front on the Habsburg rear. In 1697 the occasion of the election of a new Polish king had offered the opportunity to secure the French position in Poland. However, French prospects were undermined by the machinations of (the then) Frederick Augustus I of Saxony to raise his state to the front rank of European powers. The Saxon elector, an ambitious and vainglorious man, was determined to emulate the power and prestige of Louis XIV and force his way onto the wider European stage. To achieve this he

¹⁷ George Mackenzie, secretary of the British legation in Dresden, to the duke of Queensberry, 7 July 1711 (n.s.) (PRO, [now TNA], SP 88/19 f. 77). The religion of Augustus's son was of great interest in international relations. Mackenzie was detailed to keep a watching brief on the situation and appraise the British government of developments. The depth of interest in the situation was such that when the

needed more land, more people and a royal title. Through lavish bribery, rapid military action and the sterling services of his envoy, Colonel Jacob-Heinrich von Fleming (1667-1728) who utilised his powerful family connections in Poland to the full, Augustus II snatched the throne of Poland from under the noses of the French.¹⁸ This double victory gave him the pleasure of besting the Sun King while furthering his own aims in one daring gambit.¹⁹ The French, however, never forgot this blow, nor did they give up attempts to recover influence in the east.

The somewhat tarnished reputation of Augustus also complicated Hooke's mission. Prior to ascending the Polish throne in 1697, Augustus had erratically commanded the emperor's army against the Ottomans. The emperor was greatly relieved by Augustus's timely departure from his post to pursue the Polish crown in 1697.²⁰ In other areas of life Augustus II was similarly inconsistent and easily distracted from applying himself to tasks in hand. Hooke states that Augustus placed great trust in his first minister, Count Fleming (the man who had facilitated the election in Poland and who had risen quickly after his successes there) 'not because of inclination but because of indolence'.²¹ In this analysis, Hooke echoed Louis XIV's view of Augustus as a flawed ruler whose greatest failings were a lack of

Frederick August made a trip to Italy in the latter half of 1712 Mackenzie was ordered to leave Dresden and follow his movements closely.

¹⁸ Anon., *An account of a battle between some young men of the P. of Conti's party and the Elector of Saxony's, now King of Poland, and the defeat of the former* (London, 1697); Charles Sass, 'The election campaign in Poland in the years 1696-97' in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, xii, no. 2 (1952), pp 111-27. This latter article suffers from some surprising errors in regard to the spelling of the names of French diplomatic personnel but on the whole contains useful information.

¹⁹ T.C.W. Blanning, *The culture of power and the power of culture: old regime Europe, 1600-1789* (Oxford, 2002), pp 60-63.

²⁰ Jerzy Lukowski, *Liberty's folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century, 1697-1795* (London, 1991), p. 123; Sass, 'The election campaign in Poland', p. 122.

²¹ Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26 f. 455).

conviction and consistency.²² Louis's view was based on painful firsthand experience of the most capricious of Europe's sovereigns.

In 1701 preliminary articles of alliance had been negotiated and signed with France when Augustus stalled ratification with a succession of excuses.²³ The extent of his double-dealing became evident when he signed a treaty with the emperor, reinforcing his position in Poland. Augustus extracted this favourable treatment by informing the emperor of the rival French offer, thereby capitalising on the traditional rivalry between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs.²⁴ To antagonise the French further, on 11 November 1702, the then French minister in Dresden was seized by a lieutenant colonel and fifty dragoons on his way back from supper and unceremoniously expelled from Saxony. As one diplomat put it 'one can never tell whom [Augustus] will betray next'.²⁵

Hooke arrived in June 1711 at what was fast becoming the most extravagant court in Europe.²⁶ Augustus was determined to create a centre of cultural splendour in Dresden, a 'Florence on the Elbe'. The Zwinger palace, still under construction in 1711, was intended to rival Versailles, and provide the ultimate setting for the royal court to act out lavish pageants and parades, reflecting the grandeur of the king himself. Similar to his 1702 mission to the Netherlands, Hooke entered the Saxon capital not openly as a representative of France but *incognito*, posing as an ordinary

²² Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs*, p. 210.

²³ *Recueil des instructions donnée aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution Française*, ed. Louis Farges (31 vols, Paris, 1884-ongoing), v, Pologne (1888), p. xxii.

²⁴ 'Instruction pour le sieur Hooek (*sic*), Brigadier d'Infanterie dans les armées du Roy', 6 May 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 210v).

²⁵ Lukowski, *Liberty's Folly*, p. 123.

traveller drawn by the city's reputation as an attractive destination on the European grand tour. However, his effort at dissimulation was not entirely successful.

His presence was noted by the secretary of the British diplomatic mission in Dresden, George Mackenzie (1669-1725), in his report addressed to James Douglas, second duke of Queensberry (1662-1711) in July 1711.²⁷ Mackenzie was suspicious of Hooke from the outset, being 'assured by more than one that he is from Versailles'.²⁸ The ramifications from the recent change of power within the British polity also contributed to his apprehensions. An ardent Whig,²⁹ distrusted by the new secretary of state, Henry St John (1678-1751) for his 'correspondence with those who labour to undo the [peace] negotiations',³⁰ Mackenzie had been left in Dresden by the departing British envoy to Poland, another Scot, John Dalrymple, second earl of Stair (1673-1747).

Stair was intimately linked with the duke of Marlborough, the lynchpin of the pro-war Whig grouping that had so recently lost political primacy in Britain, and with it almost all powers of placement and patronage.³¹ Marlborough's own position as

²⁶ Mackenzie to the duke of Queensberry, 10 July 1711 (n.s.) (PRO [now TNA], SP 88/19, f. 88).

²⁷ Queensberry had died on 6 July, before Mackenzie's dispatch reached London. Queensberry's position as secretary of state (Scotland) was an addition to the previous complement of two office holders with this designation, secretary of state (Northern department) and secretary of State (Southern department), see J. C. Sainty, *Officials of the secretaries of state 1660-1782* (London, 1973), p. 22. After Queensberry's death his unconventional role in foreign affairs was reincorporated into the responsibilities of secretary St. John.

²⁸ Mackenzie to the duke of Queensberry, 10 July 1711 (n.s.) (PRO [TNA], SP 88/19, f. 88).

²⁹ Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 459).

³⁰ Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs*, pp 345-46.

³¹ Hooke was contemptuous of the party that he had so ardently supported in his youth, stating that 'the Whig party of today is not the same one called by that name in other times. It consists only of a few prominent families and their creatures. The majority of the nation is against them and their leaders are not popular'. See Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 484). Hooke was comparing the situation with the great days of the Whig party in the late 1670s and early 1680s when Shaftesbury and the other popular Whig leaders had mobilised widespread support

captain-general, which had up to this point been insulated from the political bloodletting by his military renown and hold over the army, was now severely threatened.³² His vocal support for continuing the war was the chief line of attack upon which the Tories aimed to undermine finally his declining credit at the English court. Backstairs machinations had already largely turned Queen Anne against her former favourite. If it could be convincingly argued that Marlborough's enthusiasm for renewing hostilities was based on self-interest in the financial gains to be made from the conflict, charges of war profiteering would swiftly end his supremacy as military commander.

Equally Marlborough was aware that if the war continued long enough to allow him to secure another spectacular victory such as Blenheim (1704), or successfully invade France itself, he would have a much better chance of escaping from the snare being laid for him by the Tories. This explains why Mackenzie received strict instructions from the duke of Marlborough's secretary, Adam Cardonnel (d. 1719) to 'keep a watchful eye toward him [Hooke] seeing as the duke of Marlborough is of the opinion that the French have sent him here for some

for their position, see Mark Knights, *Politics and opinion in crisis, 1678-81* (Cambridge, 1994), and T.J. Doyle, 'The duke of Ormond, the Popish Plot and the Exclusion crisis, 1678-82' (unpublished M. Litt thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2004) for an Irish perspective on this period.

³² Stephen Saunders Webb has argued that Marlborough's dominant position and widespread influence in James II's armed forces had allowed him to instigate and direct what was in effect a military coup in November 1688, see S.S. Webb, *Lord Churchill's coup: The Anglo-American empire and the glorious revolution reconsidered* (New York, 1995). While this interpretation is contentious, Marlborough's Tory opponents in 1711 were acutely aware of his alarming hold over the army and navy through a combination of family links and patronage. His request to be awarded the captain-general's position for life had evoked comparisons with Oliver Cromwell (or given his imperial connections, fears of an English Wallenstein) and his well-known predilection for self-aggrandisement added grist to the rumours which spread throughout Europe. See *Lettres de Madame duchess d'Orléans née princess Palatine*, Olivier Amiel (ed.), (Paris, 2005), p. 463. Hence the Tories need to proceed cautiously and deliberately in engineering Marlborough's fall.

design'.³³ Any negotiations that might culminate in hastening the end of the war would jeopardise Marlborough's survival strategy.

Hooke's instructions charged him to reopen relations with Augustus.³⁴ This moment was particularly promising for such an attempt. Following the death of an emperor, the elector of Saxony traditionally assumed the position of regent or vicar of the empire until the election of a successor.³⁵ Hooke was to suggest that from this unique position of strength, as no successor to the throne had been officially endorsed, Augustus had an excellent opportunity to seek the imperial throne himself. A number of lines of reasoning were used to support this proposition: the Saxon dynastic lineage was as distinguished as any in the empire; Saxony was a sufficiently important state to lend credence to a bid and a successful outcome would secure a position as a front rank power. Augustus's position in Poland was still precarious and internal opposition to Saxon rule was growing. His alliance with Russia, a newcomer to the sphere of mainstream European geopolitics but a rapidly growing regional power in the Baltic at Sweden's expense, was proving to be a double-edged sword, with the Saxon first minister expressing his growing fear of the Czar, Peter I, 'the Great' (1672-1725).³⁶

³³ Mackenzie to the earl of Dartmouth, 2 Oct 1711 (n.s.) (PRO [now TNA], SP 88/19, f. 183).

³⁴ 'Instruction pour le sieur Hooock (*sic*), Brigadier d'Infanterie dans les armées du Roy', 6 May 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 211v).

³⁵ 'Instruction pour le sieur Hooock (*sic*), Brigadier d'Infanterie dans les armées du Roy', 6 May 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 211v); F.L. Carsten, *Princes and parliaments in Germany: from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century* (Oxford, 1959), p. 235.

³⁶ This was borne out in 1715 when civil war broke out and Augustus was rescued only by Russian intervention, henceforth to act as little more than a Russian surrogate in Poland, a country described in this period by Thomas Carlyle as a 'beautifully phosphorescent rot-heap'. See Davies, *God's playground: A history of Poland* (2 vols, Oxford, 1981), i, 492.

The French diplomatic line proposed that as Holy Roman Emperor, Augustus could free himself from this dangerous dependency on Russia by calling on the aid of all the German states to maintain his possessions, as the Habsburgs had done. As a convert to catholicism from the heartland of German Lutheranism, he would be acceptable to both protestant and catholic states of the empire. Failing this, Augustus could move to use his temporary position of power to seek his own election as king of the Romans, effectively installing himself as the designated successor to the new emperor, Charles VI (1685-1740). France would wield its influence on his behalf in both cases.

The other major option presented was a bid for the crown of Hungary. This kingdom, previously subject to the Ottoman Empire had now fallen under the sway of the Habsburgs, following a decisive Austrian victory over the Turks in 1687.³⁷ The Hungarian magnates, ‘cruel, proud, revengeful [...] and inclined to war’,³⁸ were deeply divided among themselves. Though ‘all hated the Germans’,³⁹ some saw the Habsburgs as their best defence against the Turks and were prepared to acknowledge that the crown of Hungary, previously an elective monarchy, was now an hereditary possession of that dynasty. Others believed that their noble status and prerogatives were being usurped once more by an outside power. Religion also figured as an extra complicating factor with a large proportion of the rebels adhering to Lutheranism.

³⁷ [Charge d'affaires Maron?] to de Torcy, 8 Apr. 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 201v).

³⁸ Abel Boyer, *A geographical and historical description of those parts of Europe which are the seat of war* (London, 1696), p. 168.

³⁹ *ibid.*

The admixture of social, political, ethnic and religious tension frequently gave rise to rebellion. George I Rákóczi (1591-1648) ‘Prince of Transylvania, lord of a part of the Kingdom of Hungary and Count of Zekella’ initiated a rebellion ‘for love of the Hungarian nation, defence of liberty, religious freedom and the erection again of the statues and laws of the kingdom’⁴⁰ in February 1644. This strain of anti-Austrian feeling was often intertwined with a confessional element as the Counter-Reformation supported by the Habsburgs gained ground against protestantism. Further rebellions broke out in 1670 and 1678-85.⁴¹ George I Rákóczi’s grandson Ferenc I Rákóczi (1645-76) was a central figure in the former while the latter uprising, the *Kuruc* (Crossbearers’) rebellion, was led by Imre Thököly (1656-1705), who married Rákóczi’s widow, Ilona Zrínyi. This rebellion attracted the support of Louis XIV who sent money and 2,000 men to aid the rebels in 1677 before the outbreak of hostilities.⁴² Even when not at war with Austria, Louis was keen to cause the greatest possible discomfort to his Habsburg dynastic rivals (even if in doing so this meant aiding, paradoxically, the survival of protestantism, conflicting with his

⁴⁰ George Rákóczi, *The declaration or, manifesto of George Racokzkie, prince of Transylvania, to the states and peeres of Hungarie, together with the reasons added thereunto of his modern taking up of armes the 17 of February, anno 1644* (London, 1644), p. 5.

⁴¹ For Ferenc I Rákóczi (1645-76) and the rebellion of 1670, see Pierre Jurieu, *Pastoral letters directed to the suffering protestants of France, groaning under the cruel persecution of the bloody tyrant Lewis XIV*, ed. P. Jurieu (London, 1691), p. 637. Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin has written on the parallels between confessional identities in Ireland and Hungary. See his ‘A typical anomaly? The success of the Irish Counter-Reformation’ in Judith Devlin and Howard B. Clarke (eds), *European encounters: essays in memory of Albert Lovett* (Dublin, 2003), pp 78-94 and ‘Conflicting loyalties, conflicted rebels: political and religious allegiance among the Confederate Catholics of Ireland’ in *The English Historical Review*, cxix, no.483 (Sept., 2004), p. 853.

⁴² Jeremy Black, *From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The fate of a great power* (London, 1999), p. 47. French contacts with Hungarian malcontents in the 1660s were again linked to French designs on the Polish throne. An abortive treaty agreed financial and materiel aid from France to the Hungarian’s campaign against the Empire and the Turks to liberate and reunite Hungary. In return the Hungarians would supply military support for the Prince de Condé’s schemes in Poland. The plans came to nothing

increasingly draconian domestic policy regarding the huguenots). These efforts to destabilise the Habsburgs had a long history: French links with Hungarian insurgents stretched back to the 1640s.⁴³ Directing Austrian concentration to the east in the 1670s served to distract attention from the ongoing *Réunions* campaign in the west, where French forces were engaged in occupying disputed lands claimed by Louis XIV under the treaty of Nijmegen (1678).⁴⁴

The Hungarian insurgents also had the support of the Ottoman Empire. The rebellious state of the Hungarian lands became one factor motivating the Ottoman attack on Austria of 1682 and a significant detachment of Hungarians fought alongside the Ottoman forces during the siege of Vienna in 1683.⁴⁵ This rebellion was suppressed in the wake of the relief of Vienna but the underlying unrest was not extinguished. Taking advantage of Austrian military deployment in the west, the Hungarian malcontents again sought to reassert their independence. Backed by the French, open rebellion under Prince Ferenc II Rákóczi (1676-1735) broke out in 1703 and the rebels initially enjoyed a number of successes against Habsburg forces.⁴⁶ Rákóczi, grandson of George I Rákóczi, son of Ferenc I and stepson of Imre Thököly, all thorns in the side of the Habsburg Empire, had been educated in Vienna under the

with the failure of French efforts in Poland; see Bély, *Les relations internationales en Europe: XVII-XVIII siècles* (3rd ed., Paris, 1992), pp 220-22.

⁴³ Bély, *Les relations internationales*, pp 147-48.

⁴⁴ Lynn, *The wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (Harlow, 1999), pp 161-65.

⁴⁵ *Memoirs of Emeric Count Teckely in four books, wherein are related all the most considerable transactions in Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, from his birth, anno 1656, till after the battel of Salankement, in the year 1691*, ed. J. Le Clerc (London, 1693), p. 155.

⁴⁶ Anonymous agent to de Torcy, 24 Nov. 1704 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, ff 98v, 99r). 'Ragotski' (*sic*) ignored the threats of Queen Anne to send a powerful force to reduce the Hungarians into submission in the same as the Bavarians had been humbled. He responded to the English ambassador by 'mocking these advances, coldly stating that he did not believe that the queen wished to make such a long journey'.

strict supervision of the Habsburg court. This attempt to produce a loyal subject of the empire failed with Rákóczi ultimately becoming a Hungarian national hero.⁴⁷

More significantly in European terms, his rebellion became a major distraction for Austria, causing the diversion of thousands of troops from its campaigns against France.⁴⁸ For this reason Britain and The Netherlands were now striving to settle this diversion in the East on terms dictated by their own strategic imperatives.⁴⁹ Despite the peace of Szatmár, signed by a faction of the leadership in May 1711 when Rákóczi was absent seeking support in Poland, Louis XIV and de Torcy believed that ‘most of the Hungarian nation [would] be favourable to’⁵⁰ Augustus taking the throne. Augustus himself had considered such a bid at the very outset of his reign in Poland, with the aim of creating a hereditary Wettin state in the Balkans.⁵¹ If he wished now to reactivate these plans, Hooke was authorised to say that France would promise to accord new subsidies to Rákóczi and to put his Hungarian Confederates in to a state of readiness they had never before reached. His Majesty [Louis XIV] would intercede with the Porte to ensure the goodwill of the

⁴⁷ Rákóczi’s paternal grandfather, George Rákóczi had been protestant and a resolute defender of that confessions rights in Habsburgs dominated Hungary. Rákóczi himself was catholic but his beliefs were heavily influenced by the jansenism of Port Royal. This religious mentality combined with his familial associations with Lutheranism accounted for the unusual situation of a largely protestant rebel force calling on a catholic nobleman for leadership. See G. Barany, ‘Hoping against hope: the enlightened age in Hungary’ in *The American History Review*, lxxvi, no. 2 (1971), p. 325.

⁴⁸ Sturdy, *Fractured Europe, 1600-1721* (Oxford, 2002), p. 281. Even when the rebellion was suppressed the troops which were withdrawn from the Hungarian front were largely unfit for further service such had been the rigours of the campaign. Detachments sent to form an army of observation, the so called Corps of Neutrality, in northern Germany were described as ‘in a very poor state’. See anonymous informant to de Torcy, 21 Oct. 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 287r).

⁴⁹ Report of British ambassador in Berlin, Thomas Raby, on Hungarian affairs to secretary of state St. John, 20 Jan. 1711 (PRO [now TNA], SP 90/5 ff 471-492); Raby to St. John, 21 Feb. 1711 (PRO [now TNA], SP 90/5 f. 586).

⁵⁰ ‘Instruction pour le sieur Hooek (*sic*), Brigadier d’Infanterie dans les armées du Roy’, 6 May 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 214v).

Ottoman Empire towards King Augustus's state.⁵² The advantage to France in these scenarios was the diversion of Austrian armies to campaigns in the east, away from assaults on France's borders. This policy was a prominent element of French grand strategy.⁵³

Hooke observed that the Saxon court was deeply divided between two factions, one largely orientated towards Austria and the other to France.⁵⁴ Count Jacob-Heinrich Fleming remained the central figure of the Saxon administration. Fleming had accompanied William III on his invasion of England and had a varied career before entering Saxon service. In many ways he resembled Hooke, and both men were emblematic of the spirit of the times, combining, with relative ease, several different roles. Fleming demonstrated his versatility in fulfilling the duties of soldier, diplomat and minister. He also dabbled in intellectual matters, becoming involved in a heated debate on the philosophical views of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716).⁵⁵ While this discourse can be characterised as an early representation of Enlightenment rationality, older systems of thought and mentalities derived from divine right doctrine remained popular. Hooke reported that Fleming had been born in Pomerania, a Swedish territory on the Baltic coast (part of modern Poland).⁵⁶ Fleming

⁵¹ Lukowski, *Liberty's Folly* (London, 1991), p. 124.

⁵² 'Instruction pour le sieur Hooock (*sic*), Brigadier d'Infanterie dans les armées du Roy', 6 May 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 218r).

⁵³ Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 20 Jan. 1706 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 128r); Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 9 Feb. 1706 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 212r); Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 20 Jan. 1705 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 217r).

⁵⁴ Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, ff 465-467, 476).

⁵⁵ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (56 vols, Leipzig-Munich, 1875-1912), vii (1878), 117-18.

⁵⁶ Pomerania had been partitioned between Prussia and Sweden at the peace of Westphalia, at the end of the Thirty Years War. Fleming therefore had the same problematically mixed identity as Hooke. By geographical definition he was Swedish, by ethnicity a Brandenburger and by residence and political

had never formally renounced this connection and therefore was regarded as a subject of Charles XII (1682-1718) of Sweden. When he invaded and conquered Poland in 1702 and Saxony in 1706 Charles was firmly convinced that he was Fleming's rightful sovereign and therefore Fleming, acting in the interests of Charles's enemy Augustus, had betrayed his duty as a subject. Fleming only very narrowly escaped severe punishment for what Charles regarded as base treason.⁵⁷ In his report on his mission, Hooke described Fleming as very intelligent, insightful and knowledgeable but also arrogant, intimidating and extremely brusque.⁵⁸ To complicate further Hooke's endeavours in Dresden, Fleming, growing less enamoured with the workload and responsibility foisted upon him by his pleasure-loving master, and anxious for preferment and service at the imperial court, was ardently pro-Austrian.⁵⁹

Chief amongst the pro-French faction were Prince Anton Egon von Furstenberg (1656-1716) described by Hooke as sincere and a religiously devout catholic⁶⁰ and King Augustus's *maîtresse en titre*, Anna Constanze von Brockdorff

affiliation a Saxon. To complicate matters further he succeeded in his ambition of attaining a place at the Habsburg court and died in Vienna.

⁵⁷ N. Hooke, 'Mémoire de ce qui s'est passé de plus considérable dans le Nord depuis le l'année 1700 jusques en 1710 et le caractère des Princes qui ont eu part', 1712 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 132, f. 389r). Hooke described Charles as modelling himself on a military legend from the classical past, Alexander the Great, and not without foundation in Hooke's view, see *ibid.*, (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 132, f. 347r). His rival Augustus II, despite his coldly calculating image, also appears to have had a Janus-like mentality, partly orientated toward and shaped by the past but balanced by a desire to create and a fascination with innovation. Hence the same man could bring himself to believe in the potency of a prophecy casting him as the 'mighty lion' who would forge a great state from the Baltic to the Black Sea while at the same time directing significant amounts of revenue to metallurgical experimentation and ordnance improvement. The Meissen porcelain factories provide the ideal example of this dual mindset: what became the hallmark of the advanced state of Saxon manufactories developed as the accidental by-product of alchemy.

⁵⁸ Hooke, 'Relation de l'exécution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 454).

⁵⁹ Hooke, 'Relation de l'exécution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 454).

⁶⁰ Hooke, 'Relation de l'exécution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 465). Furstenberg also found time beyond politics and religion to set the brewery of the same name on a commercial footing in 1705.

(1680-c.1765) countess of Cosel, a woman of knowledge and quick wit but lacking in patience.⁶¹ This power struggle at court also had a confessional dimension as the majority of those orientated towards France were converts to catholicism. Interestingly this confessional aspect was also counterpoised by ethnic considerations on the part of one of Hooke's most useful contacts at court, the secretary of the Saxon council, Jacob Le Coq, a French huguenot. Hooke describes him as 'a French refugee, very wise, a hard worker with a quick mind [...] who had left Metz with his family at the age of nine and had a great desire to return there.' Hooke stressed that Le Coq 'is by no means attached to heresy and he has always seemed very well intentioned for the service of His Majesty'.⁶²

On arriving in Saxony, Hooke was granted an audience with Augustus and promptly set the French proposals before him.⁶³ Although Augustus himself was keen on some engagement with the French, Fleming, despite Hooke's best efforts, was less than taken with these proposals, as he clearly saw that the principal French objective was diverting the Austrians away from the west.⁶⁴ He repeatedly stated that Augustus could not and would not entertain any such prospects while the Swedish war still continued.⁶⁵ In any event, Fleming argued, the arrangements for the election had already been made and could not be changed. However, this ignored the fact that the

⁶¹ Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 467). Countess Cosel paid dearly for her insistent demands when she overstepped the mark late in 1712. The faction led by Fleming prevailed on Augustus to have Cosel imprisoned for threatening to divulge details of a secret marriage contract. She died, still in captivity, over fifty years later.

⁶² Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 481).

⁶³ Ambassador Charles Whitworth to St. John, 30 June 1711 (PRO [now TNA], SP 91/7, f. 37).

⁶⁴ Flemming to Hooke, 10 Oct. 1711 (BL, Add. MS 61244, ff 223-25).

⁶⁵ 'Memorial of an interview between field marshal count von Fleming and baron de Hooke,' 21 Feb. 1712 (Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dresden, 10026 Geheimes Kabinett, Loc. 69016, ff 34-42).

original desire of the Viennese court for a speedy election of Charles VI had been stalled by the opposition of Augustus himself. Diplomatic reports in mid-summer 1711 were dominated by this unexpected and unexplained delay. Diplomats from Vienna were already seeking votes among the eligible electors whilst the diplomatic nerve centre of Europe at The Hague held its breath lest the election be contested.⁶⁶ Such an impasse existed because of the suddenness of Emperor Joseph's death, without his brother Charles having been nominated his successor. Augustus's legacy of untrustworthy and unprincipled actions made the election a live issue. Closely marshalled and heavily influenced by Fleming, however, Augustus, though tempted, did not accept the bait on this occasion. The Archduke Charles was officially elected emperor on 12 October 1711.⁶⁷

Hooke's mission, however, was not yet at an end. He received supplementary orders from Paris to remain in Saxony and continue attempts aimed at wooing Augustus into the French camp.⁶⁸ During Fleming's absence on a diplomatic mission to Berlin, the pro-French party gained the king's ear.⁶⁹ Hooke was frequently requested to attend the king at assemblies, audiences, masques and even while Augustus was hunting. In keeping with his indolent nature, Augustus declared his strong admiration for Louis XIV, his inclination for France, and a desire to demonstrate his good will. However he never acted on these aspirations.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ *Observations from The Hague and Utrecht: William Harrison's letters to Henry Watkins, 1711-12*, ed. Linda Frey, Marsha Frey and J. C. Rule (Columbus, 1979), p. 28.

⁶⁷ Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 472).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 475.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 481.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 485.

The improved, if still tenuous, prospect of a French-Saxon alliance was thwarted by Fleming's return to Dresden. He reasserted his dominance at court, facing down the pro-French faction and, in the process, coming to plain dealing with Hooke. Interviews with the king were now severely curtailed.⁷¹ Masterfully manipulating Augustus, Fleming managed to convince him to have orders issued for the arrest of Madame Cosel. (The news reached her during a social gathering at her house, and to Hooke fell the sombre task of reading the letter aloud to those assembled). Fleming intimated that Hooke's time in Saxony should be brought to an end. In the spring of 1712 Fleming informed Hooke that 'somehow' the imperial court had discovered the presence of a French representative in Saxony in contravention of imperial rules. He expressed surprise at how this could have happened and his worry lest Hooke be kidnapped by agents of the emperor and dispatched to prison.⁷² Hooke called his bluff, ignored this intimidation and refused to leave. In the course of the following days, nothing untoward materialised.⁷³ However,

⁷¹ Ibid., f. 489.

⁷² If captured the least Hooke could expect would be a long imprisonment if not death. In January 1705 a French army colonel named Verville, attached to the Hungarian rebels of Ferenc Rákóczi, had been captured and sent to Vienna. Debate ensued concerning whether he should be 'regarded as a prisoner of war or as a spy who was attempting to incite the subjects of the Emperor'. After some weeks of deliberation and being 'examined several times', Verville was condemned to death. However the situation was complicated by intricate international considerations. His execution was strongly advocated by Neapolitan representatives in Vienna in revenge for 'the death of the marquis de Sangro decapitated in Naples three years before'. On the other hand there were suggestions that he 'should be exchanged for Baron de Chaussinet a prisoner in France'. English and Dutch ministers, pressing the emperor to quickly end the distraction of the Hungarian uprising by signing a negotiated treaty allowing imperial troops to return to the main sphere of action (in their view) against France in the west, wished to placate Rákóczi. The latter took the decisive action that settled the matter by 'threatening to hang without mercy a captured Austrian general if the French officer was put to death'. See Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 20 Jan. 1705 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, ff 127r, 128r); Anonymous informant to de Torcy, 3 Feb. 1705 (A.A.E., CP, Brunswick-Hanovre, vol. 44, f. 135r).

⁷³ Hooke, 'Relation de l'execution des Ordres du Roy', 24 May 1712 (Bodl., MS D 26, f. 477).

Hooke's commission was to stay in Saxony only as long as he thought it useful.⁷⁴ Fleming's unbending opposition rendered any progress unlikely, especially as he steadfastly denied Hooke the right to accompany the king on his forthcoming military campaigns. Obtaining passports for France, covering two different routes, in case Fleming had a final surprise in mind, Hooke reached France safely in May 1712 and took on a new role with the French delegation at the peace negotiations in Utrecht. These treaties eventually brought the War of Spanish Succession to an end and Western Europe, after some twenty-five years of almost unending conflict, finally had a respite from warfare.

Hooke's endeavours in Saxony made a favourable impression on Louis XIV. He had re-established French diplomatic relations with Augustus II and cultivated a number of sympathetic and influential contacts at the Saxon court. This went some way towards counterbalancing unchallenged Imperial diplomatic sway in Dresden. In a fluid political situation where a number of state-building projects were underway, this could be important for French diplomatic relations in central Europe. It appeared possible, indeed probable to some contemporary observers, that Saxony-Poland could develop into a major power in the region. French geopolitical interests would be well served by friendly relations. In time, Prussia rather Saxony acquired great power status but this was far from an obvious or inevitable outcome in 1711.

⁷⁴ 'Instruction pour le sieur Hooek (*sic*), Brigadier d'Infanterie dans les armées du Roy', 6 May 1711 (A.A.E., CP, Pologne, vol. 131, f. 225r).

On 8 June 1712 Hooke was awarded a life pension of 1500 francs by Louis XIV as a mark of satisfaction with his service.⁷⁵ Hooke's previous missions, such as his voyages to Scotland had been of a different nature to his Saxony posting. With an official rank of envoy extraordinaire in the diplomatic hierarchy, second only to that of ambassador, the mission to Saxony marked an important and prestigious appointment for Hooke. The awarding patent makes it clear that the pension was also a reflection of Hooke's consolidated career achievements in French service.

Saxony proved to be Hooke's last journey abroad on diplomatic service and the last major mission of his career. He stayed on as an adviser to de Torcy until the latter's departure from office as secretary of state for foreign affairs after the death of Louis XIV in 1715. Hooke, however, remained *au fait* with the world of diplomacy, intelligence and intrigue even after the departure of his patron from the ministry of foreign affairs. De Torcy, though closely associated with the 'old court' of Louis XIV, became an influential member of the regency council with a good deal of independent authority in foreign affairs.⁷⁶ Thus Hooke's continuing connections within the French political and military establishments made him a valuable contact among Irish and British *émigrés*.⁷⁷ He was sounded out in regard to advising and assisting in plans for a Swedish supported Jacobite invasion of Britain in 1715/16 but,

⁷⁵ Order by Louis XIV for a patent of a pension of 1500 francs to Sieur Hooke, 8 June 1712 (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre vol. 241, f. 138).

⁷⁶ The regent, Philippe d'Orléans, 'ordered that the most important correspondence from French agents abroad should be addressed to de Torcy who was authorised to reply without giving details to the council for foreign affairs. His great experience in diplomacy [...] made him an indispensable adviser in the field of foreign affairs even after the abbé Dubois had become foreign secretary.' See J. H. Shennan, *Philippe, duke of Orléans: regent of France 1715-1723* (London, 1979), p. 40.

⁷⁷ General George Hamilton to the duke of Mar, 21 Nov. 1717, H. M. C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers*, v, 220.

as a naturalised Frenchman, was unable to become involved. The Regency government was eager to maintain its new British alliance.⁷⁸ In 1718 Hooke was considered for the position of French envoy to Prussia.⁷⁹ The end of his active career later in the same year was marked by promotion to *maréchal de camp*, (major general). In 1720 Hooke's French naturalisation was confirmed and in 1721 he was enrolled as knight commander in the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, a prestigious honour awarded for merit.⁸⁰ After his retirement Hooke lived with his second wife, Helen St John, in Paris. This Irish lady was closely related to Honora Burke (1675-1698), daughter of the earl of Clanricarde, and wife of Patrick Sarsfield and the duke of Berwick. Hooke's first wife, Eleanor MacCarthy Reagh had died a number of years previously. His son from this first marriage, James Nathaniel Hooke (1705-1744) followed his father into the French army, before transferring to the army of the Imperial claimant Charles VI. He died in battle outside Strasbourg in 1744. The Hooke legacy in France was continued by Nathaniel's grand-nephew, the Catholic theologian Luke Joseph Hooke (1714-1796).⁸¹ After a long, active and influential career, Nathaniel Hooke died in Paris on 25 October 1738.

⁷⁸ Lewis Inese to the duke of Mar, 29 Oct. 1716, quoted in H. M. C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers*, iii, 149. See also Shennan, *Philippe, duke of Orléans*, pp 58-60.

⁷⁹ The duke of Mar to the duke of Ormond, 15 July 1718, H. M. C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers*, vii, 42-43.

⁸⁰ Because of its connotation with the idea of merit, with 'virtue, merit, and services rendered with distinction in our armies [...] the only grounds for entry', the Order was the only *ancien régime* decoration to survive the French Revolution and inspired the modern *Légion d'Honneur*. See J. M. Smith, *The culture of merit: nobility, royal service and the making of absolute monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor, 1996), p. 167.

⁸¹ See Thomas O'Connor, *An Irish theologian in enlightenment France: Luke Joseph Hooke (1714-96)* (Dublin, 1995).

CONCLUSION

Hooke's life demonstrates the interplay of his ability, flexibility, experience, personal contacts and the enduring importance of patronage. His manipulation of altering patronage networks was evident and important from the outset of his career. Active in Whig and radical Protestant circles he rose to a position as chaplain to the duke of Monmouth in 1685. Utilising his experience and apparently an innate ability to adapt, he impressed James II after his submission in 1688. In 1701 he used his twenty years of accumulated knowledge of and insight into English politics and English politicians to underpin his transfer into French service. In a period where the likelihood of second Restoration in England oscillated from possible to probable, few could be certain what the future held in political or personal terms. Hooke sought to exploit this uncertainty and the fear that it engendered in favour of France.

As a migrant and outsider in France, Hooke attempted and managed to establish a network of diverse and powerful contacts ranging from the earls of Perth and Melfort at the Jacobite court of St Germain to Francois de Callières, the duc de Chevreuse, the duc de Beauvillier and crucially the marquis de Torcy at the French court. He was also in close communication with the Cardinal Gualterio, the Papal nuncio in France.¹ In 1717 such was his renewed credit at St Germain and Versailles that it was rumoured Hooke would soon supplant General Arthur Dillon (1670-1733) as the leading Irish Jacobite.

¹ *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke*, ed. Macray, i, pp 11, 39, ii, 39, 66; On Gualterio see Pierre Blet, *Les nonces du pape à la cour de Louis XIV* (Paris, 2002), pp 215-40.

Darker insinuations claimed that Hooke himself was orchestrating a conspiracy within Jacobite circles to unseat Dillon.² Allegations were made that Hooke had been pardoned by James II in 1688 as a reward for betraying his fellow Monmouth rebels. Having ‘raised himself by treachery’ he was accused of continuing in the same vein.³ Conversations Hooke had with the British ambassador in Paris, James Dalrymple, the earl of Stair (a friend of Hooke’s prior to his posting to Paris), were pointed to as proof that Hooke was actually a British spy and had been for many years. Ironically in the same year Hooke’s appointment as the French ambassador to Prussia was stymied by worries concerning his Jacobite sympathies: Berlin had no desire to harm relations with Britain by receiving a man with uncertain loyalties.⁴

Questions about his identity and allegiance were central to innuendo surrounding Hooke during his own lifetime and caused confusion in attempts to assess him historically. One of the reasons for this is that Hooke sought, deliberately, to adopt and project different personas as befitted the surroundings in which he found himself. We see this clearly during his mission to Holland. At one and the same time he represented himself as both a ‘good Englishman’ to win over the English and Dutch, and a loyal servant of Louis XIV and France to gratify de Torcy. With the benefit of historical perspective and archival research, it is possible to judge the former a mere ploy while the latter contained a good deal of sincerity. Some contemporaries, lacking this ability to see behind the mask

² Elizabeth Ogilvie to the duke of Mar, 18 Aug. 1718, H. M. C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers*, vii, 175.

³ Captain John Ogilvie to the earl of Oxford, Robert Harley, enclosed in a letter from Ogilvie to the duke of Mar, 29 Dec. 1718, H. M. C., *Calendar of the Stuart Papers*, vii, 683-84.

⁴ Stair to secretary of state, James Craggs (1686-1721), Paris, 15 Oct. 1718, (PRO [now TNA], SP 78/162, f. 235); Hooke to Stair, Paris, 16 Oct. 1718, (P.R.O. [now TNA], SP 78/162, f. 251).

and differentiate façade from reality regarded Hooke as simply duplicitous. However, it is reasonable to wonder if there were many occasions when Hooke was not consciously fashioning the image which he wanted received.

Beyond the presentation of self, another important factor was Hooke's status as a migrant. All migrants are outsiders but Hooke's case was exceptional. He appears to have always been rootless, not particularly anchored in any setting. Born in Ireland of an English family, resident in England but seen as Irish, a freeman of Amsterdam while in exile, he ended his days as a naturalised Frenchman demonstrating the malleability and socially constructed character of 'pre-national identity'. Even in the early modern era though, before the advent of nation states and the nineteenth century conception of nationality and citizenship, a naturalised Frenchman was still viewed quite distinctly from a French 'natural'.⁵ 'Identity and that which marks it define themselves by the residue of difference'⁶ and Hooke had a surfeit of such residue. In the area of religion he transformed from a radical Protestant clergyman into a Catholic convert. Politically he developed from a Whig dissident into a Jacobite loyalist and then went on to become an adherent of Louis XIV. In displaying this variety, Hooke's life was a microcosm of the society in which he lived and reflected the experience of many of his contemporaries, such as Robert Ferguson, Thomas Prendergast, Jacob Fleming and Prince Eugene to name only a small cross-section from different social levels and countries who had similarly fluid identities. Therefore the

⁵ See Peter Sahlin, *Unnaturally French: foreign citizens in the old regime and after* (Ithaca, 2004), p. ix. Priscilla O'Connor has examined the experience of the exiled Irish community in Paris. See her 'Irish clerics in the University of Paris, 1570-1770' (Ph.D thesis, NUI Maynooth, 2006).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

fluidity of Hooke's life and career reflected the flexible, if not chaotic, nature of the ancien regime itself.

The realms where Hooke operated, international relations and diplomacy, intelligence and warfare were changeable and unpredictable, 'a system in flux'.⁷ Countries disappeared off the map, dynasties changed, and alliances mutated as diplomatic and military power altered. In 1665, the year after Hooke was born, the Dutch Republic, a front rank power was at war with England, a secondary player at best. France, after a long struggle to overcome the Spanish Monarchy, was beginning a period of aggressive expansion. By the time of Hooke's death and despite his best efforts to undermine the project, a new composite monarchy, Britain, had become the leading military and diplomatic presence in Europe. Britain's status had been achieved during the War of Spanish Succession and confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714. Hooke had forecast that the conflict would be crucial in determining who would be the leading power in Europe. He warned that, to his mind, the English '*were searching for the future*' [my italics], and that future would be underpinned by the expansion of their trade and empire at others' expense.⁸

Hooke's later career was intimately bound up with the War of Spanish Succession. The skills and abilities he could call upon, however, had been developed over many years. Although earlier and later chapters in Hooke's life can, at first glance, seem remote and disconnected from the Spanish War of Succession, the experiences of the failed minor Protestant Whig activist were crucial to the formation of the later successful consistent Catholic, one time

⁷ Jeremy Black, *From Louis XIV to Napoleon: the fate of a great power* (London, 1999), p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, (A.A.E., CP, Angleterre supp. vol. 3, f. 180r).

Jacobite, and sometime diplomat, analyst and soldier. His involvement with, and experience of politics, policies and personalities in England from 1680 gave Hooke an invaluable base of knowledge on which to build his later career. His familiarity and understanding of circumstances in England allowed him to foresee (accurately) in his written memoirs that the country was best equipped, especially financially due to its equitable tax base and well managed debt, to benefit from a long struggle over the Spanish Succession. He also forecast correctly that colonial commerce would be a key factor in the struggle. De Torcy later echoed phrases from Hooke's writings when negotiating trade and colonial questions with British secret envoy, Matthew Prior, in 1711.⁹ Hooke's mission to The Netherlands in 1702 was important precisely because his assessment of the situation was accurate: France should not be involved in a long term war because it could not sustain the financial burden. Hence the emphasis, even before the outbreak of war, on maintaining or restoring peace. Strategies for ending the war, on terms favourable to France, were the important and consistent theme linking Hooke's written analysis and active missions. This ability to conceive and implement peace policies and conceive realistic geopolitical strategies made Hooke useful and valuable to de Torcy.

Hooke's overall insight, that French security depended on splitting the Grand Alliance of England, Holland and the Empire, was not original but his capacity to describe how and why it ought to be executed was. Few in the French diplomatic service could match his detailed knowledge of both England and Holland. Militarily, Hooke considered that France had the resources to defeat any

⁹ Dale Miquelon, 'Envisioning the French Empire: Utrecht, 1711-1713' in *French Historical Studies*, xxiii, no. 4 (Autumn, 2001), p. 655.

two powers together. He outlined a number of schemes to achieve this goal. Military options (for which Hooke had drawn up detailed plans) included an amphibious landing near London and the seizure of the English capital; the capture of the Channel Islands and the institution of an effective blockade on English ports; or an expedition to Scotland to distract and divert English resources.

For a more diplomatic and long term plan, Hooke recommended developing contacts and sympathisers in England. Once communications were opened appropriate gifts and rewards could be used to encourage them to bring their influence to bear. This was the most important aspect of Hooke's mission to Holland. He carried it out by gaining access to and sounding out Stanhope, Cutts (an old friend and relative), Barnard and Marlborough. Hooke was able to enlighten de Torcy with first hand accounts of attitudes and developments among the English high command in the Netherlands, and in England itself. Along with the information he gathered at Aix le Chapelle in 1703, Hooke was able to confirm to de Torcy that attempts at subversion, and a separate peace, in England were unlikely to succeed in the short term. Hooke had also reported on the situation and outlook of the Dutch polity and that Republican elements might be able to support French overtures. Francois de Callières, a colleague and friend of Hooke's who valued his opinion and insight, made the first unofficial (and unsuccessful) proposals to the Dutch Republic for a separate peace in 1704.

By this time Hooke was actively engaged in trying to stop the war by starting another one. In trying to bring a Scottish diversion to fruition, he utilised his own experience, contacts, and powers of persuasion, and came within a hair's

breath of landing 6,000 French regulars in Scotland. The potential of the 1708 expedition, and the soundness of Hooke's strategic thought, are demonstrated by the fact that news of the project provoked a serious run on the Bank of England, and ten battalions of British troops were evacuated from Holland. The Bank of England's reaction, obviously a conscious and crucial part of Hooke's project, is only one more example of the hard headed economic beam underpinning his analyses and recommendations. Again his breadth of experience and exposure to different ideas, especially the theory and practice of the English economy, set him apart from many of his contemporaries in the French diplomatic service.

It is impossible to say with certainty what the long term outcome in Scotland would have been if the expedition had landed. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that, at the very least, the presence of 6000 French troops (even without major Scottish support) in Britain would have been seriously incapacitating for the English. A separate peace between Britain and France in 1708 would have been on very different terms to the advantageous settlement Britain obtained in 1712/13. If Hooke's plan had come to fruition would the Stuarts have been restored and would the Union have survived? Would (and indeed could) the British Empire have been as successful and have taken the same shape as it did after Utrecht if territorial and trade agreements had been dictated in 1709 by a victorious France and Spain instead?¹⁰ Might France (and Spain) not have been burdened by the enormous costs of four additional years of war? That was the objective of French grand strategy and one to which Hooke's theories and

¹⁰ Jeremy Black in the expanded introduction to the second edition of his *A system of ambition? British foreign policy 1660-1793* (Stroud, 2000) explores this fascinating question in some detail. He emphasises that the rise of Britain as the leading world power was not inevitable and suggests the 'pace and extent of European overseas expansion would probably have been less had France been the prime European power'. See pages xvi-xxv.

actions made a significant contribution. His mission to Saxony was in keeping with the general concept of dividing the Grand Alliance. The negotiation of a separate peace between France and Britain in 1712 brought about what Hooke had first advocated in 1702.

Hooke therefore was an important political strategist as well as an insightful intelligence analyst. The principles of Hooke's analysis were first set out in his memoirs of 1702/03. The ideas and strategies he originated became important elements of French policy. Until now they have been overlooked.

Not surprisingly in a world where secrecy and discretion were so vital, the archival record of the practitioners of intelligence and espionage is quite often fragmentary, scattered and difficult to reconstruct. The contents of diplomatic archives also remained sensitive and access difficult for much longer than other source material. Pursuing a career in diplomacy and espionage required more specific skills, a longer term commitment to the host country, and a higher degree of trust than, for example, a military career, resulting in much more restricted access for non-natives. A smaller proportion of Irishmen were willing or able to embark on this demanding path, although an estimation with any degree of accuracy of the number of Irishmen involved in the area of diplomacy and intelligence awaits further study

However it is clear that a number of émigrés, such as Toby Burke (1671-1742), and Richard Wall (1694-1777) did manage to carve out successful careers in the diplomatic service of France, Spain and other European countries.¹¹ As is

¹¹ On Burke see Micheline Kerney Walsh, 'Toby Bourke, ambassador of James III at the court of Philip V, 1705-1713' in Cruickshanks and Corp (eds), *The Stuart Court in exile*, pp 143-53. On Wall see Diego Téllez Alarcia, 'D.Ricardo Wall. El ministro olvidado' (Ph.D thesis, University of Rioja, 2006); idem, "Richard Wall: light and shade of an irish minister in Spain (1694-1777)" in

evident from Hooke's career, foreign nationals could be extremely useful in the world of diplomacy and foreign relations, having had different experiences, direct exposure to different ideas, modes of thought and practices and often possessing a broader range of contacts. Specifically, Irish migrants adapted to and operated in a European context while also drawing on elements of their Irishness. Hooke's capability to fulfil his mission to Saxony benefited from parallels with his experience in Ireland and England. He was intimately familiar with political factionalism and religious divisions. He had grown up and been educated in a country with a Catholic majority where an attempt, in which the Hookes had been deeply involved, was underway to advance Protestantism. His awareness of the sensitivities and suspicions of both faiths and the political power of religion was particularly useful in countries where confessional divisions were still keenly felt, such as Scotland and Holland. Similarly Saxony in 1711 had an overwhelmingly Lutheran population amongst whom the adaptation and promotion of Catholicism by Augustus II was ill received and largely unsuccessful. Augustus himself exhibited many similarities to Hooke's former master James II: a converted Catholic monarch who had succeeded his childless brother, who was now attempting to weld together disparate kingdoms, tenuously sharing a monarch, into a true unitary state of the first rank. Hence Hooke's personal experience and career development, like many of his fellow émigrés, had again equipped him very well for his new role as a diplomat and intelligence agent in the troubled sphere of European international relations.

Irish Studies Review, 11.2, August 2003, pp 123-136 and his web project at www.tiemposmodernos.org/ricardowall.

Until recently, for the reasons cited above, these career paths tended to attract less scholarly attention than those in military, religious and economic spheres. Nathaniel Hooke's career vividly demonstrates, however, that there was another route to influence in the old regime beyond money, muskets and missals. Hooke broke the Jacobite mould to become an excellent example of a career diplomat. In a period where the conduct of France's foreign relations was pivotal to its interests and security, Hooke played a significant role in the conception and initiation of policy. We can gain a sense of perspective on the position Hooke reached by comparing his role as advisor and analyst to the marquis de Torcy, architect of the foreign policy of France, a contemporary superpower, with the modern equivalent of an Irishman serving the secretary of state of the United States.

Hooke however was only one such example of an Irish émigré rising high in diplomatic and intelligence circles. An assessment of the important but largely unexplored phenomenon of Irish diplomats within the broader context of the Irish in Europe awaits the result of further investigation. While research has been devoted to Irish military exiles who implemented 'politics by other means', the activities and significance of men like Nathaniel Hooke, such as Toby Burke, Ricardo Wall, Daniel O'Mahony, and Arthur Dillon (to name only a small number) who were involved, at various levels, in various countries, in the formulation of political and diplomatic policy remains to be explored. In a wider perspective many more detailed biographical studies of Irishmen and women are needed before it will be possible to contemplate arriving at any broad assessment or comprehensive synthesis of the Irish exile experience in early modern Europe.

APPENDIX I

Fr Ambrose Grymes (Dominican) to Bevil Skelton, English Envoy, Holland (B. L., Add. 41817 f. 199).

Brussels

1 July 1685

About Hooke the Duke of Monmouth's chaplain

Most honoured Sir,

I was not the less surprised to see this enclosed yesterday, than probably you'll be to see both the enclosed & the cover, coming from a person that wants the honour of your acquaintance. The contents of the enclosed will not surprise you, when you know [that] it comes from the duke of Monmouth's chaplain, whose name, as he went here in Brussels, is as underwritten. My civilities to him he mentions in the beginning of his letter, were but common, a[s] I would them to any countryman; & though indeed I never liked him much, (however he behaved himself fairly), yet in imitation of Saint Paul I sometimes saw him, & wished he would embrace better principles than I knew he held.

And now to discover some small thing of myself, though I desire to be hid; I am a poor religious man of the holy order of St Dominick, & in this quality had the honour to make his Majesty's coronation sermon, to which all the English were invited, amongst the rest appeared this Parson Hooke, who came late, & just entered as I was inveighing against all disturbers of Monarchy, --

Absalons, Achilophels [etc]; my text was taken out of the 9th chapter of Wisdom: erunt accepta opera mea, & disponam populum Tuum juste, & ero dignus Sedium Patris mei. I discoursed much in my first [point?] of the perfection of Monarchy above all governments, Aristocratic, Democratic, [etc], & declared against Oligarchy & Anarchy; I spoke much in the praise of Kings, [?] this text out of the first book of Kings, [constitute] nobis Regem, [ut] judicet nos, sicut & universie habent nationes. In my 2nd point, because twas St George's day, I made a short panegyric of thy great champion for England, & because I was to speak of his Majesty's [virtues?] according to the words of my text, I made some little parallel betwixt him, & the Saint, showed him to be out of the [Poet] *illegible illegible* quo Juptior alter, nec pietas fuit, nec bello major & armis.

I exhorted all subjects to be loyal, told them out of Castiodoreis Sub Imperis boni Principi omnium fortune, moresq profieieunt & again [Juta] et conditio subditorum, ubi vivitur sub equitate Regnantum. I produced how the King is the model & example of his people, how the temperate Cleomenes reformed the whole Kingdom of Sparta to [rid?] debauchery; how the [General] Scipio communicated continence to his whole army; how one Clotildy converted all France, Indegundis Spain, Theodolina Italy, Ethellega Germany, Olga Russia, [D]ambruca Poland, Gisella Hungary, Casevea Persia, Helena the whole Empire; how many of the City of Samaria believed in Christ for the words of the Samaritan women, & how the little of Reclus in the Gospel converted his whole town & family, credidi—pe, domus ejus tota; I compared his Maty to the Theodosus's of the orient, the Charles of the Occident the Edward's of England, the Hermenegildes's of Spain, the Lewis's of France, the Henry's of Saxe, the Leopold's of Austrich, the Stephen's of Hungary, the Wencelaus's of Bohemia, the Josaphat's of India.

I hoped, that since he had banished all lewdedness & lewd persons from his palace, to see his court the prime court of the world, the elite & flow of all nations for virtue; & that he himself might be a 2nd Constantine, another Augustus to reform the manners of the whole world, citing for this Regis ad exemplum [etc]; & these words of the philosopher Egesippus: Rex vehi honesta, nemo non eadem noles.

At length I spoke of his Majesty's coronation, discussed how the 6th of January was celebrated by Philip King of Macedon with great solemnity, and by Augustus for the reasons I produced: made an application hereof to the 23rd of April to be eternalised for his Majesty's coronation & so echoed forth this proclamation of King Artaxerxes in the book of Esther: unde & nos inter [eteros] festos lies, hanc habetote diem, & celebrate eam cum omni laetitia, ut in posterum cognoscatur. ---omnis Provincia & civitas que [(p)ruluerit] solemnitatis ejus huius esse parlicept, gladis & ignis pereat, & hic deleatur, ut non solum hominibus, sed etiam bestis inuia sit in semni ternum, quo exemplo contempus & inobedientia --- my reasons were, because James the 2nd is our lawful King by birth, hereditary right, law of nations [etc]---

& so I epigraphised my discourse w^{ith} Te deum laudamus for giving us such a glorious Monarch & preserving his life from thousands of dangers, putting these words of Queen Esther into his mouth: traditi enim sumus, ego & populus meus, ut contenamur, jugulemur, & pereamus: infine ended with a domine saluum fac Regem [etc] for the future preservation of his Sacred Maty, & all the Royal family.

I humbly beg yr pardon Sr. for this tedious relation of what's not worth yr knowledge; I was advised to it by a worthy, ingenious, & judicious Gentleman; & the more that you may understand what he harps & carps in his letter to me. The lex Talionis he sends me must be displeasing to all Royal and loyal hearts, even honest hearts, laying all Royalty aside; [if tis] the D of Monmouth's most pestiferous

detestable declaration, needless to be sent to you; my sermon could displease no man of moral honesty. I'll say no more of myself, I am well known, & all my relations to ever been true & loyal to the King & greater sufferers for & since King Charles the first of B. memory, as likewise for his late deceased Maty.

But this is none of my business; neither is it my intent, I declare in the presence of Almighty God, to doe any harm in the world to Mr Hooke, for I wish him well; I design only what lies in me, his Majesty's preservation, wch is not entirely secure so long as men of such horrid principles lye lurking & skulking so about the world. His own hand witnesseth against him, how he [calls] his Majesty the duke of York – a bloody Romanist, Ignis & Ferrum, a deceiver, usurper, an invader. The long date of his letter is but to abscond him further from these parts; but in all probability he must be either at Amsterdam, Leiden or Harlem; this enclosed coming amongst the letters which came from the north of Holland, as I have desired Mr Chaumont my good friend here, to certify. He [Hooke] is an Irishman, but speaks good English, a tall personable man somewhat brownish to my best remembrance, slender, his face somewhat ruddy, at least sometimes, with a long duskish periwig hanging commonly behind his shoulders, I think there is somewhat of the smallpox in his face, & his visage long; his garb & gate a little too antick for a parson, flinging his long legs, as he sits, always one over another; he seemed to be about 30 years of age, or scarce so much. This is all the description I can give of him. I humbly beg the favour of you not to make use of my name herein, in all other occasions use of & command

Ever honoured Sir,

Yr most humble & obedient Servant

Ambrose

Grymes

Nathaniel Hooke to Fr Ambrose Grymes, (B. L., Add 41817 f. 86).

Reverend Father,

I think myself obliged to give you thanks for the civilities I received from you while I was at Brussels & particularly for your sermon, which I had the happiness to hear, on the day of [the Duke] of York's Coronation; and if one may ~~hereby~~ have the liberty of [*indecipherable*] I will make bold to thank you for the plain discovery of your hopes: Ignis & ferrum, are terrible things in themselves, but when [managed] by the hand of a Romanist, of a much greater horror: I can agree with you in many things, except your well wishes, which I have not so [erred] Christ as to return; instead of hoping to see you perish, I heartily desire your prosperity, and have sent you the enclosed present [*Monmouth's declaration*], that you may see that we are of a quite [different] spirit from those who call for fire & sword upon their adversaries;

I heartily forgive those who would never have forgiven me, to whose rage I might have been now subject if providence had not snatched me out of the powers of those birds of prey; if the enclosed be displeasing, tis but *lex talionis*, your (otherwise ingenious) sermon, was so too. Misconstrue not, I beseech you, these lines, which are intended to let you know that I am so far from suspecting the truth of the Religion I profess, that I am ready to shed my blood in the defence of it & my country's rights against all deceivers who would corrupt the one, & usurpers who invade the other; but though I abominate your superstitions I love your person & am & ever will be,

Your ready friend and servant,

N Hooke

3 June 1685

Service to Mrs Pennington,
Father [?]obrian & Father Cottenham.

Different ink and handwriting

I doe attest that this letter came into our
Office of Brussels the 29 June 1685
Among our Rotterdam, Leiden &
Harlem letters

Chaumont.

APPENDIX II

Mémoire donné à Monsieur le Marquis de Torcy le 18 Février, 1703: read in council (A. A. E. CP Angleterre Supp. 3, ff 178r-184v).

Quoique la crainte de la grande puissance du Roy ait été le principal motif qui a porté les Anglais à la guerre, ils étaient cependant si las de la dernière qu'ils n'auraient jamais songer à commencer une seconde si tôt, si ceux qui la souhaitaient pour leur intérêt particulier n'avoient trouvé le moyen de leur persuader que la conjoncture était favorable.

J'ay un grand Mémoire en main qui fut présenté au Conseil Privé d'Angleterre en 1701, et sur lequel je trouve qu'ils se fondent beaucoup; on y prétend que la France est moins en état de soutenir la guerre qu'eux; on y entre dans un grand détail des différentes branches du revenu; on y compte que le Roy levait le cinquième denier de tout le revenu de la France, et qu'à la fin de la guerre Sa Majesté devait plus de cent millions sterlins, qui font au moins quatorze cent millions de France, qu'il sera impossible d'en acquitter la moitié en onze années et demi de tems quand même on leveroit le cinquième denier en tems de paix; qu'ainsi la France payera plus pendant la paix à proportion de son revenu que l'Angleterre n'a payé pendant la guerre; et que l'Angleterre, en payant seulement le huitième denier, acquittera ses dettes en huit années, c'est-à-dire, trois années et demi plus tôt que la France n'aura acquittée la moitié des siennes; que le revenu annuel de la France n'est pas le double de celui d'Angleterre; qu'elle doit sept fois autant que l'Angleterre; que les dépenses de son gouvernement sont infiniment plus grosses; que l'Angleterre rétablira son commerce plutôt que la France, et que le nombre des peuples en France est extrêmement diminué pendant que l'Angleterre a augmenté les siens par l'accession des réfugiés et d'autres étrangers.

Quelques erreurs que soient les dites supputations, les Anglais les croient justes, et se fondent là-dessus, ils se persuadent que c'est présentement le tems d'assurer leur commerce et leur libertés, avant que la France ait eu le tems de se remettre.

Comme l'augmentation de leurs forces suit celle de leur commerce, ils croient mettre leur libertés à couvert en établissant celui-cy; et, comme le commerce d'Espagne et de l'Amérique est le plus lucratif de tous (en sorte que, selon un état que j'ay, ils comptent que le dernier seul fait près de la moitié de leur grains,) ils ont crû ne pouvoir jamais trouver une plus belle occasion pour l'augmenter.

Les prétentions de l'Empereur sur la succession d'Espagne leur fournit un prétexte d'attaquer l'Amérique; et il est stipulé dans le sixième article de leur traité avec ce Prince qu'il leur sera permis de prendre et de garder pour eux telles places et terres dans l'Amérique Espagnole dont ils peuvent s'en saisir.ⁱ

Une telle occasion n'est pas à négliger; aussi semblent ils porter toutes leurs pensées de ce côté là.

Dès l'année 1698, My Lord Sommersⁱⁱ dans une lettre au Roy Guillaume luy dit, Que si, en faisant le traité de partage, il pouvait obtenir aux Anglais la liberté de trafiquer dans les Indes Espagnoles, Sa Majesté gagnerait par là nation.

On sait que les colonies Anglaise en Amérique apportent un gain d'environ un million sterling tous les ans à l'Angleterre; quelques uns même le font monter beaucoup plus haut; ainsi ils se proposent des profits immenses par un établissement dans la terre ferme de ce pays là.

Il y a un an que je croyais cette entreprise impossible parce que je m'imaginai qu'ils songeaient à y faire des grands conquêtes, et à se saisir des mines; mais depuis les conversations que j'ay eues en Hollande avec des marchands et autres, et après ce qu'on m'en a mandé d'Angleterre, j'ay raison de croire que cette expédition ne sera pas difficile à exécuter, et qu'elle sera très avantageuse.

Ils sont persuadé il y a long tems que des places sur la terre ferme en Europe leur seraient à charge, et impossibles à garder; en sorte qu'ils ne sont allés en Espagne l'année dernière que pour satisfaire aux importunies de l'Empereur, qui assurait qu'il y avait un parti formé.

Ils sont donc présentement libres à travailler pour eux-mêmes en conséquence des sixième et huitième articles de leur Traité avec Sa Majesté Impériale, par le dernier desquels, ils s'obligent d'empêcher que les François ne trafiquent en l'Amérique Espagnole sous quel prétexte que ce soit, et l'opposition que le Ministre de l'Empereur à Londres vient de former à ce dessein les rendra plus ardent à l'exécuter pour ne pas manquer l'occasion pressente.

Comme ils ont témoigné dans le Parlement des grandes appréhensions que les François ne se saisissent des Isles des Canaries ils tournent peut-être leur veües de ce côté là. L'établissement fait à l'embouchure de la rivière de Mississipi leur donne aussi beaucoup d'inquiétude de crainte que la France ne se rend maître des mines nies Anglaise dans l'Amérique Septentrionale, ce que perdrait en même tems leurs Isles, qui ne subsistent que par ces colonies.

Comme ils se disposent à agir offensivement dans le Nouveau Monde, ils commenceront peut-être par suivre l'avis que le Comte de Mulgrave ouvrit il y a quelques années dans la Chambre Haute; il était, de tacher de détruire les colonies Françaises, comme le plus seur moyen de ruiner la marine du Roy, ces colonies étant la pépinière des matelots pour la France.

Je crois cependant qu'ils portent leurs veües encore plus loin, et l'habitude que j'ay eu autrefois avec le Comte de Peterborough, chef de cette expédition, et avec M. Penn son ami, qui est fort entendu dans les affaires de l'Amérique, me met en état de parler plus nettement de leurs desseins.

On dit présentement que le Comte de Peterborough ne veut plus y aller; je ne m'en étonne point, le connaissant pour le plus capricieux de tous les hommes; mais un autre chef suivra apparemment les mêmes plans.

Le Roy Charles Second s'étant rendu maître en Angleterre il y a dix neuf ans; les mécontents appuyez par les Hollandais songèrent à de faire un établissement dans l'Amérique en forme de République, et choisirent le Comte de Peterborough pour l'exécuter: cette affaire était fort avancée à la fin de la troisième année du règne du Roy Jacques, quand l'espérance d'une prochaine révolution en leur faveur, jointe au refroidissement des Hollandais, fit désister les mécontents de leur dessein.

Par le moyen de mes amis qui y étaient intéressés j'ay eu connaissance de toutes leurs démarches, et quoique je n'ay pas encore reçu les originaux de leurs plans que j'ay laissés en Angleterre, et que j'attends depuis trois mois, comme la saison avance j'ay crû devoir représenter ce qu'on m'en a mandé en gros, et ce que ma Mémoire m'en fournit.

Ils avoient songer d'abord à la Havana, la clef de l'Amérique ; la paix qui subsistait alors entre l'Espagne et l'Angleterre mettait obstacle à ce dessein, mais la guerre présente le remettra peut être sur je tapis, et la Jamaïque sera d'un grand secours pour en faciliter l'exécution.

Le Sieur Macclaine, un des chefs des Ecosais à Darién, m'a assuré en Hollande que le mauvais air de ce pays, ni les forces des Espagnols, n'avoient pas causé la ruine de cette entreprise, et que si la Jamaïque et les autres Isles Anglaises n'avoient point refusé de leur fournir des vivres, ils se seraient maintenus à Darién: il y a donc à craindre qu'ils n'y retournent, ou que les Anglais ne reprennent le même dessein avec plus de moyens. Les premières ouvertures en sont venues du Comte de Peterborough; c'était son projet favori en 1686 et en 1687; et les Anglais ne sauroient rien faire de si utile pour leur commerce; s'ils s'établissent dans cet Isthme, ils tiendront en échec Panama par Portobello; ils obligeront les Espagnols à les faire les voituriers de leur argent; ils s'attireront même avec le tems le commerce des Indes Orientales en raccourcissant le chemin de quelques milliers de lieues, et en rendant le commerce plus sur aussi bien que la navigation; par là ils diminueront la grandeur des Hollandais et ils seront à portée de s'étendre dans le païs.

Les plus grande difficulté qu'ils auront à surmonter sera d'y faire consentir les Hollandais; et il n'est pas possible que ces deux nations puissent faire un établissement commun. Il se peut donc qu'ils n'agiront de concert que pour ruiner les colonies Françaises, et qu'ensuite chacune s'établira separement, les Hollandais du côté de Sud, où ils ont déjà Surinam et Curaçao, et les Anglais plus vers le Nord; car, puisqu'ils font l'entreprise de concert, il y a de l'apparence qu'ils sont d'accord de ne pas nuire les uns aux autres.

Alors les Anglais pourraient suivre le plan de Monsieur Penn, qui proposa autrefois d'entrer dans la rivière d'Alvarado et de se rendre par là les maîtres de la province de Guaxaca, qui est toute ouverte et riche, ou de s'établir dans celle de Chiapas, qui produit en abondance la meilleure cochenille de l'Amérique, et où l'on trouve grand nombre de bons chevaux. L'entrée y est facile par la rivière de Tabasco; on est sûr d'y être assisté par une nation Indienne sur cette rivière qui n'a jamais été soumise aux Espagnols: de là on pourraient facilement s'emparer de Guatemala, où les esclaves sont nombreux et prêts à se révolter; en s'établissant sur Golfo Dolce en cette province on s'aseurera d'un port capable de recevoir mille vaisseaux et dont on peut défendre l'entrée sans peine. On y trouvera aussi une nation des Nègres révoltez il y a long tems, qui seront ravis de se joindre aux Anglais contre les Espagnols, aussi bien que les Indiens de Jacaten et de Vera Paz, qui sont toujours en guerre contre eux. Les Espagnols de ces trois provinces ne font pas cinq mille hommes capable de porter les armes, leur propres Indiens seront contre eux, et les anciens habitants descendus des premiers Espagnols, et qu'on appelle Criolios, sont dans les mêmes sentiments; l'avantage de cette situation est telle que si les Anglais peuvent s'y établir, ils tiendront toute l'Amérique en bride.

Quelque soit l'endroit sur lequel ils jettent leurs vœux, leur dessein se réglera toujours sur leur intérêt; la grandeur des Hollandais vient de ce qu'ils sont les voituriers du monde; le grand profit de leur commerce en Espagne vient entièrement de ce principe; les Anglais cherchent à le devenir, et s'ils viennent à bout de s'établir quelque part entre Carthagène et Vera Cruz, les Espagnols seront contraints de se servir d'eux; ils s'y appliqueront d'autant plus, que le projet de fournir des Nègres aux Espagnols leur a fait croire que la France a le même objet,

et il ne sera pas facile de les guérir de cette prévention. Des places sur cette côte assureront aux Anglais le commerce d'Espagne même par la nécessité qu'elles imposeront aux Espagnols de charger sur les vaisseaux Anglais.

Il sera facile à l'Angleterre de se conserver ces places une fois sequis; la puissance des Espagnols sur le continent de l'Amérique n'est rien, et les Isles Anglaises sont a porté de couper tout le secours qui leur peut-venir de dehors.

Mais si le Roy peut se saisir de la Jamaïque, ce coup seul fera sehoüer tous les projets des ennemis de ce cote là; et, selon l'aveu du Comte de Mulgrave dans le harangue dont j'ay déjà parlé, le coup seul ruinera de fond en comble leur puissance et leur commerce dans les Indes Occidentales: et si ce qu'ils affectent de publier depuis peu est vrai, s'ils ne vont pas cette année à l'Amérique. Sa Majesté aura la plus belle occasion du monde de les prévenir en s'emparant de cette Isle qui est toute ouverte. Il ne sera pas peut être impossible de la garder au moins jusques à la paix; mais quand même cela ne se pourrait point, il leur faudra du tems pour la reprendre, pendant lequel les choses pourront changer de face, et l'Espagne aura tout le loisir nécessaire pour mettre la terre ferme en état de défense.

Les differents entre les ennemis pour le partage de leurs pretendües conquêtes retarderont peut être leur entreprise, mais il n'y a point d'apparence qu'ils en abandonnent le dessein, puisque c'est l'unique moyen pour assurer leur commerce, et qu'ils n'auront jamais une conjoncture si favorable; sur tout si le Portugal entre dans leurs intérêts, ce dont les Anglais font semblant d'être assurez par la nomination que la Reine vient de faire de Monsieur de Bohomberg pour commander un corps de troupes dans ce royaume.

Quelles conventions que ces deux nations d'Angleterre et de Hollande aient pû faire, il est toujours certain que la jalousie règne tant entre elles, que, si la crainte de la France ne les tenait unies, il leur serait impossible d'éviter une rupture, comme M. Stanhope, Envoyé Extraordinaire d'Angleterre et Plénipotentiaire à la Haye, et M. Cresset, Envoyé de la même couronne à Hannover, me l'ont avoué l'année passée à la Haye.

Ce n'est pas un petit sujet de jalousie que les Anglais sont persuadez qu'ils ont perdu plus de quatre vint millions par la dernière guerre, et que les Hollandais en ont gagné prés de huit millions, ce que l'on a prétendu prouver devant le Conseil de Commerce par un mémoire dont on m'a envoyé la copie.

Les Anglais ont pour maxime, que la pêche est le véritable principe de commerce et l'unique moyen de devenir puissant sur mer, et, comme ils ont des facilitez pour ce commerce au dessus de toutes les autres nations, ils voient de mauvais œil que les Hollandais s'en sont emparez sur les côtes mêmes d'Angleterre, et qu'ils en tirent un profit de sept millions sterlins au moins tous les ans.

Peu après la Paix de Ryswick on fit de grandes plaintes dans la Chambre Basse de ce que les Hollandais ne voulaient pas souffrir que les Anglais pêchassent sur leur propres côtes: on y fit voir que la République des Provinces Unies regarde cette pêche comme le fondement de toutes leurs richesses; on représenta qu'ils trafiquent dans le Nord pour plus d'un million sterling par an avec les harangs, &c. pris sur les côtes d'Angleterre, pendant que les Anglais y envoient chaque année 400 mil livres sterling en espèces pour les marchandises qu'ils trient de ces païs là: et on fit voir que les Anglais peuvent faire le même commerce avec plus de facilité, et vendre leur pesche a deux tiers meilleur marché que les Hollandais.

La dessus, le Parlement établit un Conseil de Commerce qui s'appliquent continuellement à rétablir celui d'Angleterre, et principalement la pêche; et l'on a déjà bâti par ses ordres dans les rivières de Humber et de Trente des petites navires plus propre pour la pêche, et à meilleur marché que ceux des Hollandais.

Je n'ay pas vû l'Acte du Parlement qui établit ce Conseil,ⁱⁱⁱ ainsi je ne sçais pas l'étenduë de ses pouvoirs: je sçais seulement qu'il est autorisé d'examiner par quels moyens les peuples voisins se sont emparez des commerces d'Angleterre, et à chercher les moyens de les regagner : et que, peu avant le commencement de la guerre présente, le dit Conseil avait proposé trois choses par rapport aux Hollandais :-

1. Qu'ils s'obligeraient de ne pas empêcher les Anglais de trafiquer à la Chine et au Japan.

2. Qu'ils ne les troubleraient point dans leur commerce aux Indes Orientales, et qu'ils ne les empêcheraient point de s'y étendre.

3. Qu'ils laisseraient jouir les Anglais en pleine liberté de ce qui leur reste du commerce de poivre.

La puissance des Hollandais dans les Indes Orientales donne beaucoup de jalousie à l'Angleterre; leurs usurpations sur les Anglais à Bantam et ailleurs ne sont pas oubliées; et un des motifs pour l'établissement de la nouvelle Compagnie des Indes par Acte du Parlement a été l'espérance de recouvrir ce que l'Angleterre a perdu de ce côté là.

Les Anglais se persuadent aussi que la France n'a évité de faire un traité de commerce avec eux après le Paix de Ryswick que pour favoriser mieux les Hollandais, auxquels elle avait accorde un traité de commerce très avantageux, au préjudice de l'Angleterre: ils aient que les Hollandais furent la cause de ce que leur traité a échoué; et al défense du commerce des lettres avec la France n'est souhaitée par les Anglais que pour priver les Hollandais du profit qu'ils en tirent; comme je l'ay expliqué plus au long dans un Mémoire du 31 Janvier, 1703.

Ajoutez à cela que la jalousie des Torys contre les Etats Généraux au sujet de al succession de Hannover, et de l'appuy qu'ils donnent au Whigs étant bien cultivée, sera peut être seule capable de fournir une occasion pour détacher l'une ou l'autre nation de la ligue.

J'ay reconnu à n'en plus douter que ni l'une ni l'autre nation ne se soucie des intérêts de l'Empereur qu'autant qu'elles se servent de ses prétentions pour mieux faire leur propres affaires ; et que tout autre Prince en Flandres leur sera plus agréable que l'Archiduc; elles ne sont pas plus zélées les unes pour les autres; on n'a qu'assurer la frontière ou la barrière à la Hollande, ou ses libertés à l'Angleterre, choses qui ne sera pas fort difficile, et la première des deux nations à laquelle on vent bien donner des seuretez et des avantages pour son commerce sera ravie d'en profiter à l'exclusion de l'autre.

Je crois qu'il sera plus facile et plus avantageux à la France de détacher la Hollande et de la soutenir contre l'Angleterre, pourvû qu'on s'y prenne de bonne heure, et avant que ceux qui gouvernent l'Angleterre ayant eu le tems de se lier étroitement d'intérêt avec les chefs des Provinces Unies.

Comme toutes les factions de cette République sont jusques ici d'accord sur ce qui est de leur intérêt, et qu'elles ne sont partagées que sur les moyens de les obtenir, il parait moins difficile de les contenter que de gagner les Anglais, dont chaque parti a des intérêts differents, et tous les deux sont encore à peu près d'égale force, en sorte qu'aucun n'est maître de l'autre; car le Bill contre la conformité occasionnelle, qui est absolument échoué, fournit une preuve

manifeste que les Whigs ne sont pas si abattus qu'on l'avait crû d'abord, et tous les avis assurent qu'ils se renforcent tous les jours.

Comme l'intérêt essentiel des Hollandais les porte à diminuer le commerce de l'Angleterre, ils donneront volontiers dans tout ce qu'y pourra contribuer en assurant la leur; mais, si l'on attend trop long tems, le besoin que les Whigs ont des Etats Généraux pour s'emparer du timon des affaires, pourra produire une si étroite liaison entre les mêmes Whigs et les Hollandais, qu'on sera obligé d'attendre quelque nouvelle révolution en Angleterre pour se faire écouter par la Hollande ou par les Anglais.

Ce qui fortifie la liaison de cette République avec l'Angleterre est l'espérance de la succession de Hannover, sous laquelle les Hollandais se promettent de gouverner ce royaume. Les Torys sont encore contraires à cette succession, et quand on ne ferait d'autre usage des offres de service que my Lord Sommers vient de faire^{iv}

que de refroidir les Whigs envers la Maison d'Hannover, ce refroidissement contribuera beaucoup à faire perdre cette espérance aux Etats Généraux.

Et ceux cy étant une fois détachés, tous les desseins des Anglais sur l'Amérique iront enfumée par les obstacles que la Hollande y apportera; car elle sçait fort bien que les habitants de ce païs là trouveront mieux leur compte sous la domination des Anglais que sous la leur, parce que celle d'Angleterre est beaucoup plus douce, et que cette douceur luy facilitera les moyens de s'étendre dans le dit païs.

Quant à l'Angleterre, elle est partagée en deux factions dont les caractères sont bien différents.

Les Torys veulent la guerre pour diminuer la puissance de la France, et pour mettre l'Angleterre à couvert.

Les Whigs prétendent la même chose, mais leur véritable motif est de faire leurs propres affaires; en sorte qu'ils aimeraient mieux la paix qu'une guerre qui ne serait pas conduite par eux, laquelle ils rendraient volontiers éternelle pour pêcher en eau troublé.

Les Torys, étant en possessions des bénéfices Ecclésiastiques, craignent un Roy Catholique; les Whigs aimeraient mieux un Roy Catholique sur le trône que d'être gouvernés par les Torys; ceux cy sont généralement fermes et zèles à outrance pour l'Eglise Anglicane; ceux là sont à celui qui leur fera les plus grands avantages. Les chefs des Torys cherchent ordinairement le bien de leur parti; les chefs des Whigs n'ont veüe que leur intérêt particulier.

Il est vrai qu'on ne sçauroit se promettre de gagner toute la faction des Whigs en gagnant leurs chefs; mais la division que naîtra entre eux, et la jalousie qu'on y jettera par ce moyen, aura peut être un meilleur effet; soit pour mettre les Torys en état de rejeter la succession de Hannover avec plus de facilité, soit pour ôter aux Hollandais tous les moyens pour prendre des mesures sûres et efficaces, voyant les Whigs désunis.

Je pose pour principe que les Torys voudraient rejeter la succession de Hannover, et rappeler le Roy d'Angleterre après la mort de sa sœur, comme l'unique moyen de se soutenir contre les Whigs; mais qu'ils n'osent pas découvrir leur dessein avant que de voir la dernière faction abattue on désunie; et que, de l'autre côté, les Whigs soupçonnant le dessein des Torys, et les sentants plus puissants qu'eux, aimeront mieux se jeter entre les bras de qui que ce soit, que d'être sous la domination de leurs ennemis: qui, dans le peu de tems que ce Parlement a été assemblé, leur ont donné tant de marques d'une haine mortelle

prête à tomber sur leurs chefs, par les résolutions de la Chambre Basse sur la mauvaise conduite des Whigs pendant leur ministre, en appliquant l'argent à d'autres usages que ceux auxquels il avait été destiné par le Parlement; et que, pour prévenir le Torys, ils sont capables de jouer le même rôle que leurs prédécesseurs, qui, voyant travailler leurs ennemis au rappel du Roy Charles II., ils les prévirent, et en eurent tout le mérite,

C'est à ces maximes que j'attribue en partie l'offre que my Lord Sommers vient de faire de ses services; son caractère est d'être droit, sincère et modéré; il est la meilleure tête de l'Angleterre; on peut tout espérer de son habilité et de son crédit dans la faction; ce crédit même augmentera tous les jours, puisqu'il n'est plus employé par la Cour, car il suffit d'y avoir une charge pour être suspect aux crédit (ce que je ne crois pas), il déconcertera toutes les mesures des Whigs et des Hollandais, en sorte que toute confiance cessera, au moins pour quelque tems; pendant lequel on verra ce qu'il y a à espérer de luy, et, s'il manque à la fin, on se servira toujours utilement de ses démarches pour alarmer les Torys et pour les faire aller plus vîte, ce qui causera une confusion de part et d'autre qui ne sçauroit être que tres avantageuse à la France.

L'offre de my Lord Sommers m'a fait consulter un traité qu'il fit sur la succession d'Espagne peu après la mort du feu Roy Catholique, pour tacher d'y découvrir ses sentiments sur les affaires présentes; j'y trouve qu'il ne souhaitait pas la guerre, et qu'il n'était pas de ceux qui s'alarmaient si mal apropos de la succession du Roy Philippe V. Il y entreprend de prouver que l'union entre la France et l'Espagne ne sçauroit subsister long tems que le testament du Roy Charles est valide; que la cession de Monsieur le Dauphin en faveur du Roy son fils est bonne et juste; qu'il n'est pas de l'intérêt de l'Europe que l'Empereur mette le pied en Italie; qu'en donnant un Prince souverain et particulier à la Flandre on assurera l'Angleterre et la Hollande; que celle cy ne sçauroit désirer une meilleure barrière, et que tout ce que la première pourrait souhaiter c'est qu'on y levé la défense de ses manufactures de laine.

Ce discours prouve ce que j'avais remarqué dans un Mémoire du 26 Mars 1702, que la faction des Torys est plus animée contre la France en cette conjoncture que celle des Whigs, et les conversations que j'ay eu en Hollande avec Monsieur Stanhope et plusieurs autres m'ont confirmé dans cette pensée.

My Lord Marlborough affecte de paraitre franc et ouvert; il parle assez librement; il ne se laisse pas cependant voir au fond; mais pour peu qu'on l'étudie, et qu'on le fréquente, il n'est pas difficile de pénétrer ses inclinations et son but.

My Lord Godolphin raffine toujours; il est sombre et défiant, aimant les délais, d'un accès difficile, fourbe et dissimulé.

My Lord Rochester est dur, opiniâtre, hautain, plein d'affectation, entêté de certaines maximes de sa façon, jugeant des choses uniquement par rapport à ces maximes. Son crédit ne s'étend qu'à ce qui regarde sa propre fortune; le maniement des affaires est absolument entre les mains des deux premiers qui vivent dans une très étroite union; le premier ne faisant rien sans l'approbation du second.

Cela me fait croire qu'il sera très difficile de réussir dans une négociation avec luy en Angleterre, les raffinements de my Lord Godolphin ne luy donneront pas le tems de se laisser prévenir; ainsi on perdra les avantages qu'on tire tous les jours des premières impressions. Les choses iront tout autrement en Flandres; là on aura le loisir de luy faire goûter des propositions raisonnables, on tirera des lumières de ses réponses; et quoiqu'il ne conclura rien sans l'autre, pour peu

qu'on se fasse écouter il écrira selon ses inclinations et ses préventions, et non pas si nüement que lorsqu'il verra M. De Godolphin à toute heure: et l'on gagnera peut être quelques uns de ceux en qui il se confie, qui le fortifieront par avance contre les difficultés de son ami.

Et, comme il aime passionnément l'argent, on profitera du refus que la Chambre des Communes vient de faire d'assurer la pension sur les postes à ses descendants, malgré toute la politesse de leur refus il sçait bien qu'il a perdu du terrain parmi eux; il ne voit pas de jour à établir la fortune de sa Maison; il sçait qu'un favori du Prince n'est jamais long tems bien avec le peuple en Angleterre, et ces considérations le disposeront à embrasser la première ouverture d'établir sa fortune, d'affermir l'Eglise Anglicane, et de ruiner le parti des Whigs, en rappellent le Roy d'Angleterre comme le moyen le plus sur de parvenir à ses souhaits.

Et quand même il n'accepterait pas les propositions qu'on luy pourra faire, ni luy, ni les Alliez ne sçauroient tirer le moindre avantage de cette démarche. En ne proposant rien qui puisse nuire à la France, en leur faisant sentir la force des armes du Roy en même tems on les empêchera de s'imaginer qu'elles proviennent d'un défaut des moyens de continuer la guerre, et en limitant un tems pour l'acceptation des propositions, le Roy se conservera la liberté d'agir comme il luy plaira; il fera voir a tout le monde son amour pour la paix et pour le repos de l'Europe, il détrompera ceux qui ont été abusez par les artifices de ses ennemis, et il jettera des défiances parmi les Alliez, qui deviendront jaloux de la puissance à laquelle on aura fait des propositions avantageuses.

L'état présent de l'Ecosse fournit un moyen presque infaillible de mettre l'Angleterre dans la nécessité de faire la paix, on de devenir presque inutile et même à charge aux Alliez.

Les Ecossois, outre leur mécontentement contre les Anglais pour l'affaire de Darién, font paraitre très peu de disposition à admettre la succession d'Hanover; et selon l'établissement depuis la Révolution, ils sont en droit de la rejeter. Pour les empêcher de faire éclater leur ressentiment, les Anglais les amusent par un prétendu traité pour l'union des deux nations, lequel ils tirent en longueur tout exprès pour être plus en liberté de songer aux affaires de dehors: et les Ecossois de l'autre coté sont bien aises de gagner du tems pour mieux faire leur marche avec le plus offrant.

Les Hollandais et les Whigs profitent de l'occasion; outre le grand ressort des derniers à Hanover j'ay une lettre de cette Cour là qui m'assure que my Lord Lorn, fils du Duc d'Argyle, y était arrivé, et qu'il avait fait le voyage par ordre de son père; et c'est peut être en conséquence de ses instructions que la Duchesse Douairière de Hanover a envoyé depuis peu dix mil livres sterling en Ecosse pour s'y faire des amis; et quand ses finances seront épuisées les Hollandais ne luy laisseront pas manquer d'argent.

Dans ce Royaume les Ducs de Hamilton et d'Argyle sont le plus en état de faire panacher la balance en faveur du parti qu'ils épouseront: pour le Duc de Queensbury, il a assez de crédit à la Cour pour se faire donner l'employ de Grand Commissaire, mais il n'en a point du tout parmi le peuple en Ecosse.

Le Duc de Hamilton est à la tête des Episcopaux et des Jacobites, et de plusieurs autres seigneurs et gentilshommes qui sont contraires à la succession d'Hanover et au gouvernement Presbytérien; les uns par principe de conscience et d'honneur, mais la plus grande partie pour faire acheter leurs suffrages en cette conjuncture ou chaque prétendant a besoin d'eux.

Le Duc d'Argyle est chef des Whigs et des Presbytériens, qui (étant tous Whigs d'Eglise) ne le suivront plus d'abord qu'ils le verront abandonner leur cause; ainsi on ne peut espérer de luy que de rompre sous main les mesures des Whigs en faisant semblant de poursuivre leurs intérêts avec zele.

Le parti du Duc d'Hamilton est généralement porté pour le Roy d'Angleterre, en sorte qu'une médiocre somme suffirait pour s'en assurer; mais s'ils ne trouvent pas leur compte en suivant leur inclination; ils changeront bientôt de sentiment et se mettront du côté de ceux qui leur feront toucher de l'argent; et comme les Whigs ont déjà commencé à en distribuer, le tems est précieux si l'on veut s'assurer d'eux.

S'il est vrai que les Commissaires d'Ecosse pour l'union des deux royaumes ont déjà fait quelques difficultés sur la succession, c'est une espèce de signal avec deux partis de commencer leurs négociations.

Il y a deux manières de se servir utilement de l'Ecosse,

(1.) L'une est de faire rejeter la succession d'Hanover, dans le Parlement qui doit s'assembler dans le mois prochain; pour y réussir il ne suffira pas d'avoir les seigneurs; il faut aussi s'assurer des Bourgs libres, qui sont en grand nombre, mais leurs Députés sont si pauvres, que cent mil France distribuez avec prudence y suffiraient.

Après y avoir beaucoup pensé, en m'êtré servi des lumières des autres, je ne vois que le seul Duc de Hamilton en état de conduire cette affaire. J'ay donné le sixième de ce mois un fidèle extrait d'une lettre de Londres, dans laquelle on doute de son intégrité, parce qu'il a eu sa part de l'argent d'Hanover; je ne sçaurois cependant être du sentiment de la personne qui l'a écrit; je crois bien qu'il a pris cet argent sans s'engager à rien; je l'ay connu très particulièrement autrefois; il est naturellement fort circonspect, et ayant été deux ou trois fois en danger par l'imprudence e la Cour de Saint Germain, il le sera peut être devenu encore plus; mais il a beaucoup d'honneur, et pourvû qu'on s'y prenne bien dans les commencements, est sera facile de l'engager; et l'on peut compter sur sa parole. Si l'on peut s'assurer d'une supériorité dans le Parlement.

Les avantages qu'on en tirera seront infinis; on rompera l'union de ces deux royaumes, on fera rejeter la succession d'Hanover; par ce moyen on tiendra les Anglais toujours en alarme voyant les Ecossois sur la pointe de se séparer d'avec eux, dans un tems ou les forces d'Angleterre étant employées au dehors elle ne sera pas en état de s'y opposer; cela fournira un bon prétexte aux Torys de se joindre aux Ecossois pour éviter une guerre civile; il facilitera toutes les négociations qu'on voudra mettre sur pied; il déconcertera les Hollandais, et il donnera lieu au second moyen (qui est le meilleur et le plus efficace) de rendre l'Ecosse utile à la France.

(2.) Ce moyen est d'y jeter un petit corps de troupes de consentement des principaux de la nation qui favoriseront leur descente. Je me suis fait instruire des moyens de réussir en ce dessein, des lieux qui y sont propres, et de ce qu'on peut attendre des Ecossois; mais quoique je sois persuadé que ce serait un moyen infailible de mettre l'Angleterre hors d'état de troubler la France de long tems, comme je ne crois pas les choses assez meures encore, je ne m'étendrai pas d'avantage là-dessus.^v

Avant que de quitter l'Ecosse je crois devoir remarquer, que lorsque je m'acquittais envers my Lord Middleton des compliment que le Comte de Marlborough m'avait prié de luy faire, ce my Lord me dit, que de l'humeur dont il connaît M. de Marlborough, il avait assurément envie d'entrer en matière avec

moi si j'avais été chargé de quelque chose; qu'il me verrait plus volontiers qu'un autre, et que si l'occasion se présentait de l'entretenir, je ferais bien de lu proposer de mettre le Roy d'Angleterre sur le trône d'Ecosse,^{vi} et que ce Prince renoncerait à l'Angleterre, pendant la vie de sa sœur; j'ay répondu, que je ne croisais pas que milord Marlborough ou les Anglais en voudraient entendre parler, qu'ils craindraient quelque remuement en Angleterre de la part de ce Prince à la tête des Ecosais, et soutenu par la France, M. de Middleton ne répondit rien alors, mais comme il m'en a parlé une seconde fois depuis, je crains qu'on ne fasse faire la proposition par quelque autre, laquelle ne sçauroit manquer d'avoir des mauvaises suites.

On m'a souvent mandé de Hollande que plusieurs font difficulté d'admettre M. de Marlborough pour Général de leurs troupes, mais comme il est (selon les derniers avis) sur son départ d'Angleterre cette affaire est apparemment ajustée. Je crois qu'il pressera son départ pour commencer la campagne de bonne heure, pour tacher par là de ruiner la cavalerie du Roy. J'ay déjà remarqué ailleurs qu'il avait envie de tenir la campagne jusqu'à la fin de Décembre dernier dans ce dessein, ne se souciant pas de ruiner la cavalerie des Alliez, étant persuadé qu'ils remettraient la leur avec plus de facilité que le Roy. J'ay sçu depuis que M. Dopft était envoyé vers le Prince Louis de Bade, pour le porter à faire le même chose. La bataille de Friedlingen rompit toutes ces mesures, mais ils pourraient peut être les reprendre, au moins en Flandre.

On publie en Angleterre que les troupes destinées pour la descente seront envoyées en Portugal; mais comme les Anglais ont une grande envie de tenter une descente en France, ce bruit n'est peut être répandu que pour couvrir un autre dessein.

ⁱ Art. 6. Tract. Hag. Com. 7 Sept. 1701. Licitum sit regiæ suæ majestati Mag. Brit. et Dom. Ordin Generalibus, quas poterant in Indiis Hispanicæ ditionis terras et urbes armis occupare, quidquid autem occupaverint ipsorum manebit

ⁱⁱ In his answer to the following letter of King William to him.

My Lord,

Loo, 15 Aug. 1698.

I imparted to you before I left England that in France there were expressed to my Lord Portland some inclinations to come to an agreement with me concerning the succession to the King of Spain; since which Count Tallard has mentioned it to me, and hath made propositions, the particulars of which my Lord Portland will write to Vernon, to whom I have given orders not to communicate them to any others besides yourself, and leave to your judgement to whom else you think proper to impart them, to the end I might know your opinions upon so important an affaire, and which requires your greatest secrecy. If you think it fit this negociation should be carried on, there is no time to be lost, and you must send me the full powers under the great seal, with the names in blank, to treat with Count Tallard. I believe this may be done secretly, that none but you

and Vernon, and those to whom you shall have communicated it, may have knowledge of it; so that the clerks who are to draw the warrant, and the full powers, may not know what it is.

According to all intelligence, the King of Spain cannot outlive the month of October, and the least accident may carry him off every day.

I received your letter yesterday of the 9th; and since my Lord Wharton cannot at this time leave England, I must think of some other to send Ambassador into Spain. If you can think of any one proper, let me know, and always be assured of my friendship.

W.R.

Lord Sommers' Answer.

Sir,

Having your Majesty's permission to try if the waters would contribute to the re-establishment of my health, I was just got to this place when I had the honour of your commands. I thought the best way of executing them would be to communicate them to my Lord Orford, Mr. Mountague, and the Duke of Shrewsbury; who before I left London had agreed upon a meeting about this time on the subject of my Lord Portland's letter; at the same time letting them know how strictly your Majesty required it should remain an absolute secret, Since that, Mr. Mountague and Mr. Secretary Vernon are come down hither; and upon the whole discourse three things are principally necessary to be suggested to your Majesty.

1. that an entertaining a proposal of this nature seems to be attended with very many ill consequences if the French do not act a sincere part; but we were soon at ease as to any apprehension of this sort, being fully assured that your Majesty would not act but with the utmost niceness in an affair wherein your glory and the safety of Europe are so highly concerned.

The second thing considered was the very ill prospect of what was like to happen upon the death of the King of Spain, in case nothing was done privately towards the providing against that accident, which seemed probably to be very near; the King of France having so great a force in such readiness that he was in a condition of taking possession of Spain before any other Prince could make a stand.

Your Majesty is the best judge whether this be the case, who are so perfectly informed of the circumstances of all places and parts abroad. But so far as relates to England it would be want of duty in me not to give your Majesty this clear account, that there is a deadness and want of spirit in the nation universally, so as not to be disposed to the thoughts of entering into a new war; and that they seem to be tired out with taxes beyond what was discerned till it appeared by the late elections. This is the truth of the fact upon which your Majesty will determine what resolutions are proper to be taken.

That which remains was the consideration what would be the condition of Europe if these proposals took place.

Of this we thought ourselves little capable of judging; but it seemed that, if Sicily was in French hands, they would be entire masters of Levant Trades; that if they were possessed of Final, and those other sea – ports on that side, whereby Milan would be entirely shut out from relief by sea, or any commerce, that Dutchy would be but of little signification in the hands of any Prince; and if the King of France had possession of that part of Guipuscoa which is mentioned in the proposals, besides the ports he would have in the Ocean, it do's seem he would have an easy way of invading Spain on that side as now he has on the side of Catalonia. But 'its not to be hoped that France will quit its pretensions to so great a succession without considerable advantage; and we are all assured your Majesty will reduce the termes as low as can be done, and make them as far as possible in the present circumstances of things such as may be some foundation to the future quiet of this kingdom, which all your subjects cannot but be convinced is your true aime.

If it could be brought to pass that England might be some gainer by this transaction, whether 'twas by the Elector of Bavaria, who is the gainer by your Majesty's interposition in this treaty, his coming to an agreement let us into some trade into the Spanish Plantations, or in any other manner, it would wonderfully endear your Majesty to your English subjects.

It do's not appear, in case this negotiation should succeed, what is to be done on your part in order to make it take place, whether any more be required than the English and Dutch sit still and France itself is to see it executed; and, if that be, what security ought to be expected that, if by our being neuter the French be successful, they will confine themselves to the terms of the treaty, and not attempt further advantage on their success.

I humble beg your Majesty's pardon that these thoughts are so ill put together; these waters are known to discompose and disturb the head so as almost totally to disenable one from writing. I should be extremly troubled if my absence from London has delayed the dispatch of the

Commission one day. I have put the seal to it without expecting the return of your warrant, which Mr. Secretary sent, begging of your Majesty it may soon be transmitted to myself or Mr. Secretary, so as it may not be known but that I had it in time. You will be pleased to observe that two persons as the commission is drawn must be named in it, but the powers may be exercised by either of them.

I suppose your Majesty will not think it proper to name Commissioners who are not English, or naturalised, in an affaire, of this nature.

I pray God give your Majesty honor and success in all your undertakings.

I am, with the utmost duty and respect,

Sir,

Your Majesties most dutiful and obedient Servant,

SOMERS.

Tunbridge, 26 Aug. 1698.

The Commission was writ by Mr. Secretary, and I have had it sealed in such a manner that no creature has the least knowledge of the thing but the persons already named.

ⁱⁱⁱ (The Board of Trade and Plantations, which had ceased to exist in 1675, was revived in 1696, not by Act of Parliament, but by Commission from the King. A Bill to constitute such a Board was read a first and second time in the House of Commons, 12 and 18 Feb. 1695/6 and then laid aside as being an interference with the royal prerogative).

^{iv} This refers to a Memoire I had given M. de Torcy, Feb. 12, 1703, in which I gave him an account of that Lord's offers; soon after this I shew'd him an original letter from my Lord Somers; on which M. de Torcy wrote the following letter to him, all in his own hand.

"Vous pourrez, Monsieur, assurer vos amis, et on leur tiendra parole, que toutes les propositions qu'ils voudront me faire par votre moyen pour le service du Roy d'Angleterre seront tenues secretes, qu'elles ne seront communiquées à personne sans leur consentement, et que jamais on ne dira leurs noms; que de plus, on aura soin des interêts de ceux qui offrent leurs services.


Ce. 25 Avril, 1703. "

This letter was writ in the terms Lord Somers had desired; it was writ in my presence at Versailles. M. de Torcy gave it me on the spot, and I sent it into England enclosed in one from me, May 10, 1703.



*William III by y^e Grace of God King of
England, Scotland, France, and Ireland,
Defender of the Faith. &c.*

William III from Edward Chamberlaine's *Angliae notitia: or the present state of England, with diverse remarks on the ancient state thereof* (London, 1700).



The West Indies as depicted in *A book of the continuation of the foreign passages* (London, 1654)




James II as duke of York in 1683 (*Historical memoirs of the life and actions of his royal highness, the renowned and most illustrious prince, James, duke of York and Albany*, London, 1683)



JACOBUS II. ds
D. G. Angliæ: Scotiæ: Fran: et Hiber: REX . . .
Printed for W. Crook at the green Dragon about Temple

James II in 1690 (Samuel Clarke, *The historian's guide or Britain's rememberencer*, London, 1690).



The intended landing site at Leith of the French fleet in 1708 and its proximity to Edinburgh. (From J. Kelly, 'The Worcester affair', in *The Review of English Studies*, New series, li, no. 201 (Feb., 2000), p. 4).

THE
DECLARATION

OF

J A M E S

DUKE of MONMOUTH,

&

The Noblemen, Gentlemen & others, now in Arms, for Defence & vindication of the Protestant Religion, & the Laws, Rights, & Privileges of England, from the Invasion made upon them: & for Delivering the Kingdom from the Usurpation & Tyranny of


J A M E S
DUKE of YORK.

Our Government was originally instituted by God, & his or their forme of it chosen and submitted to by us, for the peace happiness & security of the Government, & not for the private Interest, & personall greames of those that Rule: for that Government hath been alwayes esteemed the best where the Supreme Magistrates have been vested with all the power & prerogatives that might Capacitate them, not only to preserve the people from violence & oppression, but to promote their prosperity; & yet where nothing was to belong to them by the Rules of the Constitution, that might enable them to invade and oppress them. And it hath been the Glory of England above most other Nations, that the Prince had all intrusted with him that was necessary either for advancing the welfare of the people, or for his own protection in the discharge of his Office, & with all good so limited & restrained by the fundamental Terms of the Constitution, that without a violation of his own Oath, as well as the Rules, & measures of the Government, he could do them no hurt, or exercise any act of

Title page of Monmouth's declaration of June 1685 (From Early English Books Online).




Jean Baptiste Colbert (1665-1746), marquis de Torcy (From Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Saint-Simon and the court of Louis XIV* (Chicago, 2001).



Frederick Augustus (1670-1733) 'the Strong', elector of Saxony and king of Poland (From Tony Sharp, *Pleasure and ambition: the life, loves and wars of Augustus the Strong* (London, 2001).




Queen Anne (1665-1714) of England, Scotland and Ireland. (From the *Atlas Royal* produced for Augustus II in Amsterdam, 1706-1710. Vol. 1, Hand-coloured engraving (108).



Versailles 1722 (From Christine Previt, *The man who would be king: the life of Philippe d'Orleans, regent of France 1674-1723* (London, 1997).




Louis XIV inaugurating the Royal and Military Order of Saint Louis in 1693. Hooke's status as a commander of the Order was marked by a red sash. (From Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Saint-Simon and the court of Louis XIV* (Chicago, 2001).




The Council room at Versailles where the *Conseil d'en haut* was frequently convened. (Author's photograph).



The Cross of the Order of Saint Louis. (Author's photograph).



Travel in the eighteenth century (From Euan Cameron (ed.), *Early modern Europe* (Oxford, 2001).




The Zwinger palace, Dresden (From Tony Sharp, *Pleasure and ambition: the life, loves and wars of Augustus the Strong* (London, 2001).



A contemporary depiction of warfare in the eighteenth century from Leonard Krieger, *Kings and philosophers 1689-1789* (London, 1971), p. 37. Hooke was involved in the battles of Eckeren, Ramilles, Oudenarde and Malplaquet, and the siege of Menin during the War of Spanish Succession.



Rue Saint Jacques du haut pas, Paris, along which the Hooke family's apartments were located. (Author's photograph).



Map of the Scottish Darien colony, c. 1699 (From Early English Books Online).



Map of South America and the Caribbean, c. 1680s. (From Basil Ringrose, *Bucaniers of America the second volume : containing the dangerous voyage and bold attempts of Captain Bartholomew Sharp, and others, performed upon the coasts of the South Sea, for the space of two years, &c. : from the original journal of the said voyage* (London, 1685).

Nathaniel Hooke's birthplace, Corballis House, Dublin Airport. (Photograph courtesy of Ms. Eleanor Shaw).

James III's 1708 *Declaration to his good people of his ancient kingdom of Scotland*. Hooke advised on the content and tone. (From A.A.E., CP Ang. supp 4, f. 12r).

The General Pardon of 1686 from which Nathaniel Hook (*sic*) was excluded.
(From Early English Books Online).

Hooke's safe conduct pass, granted by the duke of Marlborough, for travel to Aix la Chapelle in August 1703. Note the exclusion zone of two leagues (*c.* six miles) from the Allies' armies and fortifications. (From A.A.E., CP Ang. supp 3, f. 189).



*Behold the Christians Scourge, by fortune hurld,
Like Damnd Pandoras Boxe, the plague of word,
No Leagues nor oaths, bind this Leviathan;
With fire and Sword, he madly rushes on.*

THE MOST
Christian Turk:
Or, a VIEW of the
LIFE and Bloody REIGN
OF
LEWIS XIV.
Present King of FRANCE.

CONTAINING

An Account of his Monstrous Birth, the Transactions that happened during his Minority under Cardinal *Mazarine*; afterwards his own unjust Enterprizes in War and Peace, as Breach of Leagues, Oaths, &c. the blasphemous Titles given him, his Love-Intrigues, his Confederacy with the *Turk* to Invade *Christendom*, the cruel Persecution of his Protestant Subjects, his Conniving with Pirates, his unjustly Invading the *Empire*, &c. laying all Waste before him with Fire and Sword, his Quarrels with the Pope and *Genoiese*, his Treachery against *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, the Engagements of the Confederate Princes against him; with all the Battles, Sieges, and Sea Fights, that have happened of Consequence to this Time.

LONDON, Printed for Henry Rhodes, near Bridegan End, in Fleetstreet, 1690.

A contemporary English view of Louis XIV riding roughshod over the world. (From *The most Christian Turk: or, a view of the life and bloody reign of Lewis XIV. Present king of France* [...] (London, 1690).

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